SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 31
Copyright © 2015, Cigital
Video Game Security
AppSec California 2016
Carter Jones
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusion
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
How Carter got his start in video game security
• Video games are fun, but really hard to win.
• You can practice, practice, practice
• Or…you can cheat
• Sometimes I’m too impatient (or lazy) to practice,
so I learned how to hack.
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Hacking side scrollers
• Played an MMORPG
• Saw a player’s character flying
around the screen—which isn’t
normally possible
• Googled how to fly in the game
• Followed tutorials
• Elements of reverse engineering
• Flew around the screen
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Hacking games  Security industry
• Skillset crossover between game hacking and
security consulting/research
• Activities:
• Threat modeling
• Reverse engineering
• Network protocol analysis
• Among others
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Assessment activities
• Threat modeling
• Identify the components of a system, various threat actors that can
attack those components, and the possible ways that the components
can be attacked
• Identify key technical risks and existing controls (protections)
• Reverse engineering
• Take apart the client (and server if available) to find weaknesses
• Network protocol analysis
• Reverse engineer the protocols used by the client and server
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusions
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Business risks
• Various risks exist for a business in the gaming industry
• Examples of cyclical risks:
• Profit loss  tarnished brand
• Lots of hacks  customer disloyalty
• Tarnishing the brand  customer disloyalty
• Loss of customer data  customer disloyalty
• Intellectual property theft  loss of revenue
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Business risks
• Risk prioritization can differ between business models
• Freemium: gaining paid-only
in-game benefits for free
• Subscription-based: playing
the game for free
• One-time payment: DRM
bypass/piracy
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusion
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Technical risks
• Account and asset hijacking/theft (account credential
theft, in game item theft, etc.)
• Cheating, automation, botting, etc.
• Denial of service
• Fraud in a virtual economy
• Piracy of game titles and game content
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Risks vary by game genre
• Different game genres may have different risks
• Examples:
• FPS
• Statpadding user stories (attacker goal: bragging rights)
• Aimbots/cheating (attacker goal: competitive advantage)
• MMORPG
• Account theft (attacker goal: financial gain)
• Private servers (attacker goal: avoid paying subscriptions)
• RTS
• Map hacking (attacker goal: competitive advantage)
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Risks vary by gaming platform
• Game consoles
• Mobile devices
• PCs (Windows, Linux, Mac)
• Web browsers
• Cloud hosted PCs
• Examples:
• Game consoles tend to focus on client-side validation
• Web-based games tend to focus on server-side validation
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Example video game assets
• Game content and patches
• Player account information
• Payment/billing information
• In-game assets (inventory, points, virtual currency, etc)
• Fraud and cheat detection data
• Customer service representatives (or their accounts)
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Example video game controls
• Encrypted protocols
• VPN tunnels
• Anti-tamper security on the game client
• Security event monitoring
• Cheat/fraud analysis
• IP address white-listing
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusion
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Defense: protect assets using layered approach
• Relying on a single control for protecting assets isn’t enough
• Example asset: premium items that must be purchased
• Example layering of controls:
• Anti-tamper/anti-reversing of client – makes it difficult for players to
trick their client into thinking they’ve paid for a premium item
• Network encryption – makes it difficult to send spoofed messages
over the wire to the server
• Server-side checks – when a game client says to use a premium
item and gain whatever perks are normally given, make sure the
player actually has purchased that item
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Offense: general hacking process
• Think of a goal
• Get unlimited health
• Gain access to restricted parts of the game
• See hidden parts of a map
• Access powers that are above current level
• Plan the attack: think of a way to reach that goal
(example: unlimited ammo)
• Find out how to modify the game client (at runtime or on disk)
• Find out how to send spoofed network packets to the game server
• Look for server logic flaws
• Execute the attack
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Example: unlimited ammo in Pwnie Island
• Find out how to modify the game client
• Game trainers! (no anti-tampering mechanism exists)
• Find out how to send spoofed network packets to the
game server
• Possible when proxying network traffic or by changing the behavior
of the game client itself
• Look for server logic flaws
• Server-side checks look for discrepancies in ammo count
between the client and the server
• Server itself can be controlled by the attacker
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Example: unlimited ammo in Pwnie Island
1. Identify address of ammo
2. Identify instruction that writes
to that address
3. Change it to a NOP sled
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Demo
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Example: sheilds/invisibility
1. Identify key addresses
2. Identify patterns in memory, which can reveal
structures
3. Identify other key values within the structure
4. Identify reliable pointers to an instance of the
structure
5. Repeatedly change values at offsets in the
structure
Example: every 50 milliseconds, enable invisibility and
large shields
This is useful for when instructions that would be
NOP’d would give advantage to enemy players or
NPCs.
Offset Value
0x100 XAxisPosition
0x104 YAxisPosition
0x108 ZAxisPosition
0x200 XAxisVelocity
0x204 YAxisVelocity
0x300 DirectionFacing
0x400 Health
0x404 Shields
0x408 Invisibility
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Client-side protections
• Obfuscation
• Makes static analysis more difficult
• Can be applied to all of the code or just to portions
• Generally is just some encryption applied to most of the binary
• Anti-debugging
• Checks to see if a debugger is enabled
• Either stops execution or behaves differently (common with malware)
• Runtime integrity checks
• Checks to see if portions of the code have been changed after the program
was launched
• Useful for identifying non-debugging-based runtime hacks
(WriteProcessMemory, VirtualAlloc, etc.)
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusion
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Network-based hacks
• Useful when client-side protections prevent easily
tampering with client
• Do everything from a network level (no interaction with the
game client’s process)
• Usually done by proxying client → server traffic, but can
also be done by completely replicating the client’s behavior
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Example network hacks
• Map viewers
• View all mob locations on the map, rather than what is normally available
through the game client mini-map
• Reveal locations of hidden items that are hidden from the game client’s view
• Speed/teleport hacks
• Intercept XYZ coordinates and velocity in network packets and modify them
slightly to give a speed advantage or to teleport the player
• Server-side exploits
• Identify and exploit flaws (logic vulnerabilities) or bugs (implementation
vulnerabilities) in the server to execute arbitrary code
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Server-side protections
• Only send data to the client on a need to know basis
• Consider all data from the client is potentially malicious
• Compare data received from the client to an acceptable
range of expected data
• Performance improvement: perform sampling of data
received from the clients
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusion
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Industry comparisons
• These types of hacks are not specific to the video gaming
industry
• Examples:
• Financial institutions
• bank websites
• stock trading
• ATM transactions
• Media and entertainment
• Video streaming restriction bypass
• Copyright protection for physical media
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Overview
• Industry overview
• Risks
• Business
• Technical
• Attack and defense
• Thick client
• Network
• Industry comparisons
• Conclusion
Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital
Conclusion
• Video game security: not just about preventing cheating
• Business and technical risks:
• Differs by type of game (genre, platform, etc.)
• Some risks are unique to gaming industry
• Some risks are shared with other industries
• Layered defenses are very important
• Both attack and defense processes apply to more than just
the video game industry

