1. Ibn-Khaldun Paper Series
April 2015
Resurgence of
Russia and China
Ibn-Khaldun Paper Series
April 2015
Resurgence of
Russia and China

2. 1
IISA Annual Strategic Brief for the Resurgence of Russia
and China Programme
Contents
 Summary.............................................................................................................................2
 Introduction .......................................................................................................................3
 Chapter 1: The destabilisation of Eastern Europe: Russia’s historical perception of
insecurity and its repercussions for modern Europe......................................................5
 Chapter 2: ‘The Cold war is dead, long live the cold war’: Western response to the
Rise of Russia and China in perspective..........................................................................9
 Chapter 3: Rise of an Empire? The Internal Dynamics of China...............................13
 Chapter 4: The revival of gunboat diplomacy? China’s assertive push in the South
China Sea and its soft-power ambitions in the Asia Pacific.........................................18
 Chapter 5: Syria and beyond - Russia & China in the MENA region........................26
 Chapter 6: Russia and China in South Asia and the US Afghan withdrawal............33
 Chapter 7: Russia and China in Central Asia: emerging trends................................36
 Chapter 8: Global economics and the Sino-Russian relationship...............................39
 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................45
 References ........................................................................................................................50
 About the Authors...........................................................................................................57
 About IISA and the ‘Resurgence of Russia and China programme’..........................58

3. 2
Summary
 China has focused its attention on East and Southeast Asia, attempting to gain control of
the region through a combination of assertive tactics which stop short of military
intervention. China has combined this with attempt to build soft power by promoting the
‘Asia-Pacific dream’.
 Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine have their roots in
Russian fears of encirclement and it has used the tactics of 19th
century ethno-nationalists
to justify this intervention.
 The West has been slow to react to Russian actions in Ukraine but has ramped up
sanctions to hit the energy sector, vitally important to the Russian Economy.
 Since becoming Chinese Premier, Xi Jinping has pursued the idea of the 'Chinese Dream',
creating prosperity and cracking down on corruption. This has increased the regime’s
legitimacy in many citizens’ eyes but also centralised power around Xi. This will have a
significant impact on both foreign and domestic policies.
 In the MENA region Russia has taken a leading role in the Syrian conflict, vetoing
military action and leading the efforts to dismantle chemical weapons, whilst also
maintaining its relationship with neighbouring countries which fervently oppose Assad's
regime. China has increased regional links, with 60% of its oil supplies coming from the
region, meaning that it has increasing interest in stability.
 Russia and China have a strong stake in South Asian stability, with both fearing it could
be a conduit for extremism into their territories, especially China’s Xinjiang region.
 Russia has sought to shore up its influence in Central Asia by offering fast-track
citizenship to Russian speakers. However China is gaining increasing influence and
leverage over Central Asia and may be able to displace Russia in the future.
 Russia’s deteriorating economic position has made it increasingly dependent upon China.
This is going to have a significant impact on global power distribution as China will have
more control over Central Asia and has used this power to begin to reshape global
financial institutions.

4. 3
Introduction – Usama Butt
Since the dawn of the 21st century, the
Islamic world has been centre stage of
global power politics. The Islamic world and
its different regions has been the sticking
point around which international security
and governance agendas seemed to evolve;
from the US-led Global war on terror across
the Islamic World, to the internal turmoil of
the Arab Spring and post Arab revolution
crises that have shaped and reshaped global
security agendas. Yet, in an almost echo of a
forgotten history; Russia arises from its
shadows and the Crimea and Ukrainian
crisis emerges on the global stage. Equally
so, a more assertive China under the
leadership of its new premier Xi Jinping has
started using its military muscles in the Asia
Pacific and beyond, and started to transform
the internal system, thus forcing the US to
consider ‘rebalancing’ the Asia Pacific
region.
All of these developments seem to have
emerged in the last two years and western
strategy looks to be reacting to the rapidly
changing world around it, instead of shaping
the change. But is it really so? Has the world
around us change dramatically and
suddenly? A rational explanation is and
should be, of course not. Whilst the global
focus remained on denying Islamist Jihadist
forces, especially Al-Qaeda and its affiliates,
a stronghold (a strategy that backfired on
itself as the situation in Iraq, Syria and
Afghanistan demonstrates), as well as
making the international system -with all its
faults- work at all ‘costs’; other global
powers i.e. Russia and China have slowly
but steadily accumulated both soft and hard
power.
History is a cruel thing; it does not favour
those who do not pay attention to it and it
almost certainly does not forgive those who
do not learn from it. Yet the West - first in
its post-cold war ‘power mode’ and then in
its post 9/11 ‘avenger mode’ has made both
such mistakes repeatedly. Chinese
‘ambitions’ in different regions of the world,
including the Asia Pacific, Africa and
Chinese attempts at spreading its ‘cultural’,
as well as huge western trade deficit in
China’s favour have signalled a shifting
global power balance. Russian manoeuvring
in Central Asia, its use of energy weapons to
control its Eastern European neighbours and
last but not least Russia’s invasion of
Georgia should have been a stark reminder
that something was changing in the
international order. Russia was certainly not
a spent force and China was not just an
economic power that wanted to spread its
‘soft power’ from trade, investment and
culture.
In fact the western policy of ‘jumping in
first and evaluating later’ in the Islamic
world has given a huge advantage to Russia
and even more so to China. Whilst the West
got bogged down in almost unending wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Chinese and
Russians used these policy disasters to their
advantage. The thing about ‘soft power’ is
very simple; to be effective, it needs to be
backed up with ‘hard power’. China in
particular has accurately understood what

5. 4
‘power’ means but most importantly that it
comes in different forms. The Chinese may
have cleverly sneaked in where the US and
Western ‘hard power’ was creating gaps for
‘soft powers’ but quite oppositely the
Russian jumped in with their ‘hard power’
for example in Georgia where Western ‘soft
power’ was not backed up with their ‘hard
power’.
In this game of hard and soft power, known
as ‘smart power’, comes the Arab revolution
and the West again has not ‘acted’ but
‘reacted’ to events. This of course plays
right in the hands of Russia and China and
in an almost U-turn of global history, Russia
starts dictating terms in Middle Eastern
politics. Russia and China also converge not
just over the issue of Syria but on other
important global issues. Whilst the West and
the ‘new east’ i.e. Russia and China play cat
and mouse; the Islamic world where most of
it started is completely overlooked. The
universities, governments and think-tanks in
the Islamic world have almost no notable
programmes on China or Russia whereas
both Russia and China, through more
rigorous cultural diplomacy - be it
Confucius institutes or more assertive
diplomacy - have a more thorough
understanding and greater hands on
involvement in the different regions of the
Islamic world.
This is precisely why the Institute for
Islamic Strategic Affairs (IISA) started its
programme on the ‘Resurgence of Russia &
China; Implications on the greater Mid-East
and wider Islamic world’ in 2014.
Throughout 2014 and 2015 we have studied
and researched different angles of issues
relating to power, politics and diplomacy of
these emerging powers and their internal and
external dynamics, especially their
interactions with the Islamic world as a
civilisation and its different regions. This
paper is our annual strategic brief which
summarises the major trends and dynamics
pertaining to the resurgence of Russia and
China and how they have particularly
impacted on the Islamic world both
regionally and globally in 2014.

6. 5
Chapter 1: The destabilisation of Eastern Europe:
Russia’s historical perception of insecurity and its
repercussions for modern Europe – Timothy Williams
In March 2014, Former US secretary of
state Hillary Clinton compared Putin’s
annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula
to Hitler’s annexation of the
Czechoslovakian Sudetenland in 1938.
Although the analogy clearly has its
weaknesses, namely the world being very
different to 1930s Europe, it did make a
pertinent point about the tactics which Russia
has used in Eastern Europe and in the way
that it views national security.
The formation of Russia,
from imperial power
under the Tsars, to Soviet
Communism and into the
post-Cold-War era of the
1990s has been one of
territorial ambitions,
imbued with a sense of
vulnerability. Positioned
on the fringes of Europe
and the steppes of Asia, with no geographical
protection, Russia’s raison d'État has been
expansionism to protect against attack. Yet it
is in the post-modern world that these fears
still remain and continue to influence Russian
foreign and domestic policy.
One of the major justifications for recent
Russian polices in Eastern Europe has been
to declare that Russia has a responsibility to
all Russian speakers. In March 2014, Putin
declared that it was Russia’s responsibility to
protect Russian speakers throughout the
world and that they had the right to Russian
citizenship.1
These are however justifications
for actions intended to increase Russian
‘security’. To understand why language is
used to justify intervention in Europe, we
must look at the history of Europe for the
past two centuries.
The use of language as a definer of which
nation people should belong to has its roots
in the formation of the ethno-nationalist
states of Europe in 19th
and 20th
Century.
Seen by many as a way to overcome the
injustices of European imperial rule, ethno-
nationalist movements
emerged to create their own
states. It did not take long for
these movements to be
exploited by nation states to
help further their territorial
ambitions through using
agent provocateurs to create
a crisis, which could then be
used to justify foreign
intervention to protect its
‘people’ lying within a foreign border.
European history is patchwork of empires
and states which have controlled different
parts of the continent at various times
throughout history and the same justification
of language would entitle several countries
domain over much of the globe due to the
prevalence of these languages. Putin has
therefore used the principles and tactics of
19th
Century ethno-nationalism to further his
own territorial and geopolitical ambitions.
Putin has used the
principles and tactics
of 19th Century ethno-
nationalism to further
his own territorial and
geopolitical ambitions

