1. The Development of Kurdish Nationalism in
Modern Iraq: Is an Independent Kurdistan on the
Horizon?
By: Ravenel Godbold
Introduction
The establishment of an autonomous Kurdistan in northern Iraq in 1991
appeared to be a step in the right direction for the Iraqi Kurds. Within the span of a
century, the Iraqi Kurds have evolved from an Ottoman minority group without
nationalist goals to controlling an autonomous region with significant political
power in the Iraqi state. Since the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi
Kurds have made efforts to remain a part of the Iraqi state as long as their demands
are met, but the question of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan has not been removed
from the table. The following pages will address the feasibility of an independent
Kurdish state beginning with the development of Kurdish nationalist sentiment and
participation in the Iraqi political arena. The sections that follow explore the Iraqi
Kurds and whether the limited autonomy they enjoy is indicative of a future,
successful secession from the Iraqi state or is better used as an effective bargaining
chip.
The Kurds and Kurdistan
Kurdayeti, or Kurd, was first used in the 12th century to describe nomadic
groups residing in the mountainous regions of Iraq and Iran but over time has

2. 2
evolved into a term for identifying the fourth largest ethnic group originating in
present-day Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.1 The Iraqi Kurds comprise 25% of Iraq’s
population, an estimated 4.7 million people, making them the largest minority
percentage of the host states.2 Today there are an estimated 20-30 million Kurds,
with the most sizeable communities in the United States, Germany, Russia, Israel,
Georgia, and Canada.3
The Kurds utilize several myths of origin,4 but are likely a result of Indo-
European tribe migration into the Zagros region.5 Similar to other ethnic groups, the
Kurds are not a homogeneous people and within the Kurdish community there are
linguistic, religious, and tribal differences.6 There are a number of different dialects
within the Kurdish language, influenced by the official languages of the countries in
which they reside; the most widely spoken dialect is Kurmanji and is used by Kurds
in Turkey, Syria, northern Iran, and the portion of Iraq north of the Greater Zab
River, while Sorani/Kurdi is spoken south of the Greater Zab in Iraq and in the
Kordestan province of Iran.7 Religiously the Kurds are less diverse; the majority of
Kurds are Sunni Muslims following the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence although
there are minorities following Sufism, Judaism, Christianity, Yarsanism, Yazidism,
1 Craig Douglas Albert, “A History of Violence: Ethnic Group Identity and the Iraqi
Kurds,” Iran and the Caucasus 17 (2013): 223.
2 2 Kerem Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, (London: Pluto Press,
2012) 7.
3 Jeremy Jimenez and Peter Kabachnik, “The Other Iraq: Exploring Iraqi Kurdistan,”
FOCUS on Geography 55.2 (Summer 2012): 31.
4 The majority of the Kurds, according to Craig Douglas Albert, believe they are
descendants of the Median Empire in 6th century Persia. Albert, 224.
5 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 5.
6 Albert, 223.
7 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 5.

3. 3
and Shi’ism.8 Finally, there are tribal differences between the Kurds. These
differences will be discussed when summarizing the development of Kurdish
political parties.
The majority of Kurds reside in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, a region
referred to as Kurdistan beginning in the 16th century.9 The region was ruled by the
Ottoman and Persian empires until the early 20th century when the Middle East was
divvied up into the present day states. The area receives an adequate amount of
rainfall, creating a suitable environment for agriculture (primarily tobacco, cotton,
grains, fruits, and vegetables) and livestock farming, while10 Iraqi Kurdistan is also
rich in oil, natural gas, minerals (chrome, copper, iron, coal, lignite), and water.11 All
four countries have had conflicts with the Kurdish populations residing within their
borders, but those in Iraq are the only ones who have managed to achieve autonomy
and have their borders recognized by both domestic and foreign entities.
Developing a National Identity
The Ottoman Empire and British Control
Kurds living in the Ottoman vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra did not
develop a strong sense of national identity until the post-World War I period. While,
the Ottoman Period was not absent of Kurdish discontent,12 the Ottomans had
successfully reduced the powers of Kurdish Amirs without facing much opposition,
8 Ibid, 6 and Albert, 227.
9 See Appendix A.
10 The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 7.
11 Ibid. The effects of these natural resources on the political situation in Iraqi
Kurdistan will be discussed more in depth in the following pages.
12 See David McDowall’s A Modern History of the Kurds for an in depth history of
Kurdish shaykhs, uprisings, and threats to the Ottoman Empire.

4. 4
largely due to the use of religion as the marker of identity; as Muslims, the majority
of Kurds was still an integral part of the Ottoman system and did not feel their
position was threatened by the power reductions.13 With the outbreak of World War
I, the Kurds rallied around the Ottoman Empire when it declared war on Britain,
France, and Russia in 1914.14 Unfortunately, for the Ottomans, the Kurdish support
was short lived and nationalist ideas began to develop; Edmund Ghareeb attributes
the beginnings of Kurdish nationalism to a number of factors including: poor social
and economic conditions in Kurdish areas, closer ties between Kurdish tribes, the
lack of interest of the Young Turk movement in minorities, and the rise of strong
nationalist movements in other Ottoman subjects (Greeks, Arabs, Armenians,
Bulgarians, and Albanians).15
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, it appeared a Kurdish state
was on the horizon. Signed on August 10, 1920 by the Ottoman Government and
Allied Powers, the Treaty of Sevres essentially redrew the map of the Middle East,
created the new states of Turkey and Iraq, and dissolved the Ottoman Empire. The
question of “Kurdistan” was also addressed,16 and the discussion continued at the
1921 Cairo Conference when delegates agreed a Kurdish state should act as a buffer
between the other Middle Eastern states. Due to unhappiness with land divisions,
13 Peter Sluglett, “Common Sense, or a Step Pregnant with Enormous Consequences:
Some Thoughts on the Possible Secession of Iraqi Kurdistan,” Secession as an
International Phenomenon: From America’s Civil War to Contemporary Separatist
Movements, Ed. Don Harrison Doyle, (Athens: University of Georgia, 2010) 322.
14 Sluglett, 323.
15 Edmund Ghareeb, “The Kurdish Issue,” Iraq: Its History, People, and Politics,
Ed.Shami Constantine Inati, (Amherst, NY: Humanity, 2003) 167.
16 Mahir A. Aziz, The Kurds of Iraq: Ethnonationalism and National Identity in Iraq
Kurdistan, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011) 61.