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Sistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - Introdução
Sistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - IntroduçãoSistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - Introdução
Sistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - IntroduçãoAdriano Teixeira de Souza
 
Active directory architecture
Active directory architectureActive directory architecture
Active directory architecturerahuldaredia21
 
Arquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadores
Arquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadoresArquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadores
Arquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadoresCleber Fonseca
 
Lei de Incentivo ao Esporte
Lei de Incentivo ao EsporteLei de Incentivo ao Esporte
Lei de Incentivo ao EsporteMichel Freller
 
Infraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresas
Infraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresasInfraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresas
Infraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresasJordana Benfica
 
Banco de Dados - Tipos de Dados
Banco de Dados - Tipos de DadosBanco de Dados - Tipos de Dados
Banco de Dados - Tipos de DadosNatanael Simões
 
Endereçamento IP
Endereçamento IPEndereçamento IP
Endereçamento IPPjpilin
 
Infraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de Dados
Infraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de DadosInfraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de Dados
Infraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de Dadostiredes
 
Protocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson Treinamentos
Protocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson TreinamentosProtocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson Treinamentos
Protocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson TreinamentosFábio dos Reis
 
Windows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networks
Windows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networksWindows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networks
Windows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networksOchiroo Dorj
 
PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"
PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"
PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"Marcioveras
 
Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015
Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015
Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015C H
 
Arquitetura de Computadores - RAID
Arquitetura de Computadores - RAIDArquitetura de Computadores - RAID
Arquitetura de Computadores - RAIDelliando dias
 
Introdução ao desenvolvimento Web
Introdução ao desenvolvimento WebIntrodução ao desenvolvimento Web
Introdução ao desenvolvimento WebSérgio Souza Costa
 

Mais procurados (20)

Sistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - Introdução
Sistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - IntroduçãoSistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - Introdução
Sistemas Distribuídos - Computação Paralela - Introdução
 