7. 6
Viewed through this historical lens, the
Ukrainian move towards the EU in early
2014, prompted by
overthrowing President
Viktor Yanukovych, was
seen as a shift away from
Russia’s sphere of
influence. Fearing losing
its buffer zone and a
potential NATO state on
its borders, Russia acted
to support small groups
of separatists in Eastern
Ukraine who were less
willing to join the West, seeing themselves as
more Russian than Ukrainian. Ukraine,
independent of Russian influence, was also
more likely to refuse to renew the Russian
lease on Sevastopol port for the Russian
Black Sea fleet, which would have removed
Russian access to a warm water port. Russian
belief that the Ukraine’s political shift was a
security threat has elicit the following
response.
Russia’s response began by sending
unidentifiable troops to the Crimea,
nicknamed ‘little green men’ (see figure 1
right) because of their lack of identifiable
allegiance. They were said to be ‘patriots’
who aimed to protect Russian speakers from
the rise of fascist groups in Ukraine, yet it
was quite clear from their equipment and
other factors that they were Russian soldiers,
a fact later confirmed by President Putin.2
Yet before these Russian soldiers arrived
there was no discernible rise in violence in
region, especially aimed at Russian speakers.
However with the Russian presence, the
Crimea seceded from Ukraine in a
referendum which had signs of clear
corruption. A leader of the ‘Russian self-
defence’ forces in Crimea, Igor Girkin, stated
that the majority of the law enforcement,
administration and army of Crimea were
hesitant to support the "self-defence" forces
and they actually had to
"forcibly drive the deputies
to vote [to secede from
Ukraine]", and only the
presence of regular Russian
army in Crimea "made the
whole thing work".3
Following the secession,
the Crimea was absorbed
into the Russian federation.
Putin has since confirmed
that he planned to annex
Crimea weeks before the referendum.4
Since the annexation, Russia has escalated its
intervention in Eastern Ukraine. In the
Eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and
Luhansk, pro-Russian groups declared
independence from the Ukrainian
government and separatist groups started
carving out territory. Russia has provided
support to these groups with weapons and
manpower, giving them a distinct advantage
against the Ukrainian army beset by outdated
weapons and decimated by corruption.
Russian heavy weaponry and soldiers have
played a decisive role in enabling the
separatists to expand their area of control in
eastern Ukraine. Although it is unclear
exactly what Putin’s eventual aim is, it seems
that he seeks to expand Russian control in
Russian heavy
weaponry and soldiers
have played a decisive
role in enabling the
separatists to expand
their area of control in
eastern Ukraine
Figure 1. One of Putin’s 'little green men'

8. 7
eastern Ukraine and eventually create a land
corridor with the Crimea and a buffer zone
against the rest of the Ukraine. Although
Putin has denied Russian involvement in
eastern Ukraine, the evidence clearly
demonstrates strong Russian support.
The episode also illustrates another element
of Russian policy shaped by its previous
history. In the Crimea and in Eastern Ukraine
Russia has been demonstrating the use of
Maskirovka, a Russian term for a holistic
tactic of denial and deception. It is a process
whereby you manufacture the fog of war and
create the uncertainties, allowing you to
exploit the confusion.5
It has long been an
integral part of Russian military training and
predates the Russian state by
centuries. These tactics have
been used to great effect by
Putin in Eastern Europe,
allowing him to slowly take
territory by using proxies,
whilst avoiding a clear state
on state war. This has been
exemplified by the use of
Putin’s ‘troll army’, a large
group of Russian’s paid to
post pro-Russian and anti-
Western propaganda online.6
This has helped
to confuse the narrative, allowing Putin to
benefit from the state of confusion.
Putin’s intervention to protect Russian
speakers and prevent the rise of neo-fascists
in Ukraine has created the problem which it
was ostensibly intended to solve. These
events have provoked a pushback from
Ukrainian citizens and created the violence
and internal breakdown of security which
was the original justification for intervention.
The Ukrainian military, significantly
weakened by corruption, a lack of resources
and fighting a superiorly equipped force
backed by Russia has had to rely upon militia
groups, some of which are made up of neo-
fascists, to bolster their capabilities. The
Ukrainian government is also resorting to
more draconian policies to help fight the war.
Having removed conscription in 2013, the
Ukraine reintroduced it in 2014. With over
85,000 men avoiding the draft in 2014,
Ukrainian officials have cracked down on
civil liberties such as restricting the freedom
of movement for military aged men.7
The conflict seems to be becoming
intractable as diplomatic solutions fail to
materialise. Despite several attempts at
ceasefires, most have broken down quickly,
with each side blaming the other. Although
there may be some truth in
these claims, it appears to be
another instance of
Maskirovka, as the pro-Russian
separatists have consistently
improved their strategic
positions following these
ceasefire attempts. The fall of
Debaltseve was a clear
indication of this tactic as pro-
Russian fighters took the
opportunity provided by a
ceasefire to take the strategically important
town.8
Russia continues to use the situation
for its own ends and rejected Ukrainian calls
for UN peacekeepers to monitor the
ceasefires. The current ceasefire is unstable
with each side using it to strengthen their
forces.
The longer that the conflict in Eastern
Ukraine continues, the more likely it is to
become a frozen conflict, allowing Putin to
create a small self-declared state similar to
South Ossetia or Abkhazia. This would
create a buffer zone which Putin desires.
There have also been indications that South
The West has
reacted to the
Russian threat by
training Ukrainian
soldiers and
providing other
non-lethal support

9. 8
Ossetia and Abkhazia may be increasingly
absorbed under Russian control, having acted
as semi-independent states for several years.9
The West has begun to react to the threat
from Russia, with NATO forces becoming
more present and visible in member states
close to Russia. Rearmament is slowly
occurring in other Eastern European nations
and the Baltic States are increasingly feeling
threatened. Lithuania has reintroduced
conscription to boost its military capability.
The West is slowly moving
up the level of support with
the US and UK now
providing training to the
Ukrainian forces and non-
lethal aid. The US is also
mooting the idea of
sending weapons to
support Ukraine. This is
likely to help it in the short
term but not deter Russian
intervention, which will
likely increase. Russia is
likely to continue to
support the separatists and
try to create a land
connection to the Crimea, with the aim of
creating another frozen conflict and slowly
absorbing the territory into the Russian
federation. The Ukraine conflict is therefore
becoming a proxy war with Russia
continuing to arm, finance and provide
manpower to the separatists.
It is difficult to determine how Europe will
react to Russia in the long term. It may have
a beneficial effect on Europe, reversing the
increasingly separatist feelings within the EU
which threaten to pull it apart. It could
however exacerbate the separation and speed
up a European breakup. If European leaders
don’t tackle the grievances of southern
nations such as Greece and Cyprus, Russia
may step in to further ferment discord and
break up the union. Whilst there are some
genuine grievances from Russia, including
NATO expansion to the East and Western
failure to take account of Russian views of its
security, the Russian reaction has been
counter to both international law and the
general norms of state behaviour. Without
diplomacy and compromise from both sides,
then it seems likely that a second cold war
may be beginning, but with a very different
dynamic given Russia’s
growing dependency on
China (see chapter 8). We
must however consider that
a weakened Russia is a
dangerous Russia, with
Putin feeling threatened, he
is more likely to take risks
and attempt further
brinksmanship.
Without a settlement soon,
Ukraine may shift further
towards total war, with
foreign fighters being
drawn in. It has already
drawn in Chechen fighters on both sides of
the conflict, with it potentially becoming a
proxy battle for their own frozen conflict.10
The fighters are currently non-Jihadist and it
may help divert young Chechens away from
joining ISIS in Syria. However, in the long
run, it could help to import hardened Jihadist
fighters from Chechnya and Syria into
Europe. It is therefore imperative for Europe
to find a solution to the conflict, or the
security of Europe could be threatened, not
just by Russia, but also Jihadist fighters in
mainland Europe. Europe stands at a cross
roads; the way it deals with the Ukraine crisis
is likely to shape the whole nature of Europe
in the years to come.
It is imperative for
Europe to find a
solution to the conflict,
or the security of
Europe could be
threatened, not just by
Russia, but also
Jihadist fighters in
mainland Europe

10. 9
Chapter 2: ‘The Cold war is dead, long live the cold
war’: Western response to the Rise of Russia and
China in perspective - Usama Butt & Angeliki
Kontodimos
The rise of Russia on world stage starts from
the decline of Boris Yeltsin and the
emergence of a new figure on the Russian
political scene; Vladimir Putin. An ex KGB
officer; Putin inherited an economically
stagnant, proto western, internally divided
and globally disoriented Russia. Putin,
unlike his predecessor, fully realised
Russian potentials and its geo-strategic
importance. He understood that although
Russian ideas may have been ‘defeated’ as
Soviet Union fell; its soft
and hard power remained
intact. He also understood
that Russia remained a
regional, nuclear and
military power.
Above all, Putin
understood fully that it was not an ‘end of
history’ as Fukuyma11
claimed and that the
world may have changed momentarily but
not completely. The rise of Putin coincided
with other internal and external phenomenal
developments including consistently high
global oil and gas prices and the events of
9/11, with the subsequent US/NATO
obsession to eliminate Islamists and
Jihadists ideologies. When President Bush
claimed that he had ‘looked into Putin’s
soul’12
; he failed to observe that Putin had
also looked into his soul too. Russia had
been involved in the Middle East for
decades and Putin understood that US
ventures to change Middle Eastern dynamics
will not succeed.
While US and the west was involved in the
so called global war on terror (GWOT)
Putin, trained by the KGB, started to assert
his power internally by getting rid of
oligarchs and their monopolies. Having
largely defeated the Chechen rebellion in
late 90’s he was also successful in creating
an ‘enemy’ that Russians could align against
which rekindle once disoriented Russian
identity. The rise of Russia - put simply - is
intertwined with the rise of Putin and the
rise of Putin is intertwined
with the decline of the west
due to its ventures in the
Islamic world.
China on the other hand
fully understood that power
does not come in one form.
Chinese success has been due to its rigorous
understanding of how power works, in
particular how west has been able to use
different forms of power to consolidate
power over the centuries. The Chinese
cautiously welcomed capitalism and western
economic thinking in a way which would
benefit China without weakening the central
authority and power of the communist party.
China understood that to change the world
to China’s benefit, it had to understand how
western power works and then work within
it to eventually tilt the balance to its
advantage.
The process, which began in the 1990s, is
now starting to pay off. China have been
keenly observing the west and working
Putin understood
fully that it was not
an ‘end of history’ as
Fukuyma claimed