5. 5
the Treaty of Sevres was rejected July 24, 1923 and replaced with the Treaty of
Lausanne, establishing the modern Turkish state and rejected the idea of
“Kurdistan”; the region was divided between Iraq (Mosul was incorporated into the
state), Turkey, Syria, and Iran on June 5, 1926, creating the borders and populations
of the modern Middle East.
During this same period, British policy in the region under their control
appeared sympathetic to the Kurdish cause and in some ways encouraged Kurdish
nationalism, toying with the establishment of a Kurdish province.17 The 1921
provisional constitution declared Iraq to be comprised of two national groups, the
Arabs and the Kurds. After 1925, the Kurds were given more leniencies and allowed
to teach Kurdish in schools, publish Kurdish language books, and represent the
Kurdish majority region in the government.18 The small successes for the Kurds
were short lived, and the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty of Alliance did nothing to promote
Kurdish autonomy or basic rights.19 Two years later, Iraq officially gained
independence from the British, although British influence would remain until the
1958 Revolution, and was granted membership into the League of Nations
conditional on the protection of civil and political rights of the Kurdish population.20
The 1930s began the process of major transformations in the form of revolts,
development of Arab nationalism, and political party formation in the Iraqi political
sphere. The most notable party established in this decade was the Iraqi Communist
Party (ICP) in 1934, which initially attracted the support of urban Kurds due to their
17 Aziz, 60.
18 Aziz, 68.
19 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 11.
20 Ibid.

6. 6
support for minority groups, but the development of Kurdish parties beginning in
the 1940s led to a shift in political alliances.21 In 1935 Mustafa Barzani became a
prominent figure in Kurdish nationalism, leading a revolt of Kurdish chiefs against
the government’s failure to uphold the terms of the declaration of independence,
most notably the official use of the Kurdish language, representation of Kurds in the
National Assembly, and a fair division of resources.22 Even though the revolt
ultimately failed, Mulla Mustafa’s participation put him and the Barzani tribe on the
political map.
Central Iraq also underwent a number of changes during the 1930s; Britain
refused to relinquish control of the area and after the deaths of King Faysal I and
Ghazi, and the weak rule of King Faysal II, the future of Iraq was again in question.23
Several succeeding cabinets were unable to effectively govern due to factionalism,
sectarianism, and general incompetence of political leaders in office.24
The 1930s also saw two distinct forms of nationalism begin to develop
among Arab Iraqis: qawmiyyah, an ethnic, racial nationalism, and wataniyyah, a
territorial nationalism. Qawmiyyah, an ethnic and racial nationalism, stems from
qawm, which has taken on the European connotation of “nation” although it
originally referred to blood relation, while wataniyyah, a territorial nationalism,
comes from watana, or “homeland”.25 Iraqis subscribing to the qawmiyyah theory
21 Aziz, 66.
22 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 12.
23 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey,
and Iran, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP, 2005) 35.
24 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996) 287.
25 Johan Franzen, “The Problem of Iraqi Nationalism,” National Identities 13.3
(2011): 220.

7. 7
tended to support Pan-Arabism, a strain of nationalism that also developed during
the 1930s, while proponents of wataniyya supported Iraqi patriotism.26 Perhaps
unsurprisingly many of the Ba’athists (Iraqi Renaissance Socialist Party) were also
qawmiyya nationalists, supporting an Arab Iraqi state and claiming such a state was
the only way to achieve unity over the minorities.27 The importance of qawmiyyah
and the Ba’ath party will come into play following the 1968 Ba’ath Revolution.
The British, Qasim, and the First Ba’ath Coup
With much of the western world focused on the outbreak of World War II,
Iraq faced a new leader as the result of yet another coup on April 3, 1941, Rashid Ali
el Gailani.28 Ali reached out to the Axis powers for support, prompting British
military intervention in Basra, Baghdad, and Habbaniya where they managed to
defeat Ali’s military and secure their hold on oil interests.29 Despite success over
Ali’s military coup, the British were then forced to contend with a Kurdish revolt
from 1943-1945 under the leadership of Mulla Mustafa Barzani. British pressure on
Baghdad secured a pardon for Mulla Mustafa in November 1943 and attempts to
negotiate between Mulla Mustafa and Baghdad began. Negotiations appeared to
succeed, but Arab nationalists refused to implement the changes and Mulla Mustafa
began testing the limits with newfound confidence from support in the north,
resulting in a stalemate.30
26 Natali, 35.
27 Ibid.
28 Kelly Bell, “World War II: Air War over Iraq,” Aviation History Magazine, May
2004, Available: http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-air-war-over-iraq.htm.
29 Ibid.
30 McDowall, 291.

8. 8
The stalemate continued through the summer of 1944 when Mulla Mustafa
again rejected amnesty from Baghdad and Iraqi troops marched on Mulla Mustafa,
forcing him on the defensive and causing him to flee to Mahabad province in Iran.31
While in Mahabad, Mulla Mustafa participated in the nationalist movement and
defended the first Kurdish Republic before retreating to the Soviet Union in 1947,
where he resided for 11 years before returning to Iraq on October 6, 1958.32
In 1946, four political groups united to establish of the Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP): Heva, Shoresh, Rizgari (Liberation), and the Iraqi branch of the Iranian
KDP.33 The KDP essentially represented the Barzanis, a Kurmanji speaking tribe
located in the northwest region of Iraqi Kurdistan, and to some extent, this remains
true in the current party composition.34 Mulla Mustafa was elected
president/chairman, Hamza Abdullah was named secretary-general, and Shaikh
Latif and Shaikh Ziad Aghaz were chosen as vice presidents.35 Due to Mulla
Mustafa’s exiles in Iran and the Soviet Union, the KDP played a minor role in Iraqi
politics. Ibrahim Ahmad, a Kurdish nationalist, replaced Abdullah as secretary
general in 1953, hoping to combine Kurdish nationalism with leftist nationalist
movements.36 Abdullah regained control briefly in 1959, but his close ties with the
ICP concerned Mulla Mustafa and Ahmad took back the position later that year.
These competing interests within the KDP led to factionalism and later the creation
31 McDowall, 293.
32 Aziz, 68.
33 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope, (New York: St. Martin's,
1992) 22.
34 Sluglett, 332.
35 Ibid.
36 Gunter, 23.

9. 9
of new parties, but for the next decade the KDP remained the primary Kurdish party
in Iraq.
During this period, British policies remained in effect, and it was not until the
July 1958 Revolution that British influence was expelled and a new political class
emerged. Abdul Karim Qasim, leader of the Free Officer’s Movement, came to power
as nationalist military officers and a new class of intelligentsia was thrust into the
center of Baghdadi politics.37 Qasim supported the wataniyyah strand of
nationalism, pushing for a unified Iraq state with Arab-Kurdish solidarity.38 The July
27, 1958 provisional constitution contained contradictory articles; Article Three
named the Kurds as an integral part of the Iraqi state with guaranteed rights while
Article Two declared Iraq to be part of an Arab nation.39
Initially Kurds were allowed to broadcast, publish, and educate in Kurdish,
the Kurdish ethnic identity was recognized,40 and a Kurd was appointed to the
“sovereignty council”.41 Qasim also attempted to ally with Iraqi communists, and in
1959 the Kurdish and communist allies suppressed anti-Qasim revolts in Mosul and
Kirkuk. Unsurprisingly, Qasim’s alliances with both the Kurds and the communists
were short-lived; by 1960, any concessions granted during the first two years of the
government were withdrawn out of fear that the Kurds would demand
independence. KDP members sent demands regarding cultural, national, and
economic recognition to Baghdad and were met with attacks by Qasim through
37 Frazen, 226.
38 Aziz, 69.
39 Aziz, 68.
40 Aziz, 69.
41 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 13.