Active directory architecture
Active directory architectureActive directory architecture
Active directory architecture
 
Modelo documentacao-rede
Modelo documentacao-redeModelo documentacao-rede
Modelo documentacao-rede
 
Arquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadores
Arquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadoresArquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadores
Arquiteturas Paralelas e Distribuídas - Aula 2 - Arquiteturas de computadores
 
Topologia de Redes
Topologia de RedesTopologia de Redes
Topologia de Redes
 
Lei de Incentivo ao Esporte
Lei de Incentivo ao EsporteLei de Incentivo ao Esporte
Lei de Incentivo ao Esporte
 
Infraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresas
Infraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresasInfraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresas
Infraestrutura de ti para pequenas e médias empresas
 
Banco de Dados - Tipos de Dados
Banco de Dados - Tipos de DadosBanco de Dados - Tipos de Dados
Banco de Dados - Tipos de Dados
 
Endereçamento IP
Endereçamento IPEndereçamento IP
Endereçamento IP
 
Infraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de Dados
Infraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de DadosInfraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de Dados
Infraestrutura e Componentes de Redes de Dados
 
Questões Cisco CCNA Cap 6
Questões Cisco CCNA Cap 6Questões Cisco CCNA Cap 6
Questões Cisco CCNA Cap 6
 
Protocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson Treinamentos
Protocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson TreinamentosProtocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson Treinamentos
Protocolo DHCP - Noções básicas - Bóson Treinamentos
 
Windows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networks
Windows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networksWindows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networks
Windows server 2008 step by-step guide for dns in small networks
 
PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"
PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"
PROJETO DE REDES EMPRESA FICTÍCIA "SKYNET"
 
projecto de rede computadores
projecto de rede computadoresprojecto de rede computadores
projecto de rede computadores
 
Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015
Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015
Técnicas de Invasão - INFOESTE 2015
 
Arquitetura de Computadores - RAID
Arquitetura de Computadores - RAIDArquitetura de Computadores - RAID
Arquitetura de Computadores - RAID
 
Introdução ao desenvolvimento Web
Introdução ao desenvolvimento WebIntrodução ao desenvolvimento Web
Introdução ao desenvolvimento Web
 
EvilDuino
EvilDuinoEvilDuino
EvilDuino
 
DHCP
DHCPDHCP
DHCP
 

Destaque

Secure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat ModelingSecure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat ModelingCigital
 
Can You Really Automate Yourself Secure
Can You Really Automate Yourself SecureCan You Really Automate Yourself Secure
Can You Really Automate Yourself SecureCigital
 
How to Choose the Right Security Training for You
How to Choose the Right Security Training for YouHow to Choose the Right Security Training for You
How to Choose the Right Security Training for YouCigital
 
6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions
6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions
6 Most Common Threat Modeling MisconceptionsCigital
 
7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM
7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM
7 Lessons Learned From BSIMMCigital
 
STRIDE And DREAD
STRIDE And DREADSTRIDE And DREAD
STRIDE And DREADchuckbt
 
Application Security Architecture and Threat Modelling
Application Security Architecture and Threat ModellingApplication Security Architecture and Threat Modelling
Application Security Architecture and Threat ModellingPriyanka Aash
 
Application Threat Modeling
Application Threat ModelingApplication Threat Modeling
Application Threat ModelingPriyanka Aash
 
Real World Application Threat Modelling By Example
Real World Application Threat Modelling By ExampleReal World Application Threat Modelling By Example
Real World Application Threat Modelling By ExampleNCC Group
 
16 garrone neto, domingos and uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...
16  garrone neto, domingos  and  uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...16  garrone neto, domingos  and  uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...
16 garrone neto, domingos and uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...pryloock
 
Goldwind - Wind Solar Colocation
Goldwind - Wind  Solar ColocationGoldwind - Wind  Solar Colocation
Goldwind - Wind Solar Colocationgoldwindaus
 
Media evaluation activity 3
Media evaluation activity 3Media evaluation activity 3
Media evaluation activity 3lambykins
 
ở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcm
ở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcmở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcm
ở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcmsharda531
 
Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'
Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'
Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'BASPCAN
 
Ebook heart of great leader entire
Ebook heart of great leader entireEbook heart of great leader entire
Ebook heart of great leader entirequang nguyen
 
How to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for Teachers
How to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for TeachersHow to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for Teachers
How to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for TeachersJennifer Birnel
 
Estadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, Posgrado
Estadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, PosgradoEstadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, Posgrado
Estadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, PosgradoÁlvaro Miguel Carranza Montalvo
 