11. 10
within the international system to their
strategic advantage. The rise of China once
again coincides with the western military
involvement in the Islamic world after 9/11.
China took full advantage of the gap in the
market for soft power in different regions of
the Islamic world and across the globe,
while US and the west was doing exactly the
opposite i.e. demonstrating its hard power
across the Muslim world in Counter-
terrorism efforts.
The near simultaneous rise of Russia and
China unsurprisingly coincides with short-
sighted western policies in Iraq, Afghanistan
and other parts of the Islamic world and the
global stage. In simpler
words; Russia and China
crept onto the global
power stage while the west
was looking the other way.
This brings us to the
situation in the past few
years i.e. post Arab
revolution period where
China emerges as a key
player in Asia Pacific and
Africa, and Russia in the
Middle East, Caucasus and
Eastern Europe.
In retrospect, western responses to Chinese
and Russian advances have at been at best
slow and at worse counterproductive. Both
Russia and China - taking advantage of
western engagement in the Islamic world -
have also been able to play one western
power against another. While NATO was
fully involved in Afghanistan over the last
decade; both China and Russia looked to
Europe. ‘Divide and rule’ may be too strong
a phrase to use but Sino-Russian policies
have been very close to this. Both China and
Russia took strategic advantage of the
economic meltdown. China in particular saw
a huge shift of trade deficits (Currently US-
China trade deficits stands over $300 Billion
whereas EU’s deficit to China is in excess of
$120 Billion)13
. This of course is not to say
that economic meltdown did not impact on
Sino-Russian internal dynamics, but the
strategic advantage both countries enjoyed
outweighs the internal economic losses.
Furthermore, China in particular has been
very good at playing a ‘divide and rule
game’ with EU. It quickly realised that
Brussels does not have actual central
authority and member states often enjoy
independent policies. Beijing consequently
grew closer to German
block whilst keeping the
UK-French block at bay.
China has also invested
(diplomatically and
economically) in Eastern
Europe. Russians have also
established similar patterns
while establishing closer
strategic and trade
relationships with stronger
economic member states,
especially Germany. In
essence then; while Russia and China have
played a classic ‘divide and rule’ card; the
most important thing to remember is that
they did not, and to some extent, still do not
face any challenges and obstacles from EU
or other western countries that may hinder
this practise. Although now UK is coming to
realise the ‘Russian threat’. However, the
Ukraine episode and the subsequent
European response demonstrated that while
almost all member states and Brussels
agreed that Russia had to be stopped, the
West has largely remained slow and divided
in its strategic responses.
The western ‘strategy’
seems to hover
around four year
administration cycles
which are in effect not
a strategy but set of
‘short term policies’

12. 11
This clearly points to a Western strategy of
‘not having a strategy’ both in peace and
war. The western strategy seems to hover
around four year administration cycles
which are in effect not a strategy but set of
short term policies. In retrospect; China in
particular, and Russia to an extent, have
clear strategic goals. One only has to
superficially analyse Chinese white papers
published in the last few
years. Chinese strategic
vision of 2020 and its
subsequent actions to
meet that strategic vision
are but one aspect of
this.
Western Economic Responses to Russia
Economics remain a pivotal driver of
international change and the economic
relations between the EU and Russia and
China in 2014 are important to observe.
Since the beginning of 2014, significant
capital flight has hit the Russian Federation,
mainly as a result of Russia's longstanding
structural economic problems causing a lack
of certainty and stability in the Russian
business environment. During 2014 capital
flight from Russia reached over US$150
billion.14
Although the business
environment, unattractive for investors, has
played a paramount role in the greatest
capital flight from Russia since the 2008
recession, the significance of the East-West
crisis for this capital flight cannot be
doubted. Western reactions to Russia's latest
strategic moves have contributed to a
growing perception of Russia as financially
unstable and the Russian government as
indifferent to how detrimental its stances
might be for its trade relations and
consequently to its financial standing in the
world order.15
Following the annexation of Crimea in
March 2014, Western governments have
suspended all trade negotiations with the
Russian Federation and have introduced a
series of punitive economic measures
against the country. Western countries have
been introducing economic sanctions
targeting specific companies, including
major oil firms such as
Rosneft, Transneft and
Gazprom, as well as the
financial, energy and arms
sectors.16
The United States
along with the European
Union have gone even
further by introducing
specific bans targeting individuals known to
be close to the Russian government and
Vladimir Putin.17
More recently, on the 3rd
of October 2014,
the United States government announced
that Russia would no longer be eligible for
the Generalized System of Preferences,
according to which developing countries
benefit from preferential tariffs. The United
States has publicly justified this decision,
which is unlikely to have any concrete
impact on the Russian economy as the GSP
program expired in 2013 and Russian
imports to the US have not been subject to
preferential treatments since then, by
referring to the guidelines of the GSP
program.18
However, this move has been
seen by Russia as a symbolic move, which
despite it being unclear whether it will have
negative effects on Russian external trade,
represents a signal from the United States,
indicating its unwillingness to cooperate
with Russia in finding an amicable solution
to the Ukrainian crisis and normalizing their
trade relations.19
The West has stepped
up sanctions by
targeting the Russian
energy industry

13. 12
The West has also stepped up sanctions by
targeting the Russian energy industry. They
have stopped the transfer of cutting-edge
technologies for the energy industry to
Russia, thus hampering their future
production. They have also banned loans to
state-owned banks and energy companies,
aimed at preventing the development of
further oil fields.20
With Russia so
dependent upon the energy industry, this is
having a significant impact, which is likely
to increase in the next few years as a lack of
access to Western oil technology is likely to
reduce output.
Russia’s economic problems have increased
since December 2014 with the sudden
collapse in the value of the Rouble. This has
been caused by several factors (see chapter
8), including Western sanctions. There are
also suggestions that the West is also
considering banning Russia from the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication (SWIFT) interbank
transfer system. Were this to occur, it would
make money transfers with Russia
extremely difficult and would significantly
increase capital flight. In this circumstance
Russia has claimed that they would create a
rival bank transfer system and Russian PM
Medvedev has recently said that ‘our
economic reaction as with any other reaction
[to a SWIFT ban] will be unlimited’.21
What
this entails seems unclear, but it would
almost certainly involve using Gazprom to
cut off gas supplies to several Eastern
European countries, with other measures
likely. Unless there is a significant
improvement in the conflict in the Ukraine,
which seems unlikely, Russia is likely to
become increasingly isolated from the West.
China-EU Trade Relations
With trading of more than €1 billion a day,
the European Union is China’s biggest
trading partner, while China is the EU’s
second biggest trading partner.22
Along with
the adoption of the 2020 Strategic Agenda
for Cooperation in November 2013, China
and the EU announced the opening of
negotiations for an EU-China
comprehensive investment agreement.23
In
March 2014, the EU also committed to
opening negotiations for a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with China after the
successful conclusion of the Investment
negotiations.24
However, despite the
significant progress made in bilateral
cooperation, the EU believes that there are
still many structural issues in the Chinese
economic system that need to be addressed -
lack of transparency, non-tariff barriers to
trade and the minimal protection of
intellectual property rights - before
proceeding with a Free Trade Agreement.
These issues have also resulted to China and
the EU being parties in various trade related
disputes at the multilateral-WTO level.
China and the EU’s continue to have a
strong economic relationship and there have
been indications that China’s willingness to
maintain good economic relations with the
EU are impacting on their relations with
Russia. Several Chinese investment banks
have pulled out of investment talks with
Russian companies as they want to avoid the
ire of the West and do not want to be seen to
help Russia circumvent US and EU
sanctions. 25
The changing economic position vis-a-vis
Russia and China is having a dramatic
impact upon their relationship. With
Russia’s economy seemingly collapsing and
China benefitting, the terms of their
relationship is also changing. This will be
addressed further in Chapter 8.

14. 13
Chapter 3: Rise of an Empire? Internal Dynamics and
Emerging Trends in China – Dani
The Leadership of President Xi: How Far
do his reforms go?
Although it is too early to provide definitive
judgements about President Xi Jinping’s
leadership, particularly if following the
pattern of China’s last top leadership
succession, which requires ten years, yet a
tentative assessment is still possible. This is
mainly based on the data since 2012, his
appointment as the General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China (CPC) and the Chairman of the
CPC Central Military Commission and later,
since 2013, his appointment as the President
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and the Chairman of the PRC Central
Military Commission.
Moreover, this analysis
is necessary to interpret
what is happening and
presumably what will
occur in the future. The
dynamics and changes
of China of the last three decades, makes
this analysis more significant to see.
There has been a mixed reaction towards
Xi’s leadership, citing his strengths and
weaknesses.26
However, there is generally a
relatively positive appreciation of him,
especially from internal stakeholders,27
with
many seeing the spirit of renewal and
rejuvenation spreading across the country.
The ‘Chinese Dream’ is the neologism of
the regime, aimed at becoming the zeitgeist
for Xi’s China and is closely linked to the
path of transforming China into a developed
country, focussing on the two most
important centenary milestones for the
Chinese Communist Party to achieve this.
These are the century anniversary of
Communist Party of China in 2021 and the
formation of the People’s Republic of China
in 2049. To this end, some reform agendas
have been set and started. The anti-
corruption campaign is the flagship
programme that aims to catch both ‘flies’
and ‘tigers’ and thus hopefully promote
more effectiveness and efficiency of the
government. The economic reforms have
been intensified, strengthening the market
economy through furthering economic
liberalisation. The military modernisation is
proceeding, with the aim
of guarding and
maintaining national
security. Some other
improvements, including
legal reform have been
initiated; however, Xi’s
reform agenda lacks a clear of plan for
political reform to improve governance,
representation and diversity. This is one of
the strongest critiques against Xi’s
leadership.28
While there was a strong expectation that Xi
would be more accommodating to diverse
opinions and flexible in handling criticism
compared to his predecessor, owing to his
exposure to the West, including a short time
in the United States during 1980s, this hope
seems to be diminishing. He has increase
some limits upon civil liberties in the hope
of maintaining political stability. The tighter
control over public access to, and freedom
Xi Jinping’s anti-
corruption campaign is
his flagship programme