10. 10
enemies of the Barzani tribe.42 The Kurds answered with a revolt (March 1961-
1963), with the goal of obtaining autonomy and advancing the social agenda.43
During this period, there were also debates within the KDP, most notably Jalal
Talabani and his followers, foreshadowing the inevitable split within the KDP in the
next decade.
On February 8, 1963, the Ba’ath Party succeeded in its first revolution,
overthrowing Qasim and establishing a new government. Their success was brief, as
Abdel Salam Arif overthrew the party nine months later and governed Iraq until
1966. Under Arif, the Kurds were unable to make progress regarding their demands
for autonomy; however, following Arif’s death in 1966, his brother, Al-Bazzazz drew
up the June 1966 Accord, also referred to as the Al-Bazzazz Declaration. The
declaration outlined 15 points regarding the Kurdish demand for autonomy and
national recognition for their rights, but Nasserites, Ba’athists, and Communists
crushed what would have been a positive step for the Kurds.44 Two years later, the
Ba’ath Party regained power in the 1968 bloodless coup and power dynamics
changed yet again.
The Ba’athists and the Kurds: Internal Discord, Arabization, and Anfal
The second Ba’ath coup took place from July 17-30, 1968 and by the end of
the two-week period General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a relative of Saddam Hussein’s
from Tikrit, took power. Shortly after, a Kurdish revolt erupted and the Ba’ath party,
having failed to crush the revolt, began negotiations with the Kurds. The result was
42 Aziz, 70.
43 McDowall, 313.
44 Aziz, 71.

11. 11
the March 11, 1970 Agreement, offered by the Revolutionary Command Council
(RCC), which detailed 13 articles granting Kurds a significant amount of autonomy
while keeping the region part of the Iraqi state.45 The articles included full
recognition of the Kurdish nationality, central government positions for Kurdish
politicians, autonomy within four years, integration of the peshmerga into the Iraqi
army, and a census and plebiscite to determine the status of Kirkuk. This success,
like previous ones, was superficial and failed to live up to the expectations
promised; the 1970 agreement experienced partial implementation and by 1974,
the negotiations culminated in a deadlock.
The 1970s proved to be a difficult decade for the Kurds. The 1974 Autonomy
Law, the Algiers Agreement, changes in government policy, and internal strife dealt
Kurdish nationalism hard blows. The Autonomy Law, offered to Barzani by Saddam
Hussein, granted the Kurds significant authority over the social and economic
aspects of what would be a self-governing region. There were caveats, and Barzani
refused to sign due to the legal limitations for autonomy and significant decrease in
land area.46 A year later, the Algiers Agreement was signed on March 6, 1975
between Iraq and Iran, resulting in the withdrawal of Iranian support for the Kurds.
On March 23, 1975, Barzani announced defeat and fled to Iran with an estimated
100,000 Kurds, leaving the KDP in his son’s hands.
Following Barzani’s self-imposed exile in Iran, Jalal Talabani and other
disgruntled KDP members broke away to form the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
(PUK) party. The majority of PUK members heralded from the Surani-speaking
45 Aziz, 72.
46 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 19-20.

12. 12
northeast region of Iraqi Kurdistan, preferred a more progressive political
approach, and had opposed the close ties between the KDP and the United States
during the 1963 Ba’ath reign.47 Unlike the KDP, the PUK was less tribal oriented but
the Talabani tribe, one of the largest in Iraqi Kurdistan, was important in ensuring
loyalty to the party.48 Splinter parties (KDP-PL, PASOK, KSPI, and KPDP)49 also
formed during the late 1970s, and inter-Kurdish skirmishes became commonplace.
In addition to external enemies, the Kurds were fighting amongst themselves.
During this same period, the Ba’ath party introduced a new ideology to
replace Qasim’s nationalist ideology. Nationalism in Iraq shifted from wataniyyah to
qawmiyyah; Ba’athists aimed to make Iraq the center of the Arab world and
Saddam’s vision of the ideal Iraqi identity was based on Sunni Muslim
characteristics. In order to force the assimilation of Iraqi’s multiple minority groups,
Saddam implemented the process of Arabization. In order to alter the demography,
tens of thousands of Iraqi Arabs were resettled in Kurdish areas with the guarantee
of housing and jobs.50 Kurdish villages were destroyed or renamed, the Kurdish
language was forbidden in schools, and national and cultural Kurdish activities were
banned.51
The Arabization process continued after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-1988), and Saddam used this external threat to instigate additional violence
47 Sluglett, 333.
48 Anil Hira and Kawa Jabary, “The Kurdish Mirage: A Success Story in Doubt,”
Middle East Policy 20.2 (2013): 100.
49 Aziz, 76.
50 Nouri Talabani, “Ethnic Cleansing in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Kurdish Identity: Human
Rights and Political Status. Ed. Charles G. MacDonald and Carole O’Leary.
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007) 145.
51 Aziz, 75.

13. 13
against the Kurds. Some groups announced their support for Iran52 while others
sided with Saddam in exchange for financial compensation.53 It was not until 1988
that the PUK and KDP came together, along with the KPDP, KSP, PASOK, ICP, KTP,
and ADM, to form the Iraqi Kurdistan Front with the goal of the right of self-
determination and democracy for Iraq.54 One of the main catalysts was most likely
the Anfal campaign, spearheaded by Ali Hassan al-Majid, also known as “Chemical
Ali” and the cousin of Saddam. As the head of the Iraqi State Security Services and
the chief of the Ba’ath Party’s Bureau for Northern Affairs, Ali launched military
offenses against civilian and military targets with chemical weapons;55 the attacks
occurred in three waves, beginning with Bergalou and Sergalou, followed by
Sewsenan, and concluding with villages on the Germian plane.56 The Anfal
campaigns destroyed an estimated 3,000 villages, displaced 1.5 million people, and
killed 180,000.57 Those who survived the attacks faced detainment in camps.
Medical studies showed the physiological effects of chemical weapons lasted for
years after the initial attack.58 The war ended after nearly a decade in August 1988,
and amnesty was granted on September 6, 1988.
52 Albert, 218.
53 Albert, 231.
54 Aziz, 79.
55 Research conducted by Dr. Christine Godsden of Liverpool on the Halabja attack
revealed the use of chemicals included mustard gas, Sarin gas, Tabun, and VX (nerve
agents). See Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 27.
56 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 22-25. The attack at Halabja
was not part of the Anfal campaign but was the most devastating in terms of
damages
57 Ibid.
58 Effects included respiratory problems, eye disorders, skin diseases, cancers,
congenital abnormalities, infertility, miscarriages, stillbirths, and neonatal/infant
death. See Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 28.