Destaque (20)

Secure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat ModelingSecure Design: Threat Modeling
Secure Design: Threat Modeling
 
Can You Really Automate Yourself Secure
Can You Really Automate Yourself SecureCan You Really Automate Yourself Secure
Can You Really Automate Yourself Secure
 
How to Choose the Right Security Training for You
How to Choose the Right Security Training for YouHow to Choose the Right Security Training for You
How to Choose the Right Security Training for You
 
6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions
6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions
6 Most Common Threat Modeling Misconceptions
 
7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM
7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM
7 Lessons Learned From BSIMM
 
Threat Modelling
Threat ModellingThreat Modelling
Threat Modelling
 
STRIDE And DREAD
STRIDE And DREADSTRIDE And DREAD
STRIDE And DREAD
 
Application Security Architecture and Threat Modelling
Application Security Architecture and Threat ModellingApplication Security Architecture and Threat Modelling
Application Security Architecture and Threat Modelling
 
Application Threat Modeling
Application Threat ModelingApplication Threat Modeling
Application Threat Modeling
 
Real World Application Threat Modelling By Example
Real World Application Threat Modelling By ExampleReal World Application Threat Modelling By Example
Real World Application Threat Modelling By Example
 
16 garrone neto, domingos and uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...
16  garrone neto, domingos  and  uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...16  garrone neto, domingos  and  uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...
16 garrone neto, domingos and uieda, virgínia sanches. activity and habita...
 
Goldwind - Wind Solar Colocation
Goldwind - Wind  Solar ColocationGoldwind - Wind  Solar Colocation
Goldwind - Wind Solar Colocation
 
Media evaluation activity 3
Media evaluation activity 3Media evaluation activity 3
Media evaluation activity 3
 
Epistemología, Bolivia, Belleza, Carnaval, White Skin
Epistemología, Bolivia, Belleza, Carnaval, White SkinEpistemología, Bolivia, Belleza, Carnaval, White Skin
Epistemología, Bolivia, Belleza, Carnaval, White Skin
 
ở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcm
ở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcmở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcm
ở đâu dịch vụ giúp việc văn phòng uy tín hcm
 
Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'
Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'
Piloting the Child Sexual Abuse 'hubs'
 
Ebook heart of great leader entire
Ebook heart of great leader entireEbook heart of great leader entire
Ebook heart of great leader entire
 
Gaurav Resume
Gaurav ResumeGaurav Resume
Gaurav Resume
 
How to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for Teachers
How to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for TeachersHow to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for Teachers
How to Use the Montana Memory Projfect for Teachers
 
Estadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, Posgrado
Estadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, PosgradoEstadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, Posgrado
Estadística, Chat, Bolivia, Medicina, Estética, Salud, CEPI, Estudios, Posgrado
 

Semelhante a Video Game Security

Chapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K I
Chapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K IChapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K I
Chapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K IDr. Ahmed Al Zaidy
 
Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)
Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)
Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)Korea University
 
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass HousesCyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass HousesCigital
 
How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ
How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ
How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ HiveMQ
 
gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials domain 4
gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials   domain 4gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials   domain 4
gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials domain 4Anne Starr
 
Revolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ Swarm
Revolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ SwarmRevolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ Swarm
Revolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ SwarmHiveMQ
 
Cybertopic_2security
Cybertopic_2securityCybertopic_2security
Cybertopic_2securityAnne Starr
 
Castle Presentation 08-12-04
Castle Presentation 08-12-04Castle Presentation 08-12-04
Castle Presentation 08-12-04Howard Hellman
 
ICS Cyber Security Effectiveness Measurement
ICS Cyber Security Effectiveness MeasurementICS Cyber Security Effectiveness Measurement
ICS Cyber Security Effectiveness MeasurementAleksey Lukatskiy
 
The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...
The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...
The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...ForgeRock
 
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass HousesCyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass HousesPaige Rasid
 
APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...
APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...
APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...apidays
 
Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...
Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...
Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...Amazon Web Services
 
Cisco Connect Toronto 2018 DNA assurance
Cisco Connect Toronto 2018  DNA assuranceCisco Connect Toronto 2018  DNA assurance
Cisco Connect Toronto 2018 DNA assuranceCisco Canada
 
2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security
2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security
2016, A new era of OS and Cloud SecurityTudor Damian
 
Advanced Security on Kubernetes with Istio
Advanced Security on Kubernetes with IstioAdvanced Security on Kubernetes with Istio
Advanced Security on Kubernetes with IstioShunsuke Miyoshi
 