15. 14
of expression on, the internet, the harsher
oppression against religious and ethnic
rights in some regions, and the stricter
approach to any dissidents, are but a few
examples of this. All of these are done in the
name of nationalism and public interests.
Xi’s reform agenda has been viewed by
some as a merely populist campaign,
intended to increase his political image and
gain broader support and legitimacy in the
eyes of the Chinese people. Moreover, Xi
has focused more on building his own
domestic legitimacy, a necessary step to
advance the rest of his reform agenda.29
As the fifth generation of China’s
Communist leadership, Xi is facing his own
challenges including several corruption
crises and significantly slower economic
growth after more than three decades of
miraculous growth. Xi’s
challenge is to make
significant changes,
while at the same time,
looking to build
continuity and stability.
It is also clear that Xi
would like to reform
some areas, but also maintain the status quo
on the other areas. His high level of
education and decisiveness also brings him
charisma comparable to the late Deng
Xiaoping and even Mao Zedong himself.
Yet, his one-man show is considered as a
betrayal against the collective leadership
implemented since post Deng period, and
acts as a reminder of the possibility of the
emergence of a strong man with higher
centralised authority, or even a dictator.30
His background as the son of Xi Zhongxun,
a national hero who fought with Mao during
revolutionary period, as well as his step-by-
step political career, gives him significant
legitimacy and knowledge to lead a possible
reform. However, these aspects also indicate
that there will be limits to the reforms.
While a certain degree of reform is
expected, there are fundamental questions
about how far or fundamental it will go.
Reflecting the paradoxes above, it is more
realistic not to expect too much from Xi.
Nevertheless, it is more appropriate and
accurate to keep watching and observing
him and his rest of the period, at least until
his first term which is going to finish in
2017 or 2018.
Reform Policies: How Important is the
Anti-Corruption Crusade?
The reform agenda cannot be separated from
the momentum of the top leadership change,
from the fourth generation of President Hu
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to the fifth
generation of President
Xi Jinping and Premier
Li Keqiang. This reform
plan which came out
since the 18th
National
Congress of the
Communist Party of
China in 2012, has to be
put into context of the economic and
political situation. Xi directly leads two
newly established groups dealing with the
issues; the Comprehensive Deepening of
Reform group and the National Security
Commission. While the economic reform
started in 1978 following the death of Mao
and the embraced capitalism, the current
reform plan is on the verge of the economic
sluggishness and the political crisis. The
case of Bo Xilai, for example, has shown a
bitter reality and deep impacts to the
Chinese people and the global public, as the
case did not only involve one of the highest
officials in the country but also foreign
actors. As shown by the legal decision given
Political and economic
reforms are likely to be
far slower than anti-
corruption reforms

16. 15
to Bo, the problem is mainly associated to
the massive corrupted acts both in terms of
quality and quantity, which is particularly
pervasive in the circle of public sector
officials. As a result, the anti-corruption
crusade has become one of the most
essential points on the reform plan.
The anti-graft campaign under the slogan of
catching both flies and tigers has brought
significant changes. Data released by the
Chinese Communist Party indicates that
over 100,000 party members have been
disciplined as part of the investigations.31
The anti-corruption efforts have not shyd
away from high profile figures with Zhou
Yonggang, the ex-member of highest body
in the CPC, the Politburo Standing
Committee and the previous Secretary of the
Central Political and
Legislative Committee,
being charged with
corruption. Another
prominent figure caught
with corruption charges is
General Xu Caihou,
another Politburo member
and the Vice Chairman of
the Central Military
Commission during Hu’s period. These bold
actions are believed to be part of broader
reform agenda led by Xi.32
Without charging
high ranking officials, it seems likely that
the reforms will not succeed. The belief and
reality is that corruption is endemic within
the system, tightly woven into the system
which causes bureaucratic barriers and
inefficiency utilisation. To expand its
military power, modernizing the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) also depends upon
cutting corruption with military
institutions.33
On the other hand, this
corruption probe may backfire, creating
distrust and instability, and threatening to
decrease support toward the Xi’s regime.34
This dilemma has forced Xi to take decision
prudently and strategically.
At the economic sector, after reaching two
digits for decades, the slowing of economic
growth is becoming the new normal, and the
main issue is to maintain growth which is
more economically, environmentally and
socially sustainable.35
To be more resilient
in facing the global crisis, is another
challenge to solve. The lessons from the
recent US and Europe crisis have indicated
the need for China to rely more on domestic
market than exports. Opening market and
financial liberalisation are being done,
including lessened control over the Yuan.
However, there are some issues, such as the
anti-monopoly law and the information
security which may
threaten any foreign
investments. In addition,
the huge inequality gap and
rapid environmental
degradation are still
haunting the Xi’s regime.
Other reforms are under
way too, like judicial
reforms which strengthen
the rule of law process in the local level.36
This legal reform is considered essential,
despite the many hurdles.37
In general, the anti-corruption plan has
become the highlight of the reform agenda.
On one side, it is fundamental due to its
contribution to executing other reform
agenda. The severity of corruption in China
definitely becomes a huge barrier for more
comprehensive and rapid reform. Yet, on the
other side, the anti-corruption crusade is
important in establishing a stronger
legitimacy among people, particularly about
Under Xi’s leadership,
China’s foreign
policies are not only
considered assertive,
but also proactive

17. 16
the CPC’s rule in China. Worsening
corruption would certainly send the message
to the Chinese people that the regime cannot
be trusted and sustained anymore.
China Assertive Foreign Policies: A
Paradox?
Following its increasing soft and hard
power, China’s foreign policies have
become considerably more assertive in the
past few years. China has taken a more
assertive approach to protect its national
security interests and ensuring access to the
resources necessary to maintain economic
growth. Furthermore, China regards the
USA’s ‘pivot to Asia’ as a policy of
containment, which is a threat, both to
China’s quest of resources, but also to its
national security. Cyber warfare has become
the newest area of conflict between the two
nations, with each conducting cyber
espionage. The United States’ continued
relations with Taiwan and provision of
military equipment is a further source of
tension. The tension has been heightened by
US support for countries in the region which
feel threatened by China’s assertive policies.
The US has maintained strong ties with the
traditional allies in the region, such as Japan,
South Korea and has also sought to increase
ties with countries including the Philippines
and Vietnam. Yet, the two nations remain
deeply interdependent, with Xi suggesting
that they have established ‘a new model of
big power relationship’, with economic
interdependence key to prevent tension
turning into direct clash conflict.38
While China has many border disputes with
its neighbouring countries, the dispute in the
East China Sea has received particular
attention. The dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with Japan is one of
the most important territorial disputes for
China because of its importance to its
national identity. Despite the East China Sea
border dispute also involving South Korea,
China has focused much more on its
engagement with Japan.39
It is quite clear
then, that nationalist sentiment plays
important roles in this issue, in which the
historical accounts are never left aside. The
South China Sea is even more complex due
to the greater number of countries involved,
and clashes with the Philippines and
Vietnam over this matter, has stirred up anti-
China movement, in each country.
Another important issue is China’s
relationship with the Central Asia countries
and Russia, which is not only about
economic cooperation but security ones due
to the problem of separatism and terrorism
in the Northwest area. While the Central
Asia region has significant potential to
supply China with resources, particularly oil
and gas, China’s cooperation with these
countries in the region is also influenced by
Russia. Yet, the shared interest to encounter
the US and its western allies’ dominance in
global politics always opens the door of
cooperation opportunity between China and
Russia, with the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) going from strength to
strength.
China’s foreign policies in other regions are
also pragmatic, especially in terms of the
economic benefits. The relationship with
India, very unstable since their
establishment, is also driven by the
economic exchange, limiting the impact of
border disputes. Chinese relations with the
European Union (EU) function in a similar
way; while China is criticised over its

18. 17
human rights abuses, economic cooperation
continues to increases.
Under Xi’s leadership, China’s foreign
policies are not only considered assertive,
but also proactive.40
China is trying to take a
bigger role in determining the regional and
international political landscape. Its
increasingly dominant role that China plays
in developing and maintaining emerging
power organisations such as BRICS and the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB) clearly demonstrate this. Xi’s foreign
policies are far more assertive than those of
his predecessors. Deng’s formulation of
“Hide and Bide”, the 1990s policy of an
“amicable, tranquil and prosperous
neighbourhood” and the even more recent
“Peaceful Rise”, contrast significantly to the
reality of Chinese foreign policy. There is a
significant disparity between China’s self-
perception and other countries’ perceptions
of it. China’s assertive foreign policies are
meant to protect its sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political economic interests.
However, these policies are increasingly
counterproductive in achieving their states
purpose, frequently give opposite results.41
If China fails to take account of these
differences of perception, it may find that
many more states turn away from it.

19. 18
Chapter 4: The revival of gunboat diplomacy? China’s
assertive push in the South China Sea and its soft-
power ambitions – Timothy Williams
China’s ‘peaceful rise’ has been the national
mantra since the 1990s and has been used in
an attempt to assuage fears that it would use
its growing international significance to
remodel the international system. Although
China has made strong efforts to use soft
power to further its interests and has
generally adopted a policy of non-
intervention, the South China Sea
has been the region to first feel
China’s hard power. Its increasingly
assertive foreign policy is
significantly altering the region, and
in the process is demonstrating that
this peaceful rise is on its own terms,
whilst simultaneously demonstrating
the limits of Chinese soft power to
influence other’s actions.
The significance of the South
China Sea
The South China Sea is important to
China for several reasons. The first
is the significant economic
importance as about half of the
world’s merchant tonnage flows
through the region, carrying $5.3
trillion of goods annually.42
The Sea
is also rich in natural resources with
about 10 percent of global fishing
stocks and potentially vast energy
resources. Estimates for the region vary
from only a few billion barrels of proven oil
and gas reserves to 125 billion barrels of oil
and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in
undiscovered resources according to the
Chinese National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC).43
There are also potentially large
deposits of Methane hydrates, which have
been touted as a significant future energy
reserve. As China is now the world’s largest
energy consumer and has indicated its
intention to provide 85% of its energy needs
domestically by 2020, this is a significant
factor in ensuring greater energy security.44
The second major reason is the national
significance that the region has to China.
The Chinese claim to the territory is based
Figure 2. The 'nine dash' line