14. 14
Intifada, International Intervention, and Semi-Autonomous Rule: 1991-200359
March 1991 Rebellion
The 1990s marked a turning point for the Kurds in their struggle against the
central Iraqi government, but internal conflict continued to divide the Kurdish
parties. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 set things in motion and on
March 5, 1991 a spontaneous uprising, raparin in Kurdish, began in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Beginning in Ranya, the uprising spread to Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Dohuk, and Zakho60
following the ceasefire signed between Iraq and NATO troops.61 Despite claims of
U.S. and allied incitement, the U.S. did not support the rebellion for fear of a Shi’ite
revolution in the south, vested interested in Saddam’s regime, and in order to
preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity.62 The peshmerga was inundated with troops63
and confidence, attacking and overthrowing military bases, security headquarters,
and Ba’ath party offices.64 Saddam’s forces easily suppressed the rebellion, leading
to the exodus of 2 million Kurds to Turkey (~500,000) and Iran (~1.5 million), the
detainment of ~100,000, and the death of ~20,000.65 The Kurds who fled to Iran
were accepted, but those on the Turkish border were less fortunate and many died
while waiting for refuge. In Kirkuk an estimated 30,000 Kurds were arrested and
59 See Appendix B.
60 Aziz, 82.
61 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 29.
62 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 31.
63 An estimated 50,000+ troops are thought to have deserted the Iraqi army in the
north. See Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 30.
64 Aziz, 82.
65 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 31.

15. 15
detained without food or water for days, hundreds of homes were razed, and those
who survived were forbidden from returning.66
The United Nations wasted little time in condemning Saddam’s response to
the uprising; in a meeting held on April 5, 1991, the UN Security Council issued
Resolution 688 despite a formal protest from Iraq, abstentions from China and
India, and votes against the resolution by Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.67 The
controversial resolution condemned Iraq’s repressive tactics and demanded Iraq
end the repression immediately, as well as allow access to humanitarian aid
organizations. Coupled with the economic embargo placed on Iraqi oil shortly after
invading Kuwait, Baghdad was displeased with international intervention. On April
13, 1991 the Gulf War allies launched Operation Provide Comfort to provide
humanitarian relief for the Iraqi Kurdish region; the operation eventually supplied
15,500 tons of supplies by 20,000 personnel from 13 countries.68
Operation Safe Haven commenced shortly after on April 16, 1991 in order to
establish refugee camps for Kurds between the Turkish and Iranian borders; camps
began at Zakho and eventually spread east to Amadiyya and south to Dohuk.69 The
idea of “Kurdish enclaves”, later “safe havens”, was initially proposed by Turkish
President Ozal and advocated for by British Prime Minister John Major; the United
States and UN reversed their earlier positions and supported the safe haven
system.70 Allied forces established a 36-mile by 36-mile no-fly zone above the 36th
66 Talabani, 146.
67 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 33.
68 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 34.
69 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 35.
70 Gunter, 56.

16. 16
parallel, including Erbil, Mosul, Zakho, and Dohuk, and Kurdish refugees began to
return to their homes within the zone. By May 23, 1991 the UN announced an
agreement to station a maximum of 500 UN guards in four provinces, and on June 7,
1991 the UNHCR took over the humanitarian relief efforts initially headed by the
United States.71
Founding and Fighting: The Emergence of the KRG
While international bodies organized preliminary humanitarian relief efforts,
Kurdish leaders began negotiations with the Iraqi government in April 1991; the
negotiations went through two rounds, with only four of the seven IKF parties in
attendance (Talabani attending the first round (April 18-24) and Massoud Barzani
attending the second (May 6-18)).72 In June Barzani returned to the Kurdish region
with claims of an autonomy deal based on the constitution and the March 1970
Agreement, but in return, Saddam required the Kurds commit to an appendix titled
“Kurdistan Fronts Commitments Toward the Homeland”, which detailed the
disbandment of the peshmerga, surrender of radio stations, immediate end of talks
with international bodies, commitment to the Iraqi state, support of the Ba’ath party
in dealing with nationalistic groups, and the implementation of programs drawn up
by the central government.73 The IKF responded with a counter proposal that was
not accepted and in fall 1991, the negotiations disintegrated and clashes broke out
between Kurdish and Iraqi forces.
71 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: the Iraqi Dilemma, 36.
72 Gunter, 59.
73 Gunter, 71.

17. 17
By late October 1991, Saddam withdrew all troops, cut the salaries of
Kurdish employees, and imposed a blockade on the Kurdish region. The Kurdish
Front recognized Saddam’s attempt to force the Kurds into submission and
responded with the announcement of parliamentary elections to replace the
Legislative Assembly, as well as give the Front some semblance of order, to be held
on April 3, 1992.74 The elections were held a month late, May 19, 1992, in the three
provinces the Kurds controlled on the basis of proportional representation with 7%
of the vote required to qualify for a seat.75 Smaller parties participated, including
Islamic, Assyrian Turkmen, and leftist groups, and some combined in attempts to
gain more votes; however, the results showed the KDP and PUK had the most loyal
following as the only two parties to meet the 7% requirement, and Barzani and
Talabani agreed to lead the front together, splitting the seats 50-50 between the two
groups.76
The National Assembly met for the first time on June 4, 1991 and the Kurdish
Regional Government (KRG) was established a month later;77 the KRG declared
Kurdistan a federal Iraqi state on October 4, 1992 despite protests from Iraq, Iran,
Syria, and Turkey.78 Rather than completely leaving the Iraqi state, the Kurds made
it clear they were open to returning “to the fold, but only if the central government
made major changes in the former Iraqi constitution.”79
74 McDowall, 379.
75 McDowall, 380.
76 Ghareeb, 179.
77 McDowall, 382.
78 Aziz, 85.
79 Mohammed M.A. Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds and Nation-Building, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012) 9.