2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian
2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian
2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor DamianITCamp
 
Which One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development Environment
Which One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development EnvironmentWhich One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development Environment
Which One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development EnvironmentBitbar
 
BSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity Model
BSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity ModelBSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity Model
BSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity ModelCigital
 

Semelhante a Video Game Security (20)

Chapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K I
Chapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K IChapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K I
Chapter 4 Advanced Cryptography and P K I
 
Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)
Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)
Session2 2 김휘강 codegate2(hkkim)
 
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass HousesCyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones, and Glass Houses
 
How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ
How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ
How to Monitor and Observe IoT and MQTT Applications with HiveMQ
 
gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials domain 4
gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials   domain 4gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials   domain 4
gkkwqdqqndqw2121234Security essentials domain 4
 
Revolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ Swarm
Revolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ SwarmRevolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ Swarm
Revolutionizing IoT Testing - A Sneak Peek of HiveMQ Swarm
 
Cybertopic_2security
Cybertopic_2securityCybertopic_2security
Cybertopic_2security
 
Castle Presentation 08-12-04
Castle Presentation 08-12-04Castle Presentation 08-12-04
Castle Presentation 08-12-04
 
ICS Cyber Security Effectiveness Measurement
ICS Cyber Security Effectiveness MeasurementICS Cyber Security Effectiveness Measurement
ICS Cyber Security Effectiveness Measurement
 
The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...
The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...
The Value of User and Data Centricity Beyond IoT Devices: Stein Myrseth and G...
 
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass HousesCyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass Houses
Cyber War, Cyber Peace, Stones and Glass Houses
 
APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...
APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...
APIsecure 2023 - For flex(ibility) sake, modernize your legacy APIs!, Topher ...
 
Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...
Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...
Understanding and Hardening the Attack Surface at the Edge (GPSTEC402) - AWS ...
 
Wi-Fi Security Fundamentals
Wi-Fi Security FundamentalsWi-Fi Security Fundamentals
Wi-Fi Security Fundamentals
 
Cisco Connect Toronto 2018 DNA assurance
Cisco Connect Toronto 2018  DNA assuranceCisco Connect Toronto 2018  DNA assurance
Cisco Connect Toronto 2018 DNA assurance
 
2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security
2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security
2016, A new era of OS and Cloud Security
 
Advanced Security on Kubernetes with Istio
Advanced Security on Kubernetes with IstioAdvanced Security on Kubernetes with Istio
Advanced Security on Kubernetes with Istio
 
2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian
2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian
2016, A New Era of OS and Cloud Security - Tudor Damian
 
Which One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development Environment
Which One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development EnvironmentWhich One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development Environment
Which One Works You The Best: In-House or Cloud-Based Development Environment
 
BSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity Model
BSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity ModelBSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity Model
BSIMM-V: The Building Security In Maturity Model
 

Mais de Cigital

Getting Executive Support for a Software Security Program
Getting Executive Support for a Software Security ProgramGetting Executive Support for a Software Security Program
Getting Executive Support for a Software Security ProgramCigital
 
Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!
Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!
Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!Cigital
 
Get Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM Assessment
Get Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM AssessmentGet Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM Assessment
Get Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM AssessmentCigital
 
Software Security Metrics
Software Security MetricsSoftware Security Metrics
Software Security MetricsCigital
 
Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin?
Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin? Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin?
Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin? Cigital
 
Static Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind Spot
Static Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind SpotStatic Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind Spot
Static Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind SpotCigital
 
The Complete Web Application Security Testing Checklist
The Complete Web Application Security Testing ChecklistThe Complete Web Application Security Testing Checklist
The Complete Web Application Security Testing ChecklistCigital
 
SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?
SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?
SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?Cigital
 
The Path to Proactive Application Security
The Path to Proactive Application SecurityThe Path to Proactive Application Security
The Path to Proactive Application SecurityCigital
 
BSIMM By The Numbers
BSIMM By The NumbersBSIMM By The Numbers
BSIMM By The NumbersCigital
 
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software Security
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software SecurityBSIMM: Bringing Science to Software Security
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software SecurityCigital
 
5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams
5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams 5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams
5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams Cigital
 
How to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security Flaws
How to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security FlawsHow to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security Flaws
How to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security FlawsCigital
 

Mais de Cigital (13)

Getting Executive Support for a Software Security Program
Getting Executive Support for a Software Security ProgramGetting Executive Support for a Software Security Program
Getting Executive Support for a Software Security Program
 
Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!
Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!
Handle With Care: You Have My VA Report!
 