20. 19
upon historical records which they assert
date back to the 13th Century, although the
territory has only been claimed in its current
form since 1947 by Chiang Kai-shek’s
nationalist government. In 1953 the claim
was modified and the notion of the ‘nine-
dash line’ (see figure 2 above) was created
to include all territory within it.45
One of the
aims of China’s rise has been to recover
from the perceived humiliation of
colonialism from the 19th Century and
return to the preeminent position in the
international system which China enjoyed
for millennia. Not to protect China’s
territorial claim would seem to be a similar
capitulation. In 2012 China made the South
China Sea a core national interest; to
relinquish control would send a sign to the
nationalists that the government is weak.
The rising tide of nationalism within China
has already led to a stand-off in the East
China Sea with Japan over the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, with nationalists
calling for China to actively assert itself in
the region. The same forces are starting to
shape Chinese perceptions of the South
China Sea.
The third is China’s strategic concerns. The
South China Sea forms part of the Chinese
strategy to overcome their asymmetric
military capabilities vis-a-vis the US by
pushing the US beyond the ‘First Island
Chain’ which runs from the Kurile Islands,
through the main islands of Japan, the
Ryukus, the Philippines, and Borneo (see
figure 3 below). This is to establish an anti-
access/area denial strategy (A2/AD), aimed
at deterring the US from being able to bring
its naval assets close to the Chinese
mainland, therefore buffering China from
direct military threat. The eventual aim
seems to be to push the US beyond the
second island chain.
The region has not
experienced full peace for
several decades, with minor
territorial clashes between
China and Vietnam and the
Philippines; however the
last few years have seen an
escalation of the territorial
disputes, both in severity
and number as China now
has serious disputes with
all of the countries with
maritime territory in the
South China Sea. China
appears to be seeking to
create a sphere of influence
in the South China Sea and
surrounding areas, similar to the USA’s
Monroe Doctrine of the 19th Century. To
achieve this it has undertaken a long term
strategy to assert its de facto control of the
region through a novel strategy which falls
short of armed conflict, but has allowed it to
Figure 3. The 2 island chains

21. 20
significantly alter the regional status quo by
slowly establishing regional dominance.
Para-gunboat diplomacy
This phenomenon has been called ‘para-
gunboat diplomacy’ by Christian Le Miere
and has been characterised by the combined
use of the Chinese coast guard, civilian
vessels and non-state groups to control
maritime territory without the negative
consequences of using traditional military
force.46
They act as maritime paramilitaries
and by their nature this makes it difficult for
traditional navies to respond because there is
no official military threat and therefore no
acceptable recourse to force. This has been
undertaken with the triad of establishing
control of maritime
territory, building
artificial islands and
populating existing
islands with Chinese
Citizens.
For several years China
has been using its coast
guard to defend its
territorial claims within
the nine-dash line, with
particular efforts in several key areas
including around the Spratly Islands, the
Paracel islands and the Scarborough Shoal.
This has included regularly detaining non-
Chinese fishing boats which enter the
territory within the nine-dash line, even if it
legally falls within another state's maritime
territory. They have also been intercepting
supply ships from reaching islands and
territory held by other states, in an attempt
to force them to leave. Chinese ships have
also been blamed for ramming and
subsequently sinking a Vietnamese fishing
boat.
These tactics escalated in May 2014 when
the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company
(CNOOC) towed the Haiyang Shiyou 981
oil rig into a position close to the Paracel
Islands and 120 nautical miles from the
Vietnamese coast, which is within
Vietnam’s 200 miles EEZ. They also towed
a second oil rig even closer to the
Vietnamese coast. The stated purpose was to
test for oil reserves. The oil rigs were
protected by an armada of Chinese ships,
possibly numbering in the hundreds and
consisting of a combination of Chinese coast
guard ships and small Chinese fishing ships
which swarmed around the oil rig to protect
it and intercept Vietnamese coast guard
ships. These were used to prevent
Vietnamese ships from
coming close to the oil
rigs. The combined use of
civilian vessels and coast
guard ships make an
effective force for
imposing territorial claims
on the region, without the
negatives of using actual
naval vessels.
The second significant
tactic China has employed is extensive
building in the region, including the
construction of artificial islands and
lighthouses. China has begun a major land
reclamation project on the Johnson South
Reef, part of the Spratly islands. The island
seems likely to feature a military base which
would include a port and an airbase, and
would be at least double the size of the US
military base of Diego Garcia, which
occupies an area of 44 square kilometres. If
this comes to fruition, it will enable China to
control a large swathe of territory in the
region. China has also recently built
Para-gunboat diplomacy
allows China to control
maritime territory
without the negative
consequences of using
traditional military force

22. 21
artificial islands on Cuateron, Johnson South
and Gaven Reefs.47
China’s proposed
construction of lighthouses on the disputed
Paracel Islands is a further sign of using
building to enforce control of maritime
territory.48
China may use these new
airbases to enforce an air-defence
identification zone (ADIZ) on the South
China Sea, as it did in East Asia, covering
the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
The third major tactic has been through the
settlement of existing islands. China has
stepped up efforts to settle the islands it
holds through upgrading its official control
of the region and establishing permanent
settlements on islands in the South China
Sea. In 2012 China announced the
establishment of Sansha city on Woody
Island (Yongxing
Island), the largest of
the Paracel Islands. This
was done with the
intention that it would
administer the whole
territory within the
nine-dash line and
included establishing a
military garrison, a small airport, a hospital
and recently a school. The island is only 13
square kilometres in size but was intended to
administer over 2,000,000km2
of ocean.
This settlement has been done for two
reasons.49
The settlement of civilians makes
any potential military action difficult
because of the risk of harming civilians and
it may potentially strengthen legal claims.
All of the above tactics are enabling China
to change the balance in the region and are
likely in breach of the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DoC) made in 2002, aimed at preventing
any country changing the status quo. These
actions have elicited various responses from
regional countries.
Regional responses to China
One of the main responses has been the
increased regional defence spending as
many countries seek to create a credible
deterrence against China. East and Southeast
Asia has seen defence spending increase by
about 5% from 2012-13 and is set to
increase further.50
This has also stimulated
the growth of indigenous defence industries
as Indonesia, Vietnam and Japan are seeking
to boost their capabilities and boost defence
exports in the region.
Many countries are also resorting to tactics
similar to China’s, in order to counter China.
This has involved
strengthening and utilising
their coast guards as
paramilitary enforcers and
civilians to settle islands in
the Sea. The tactic of
settling small islands has
also been mirrored by the
Philippines on islands such
as Pagasa where small civilian communities
are being established on previously
uninhabited or sparsely inhabited islands.
Malaysia and Vietnam are also making
improvements to their existing military
bases on islands in the region.51
One
interesting tactic that Vietnam is employing
is the issuing of drilling licences to foreign
oil corporations for oilfields in its territory.
This has the benefit of demonstrating that it
has legitimate control of the territory and it
also makes it harder for China to use its
paramilitary forces against foreign oil
companies. This culminated in a deal signed
between Vietnam and India which gave
India oil drilling rights within Vietnamese
Non-traditional tactics
can help to reduce the
asymmetric power
disadvantage of small
states within the region

23. 22
maritime territory, some of which was
claimed by China.52
These non-traditional
tactics can help to reduce the asymmetric
power disadvantage of small states within
the region.
The Philippines and Vietnam have also
resorted to legal measures to counter China
as it filed an arbitration case at the UN
arbitral court in The Hague, seeking
clarification on their entitlements under the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). China however refuses to
accept the arbitration. There have also been
attempts by ASEAN to create a legally
binding code of conduct for the South China
Sea, but it requires China to agree to the
terms, which appears
unlikely.53
The USA has been increasing
its presence in the region as
part of its ‘pivot’ to Asia by
moving a greater share of its
military resources to the
Pacific under the United States Pacific
Command (USPACOM). It has sought to
strengthen alliances in the region and
Obama’s regional visit in April 2014 was a
clear sign of this. Japan and the Philippines
got the most from the visit with the US
affirming that the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands were covered by Article Five of the
US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Co-operation
and Security. The Philippines also signed a
ten-year defence pact, called the ‘enhanced
defence co-operation agreement’; however
this has recently been challenged in courts
for being unconstitutional because it was not
approved by the Philippine senate.54
This
could significantly delay the ratification of
the treaty or even prevent its ratification
entirely and hostile views of the US may
continue to make it difficult for it to forge
closer regional ties. The USA has however
been strengthening relations with Vietnam
through the easing of its restrictions on the
sale of arms, Vietnam’s possible joining of
the US led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
trade agreement, a US-Vietnamese nuclear
energy agreement and further military
engagement. The US is also seeking to sell
coast guard vessels to Asian countries to
enable them to resist Chinese pressure.
Japan is also becoming a more important
regional player. China’s territorial dispute
with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
became a major area of regional instability
and conflict in 2012 after the Japanese
government nationalised the islands,
eliciting riots in China.
However in the last year the
number of territorial incidents in
East Asia has declined, with the
focus shifting to the South
China Sea. However the
significant change in 2014 has
seen Japan, under Prime
Minister Abe, become a major balancing
force to China. It has been developing its
military capabilities, especially its power
projection through the creation of flat top
destroyers which could become aircraft
carriers and the establishment of an
amphibious assault unit capable of securing
outlying Japanese islands if they are
invaded. The reinterpretation of Japan's
pacifist constitution to allow for collective
self-defence means that Japan could
militarily aid an ally if they were attacked.
Japan has lifted the self-imposed arms
export ban, meaning that it will be able to
sell weapons abroad. Japan has also recently
agreed to sell 6 coastal patrol boats to
Vietnam and 10 boats to the Philippines to
help each country to police their territorial
waters and prevent Chinese incursions.
Japan may
become a major
balancing force
to China

24. 23
China has been trying to diminish Japan’s
ability to form closer regional alliances
through its public diplomacy campaign to
link Japan’s current rearmament,
constitutional reinterpretation and regional
ambitions to its imperial past. This
campaign has failed as many countries,
feeling threatened by China, are embracing
closer ties with Japan. China’s policies are
also having a destabilising impact on the
domestic politics within the region as
populations pressure their governments to
take a tougher stance against China as
protests and violence increase. This has the
potential to combine with ethno-religious
and other grievances to create significant
conflict in the region.
For many years
Indonesia has been a
mediating force in the
territorial disputes
between China and
other nations in the
region, having been
regarded as relatively
neutral because it didn’t
have a dispute with China; however these
positive relations are likely to be tested.
There have been a number of maritime
incidents in Indonesian territorial waters in
the past few years and these may increase in
the future as China’s nine-dash line contains
maritime territory owned by Indonesia. The
election of Indonesia’s new President Joko
Widodo is also likely to increase the
institutional forces pushing for a harder line
on Chinese territorial ambitions. His lack of
foreign policy experience is likely to make
him reliant upon his advisors, especially his
cabinet which contains tough individuals
including the Defence Minister Ryamizard
Ryacudu, who takes a strong view of
defence and is reluctant to cooperate
multilaterally.55
There have previously been
some altercations between China and
Indonesia on territory and if these increase
in frequency, Indonesia may be forced to
take a firmer stance. Indonesia’s new policy
of sinking ships found to be illegally fishing
in its territorial waters are a clear example of
this and may prove to be an areas of tension
in 2015.56
It may be a sign of a growing
trend of public opinion shaping foreign
policy in the region. Bilateral relations have
been maintained and they recently agreed to
share satellite intelligence57
, yet they are
certainly ensuring military preparedness by
increasing military spending and also
recently announcing the creation of a new
coastguard.58
It therefore
seems that Indonesia is likely
to play a more assertive
regional role in the future.
The rising levels of piracy
and the recent pledge by Al-
Qaeda to attack Chinese
shipping in the region will
prove a significant hurdle to
China’s interests and could
derail plans for the ‘maritime silk-road’. The
best way to counter these threats is through
regional cooperation, which has been made
difficult through Chinese provocations. The
use of para-statal forces will also make the
use of Private Maritime Security
Companies, which have been relatively
effective against piracy elsewhere, far more
likely to spark a serious incident as the
distinction between pirates, civilians and
para-statal forces is becoming increasingly
blurred.
China used the latter
part of 2014 to try to
mend relationships
damaged by its
assertive actions
earlier in 2014