18. 18
A “unified” KRG was unable to withstand the pressures of the individual
parties, and in 1994, a civil war erupted between the KDP and the PUK, due to a lack
of trust, lack of transparency, and disputes over border tariffs.80 A land dispute near
Qala Diza between a KDP claimant and PUK supporting farmers in May 1994
sparked tensions and battles were fought between the two parties intermittently
until August 1994, and again in December 1994.81 Despite attempts to mediate by
the Iraqi National Congress,82 ironically a predominantly Arab opposition party,
tensions continued to escalate. Another attempt to mediate, the Drogheda peace
talks, took place in 1995 in Ireland. Both parties agreed to demilitarize Erbil, the
turnover of KDP customs revenues to a joint bank account, reconvening the KRG,
and reassuring outside parties of their dedication to Iraq’s integrity and Turkey’s
interests.83
Unfortunately, the talks failed in 1996 when the KDP allied itself with the
Ba’ath party in an attempt to retake Erbil and Sulaimaniya and fighting ensued.84
Later that year, the two parties established their new headquarters, the PUK in
Sulaimaniya and the KDP in Erbil;85 until the détente was signed in 1998, the two
parties operated as two separate administrative units, making progress difficult but
not impossible. The KRG experienced limited successes during this period, including
the 1992 elections, rebuilding of villages, economic and civil society growth and
80 Ahmed, 9.
81 McDowall, 386.
82 McDowall, 387.
83 Kerem Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, (London: Pluto
Press, 2004) 49.
84 Ibid.
85 Hira and Jabary, 102.

19. 19
development, and degrees of liberation, which will be discussed in the following
section devoted to non-governmental and humanitarian aid organizations.86
The ceasefire, signed September 17, 1998 in Washington D.C., stipulated
measures for power sharing between the KDP and the PUK, and the two groups
coordinated activities beginning in 2000.87 Following the September 11, 2001
attacks on the United States, the Kurds played an important role in preparation for
the U.S. invasion in 2003. Talabani and Barzani realized the survival of the KRG
would be dependent on the U.S. after Saddam’s fall and agreed to assist in military
and counter-terrorism capacities as long as their safety was guaranteed.88 However,
it was not until the conclusion of the Second Gulf War that the KRG began to involve
itself in Baghdad’s political sphere and influence the outcome of central government
proceedings.
International Aid and Rebuilding Iraqi Kurdistan: 1992-2003
The international community played a major role in the creation of a semi-
autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq, particularly in the form of financial aid.
Denise Natali, one of the foremost researchers regarding the Kurdish question in
Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey, divided the decade from 1992-2003 into two periods:
NGO Dependency (1992-1996) and Oil For Food Program (OFFP) (1996-2003).
Following the First Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan experienced a double economic
embargo by the UN and the central Iraqi government. The UN embargo prevented
86 David Romano, “The Struggle for Autonomy and Decentralization – Iraqi
Kurdistan,” From Desolation to Reconstruction: Iraq’s Troubled Journey, Ed. Mokhtar
Lamani and Bessma Momani, (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,
2009) 56-57.
87 Aziz, 88.
88 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 103.

20. 20
the sale of oil, limited food availability, prohibited external trade and encouraged
inflation, while the Iraqi embargo reinforced the food shortage through a rationing
system.89 During this period, the majority of Kurdistan’s revenue derived from
tariffs imposed on traffic crossing the borders from Syria, Turkey, and Iran.90
The focus of financial aid during the NGO Dependency period was on
immediate relief rather than long-term development; assistance was provided in the
form of food and fuel handouts on the basis of six-month contingency plans rather
than long-term macroeconomic reform.91 Some organizations chose to aid Iraqi
Kurdistan exclusively, rather than Iraq as a whole based on Baghdad’s tendency to
micromanaging,92 and the funding paid teaching salaries, implemented school
feeding programs, reconstructed villages, resettled internally displaced persons,
rebuilt access roads, and began the revival of the agricultural sector.93
While the aid programs succeeded in initiating the rebuilding of Iraqi
Kurdistan, they failed to provide the groundwork for sustainable, long-term projects
to keep the region afloat. The Kurds switched their dependency from Baghdad to the
NGOs; by the mid-1990s, 70% of the population was dependent on international
relief and the most skilled workers went to work for NGO’s or U.S.-led projects.94
The lack of development led to “corruption, the disparity of wealth, internal conflict
between the KDP and PUK over resources, and the stagnation of socio-political
89 Denise Natali, “The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan,” Third World Quarterly, 28.6
(2007) 1112.
90 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: Past, Present and Future, 67.
91 Natali, 1113-1114.
92 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 75.
93 Natali, 1113.
94 Natali, 1114.

21. 21
norms (lack of growth in the private sector, free trade development, and foreign
investment).”95
The second phase described by Natali, the Oil for Food Program (OFFP)
period, lasted from 1996 to the Second Gulf War. The OFFP, implemented by the UN
under Resolution 986, passed by the UN Security Council, shifted the focus from
relief to development, and allotted 13% of the total aid for Iraq to be used in the
north. The UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOCHI) was to act
on behalf of the central government in order to procure, transport, and deliver aid
to region; the aid initially totaled $29 million, with an additional $9.8 billion in
interest over oil sale funds and currency exchange gains.96 The financial aid was to
be distributed in 13 six-month phases, but only 51% of the funds were received
during the period.97 Even without the full allotment of funding, Dohuk, Erbil, and
Sulaimaniya experienced growth and development; factories were built, the private
sector developed, and food availability and social conditions improved.98 The KRG
also experienced positive growth during the OFFP; the UN incorporated local
personnel into legitimate governing bodies and essentially gave lessons in good
governing policies.99
Unfortunately, the OFFP period also perpetuated the dependency on
international investment. Implementers of the OFFP wanted to avoid stepping on
the toes of Baghdad and, as a result, did not introduce major economic or social
95 Natali, 1115-1116.
96 Natali, 1116.
97 Ibid. The remaining 49% stayed in a French bank for five years while accruing
interest to benefit Saddam’s regime, the UN, and private investors.
98 Natali, 1117.
99 Ibid.

22. 22
reform in Iraqi Kurdistan. The trial run period for the semi-autonomous region
illuminated the glaring economic, social, and political issues facing the KRG for the
future. It was not until the Second Gulf War and post-war period that the area
experienced the developments and changes required for an autonomous region and
certainly an independent state.
The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq: 2003-2011
Political Change: Kurdish Integration into Baghdad’s Political Sphere
On May 6, 2003, shortly after the invasion of Iraq, the United States
established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Paul Bremer, with
the goal of administering the executive aspects of Iraq’s government.100 The CPA
was approved by the UN, which in turn adopted Resolution 1483 to formally
authorize the CPA’s activities. The Resolution acknowledged the creation of the Iraq
Governing Council (IGC), an Iraqi governing body that would not take over the
duties of the CPA until “an internationally recognized representative government
was formed.”101 The ICG was created on July 13, 2006 despite protests from the
seven major opposition groups, and the result was a 25-member council, five of
whom were Kurds.102 The IGC was granted more authority than initially discussed,
and on November 15, 2003, the council announced its intention to accelerate the
power transfer to a transitional government.103
100 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 117.
101 Ibid.
102 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 118.
103 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, 119.