Get Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM Assessment
Get Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM AssessmentGet Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM Assessment
Get Your Board to Say "Yes" to a BSIMM Assessment
 
Software Security Metrics
Software Security MetricsSoftware Security Metrics
Software Security Metrics
 
Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin?
Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin? Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin?
Software Security Initiative Capabilities: Where Do I Begin?
 
Static Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind Spot
Static Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind SpotStatic Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind Spot
Static Analysis Tools and Frameworks: Overcoming a Dangerous Blind Spot
 
The Complete Web Application Security Testing Checklist
The Complete Web Application Security Testing ChecklistThe Complete Web Application Security Testing Checklist
The Complete Web Application Security Testing Checklist
 
SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?
SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?
SAST vs. DAST: What’s the Best Method For Application Security Testing?
 
The Path to Proactive Application Security
The Path to Proactive Application SecurityThe Path to Proactive Application Security
The Path to Proactive Application Security
 
BSIMM By The Numbers
BSIMM By The NumbersBSIMM By The Numbers
BSIMM By The Numbers
 
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software Security
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software SecurityBSIMM: Bringing Science to Software Security
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software Security
 
5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams
5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams 5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams
5 Models for Enterprise Software Security Management Teams
 
How to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security Flaws
How to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security FlawsHow to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security Flaws
How to Avoid the Top Ten Software Security Flaws
 

Último

MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...Jittipong Loespradit
 
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the pastArchitecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the pastPapp Krisztián
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...masabamasaba
 
Harnessing ChatGPT - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile Environment
Harnessing ChatGPT  - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile EnvironmentHarnessing ChatGPT  - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile Environment
Harnessing ChatGPT - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile EnvironmentVictorSzoltysek
 
WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...
WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...
WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...WSO2
 
Direct Style Effect Systems - The Print[A] Example - A Comprehension Aid
Direct Style Effect Systems -The Print[A] Example- A Comprehension AidDirect Style Effect Systems -The Print[A] Example- A Comprehension Aid
Direct Style Effect Systems - The Print[A] Example - A Comprehension AidPhilip Schwarz
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...
%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...
%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...masabamasaba
 
WSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With Simplicity
WSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With SimplicityWSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With Simplicity
WSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With SimplicityWSO2
 
%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...
%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...
%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...masabamasaba
 
Software Quality Assurance Interview Questions
Software Quality Assurance Interview QuestionsSoftware Quality Assurance Interview Questions
Software Quality Assurance Interview QuestionsArshad QA
 
%in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park
%in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park %in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park
%in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park masabamasaba
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...masabamasaba
 
WSO2CON2024 - It's time to go Platformless
WSO2CON2024 - It's time to go PlatformlessWSO2CON2024 - It's time to go Platformless
WSO2CON2024 - It's time to go PlatformlessWSO2
 
Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024
Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024
Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024VictoriaMetrics
 
%in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park
%in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park %in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park
%in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park masabamasaba
 
Define the academic and professional writing..pdf
Define the academic and professional writing..pdfDefine the academic and professional writing..pdf
Define the academic and professional writing..pdfPearlKirahMaeRagusta1
 
tonesoftg
tonesoftgtonesoftg
tonesoftglanshi9
 
call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️Delhi Call girls
 

Último (20)

MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
MarTech Trend 2024 Book : Marketing Technology Trends (2024 Edition) How Data...
 
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the pastArchitecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
Architecture decision records - How not to get lost in the past
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Colorado Springs Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
 
Harnessing ChatGPT - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile Environment
Harnessing ChatGPT  - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile EnvironmentHarnessing ChatGPT  - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile Environment
Harnessing ChatGPT - Elevating Productivity in Today's Agile Environment
 
WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...
WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...
WSO2CON 2024 - Cloud Native Middleware: Domain-Driven Design, Cell-Based Arch...
 
Direct Style Effect Systems - The Print[A] Example - A Comprehension Aid
Direct Style Effect Systems -The Print[A] Example- A Comprehension AidDirect Style Effect Systems -The Print[A] Example- A Comprehension Aid
Direct Style Effect Systems - The Print[A] Example - A Comprehension Aid
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...
%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...
%+27788225528 love spells in Knoxville Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Br...
 
WSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With Simplicity
WSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With SimplicityWSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With Simplicity
WSO2Con2024 - Enabling Transactional System's Exponential Growth With Simplicity
 
%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...
%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...
%+27788225528 love spells in new york Psychic Readings, Attraction spells,Bri...
 