25. 24
Regional rapprochement
In an effort to de-escalate the regional
tensions, China has been seeking
rapprochement in several ways.59
China has
sought to improve relations with Japan,
which culminated in a formal, yet
uncomfortable meeting between the leaders
of the two countries in November 2014.
China has also sought to reduce the
likelihood of a military accident with the
USA by establishing guidelines to notify
each other of military exercises and to create
a set of Safety rules for behaviour in Air and
Maritime encounters.60
Xi Jinping has also undertaken a new soft
power engagement strategy in the region
with the announcement that it was China’s
duty to fulfil the ‘Asia-Pacific dream’ of
peaceful regional economic development.61
This has taken the form of various free trade
and investment treaties and
institutions. The most
important of these is the
signing of the Chinese led
free trade area of the Asia-
Pacific (FTAAP)
agreement on between all
21 APEC members.62
China has also signed free
trade agreements with
South Korea and Australia, to secure much
needed resources and access to the tertiary
service sector.63
The second major element
of the dream is the provision of preferential
loans for regional infrastructure
development. As part of this, Xi has pledged
that China will contribute $40 billion to set
up a Silk Road infrastructure fund to
increase transport and communication links
across the region.64
This is in addition to the
Chinese led Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) which will provide $100 billion
to improve regional infrastructure
development, which has received a mixed
regional reception as several countries,
including Indonesia declined to join. By
providing 50% of starting capital, China will
be able to dominate the organisation with its
voting power. However in 2015, the UK,
France and Germany have agreed to join the
AIIB as founding members. This is mainly
due to self-interest, to gain a return from a
rapidly growing region but it is a further
demonstration of how economic power has
shifted. With these nations joining, the
organisation will have greater legitimacy
and it will also dilute China’s voting power
within the organisation.65
China has
provided a further sweetener in the offer of
$20 billion in preferential and special loans
to ASEAN countries to develop
infrastructure, if they agreed to a treaty of
friendship and cooperation.66
Japan has sought to counter Xi’s
‘Asia-Pacific dream’ by
significantly increasing Japanese
investment in South East Asian
infrastructure. The aim is to
triple Japan’s infrastructure
exports to 30 trillion yen ($260
billion) by 2020, with the lions
share going to South East Asia.
In pursuing this goal, Asia, and
ASEAN members in particular, will be a
prime market for infrastructure projects;
demand in the region is estimated at 80
trillion yen annually. Much of this will be
carried out by the Japan Overseas
Infrastructure Investment Corporation for
Transport and Urban Development, which
was established in October 2014.67
Competition for investment in the region is
going to be a big benefit to countries in the
region.
The ‘Asia-Pacific
dream’ is a key
element of China’s
new soft power
strategy

26. 25
The regional countries are warily welcoming
this prospect but are still cautious of China’s
intentions, especially as China’s regional
ambitions have become clearer. Even as
China has sought to improve relations, it has
continued to alter its strategic position in the
South China Sea by building increasingly
sophisticated islands with military bases.
China’s tactics have enabled it to change the
regional dynamic without creating an armed
conflict; however they have alienated
regional countries with which it previously
had good relations. The rising tension and
increasing militarisation of the region by all
sides makes war a possibility; however it is
unlikely in the near future. It is likely that
the small scale conflict will continue with
state and non-state actors being used to
further China’s interests. By making the
region a core interest and allowing
nationalist sentiment to be stoked has made
it difficult for China to compromise on
sovereignty. This has increased their
bargaining position as the other states in
conflict know how damaging it would be for
China to compromise. The demonstrated
effectiveness of ‘para-gunboat diplomacy’
may lead to a proliferation of these tactics
throughout the region and possibly beyond,
including other parts of the Islamic world.
China’s soft power in the region is not yet
having the desired effect as more countries
are being drawn to the US and Japan to
provide security, fearing China’s ultimate
aims. Even though China is putting renewed
efforts into promoting soft power, the past
year has demonstrated that China has not yet
mastered the art of combining soft and hard
power to create smart power and this failure
has opened up opportunities for other
regional powers, especially Japan, to thrive.
Until it figures out how to combine them
successfully, the Asia-Pacific is going to
continue to resist Chinese pressure.

27. 26
Chapter 5: Syria and beyond - Russia & China in the
MENA region - Katie Welsford & Usama Butt
The re-assertion of Russia
In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse,
Russia played only a minimal role in the
Middle East. Today, however, we are seeing
a huge shift as Russia positions itself as a
central player in the region’s politics -
arguably taking advantage of the US retreat
and attempting to reassert itself as a credible
power and partner for Middle Eastern states.
Moscow’s role in Syria - backing Assad,
removing the chemical weapons stockpile -,
its friendship with Egypt, and its position
with Iran all demonstrates the country’s re-
assertion within the region, and its quest to
resume its role as a key global power.
“Russia is on equal footing
now as a power in the
Middle East,” said Leon
Aron, a Russia policy
expert at the American
Enterprise Institute.68
Involvement in Syria,
and wider implications
Russia may have only
played a minor role in the
so-called ‘Arab Spring’,
but there is one exception: Syria. Since the
conflict’s outset in 2011, Russia has played
a key strategic role in propping up the Assad
regime - ensuring its closest Arab ally is not
toppled and that it takes a stand at the
international level against the US. Russian
officials may have made statements to the
contrary - such as PM Dmitri Medvedev
who, in 2012, said “Russia does not support
anyone in this conflict, neither President
Assad (contrary to popular belief) nor the
rebels.....Unfortunately, some countries have
a more one-sided approach”69
. But even to a
casual observer, such a line carries little
resonance, with Moscow’s stance clearly far
from neutral.
On the international level, Moscow has
firmly stood beside Assad - installing deep
divisions within the UN Security Council.
Moscow (along with Beijing) has used its
power of veto four times so far in the
conflict, preventing a tough stance being
taken against the Assad regime - be it in
terms of sanctions, external military force or
political intervention. In
2013, as the west geared
up for intervention
following the chemical
attack in Ghouta, Putin
stood firmly by Assad,
claiming that there was
insufficient evidence that
the regime stood behind
the attack. “No one doubts
that poison gas was used in
Syria. But there is every
reason to believe it was
used not by the Syrian Army, but by
opposition forces, to provoke intervention
by their powerful foreign patrons, who
would be siding with the fundamentalists,”
wrote Putin in an op-ed published by the
New York Times70
. And when, in
September, a Russian-led proposal to place
Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile under
international law and for Russia to work in
dismantling them, thus halting military
intervention, it seemed that “Putin and his
On the international
level, Moscow has
firmly stood beside
Assad - installing
deep divisions within
the UN Security
Council

28. 27
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov emerged as
kingmakers”71
.
But Russia’s support of Assad is also more
underhand - with Russia flooding Syria with
weapons. Indeed, the sale of arms to the
Assad regime constitutes an estimated 10%
of Russia’s global arms sales (valued at
$1.5billion)72
. Russian military advisors are
known to be advising the regime officials,
Russian-supplied Mi-8 and Mi-17
helicopters have reportedly been used for
dropping the horrifyingly deadly barrel
bombs on the citizens of cities such as
Aleppo73
, and Moscow is believed to have
supplied equipment including drones,
armoured vehicles, and spare parts -
essentially providing Assad with a lifeline
which has ensured his continued survival as
president.
But what of the impacts of this across the
Middle East more widely?
On a popular level, there is
widespread dissatisfaction
across the Sunni world
regarding Russia’s role in
Syria. In Lebanon, for
instance, security has had
to be severely stepped up
at the Russian embassy in
Beirut74
. “We hate Assad,
and we hate Russia too.
It’s because of Russia that Assad is still
there,” said one Jordanian national in
Amman this summer. Interestingly,
however, this has not prevented Russia from
maintaining - and developing - friendly
relations with Sunni-dominated
governments in the region.
Consider Turkey, whose government has
firmly backed the Syrian opposition since
the start of the crisis and whose territory -
according to the Turkish Disaster and
Emergency Management Agency (AFAD) -
now hosts over 1.3 million Syrian
refugees75
. There have certainly been
tensions between the two governments -
such as when Turkey forced a Syrian aircraft
transporting weapons from Russia to Syria
to land when it flew over Turkish airspace.
But relations have otherwise remained
relatively friendly, with trade ties continuing
to grow. Today, 55% of Turkey’s energy
supplies are from Russia, as are 12% of its
oil supplies76
. Plans for Rosatom to build
Turkey’s first ever nuclear power plant in
Akkuyu are still going ahead (construction is
forecast to begin in spring 2015)77
, whilst
Turkish companies were actively involved
in building the infrastructure for the Sochi
Olympics78
. For Turkey, a country which is
facing economic difficulties, it simply
cannot afford to lose these economic ties
with Russia - and thus strategic issues such
as Syria, or the Crimea79
,
cannot be allowed to get in
the way of bilateral
relations.
Jordan is a similar case.
The country has seen large
numbers of Syrian
refugees flooding its soil,
and its population is
growing increasingly
frustrated by the war’s impact on their
standard of living. Yet, the Kingdom has not
let this disrupt bilateral relations. In 2013,
King Abdullah visited Moscow to discuss
growing trade ties, the possibility of Russian
involvement in the construction of Jordan’s
first nuclear power station, and military-
technical co-operation. He also made a
repeat visit this year, reportedly with the aim
of discussing the need to find a peaceful
solution to the Syrian conflict. “It’s a great
On a popular level,
there is widespread
dissatisfaction across
the Sunni world
regarding Russia’s
role in Syria

