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ROOTKITS
THEN AND NOW
Presenter – txs
www.donkeyonawaffle.org (Donkey on a Waffle)
Who The HELL Is This GUY?!
 txs (aka Tyler)
   Security consultant for a security company
   I consult to fortune 500 companies, government, educational
   facilities
   Member of 0x90.org, Ghetto Hackers, Atarininja
   Lead researcher at Donkey On A Waffle
   (www.donkeyonawaffle.org)
   Spoke at H2K2, CarolinaCon [1,2,4], and many other major
   conferences
   Lazy bastard who makes his brother do all the grunt work
   and system administration for his sites
Overview
 Definition
 History And Evolution
 Classes of Rootkits
   Application Level
   Library Level
   Kernel Level
   Firmware Level
 Detection Techniques
 Forensic Implications
   Live State Evidence Acquisition
   Rootkit Data as Source of Evidence
 Current and Future Research
 Questions and Discussion
Definition

             What is a Rootkit?
Definition

 Wikipedia says:

 “A rootkit is a program (or combination of several programs) designed to
   take fundamental control (in Unix terms "root" access, in Windows terms
   "Administrator" access) of a computer system, without authorization by the
   system's owners and legitimate managers. Access to the hardware (ie, the
   reset switch) is rarely required as a rootkit is intended to seize control of
   the operating system running on the hardware. Typically, rootkits act to
   obscure their presence on the system through subversion or evasion of
   standard operating system security mechanisms. Often, they are also
   Trojans as well, thus fooling users into believing they are safe to run on
   their systems. Techniques used to accomplish this can include concealing
   running processes from monitoring programs, or hiding files or system
   data from the operating system.”
Definition
 h-spot.net says:
 “a set of software utilities designed to run on specifically Unix/Linux type
    computers and assume control of them as the root user without the
    knowledge or permission of the owner. More recently, the term has been
    broadened to encompass kits of software utilities that are able to hide
    files, folders, programs or processes on any type of computer and allow
    them to evade detection by the computer operator.”

 5starsupport.com says:
 “A set of programs used by hackers to gain access to information contained
    in your operating system and can even mask its presence. The program can
    also be used to access computers within a network. Usually, the rootkit is
    written for malicious purposes.”
Definition
 CompuKiss Techtionary says:
 “A rootkit is software that runs at the lowest level of the computer.
   It infiltrates the kernel of the computer. A rootkit is a technique that is
   often used by hackers and virus creators to hide the files they create. It has
   also been used by manufacturers to hide digital right management
   software, much to the chagrin of the average computer user.”

 Texas State Library and Archives says:
 “A hacker security tool that captures passwords and message traffic to and
   from a computer. A collection of tools that allows a hacker to provide a
   backdoor into a system, collect information on other systems on the
   network, mask the fact that the system is compromised, and much more.
   Rootkit is a classic example of Trojan Horse software. Rootkit is available
   for a wide range of operating systems.
Definition
 TXS SAYS (don’t believe everything I say!):

 “Rootkit technology, as defined in this presentation, includes
   any code that is implemented in an effort to hide the
   existence of the code itself, and to allow surreptitious
   execution and control of a target system.”

 This presentation will focus on the hiding of code used to
   maintain long term compromise of a target system.
History and Evolution
 Stealth technologies have been in existence since at
 least the mid 1980s
   First notable piece of “stealth” code was the Brain Virus
     Boot Sector Virus for FAT
     First virus in existence to include code created to hide the
     virus from detection
     Hooks INT13 and intercepts attempts to read the infected
     boot sector presenting a modified boot sector instead.
History and Evolution
 Stealth moves into the UNIX world
   Modified system binaries and “log cleaning” software
   began to surface
   SUN Microsystems based machines are compromised
   and “kits” are detected that attackers have utilized to
   cover their tracks
   Kit Goals – continuing root level remote access,
   privilege escalation, hiding potential evidence, going
   undetected by administrators
History and Evolution
 Packet capture and “sniffing” code added
   Captured data as it traversed the network
   Extended compromise to other targets
 Extended to libraries for quicker easier installation
 Mid 1990
   Userland Rootkits are getting detected
     Too easy to detect (hashing)
 1997-1999
   Relocation to kernel level occurs
   Similar results, far more difficult to detect
History and Evolution
 Kernel level rootkits in the unix world based on LKM
 (Loadable Kernel Modules)
   No longer do we have to rewrite individual binaries
   Rewrite the kernel code affecting all binaries
 In the windows world this is achieved via hooking,
 device drivers and direct kernel object modification
 (DKOM)
 The very core of the OS can not be trusted!
History and Evolution
 Rootkit detection tools move to the kernel level to
 match the offensive
   Cat and mouse game begins
 Early 2000s
   Virtualized computing systems are created
   A layer is created that is lower than the kernel (Virtual
   Machine Monitors)
   If Rootkit loads under the kernel it may be possible to
   intercept calls from the kernel to the hardware itself.
History and Evolution
 Get lower
  Firmware rootkits
 Today
  Continued research into virtualized rootkits
  Continued research into detection of virtualized rootkits
Classes of Rootkits
 Application Rootkits (Userland rootkits)
 Library Rootkits (Userland as well)
 Kernel Rookits (Kernel space)
 Firmware Rootkits (Hardware?!)
Operating System Layers And Rootkit Models

               Executable Program (Application Level)



                    System Libraries (Library Level)



                Operating System Kernel (Kernel Level)



         Optional Virtual Machine Monitor (Virtualized Rootkits)