23. 23
The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) went into effect March 8, 2004 as
an interim constitution for a federal, democratic Iraqi state104 with the specific goals
of: restoring sovereignty to Iraq by July 1, 2004, electing an Iraq-wide assembly by
January 31, 2005, and drafting a permanent constitution by August 15, 2005, its
ratification pending “the approval of the Iraqi majority and if two-thirds of the
voters in three or more governorates do not reject it.”105 The TAL acknowledged the
heterogeneous nature of Iraqi society and recognized the legitimacy of Arabs, Kurds,
Turkmen, Assyrians, and Armenians as nationalities within the Iraqi state, even
though Arabic and Kurdish are the only two official languages.106 The 18
governorates of Saddam’s regime were recognized as federative entities, and
Kurdistan contained three full governorates, Dohuk, Erbil, and Suleimaniya, with
portions of Diyala and Nineva.107 Article 56 stated the federal government would
begin divvying up responsibilities to local, governorate, and regional
administrations, granting the Kurdistan region much more power than it saw under
Saddam’s rule. The law also addressed the status of Kirkuk, one of the disputed
territories between the KRG and Baghdad; Article 58 deferred resolution on Kirkuk
until a census determined which individuals removed from their homes during
Saddam’s rule could return or be compensated.
104 Gunter, 15. The full text of the Transitional Administrative Law can be found in
Appendix 2 of The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq, Ed. Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry,
and Khālid Sālih. (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania, 2005) 315-340.
105 Brendan O’Leary, “Power-sharing, Pluralist Federation, and Federacy,” The
Future of Kurdistan in Iraq. Ed. Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry, and Khālid
Sālih, (Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania, 2005) 48.
106 O’Leary, 49.
107 O’Leary, 67.

24. 24
The TAL marked the first time the Kurds were truly involved in the decision
making processes in Baghdad, and the 2005 Constitution was the logical next step
for inclusivity. The 2005 Constitution was drafted by a 55-person committee (28
Shi’a coalition, 15 Kurdish list, eight Iyad Alawi’s al-Iraqia list, one Christian, one
Turkman, one Communist, and one Sunni, although 14 others were eventually
added after pressure from the Sunni community) as a decentralized, federal
constitution, and was ratified by a 78.59% majority on October 15, 2005.108 The
2005 Constitution was a big win for the KRG since it recognized the Kurds as an
Iraqi ethnic group, acknowledged Kurdish autonomy, delineated a plan for a
decentralized Iraq, and included provisions regarding the disputed territories,
primarily Kirkuk.109 Article 140 addressed the question of the disputed territories
by promising a census, normalization, and referendum to determine the final status
by December 31, 2007.
Two months later, the first general election was held on December 15, 2005
in order to elect the 275 new members of the Iraqi National Assembly; of the 275
seats, 230 were divided between the 18 governorates based on registered numbers
(including 59 for Baghdad), 45 compensatory seats were reserved for smaller
political parties, while 25% of the total seats were allotted to women.110 A reported
79.6%, or 11.9 million, registered voters participated in the elections at an
108 Saad N. Jawad, “The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and Political
Implications,” LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 1 (November 2013) 10.
109 David Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Challenges of Autonomy in the Wake of US
Withdrawal,” International Affairs 86.6 (2010) 1349-1350.
110 Yildiz, “The Kurds in Iraq”, 39-40.

25. 25
estimated 31,000 polling stations.111 The 2005 general election resulted in 54 seats
for the Kurdish alliance112 and the designation of Nouri al-Maliki, deputy leader of
the Dawa party, as Prime Minister; al-Maliki’s 37 member cabinet was approved
May 20, 2006 and included members of all major political, religious, and ethnic
groups.113 Over the course of al-Maliki’s first government, he focused on three
things: building a relationship with the U.S. and its allies, containing insurgency
movements, and implementing the 2005 constitution.114
As the central Iraqi government moved out of its infancy, the KRG
experienced developments of its own. The PUK and KDP reconfirmed their
commitment to reunify January 7, 2006, in order to bring all three provinces under
one administration.115 The accord established terms for power sharing between the
PUK and KDP while disenfranchising smaller parties.116 New positions within the
KRG were created for the PUK, one for vice president and another for deputy prime
minister, and the ministries of the interior, finance, peshmerga, and justice were
reunited.117
The Kurds experienced less promising developments from 2007 to 2010.
2007 brought an increase in insurgency movements, although they were generally
relegated to the south and were not as widespread in the Kurdish region due to
cohesive efforts between civilians and security forces and a hard-line approach by
111 Yildiz, “The Kurds in Iraq”, 40
112 The KRG participated in the 2005 election on one list and mixed the cabinet.
113 Yildiz, “The Kurds in Iraq”, 41.
114 Yildiz, “The Kurds in Iraq”, 45.
115 Ahmed, 12.
116 Ahmed, Ibid.
117 Ahmed, 14.

26. 26
the KRG.118 In August, the five remaining parties of the al-Maliki government formed
the Moderates Fronts, an alliance holding 130 seats and essentially creating a
monopoly of the parliament.119 The Kurds’ primary cause for concern of 2007 was
the failure to address the status of Kirkuk; December 31, 2007 came and went
without the promised census.
The situation in Kurdistan deteriorated throughout 2008 and into 2009. In
2008, al-Maliki began consolidating power, creating tensions with other parties who
found his methods eerily similar to those of Saddam and the Ba’ath party. The
January 31, 2009 elections, held under an open list system, showed the increase in
interest in Iraqi Arab nationalist parties; al-Maliki’s State of Law party triumphed
while the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Party (ISCI) was defeated.120 The three
Kurdish governorates and Kirkuk did not participate in these elections, which may
have contributed to the successes of al-Maliki and his party. The KRG expressed
frustration over a number of al-Maliki’s moves including the recruitment and
arming of “support councils” in Kurdish areas, the deployment of Iraqi troops to
disputed areas, the passing of deadlines regarding disputed territories, and the
question of power sharing.121
118 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: The Iraqi Dilemma, 55. Insurgency groups include:
Ba’athists, Iraqi Nationalists, Iraqi Islamists (primarily Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi
movements), Shi’ite insurgents, foreign groups (e.g. Al-Qaeda), the Islamic State of
Iraq, Partisans of the Sunnah Army, the Islamic Army in Iraq; the Islamic Front of the
Iraqi Resistance, the First Four Caliphs Army, Mujahidin’s Army, and Muhammad’s
Army.
119 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: The Iraqi Dilemma, 43.
120 Romano, “The Struggle for Autonomy and Decentralization – Iraqi Kurdistan,”
58-59.
121 Romano, “The Struggle for Autonomy and Decentralization – Iraqi Kurdistan,” 60.