29. 28
honour for me to reconfirm the good
relations between our two countries and our
personal relations,” said King Abdullah
following his April visit80
. Rosatom has also
won a $10 billion contract to build the first
nuclear power plant in Jordan - which is
scheduled to open in 2020. For Jordan, this
plant (which is forecast to produce 12% of
the country’s energy needs), such a
development is particularly valuable -
especially given the current unreliability of
the Egyptian pipelines.
Simply put, in the current economic climate,
governments such as those in Turkey and
Jordan simply cannot afford to allow
strategic issues to stand
in the way of bilateral
relations.
In more recent
developments, Russia has
once again tried to play
some ‘conciliatory role’
in Syria. ‘Moscow talks’
held in January 2015
attempted to bring
different groups on the
table in Moscow,
however, the talks have not produced any
positive results.
Egypt, and the return to the days of
Nasser
When President Morsi was removed by what
some have called a ‘democratic coup’ in the
summer of 2013, many international
governments were quick to criticise the
move. “We are deeply concerned by the
decision of the Egyptian armed forces to
remove President Morsi and suspend the
Egyptian constitution” said Barack Obama81
in the immediate aftermath. The EU quickly
suspended the provision of military aid, with
the US following suit in October, partially
suspending military aid to Egypt (including
Apache helicopters, harpoon missiles and F-
16 warplanes).
In such an environment, Russia has stepped
forward, capitalizing on Egypt’s crisis and
the international response to it in order to
boost its own position in the region -
seemingly returning to the days of Nasser in
which Russia and Egypt shared strong ties.
It is true that Russia had supported the
Brotherhood (despite the Kremlin listing the
group as a terrorist organisation since 2003),
with Sergei Lavrov the first international
politician to visit Morsi
following his election.
However, fears of waning
Russian influence had
grown during Morsi’s year
in power, and last summer’s
coup was thus rapidly
responded to, with Moscow
speedily siding with the
military and stepping
forwards as a favourable
partner to secure its security
needs.
In November 2013, Sergei Lavrov and
Sergei Shoigu met with Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
and Nabil Fahmy in Cairo - the first meeting
of such a kind since the days of the Cold
War, and one which was repeated in
Moscow in February 2014 as Sisi made his
first overseas trip. Whilst the US seems to
stumble forwards indecisively with its
attitude to military aid, delaying deliveries
despite promises otherwise, Russia has
stepped in - signing a $2 billion weapons
deal agreement with Cairo in December
2013. As Sergei Lavrov said in November
2013, “they are looking at other options
Russia has stepped
forward, capitalizing
on Egypt’s crisis and
the international
response to it in order
to boost its own
position in the region

30. 29
following the US decisions to block some
military aid, as any other country would” 82
.
The two countries have also agreed to hold
joint military exercises in 2015.
The Ukraine crisis and subsequent western
sanctions on Russia are also set, according
to Al Ahram, to deepen ties between the two
countries. Indeed, whilst Russia has banned
the import of food and agricultural products
from the west, trade with Egypt is expected
to grow - with Egypt
looking set to increase its
agricultural exports to
Russia to replace Western
goods83
. “As the Arabic
saying goes, “The
misfortunes of some are the
benefit of others””, wrote
Al Ahram.
Iraq, and a cautious ‘battle’ against IS
When the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sha m
(now simply the Islamic State [IS]) swept
across northern Iraq in June 2014, Russia
once again enacted its ‘arms supply
diplomacy’ - just as it has done in Syria and
Egypt. Moscow quickly provided the Maliki
governing with second hand planes (Soviet-
era Su-25 fighter jets) to confront the
militants sweeping across Northern Iraq -
stepping in as Baghdad grumbled about the
length of time it had taken the US to deliver
weaponry.
However, further than this, Russia has not
strayed. Moscow was not invited to join
Obama’s so-called ‘coalition of the willing’
against IS, the Ukraine crisis standing in the
way of any effective coordination. Instead,
Russia has used the situation as a means of
building its anti-western narrative. First,
when IS seized Mosul, Lavrov is quoted as
stating “the events in Iraq illustrate the total
failure of the adventure involving the United
States and Britain” 84
. Then, when the West
began airstrikes in Iraq, Moscow attacked
the US for dealing in double standards - “it
is especially strange when some countries
condemn any terrorist organizations in Iraq,
but take a different look at the activity of the
same groups in Syria” said Vitaly Churkin85
.
And then, when Obama extended airstrikes
to Syria, Moscow once
again condemned the
action, pivoting on its
previous assertions and
quickly condemning such
action as an unnecessary
act of aggression lacking
UN sanction.
Clearly, Russia must step
carefully in dealing with
the ‘IS problem’, its relative proximity to the
militants’ self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ no
doubt causing ripples of concern within the
Kremlin. Not only is there a fluidity to IS’
battle lines, but perhaps more importantly, a
large number of Russian speaking militants
(largely from the Caucasus) are known to
have joined IS (such as the notorious
Tarkhan Batirashvili [nom du guerre - Abu
Omar al-Shishani]). Indeed, a large number
of those attacking the Syrian-Turkish border
city of Kobane are believed to be from the
North Caucasus, led by al-Shishani.
Already, threats have been made. In August
2014, IS militants released a video taunting
Putin and vowing to liberate Chechnya and
the Caucasus86
- something Chechnya’s pro-
Russian leader Ramzan Kadyrov slammed
in an Instagram tirade: “These bastards have
no relations to Islam.... I emphasize that they
finish their days under the hot sun in Syria
In August 2014, IS
militants released a
video taunting Putin
and vowing to liberate
Chechnya and the
Caucasus

31. 30
and Iraq, and in the first instant of death
meet their eternal flames of hell”87
. For
Russia, perhaps more than many other
countries, a wrong step could easily lead to
retaliatory militant action inside its own
borders. A suicide bombing in Grozny on
5th October killed 5, demonstrating just how
volatile the area is and quite what a threat is
posed. As analyst for Al Arabiya, Maria
Dubovikova, writes, “Russia’s interest is not
to provoke the return of fighters, otherwise
we will witness how they will open a new
ISIS front and launch one
more “holy” war, but this
time within Russian
borders”88
.
Since the start of
‘coalition’s operations’
against IS; Russia has been
stepping up its influence in
Kurdistan. Russian
influence with one of the
groups in Kurdistan is
growing stronger. Russia seems to
understand the notion that Kurds are
becoming an important if not ‘key’ players
in the region.
Replacing the US in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace negotiations?
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long
been viewed primarily in connection to the
US - a succession of US presidents all
attempting to negotiate a settlement between
the two sides, with others in the Middle East
quartet such as Russia being shunted to one
side. But with Kerry’s 2013-14 ‘shuttle
diplomacy’ failing to reinvigorate peace
talks, and with Russia seemingly developing
improved relations with both sides, Moscow
seems increasingly likely to seek a role
within future peace negotiations - something
Moscow deems vital to the region’s
stability.
There are close relations between Russia and
Israel - Israel has the largest Russian
speaking diaspora outside the former USSR,
and Russian tourists make up the second
largest group to visit Israel89
. Both countries
regularly co-operate militarily and
strategically - such as the joint production of
weaponry - as well as enjoying various
energy agreements90
. Moreover, when the
UN General Assembly
voted on the 27th March
regarding the Crimean
Referendum, Israel was
strangely quiet. Whilst
striking diplomats were
blamed, fears of damaging
bilateral relations with
Russia, and an acute
awareness that Russia
holds sway over events in
Syria and Iran, are more
likely the cause. Meanwhile, Russia has also
worked on its relations with the Palestinians.
It has remained supportive of Palestine’s
quest for statehood, has hosted discussions
with both Hamas and the PA, has
announced plans to step up trade and
cultural co-operation, and this summer voted
in support of a UN Human Rights Council
probe into ‘war crimes’ in Gaza (something
the US opposed).
Previous peace negotiations arguably failed
in part due to a lack of balance in power
between Israel and Palestine - given that
Israel has historically enjoyed
disproportionately high levels of support
from the US. As Ahmed Qurei, the
Palestinian engineer of the Oslo Accords,
wrote “Israel and the US are two sides of the
same coin”91
. Perhaps we will soon see
Perhaps we will soon
see Russia seeking a
greater role for itself
within peace
negotiations between
Israel and Palestine

32. 31
Russia seeking a greater role for itself within
peace negotiations, drawing upon its
relations with both sides to push the current
stalemate forwards - something Abbas
himself requested when he met Putin in
Moscow in January 2014.
China, and the hedging of bets
Until recently, China has retained a low
profile in the Middle East. Today, however,
Chinese passivity in the region is over, the
country’s behaviour a reflection of its trade
and energy interests and its desires to sustain
its own economic growth. Indeed, as
China’s economy has boomed in more
recent years and the country’s reliance on
foreign energy imports has grown, the
country’s attitude towards the region has
changed. Whilst China was once able to
support itself through local oil fields such as
Daqing north-east of Beijing, today it relies
on foreign imports with 60% of its oil
supplies coming from
the Middle East - thus
substantially out-
weighing the US which
is today working in
boosting its domestic
oil and gas production.
Added to this, of course, is the value the
region plays in terms of trading partners.
In its bid to ensure undisrupted energy
imports and trade relations, China has
worked to ensure a continued friendly status
with key states in the region. Whilst the
country adheres to its long-held policy of
‘non-interventionism’, the aftermath of the
post - Arab Spring upheavals has seen
Beijing becoming more willing to engage
politically, placing heavy emphasis on the
need for stability. Naturally, many Middle
Eastern states approve of the growing
relations with China - not only because the
country acts as an extremely valuable trade
partner, but because of its role as a model of
economic growth which was not coupled
with political liberalisation. According to a
University of Maryland report, 23% of
Arabs surveyed would prefer China to be the
world’s superpower - versus 7% who would
chose the US92
.
The country’s quest for friendly relations
has resulted in it seeking to ensure it takes a
balanced approach to conflict in the region,
seemingly in a bid to ensure it is not
sidelined in any future post-war
environment. Consider Syria, a country with
which China has previously enjoyed
relatively substantial trade relations
(bilateral trade in 2009 was estimated to be
$2.2 billion - and in 2010 Syria was ranked
as China’s third largest importer). Whilst
Beijing has stood by its belief that the
conflict is an entirely internal affair, vetoing
UN Security Council votes to
block external intervention
challenging Assad, the
country has simultaneously
received several opposition
delegations - the most recent
of which saw Ahmad Jarba
(former head of the opposition National
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and
Opposition Forces) meeting with Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi and deputy
Foreign Minister Zhang Ming in April this
year 93
. China has repeatedly demonstrated
its desire not to take sides - tactically
avoiding placing blame on either side for the
use of chemical weapons, and frequently
urging the Assad regime to talk with the
opposition and agree to political changes.
Similar strategies have been seen in regards
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. China
60% of China’s oil
supplies come from
the Middle East