Software Quality Assurance Interview Questions
Software Quality Assurance Interview QuestionsSoftware Quality Assurance Interview Questions
Software Quality Assurance Interview Questions
 
%in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park
%in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park %in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park
%in ivory park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in ivory park
 
%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
%+27788225528 love spells in Huntington Beach Psychic Readings, Attraction sp...
 
WSO2CON2024 - It's time to go Platformless
WSO2CON2024 - It's time to go PlatformlessWSO2CON2024 - It's time to go Platformless
WSO2CON2024 - It's time to go Platformless
 
Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024
Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024
Large-scale Logging Made Easy: Meetup at Deutsche Bank 2024
 
%in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park
%in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park %in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park
%in kempton park+277-882-255-28 abortion pills for sale in kempton park
 
Microsoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdf
Microsoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdfMicrosoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdf
Microsoft AI Transformation Partner Playbook.pdf
 
Define the academic and professional writing..pdf
Define the academic and professional writing..pdfDefine the academic and professional writing..pdf
Define the academic and professional writing..pdf
 
tonesoftg
tonesoftgtonesoftg
tonesoftg
 
call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
call girls in Vaishali (Ghaziabad) 🔝 >༒8448380779 🔝 genuine Escort Service 🔝✔️✔️
 
CHEAP Call Girls in Pushp Vihar (-DELHI )🔝 9953056974🔝(=)/CALL GIRLS SERVICE
CHEAP Call Girls in Pushp Vihar (-DELHI )🔝 9953056974🔝(=)/CALL GIRLS SERVICECHEAP Call Girls in Pushp Vihar (-DELHI )🔝 9953056974🔝(=)/CALL GIRLS SERVICE
CHEAP Call Girls in Pushp Vihar (-DELHI )🔝 9953056974🔝(=)/CALL GIRLS SERVICE
 