27. 27
Unfortunately, al-Maliki’s government was not the only problem for the
Kurds. An offshoot of the PUK formed due to internal strife, and on April 16, 2009
Nawshirwan Mustafa announced the establishment of Gorran (Change Movement),
although it was not formally recognized as a political organization until May 1, 2010.
Gorran criticized the failures of the KRG to bring about significant change in regards
to the status of Kirkuk and the guarantees of Kurdish rights. Gorran captured the
interest of voters unhappy with the KDP and PUK, and in the 2009 elections, the
new party took 25 of the 111 seats in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament.122
The Kurds did not fare much better in 2010 and 2011. The March 7, 2010
parliamentary elections reflected the continued support for Iraqi nationalism, with
the Iraqi National Movement coming in first and the State of Law Coalition second,
even though the Kurdish Alliances won the largest number of seats.123 In order to
form a government, al-Maliki made promises to the Kurds regarding oil revenues
and the status of Kirkuk in exchange for their support.124 Three months later, the
KRG attempted to address its internal divisions by having the KDP and PUK sign a
second agreement regarding their commitment to the future of Kurdistan and its
best interests.
However, in January of 2011, Kurdistan was again embroiled in internal
conflict. A January 27, 2011 meeting between Talabani and Barzani resulted in a call
for the improvement of living standards; in response, Gorran requested new
122 Ahmed, 20.
123 Yildiz, The Future of Kurdistan: The Iraqi Dilemma, 47.
124 Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurdish Spring,” Third World Quarterly 34.3 (2013) 445.

28. 28
elections, one that was rejected by Talabani and Barzani.125 The events of January
led to demonstrations, and on February 17, 2011, 3,000 Kurds gathered in
Sulaimaniya to protest corruption, nepotism, and the monopoly of political and
economic power by the KRG.126 Despite KRG attempts to crack down on protestors,
demonstrations continued; a second major protest occurred on February 24, 2011
when the self-proclaimed “Patriotic Kurdish Scholars” called for the eradication of
KRG corruption, unification of party militias, respecting freedoms of expression and
women’s rights, the creation of jobs, the declaration of unilateral independence, and
the closing of Turkish and Iranian outposts.127 In an attempt to assuage discontent,
the KRG produced a 17-point128 plan to address the issues of demonstrators and by
March 11, 2011, the major parties had reconciled.
In addition to internal discord, the KRG faced the U.S. withdrawal and al-
Maliki’s continued attempts to consolidate his power in Baghdad in 2011. Following
the U.S. withdrawal, al-Maliki increased his control over the central government, a
process that had been occurring since 2008. In addition to fulfilling the post of
Prime Minister, al-Maliki acted as Minister of Defense, Minister of the Interior, and
Minister of State for supposed national security reasons.129 Other acts of
centralization included: bureaucratic cleansing of Kurds and Sunni politicians,130 as
125 Ahmed, 27.
126 Ahmed, 31.
127 Ahmed, 34.
128 The details of the KRG’s 17-point plan can be found on Ahmed, 31-34.
129 Burak Bilgehan Ozpek, “Democracy or Partition: Future Scenarios for the Kurds
of Iraq,” Insight Turkey 14.3 (2012) 134.
130 Ibid.

29. 29
well as increasing control over the intelligence service, the army, the police,
supreme court, and the central bank.131
Socio-Economic Developments and Foreign Involvement
The socio-economic developments of Iraqi Kurdistan and foreign
involvement have been closely linked since the establishment of the semi-
autonomous region. Many of the internal developments would not have been
possible without the backing of foreign powers. Financial aid in Iraqi Kurdistan
evolved into programs focused on long-term development, promoting good
governance, and liberalization between 2003 and 2007.132 Despite diminished
allocations to Kurdistan due to relative stability, Kurdish nationalism, and greater
need in the southern and central regions of Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan experienced
growth in the economic and social spheres.133 In addition to the 17% allotment
(estimated 13% after tax deductions) of Iraq’s total revenues,134 the KRG also enjoys
revenues from internal growth and external funding.
Throughout the early 21st century, Kurdistan enjoyed the creation of a
business class, the development of free market laws, an increase in the tourism
industry, and the creation of a large international market in the oil and natural gas
industry. As a result of the increased revenues and traffic in the region, an
131 Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Breaking from Baghdad: Kurdish Autonomy vs.
Maliki’s Manipulation,” World Affairs (November/December 2012) 51.
132 Natali, “The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan,” 1119.
133 Ibid.
134 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War
Iraq, 105.

30. 30
international airport135 was built in Erbil to accommodate investors; travelers are
able to fly from Erbil domestically (Basra, Baghdad, Najaf, or Sulaimaniya), or
internationally to hubs in the Middle East and Europe. The financial aid provided by
NGOs and humanitarian organizations between 1991-2003 created the new
business class, who invested in land, which in turn, was transformed from farms
into tourist and recreation centers.136 These projects increased concerns of those
focused on environmental protection or food production, as tourism centers took
away resources for both, and the KRG eventually created incentives for farmers
willing to work their land.137
In order to boost the economy, the KRG passed free market laws and created
incentives in order to attract investment from foreign powers. Turkish, Persian Gulf,
European, and American companies preferred the 10 year tax exemptions and free
land grants with the right to transfer profits internationally in Kurdistan, rather
than attempting to negotiate with Baghdad.138 The tourism industry did well in
Kurdistan; especially during the summer months, the region began to compete with
Lebanon and Syria for central and southern Iraqi and Gulf state tourists.139 Foreign
companies from Lebanon and the Gulf took notice of the rise in tourists, but used
foreign rather than Kurdish workers, since the local population was generally less
skilled.140
135 The Erbil airport was not used as a civil airport until 2003; the land was
previously used for an airfield and a military base for the Ba’ath party until 1991.
136 Ahmed, 70.
137 Ahmed, 80.
138 Ahmed, 70.
139 Ahmed, 83.
140 Ibid.