33. 32
enjoys substantial relations with both Israel
and Palestine, and has been continuing to
boost these. This year has seen
developments in terms of Russia and Israel
agreeing to a deepening of bilateral ties -
such as a partnership between Israel’s Tnuva
Food Industries and China’s Bright Dairy &
Food Company. Meanwhile, upon news of
the Fatah-Hamas unity deal in April,
China’s foreign ministry quickly greeted the
move positively. “[China] believes this will
be conducive to Palestinian unity, and
fundamentally conducive to the
establishment of an independent Palestinian
state and peaceful coexistence between
Israel and Palestine”94
. Repeatedly voicing
its support for the need for a peace
settlement, Beijing has attempted to take a
balanced approach to the two sides. During
this summer’s military escalation, Beijing
was quick in voicing its concerns -
immediately condemning the kidnapping of
the three Israeli teens, whilst simultaneously
calling for restraint in the Israeli military’s
response.
Whilst not a conflict situation, a similar
approach has been taken by Beijing in
Egypt. Since the toppling of Mubarak in
2011, China has greeted each successive
government warmly: building relations with
the transitional authorities, Morsi and Sisi.

34. 33
Chapter 6: Russia and China in South Asia and the US
Afghan withdrawal - Usama Butt
In March 2014, IISA’s strategic brief Ibn-
Khaldun Paper (written for the programme
US Afghan withdrawal analysis; regional
and global security implications)’ 95
discussed role, interests and ambitions of
Russia and China at length. The key
arguments are worth repeating here. To start
with China; its key strategic interests are due
to its internal and external situation.
Internally, China wants to develop the
Xinjiang region. The region not only has
huge natural resources but has strategically
became very important for China in the past
few years. This in turn is due to the external
dynamics of China; particularly the US
‘rebalancing’ attempts in South China Sea.
Chinese assertive para-
gunboat diplomacy
discussed above is
designed to win regional
wars but also to counter
US PACOM’s
‘rebalancing’ attempts.
Japanese assertive
manoeuvring is but another addition to
China’s worries. Hence, the Ibn-Khaldun
paper asserted that by developing Xinjiang
China wants to open up more options for
some kind of ‘strategic depths’ in Central
Asia and to the warm trade routes by
‘reopening’ Silk Road route. The Silk Road
will connect China to Central Asia at one
end and to Pakistani strategic port Gawadar
on the other. However, both regions are
fraught with socio-political unrests and
security issues.
Since the publication of Ibn-Khaldun paper
in March 2014; there have been key
developments to Chinese ‘strategic
backyard’ strategy both internally and
externally. Internally, Xinjiang - the key
region for this strategy - has since further
unrest which one of IISA’s reports discusses
in detail.96
Furthermore, militants from
Xinjiang region have penetrated into the
Chinese mainland by carrying out public
attacks.97
On the external front, Chinese
para-gunboat diplomacy is resulting in
creating counter-measure by Japanese
government as well as further asserting
PACOM’s role in ‘rebalancing’ attempts. In
order to counter Chinese ‘strategic backyard
strategy’ i.e. reopening Silk trade route; the
US is preparing to build a port in Oman
which will directly challenge Gawadar
port’s strategic
importance.98
The US Afghan
withdrawal comes in this
strategic context. Officially
the Chinese have
welcomed Bilateral
Strategic Agreement (BSA) that will allow a
chunk of US and NATO special and training
forces to remain in Afghanistan. China does
not want to see further instability in
Xingjiang which may emanate from
Afghanistan, if Taliban control or
Talibanisation was to extend to Afghan
peripheral regions closer to Xinjiang.
Therefore, Chinese interest will converge
with those of the US and other regional
powers such as Iran, India and Russia.
China however has other strategic priorities
in South Asia. China is cautiously concerned
about the rise of India and although it does
want to see a militancy free Afghanistan - to
China does not want
instability spreading
from Afghanistan into
Xingjiang province

35. 34
protect its interests in Xinjiang and
reopening Silk Road - it equally does not
want to see a much more assertive India.
Pakistan becomes a key player in all of this.
Its closer relations with the Taliban
movement and its strategic location as per
Gawadar mean that China would not want to
completely isolate Pakistan. However, China
is increasingly staying away from giving a
‘protector’ kind of image to Pakistan. In a
recent visit to India, the Chinese premier did
not stopover in Pakistan. BSA is also
perceived very cautiously at best or
negatively at worse by Pakistani
establishment and China has not made any
public statements to share Pakistan’s
worries. In addition in a
recent visit of a very
senior Chinese military
official with Pakistani
Presidency the focus of
conversation remained
limited in pushing
Pakistan to ‘do much
more’ to stop ETIM
militants (which are based in Pakistani tribal
regions) to return to Xinjiang.
In short, China is cautiously working to
protect its strategic interests in South Asia.
Despite its stated policies in South Asia; the
year 2014 has demonstrated that Chinese
interests are squarely limited in protecting
its internal and external interests. In so doing
China will strategically converge with
whoever is closer to achieve these, whether
it is BSA, Afghan government or Pakistani’s
etc. Given the fluidity of situation in South-
Asia; it will be a challenging task for China
and the next few years will determine how
best Chinese policies and hedging has paid
off. This is why Chinese have taken due
interest in facilitating a dialogue between
Taliban and the Afghan government. China
wants to be seen as an international
peacemaker while protecting its key
interests in South Asia.
Russian interests in South Asia are
intertwined with its key strategic interests in
Central Asia (which are discussed briefly in
the following chapter). In South Asia
Russian interests converge with that of
India, China and Iran. The key Russian
interest remains minimising or completely
stopping any spill over from Afghanistan
into Central Asian states which remain key
to its Eurasian union and other ambitions.
To that end, Russia has shared some
intelligence and its influence in the region in
facilitating US/NATO led
efforts in Afghanistan to
contain first Al-Qaeda and
then Taliban.
Russia is also increasingly
concerned about the US-
Iranian nuclear deal.
Given the situation in
Syria and Russian attempts to consolidate
more power whilst denying the west a
strategic upper hand in Caucasus region;
Iran becomes a key focus for Russia. Iranian
strategic location and influence remains
stronger in regions where Russian strategic
interests lie i.e. Caucasus, Iraq/Syria and
Afghanistan/Central Asia. Given both
countries face western sanctions, Iranian
concerns of a larger US role in Iraq and the
ongoing situation in Yemen, Russia and Iran
will likely find more convergences of
interests. For South Asia; Russian interests
already converge with Iranian interests i.e.
denying Talibanisation of the country but
given above Russia may favour a more
Iranian
Russia is also
increasingly concerned
about the US-Iranian
nuclear deal

36. 35
rather than a Western way forward for
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the near to mid-
term future.
Last but not least; Sino-Russian relations
remain strong but Russia is keeping its
options open and traditionally has had a
good strategic and military relations with
India. The blowback of Ukraine has led
Russia to ‘depend’ on China for energy and
trade deals. Russia in the longer run would
be uneasy for this ‘dependency’ to grow and
will use India, Iran and Pakistan in South
Asia to further their interests.

37. 36
Chapter 7: Russia and China in Central Asia:
emerging trends - Zenobia Homan & Angeliki
Kontodimos
Russian language in Central Asia
In Spring 2014 Russia created legislation
offering fast-track citizenship to Russian
speakers anywhere within the former Soviet
Union.99
The global press has been fast to
point fingers: beginning with Ukraine,
Russia is supposedly trying to resurrect the
Soviet Empire. One Russian wrote “I think
giving Russian speakers living in Central
Asia fast-track citizenship
is setting the stage for
Russian expansion”.100
Another Russian pointed
out that the legislation may
instead be related to the
inner workings on Russia:
“…for the country to keep
developing its population
it needs to be growing and
Putin understands that. The
population in Siberia is
declining rapidly as people
mostly want to move west.
More than anywhere else,
somebody needs to
populate these lands.”
While some people from Central Asia will
welcome the opportunity to rely on Russian
stability and its relatively strong economy,
others are tired of post-Soviet
compartmentalisation.101
A Kyrgyz citizen
wrote “I don't see anything substantially
dangerous for our country in this [Putin’s]
statement. Instead, if the process of granting
Russian citizenship becomes easier, it might
constitute an extra economic burden for
Russia itself, while providing Kyrgyzstan
with extra input into the economy.”
Interviews with speakers of Russian in
Oskemen (Kazakhstan) reveal that they
consider President Nazarbayev not only a
guarantor of minority rights but also a
guarantor of political and social stability.
“The situation in Kazakhstan is completely
different to Ukraine,”
Vadim Obukhov, deputy
head of the Russian
Cultural Centre, said. “We
don’t have any
confrontation between
Kazakhs and Russians […]
and Russia isn’t seen as
some sort of enemy
here.”102
Russian language
instruction has been a
significant point of debate
in education across Central
Asia. On one hand they
wish to promote their own national
languages, separate from Russia. On the
other hand, Russia remains the lingua franca
of Central Asia, and it remains the primary
language of business and education while
English is still unpopular and under-used. In
Tajikistan concerned parents increasingly
see Russian-language instruction as the best
available option for their children’s futures.
Knowledge of Russian remains a vital skill.
With few jobs available in Tajikistan, each
year over a million people – perhaps one-
While some people
from Central Asia will
welcome the
opportunity to rely on
Russian stability and
its relatively strong
economy, others are
tired of post-Soviet
compartmentalisation