Video Game Security

  • 1. Copyright © 2015, Cigital Video Game Security AppSec California 2016 Carter Jones
  • 2. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusion
  • 3. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital How Carter got his start in video game security • Video games are fun, but really hard to win. • You can practice, practice, practice • Or…you can cheat • Sometimes I’m too impatient (or lazy) to practice, so I learned how to hack.
  • 4. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Hacking side scrollers • Played an MMORPG • Saw a player’s character flying around the screen—which isn’t normally possible • Googled how to fly in the game • Followed tutorials • Elements of reverse engineering • Flew around the screen
  • 5. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Hacking games  Security industry • Skillset crossover between game hacking and security consulting/research • Activities: • Threat modeling • Reverse engineering • Network protocol analysis • Among others
  • 6. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Assessment activities • Threat modeling • Identify the components of a system, various threat actors that can attack those components, and the possible ways that the components can be attacked • Identify key technical risks and existing controls (protections) • Reverse engineering • Take apart the client (and server if available) to find weaknesses • Network protocol analysis • Reverse engineer the protocols used by the client and server
  • 7. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusions
  • 8. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Business risks • Various risks exist for a business in the gaming industry • Examples of cyclical risks: • Profit loss  tarnished brand • Lots of hacks  customer disloyalty • Tarnishing the brand  customer disloyalty • Loss of customer data  customer disloyalty • Intellectual property theft  loss of revenue
  • 9. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Business risks • Risk prioritization can differ between business models • Freemium: gaining paid-only in-game benefits for free • Subscription-based: playing the game for free • One-time payment: DRM bypass/piracy
  • 10. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusion
  • 11. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Technical risks • Account and asset hijacking/theft (account credential theft, in game item theft, etc.) • Cheating, automation, botting, etc. • Denial of service • Fraud in a virtual economy • Piracy of game titles and game content
  • 12. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Risks vary by game genre • Different game genres may have different risks • Examples: • FPS • Statpadding user stories (attacker goal: bragging rights) • Aimbots/cheating (attacker goal: competitive advantage) • MMORPG • Account theft (attacker goal: financial gain) • Private servers (attacker goal: avoid paying subscriptions) • RTS • Map hacking (attacker goal: competitive advantage)
  • 13. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Risks vary by gaming platform • Game consoles • Mobile devices • PCs (Windows, Linux, Mac) • Web browsers • Cloud hosted PCs • Examples: • Game consoles tend to focus on client-side validation • Web-based games tend to focus on server-side validation
  • 14. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Example video game assets • Game content and patches • Player account information • Payment/billing information • In-game assets (inventory, points, virtual currency, etc) • Fraud and cheat detection data • Customer service representatives (or their accounts)
  • 15. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Example video game controls • Encrypted protocols • VPN tunnels • Anti-tamper security on the game client • Security event monitoring • Cheat/fraud analysis • IP address white-listing
  • 16. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusion
  • 17. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Defense: protect assets using layered approach • Relying on a single control for protecting assets isn’t enough • Example asset: premium items that must be purchased • Example layering of controls: • Anti-tamper/anti-reversing of client – makes it difficult for players to trick their client into thinking they’ve paid for a premium item • Network encryption – makes it difficult to send spoofed messages over the wire to the server • Server-side checks – when a game client says to use a premium item and gain whatever perks are normally given, make sure the player actually has purchased that item
  • 18. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Offense: general hacking process • Think of a goal • Get unlimited health • Gain access to restricted parts of the game • See hidden parts of a map • Access powers that are above current level • Plan the attack: think of a way to reach that goal (example: unlimited ammo) • Find out how to modify the game client (at runtime or on disk) • Find out how to send spoofed network packets to the game server • Look for server logic flaws • Execute the attack
  • 19. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Example: unlimited ammo in Pwnie Island • Find out how to modify the game client • Game trainers! (no anti-tampering mechanism exists) • Find out how to send spoofed network packets to the game server • Possible when proxying network traffic or by changing the behavior of the game client itself • Look for server logic flaws • Server-side checks look for discrepancies in ammo count between the client and the server • Server itself can be controlled by the attacker
  • 20. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Example: unlimited ammo in Pwnie Island 1. Identify address of ammo 2. Identify instruction that writes to that address 3. Change it to a NOP sled
  • 21. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Demo
  • 22. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Example: sheilds/invisibility 1. Identify key addresses 2. Identify patterns in memory, which can reveal structures 3. Identify other key values within the structure 4. Identify reliable pointers to an instance of the structure 5. Repeatedly change values at offsets in the structure Example: every 50 milliseconds, enable invisibility and large shields This is useful for when instructions that would be NOP’d would give advantage to enemy players or NPCs. Offset Value 0x100 XAxisPosition 0x104 YAxisPosition 0x108 ZAxisPosition 0x200 XAxisVelocity 0x204 YAxisVelocity 0x300 DirectionFacing 0x400 Health 0x404 Shields 0x408 Invisibility
  • 23. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Client-side protections • Obfuscation • Makes static analysis more difficult • Can be applied to all of the code or just to portions • Generally is just some encryption applied to most of the binary • Anti-debugging • Checks to see if a debugger is enabled • Either stops execution or behaves differently (common with malware) • Runtime integrity checks • Checks to see if portions of the code have been changed after the program was launched • Useful for identifying non-debugging-based runtime hacks (WriteProcessMemory, VirtualAlloc, etc.)
  • 24. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusion
  • 25. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Network-based hacks • Useful when client-side protections prevent easily tampering with client • Do everything from a network level (no interaction with the game client’s process) • Usually done by proxying client → server traffic, but can also be done by completely replicating the client’s behavior
  • 26. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Example network hacks • Map viewers • View all mob locations on the map, rather than what is normally available through the game client mini-map • Reveal locations of hidden items that are hidden from the game client’s view • Speed/teleport hacks • Intercept XYZ coordinates and velocity in network packets and modify them slightly to give a speed advantage or to teleport the player • Server-side exploits • Identify and exploit flaws (logic vulnerabilities) or bugs (implementation vulnerabilities) in the server to execute arbitrary code
  • 27. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Server-side protections • Only send data to the client on a need to know basis • Consider all data from the client is potentially malicious • Compare data received from the client to an acceptable range of expected data • Performance improvement: perform sampling of data received from the clients
  • 28. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusion
  • 29. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Industry comparisons • These types of hacks are not specific to the video gaming industry • Examples: • Financial institutions • bank websites • stock trading • ATM transactions • Media and entertainment • Video streaming restriction bypass • Copyright protection for physical media
  • 30. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Overview • Industry overview • Risks • Business • Technical • Attack and defense • Thick client • Network • Industry comparisons • Conclusion
  • 31. Copyright © 2015, CigitalCopyright © 2015, Cigital Conclusion • Video game security: not just about preventing cheating • Business and technical risks: • Differs by type of game (genre, platform, etc.) • Some risks are unique to gaming industry • Some risks are shared with other industries • Layered defenses are very important • Both attack and defense processes apply to more than just the video game industry