Impact evaluation of Oportunidades and 
Financial Inclusion 
Carlos Chiapa, Silvia Prina 
Comments by Martín Valdivia
• Under-saving may have several explanations 
– Geographic distance of financial institutions 
– Inadequacy of savings pro...
Commitment devices 
• The flexibility-rigidity dilemma 
– Too flexible to help sustain commitments (self-control, bargaini...
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Martín valdivia impact evaluation of oportunidades and financial inclusion

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This presentation is part of the programme of the International Seminar "Social Protection, Entrepreneurship and Labour Market Activation: Evidence for Better Policies", organized by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG/UNDP) together with Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Colombian Think Tank Fedesarrollo held on September 10-11 at the Ipea Auditorium in Brasilia.



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Martín valdivia impact evaluation of oportunidades and financial inclusion

  1. 1. Impact evaluation of Oportunidades and Financial Inclusion Carlos Chiapa, Silvia Prina Comments by Martín Valdivia
  2. 2. • Under-saving may have several explanations – Geographic distance of financial institutions – Inadequacy of savings products – Financial illiteracy – Commitment issues (hyperbolic preferences, mental accounting) • Usual commitment devices include: – Labeling – timely reminders – monetary and non-monetary incentives for periodic deposits, penalties for early retirements – Choosing default mechanisms to save: reduce number and timing of decisions
  3. 3. Commitment devices • The flexibility-rigidity dilemma – Too flexible to help sustain commitments (self-control, bargaining power) vs – Too rigid that reduces take up – It occurs with penalties for early retirements if it affects their capacity to deal with shocks • Products considered in the study are perfectly liquid (no incentives/penalties) • No specific time or monetary goal attached to the goal (treatment w/ default does have a 10% automatic deposit to emergency account) • Labeling: emergencies – Health emergencies is indeed a good motivation – Some studies are allowing some endogeneity of the labeling (educational goals, housing improvements) • Obviously, we cannot test everything with one study – Question is: is this labeling and management of incentives the right mix as context?

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