31. 31
The oil and natural gas reserves in Kurdistan are without a doubt the
greatest resource the Iraqi Kurds possess. KRG territory comprises an estimated 8-
13% of Iraqi oil reserves and 17% of Iraqi natural gas resources with an estimated
12 billion barrels of oil and 22 trillion cubic feed of natural gas.141 In 2004, following
the collapse of the Ba’ath regime, the KRG signed its first contract with DNO, and
production began in 2007. Frustrated by the restrictions of national laws, the KRG
passed its own hydrocarbon law in 2007, allowing them the independence to
negotiate contracts with investors. As of 2013, over 41 companies are invested in
the oil and gas fields of Kurdistan, all of which are owned by the PUK and KDP
respectively, rather than the KRG.142 The KRG’s most recent project has focused on
the natural gas resources, and recently announced a 461 million square foot site for
the Kurdistan Gas City, as well as 180 kilometer pipeline project connecting Khor
Mor gas field to Sulaimaniya and Erbil.143 Turkey has been the primary beneficiary
of Kurdish resources, but the KRG has recently negotiated production-sharing
contracts (PSCs) with American, European, and South Korean companies,144
including Chevron, ExxonMobil, Total, and GazProm.145
These developments have been one of the sources of contention between
Erbil and Baghdad since 2003. Baghdad maintains it has the sole right to negotiate
141 Yasar Yakis, “Turkey after the Arab Spring: Policy Dilemmas,” Middle East Policy
21.1 (2014) 100-101.
142 Hira and Jabary, 106.
143 Ibid.
144 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War
Iraq, 109.
145 Bill Park, “Turkey’s Multiple Kurdish Dilemmas,” Ortadoğu Etütleri 5.1 (July
2013): 45-46. See also Massimo Morelli and Constantino Pischedda, “The Turkey-
KRG Energy Partnership: Assessing Its Implications,” Middle East Policy 21.1 (2014)
108-109.

32. 32
with foreign powers over natural resources, as these resources are common
property, but Erbil continues to negotiate contracts; there have been several
proposed agreements regarding the export of oil but all have been marred by
Baghdad’s delayed payments or the KRG’s non-compliance with the terms.146 The
October 2011 ExxonMobil agreement, the 2012 oil and gas pipelines with Turkey,
and the 2012 Nabocco gas pipeline agreement with the UAE’s Dana Gas have all
exacerbated tensions.147
Kurdish progress was not without setbacks, and there were several major
issues that arose during the post-Saddam period. Corruption has become one of the
primary points of contention facing the KRG. In a 2012 report published by the
Kurdish Regional Reform Commission (KRRC), the KRG was found to be incredibly
corrupt based on “poor governing performance, partisan loyalty (primarily
providing jobs based on need rather than qualifications), and weak agendas.”148
Despite protests from local Kurds and attempts to rectify the situation, significant
progress has not been made.
Local Kurds also contributed to roadblocks in socio-economic development.
Even though economic growth led to increased standards of living, the attitudes of
the local population did not enjoy the same evolution. Traditional values clashed
with the new developments in the region. Despite the KRG’s promotion of school
construction within Kurdish localities, some continued to oppose education.149 The
146 Morelli and Pischedda, 109.
147 Ahmed, 75 and Ozpek, 134-135.
148 Jabary and Hira, 108.
149 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War
Iraq, 115.

33. 33
status of women also experienced minimal development during this period; high
rates of teenage marriage, polygamy, honor killings, female genital mutilation, and
divorce remain prevalent.150
Current Developments: 2012-2015
There are few academic sources regarding the political, socio-economic, and
foreign policy developments in Iraq involving the Kurds from 2012-2015. Kurdish
political parties continue to battle for control of Baghdad and within the KRG for the
majority of seats in Kurdish parliament. Barzani extended his presidential term an
additional two years, and 2013 parliamentary elections resulted in the KDP holding
the largest number of seats, followed by Gorran and the PUK. In 2014 the focus
switched from independence to fighting the Islamic State; Barzani’s initial call for a
2014 independence referendum was revoked after it was decided the Islamic State
was a more pressing matter than Kurdish independence. Baghdad experienced a
change in power when Haider al-Abadi assumed the role of Iraqi Prime Minister, but
Erbil continues to recognize Barzani as president of the KRG despite presidential
elections being scheduled for August 20, 2015.
Analysis: Leverage or Independence?
The Kurds have developed a relatively successful quasi-state in northern
Iraq. Gunter aptly states that with a president, prime minister, parliament, regional
elections, flag, national anthem, peshmerga, airport, Kurdish education system, and
passport stamps, Kurdistan has the trappings of an independent state.151 The KRG
150 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War
Iraq, 116.
151 Gunter, “The Kurdish State,” 445.

34. 34
has developed foreign contacts, sending diplomatic representatives abroad and
housing foreign consulates in Erbil,152 and utilized their natural resources to
jumpstart the economy. However, these positive developments are not sufficient for
Kurdish secession from central Iraq.
The KRG continues to rely heavily on Baghdad for a number of resources. The
17% cut of total Iraqi revenues is necessary to keep the region afloat, particularly if
the KRG’s claim of this amount being insufficient for Kurdish needs is accurate, as
well as the dependence on the central government for the salaries of ministers and
judges linked to the Court of Cassation.153 Kurdistan is also tied to central Iraq
through commercial business ventures and culture. Businessmen travel to Baghdad
to sign contracts regarding food and construction imports, and a trade relationship
is still active regarding oil and gas, household goods, food, and automobiles.154
Linguistically the two areas are bound, as political, religious, business, and
occasionally personal interactions take place in Arabic.155
The support of central Iraq and international partners is also a roadblock to
the potential secession of Kurdistan. In order to keep the economy afloat, the
investment of foreign companies would be a vital component of an independent
Kurdistan, but an independent Kurdish state would not sit well with the majority of
the region’s neighbors and current partners. The KRG’s neighbors in the Middle East
would vehemently oppose the secession. Baghdad wants to maintain its territorial
152 Ahmed, 205.
153 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War
Iraq, 119.
154 Natali, “The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan”, 1124.
155 Natali, 155 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi State: Development and Dependency in Post-
Gulf War Iraq, 122-123.

35. 35
integrity and continue to enjoy the natural resources from the Kurdish region;
secession would likely result in the elimination of financial aid the KRG enjoys from
the Iraqi government. Turkey’s major qualm with Kurdish secession would be the
threat of a similar uprising within its own Kurdish minority, and the economy of
Kurdistan faces possible collapse if Turkey pulled its financial investors and cut off
trade.
Conclusion
The Kurds of Iraq have made tremendous strides in their quest for
recognition and autonomy since the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in the early
20th century. After years of violence and persecution by the Ba’ath regime and
internal discord between Kurdish parties, the 1990s and 2000s saw the
establishment of a semi-autonomous region that has enjoyed increasing influence in
Baghdad and the Middle East. The KRG’s decision to table independence discussions
in light of the current Islamic State crisis is the best move for the region. Iraqi
Kurdistan fared well in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution and benefits from its semi-
autonomous status without the pressures facing an independent state. The KRG is
able to use the threat of secession as a bargaining chip with Baghdad, and
independence would leave Erbil without much leverage. For the foreseeable future,
Iraqi Kurdistan should remain a semi-autonomous region in northern Iraq and
continue to develop politically, economically, and socially.

36. 36
Appendices
Appendix A156
156 Yildiz, The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future, xi.

37. 37
Appendix B157
157 Ahmed, xix.

38. 38
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