                      Hardware (Firmware Level)
Application Layer Rootkits
 Also referred to as userland rootkits
 Recompiled binaries to replace system binaries and
 operate in a malicious way
 Modification of dll or exe files in windows world
 Typically Trojan binaries
 Binaries grouped together into “kits”, thus the term
 “Root Kit”
Library Layer Rootkits
 Patch, hook, or replace calls to system libraries
 Technically reside in userspace
 Affects a large number of system binaries while
 only modifying a small number of libraries
 Rootkit’s library intercepts the call to the regular
 library, calls regular library, returns modified
 results.
Kernel Layer Rootkits
 Implemented by replacing or creating new code in
 the kernel
 Windows
   Device driver code
   Direct Kernel Modification (DKOM)
 UNIX
   Loadable Kernel Module (LKM)
Virtualized Rootkits
 Lowest level rootkit in existence
 Inserted below the general operating system, one
 layer abstracted from the hardware
 Can trap, drop, created, modify, all requests to the
 hardware
 Two types
   Software based
   Hardware assisted
 Not limited by size (bigger is easier to see)
Software Based
 Uses a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to manage
 resources
 Intermediary between the hardware and the operating
 system
 Requires reboot to load under the OS
 Traps all requests to the hardware filtering responses
 Presents falsified and filtered results
 Nearly undetectable to tools installed even in the kernel
 of the OS
Hardware Assisted
 Also run at one abstraction layer below the
 operating system
 Loads itself under an already running operating
 system
 Forks or migrates the OS to a guest state
 Hardware itself must support virtual hosts
   AMD-V
   Intel VT-x
Firmware Layer Rootkits
 Implemented at the hardware level
 Bottom of the stack
 Peripheral devices, disk controllers, USB keys,
 processors, firmware memory, etc
 Firmware can be modified by administratively run
 code (Think flashing the BIOS!)
 Many pieces of firmware are run before the OS is
 loaded
 Removal is difficult
Detection Techniques
 General Detection
   System monitoring tools
   Diff based detection
     Review multiple witnesses and different angles
     Differences equals liars
   Directly examine the underlying hardware
     Can be done live (does not always require a reboot)
     Use statically compiled tools
     Use tools that bypass the kernel and directly access the
     hardware (sleuth kit)
   Directly review kernel memory bypassing APIs
Application Layer Detection
 Use trusted binaries
   Compiled offline
   Statically linked
   Use a CDROM and mount save tools
     What if the mount system was compromised?!
 Live state analysis can never be fool-proof
 Gather cryptographic hashes
   Compare against known good hashes
 Check configuration files for modifications
 Use a host based intrusion detection system (HIDS)
 Get to the kernel layer and check (get lower)
Library Layer Detection
 Very similar to those used in Application Layer
 Trusted binaries
   This time targets libraries and not binaries
 Static compilation is mandatory
 Check configuration files
 Implement a strong HIDS
 Get to the kernel layer and check (get lower)
Kernel Layer Detection
 Significantly more difficult
 Safe binaries wont work, still relies on kernel
 Detect modification of the kernel tables
   SSDT has an expected range of addresses
   Addresses outside this range are suspect
   Same method used for kernel hooking in Interrupt
   Descriptor Table (IDT), Import Address Table (IAT), and
   Drivers’ I/O Request Packet (IRP) handler
Kernel Layer Detection
 Detecting DKOM
   First to arrive has distinct advantage
   Hope to use a section of kernel that is not subverted
   Thread analysis
   Heuristic memory searching
 Use a virtual machine monitor
   Get to the virtual machine layer and check (get lower)
 Binary runtime analysis
   Check that the binaries that are run do not directly modify
   the kernel
Firmware Layer Detection
 Theoretical and cutting edge
 Disassemble the ROMs
   ACK! No thanks
 Signed firmware updates
 Physical jumper on writeable ROMs
Virtualized Layer Detection
 Install the detection engine below the Rootkit
   Utilize secure hardware
   Boot from a CDROM or other secure boot system
   Create the VM FIRST below the Rootkit
 From above the Rootkit
   Monitor and compare timing based functions
   Detect the additional overhead
     Can be hindered by temperature or power fluctuations
   Execute “buggy” behavior directly in the proccessor
Virtualized Layer Detection
 Dual Core Techniques
   Run a counter thread on one core
   Execute a synchronized thread in the main core that will be
   intercepted by the Rootkit
   Compare the results, skew indicates overhead
 Prevention
   Load a preemptive hypervisor that prevents the loading of
   a malicious hypervisor
   Intercept and deny/alert on any attempt at installation of a
   new hypervisor
   Minimalist design as stealth is not a requirement, limited
   overhead
Forensic Implications
 Turn off the machine?
   Results will be steadfast
   Loses access to data stored in memory

 Live state analysis?
   Results are less than certain
   Rootkits will screw with live state analysis
Live State Analysis
 Determine the validity of the incident
 First responder activities
 When you don’t want the subject to know
 Memory acquisition
   Software based memory acquisition
    Can be subverted
   Hardware based memory acquisition
    Physical hardware required
    May also be subverted (in theory)
Live Disc Data Acquisition
 Can be subverted by rootkits
 Why bother?! Dead state analysis gives same
 results
Rookit As Evidence
 What is the goal of evidence gathering
   Prove or disprove that an event has occurred on the
   system
   The existence of a Rootkit can directly be used as
   evidence when attempting to prove events
   Take care not to disturb or otherwise taint the evidence
Current and Future Research
 Creation and detection of virtualized Rootkits
 Creation and detection of hardware assisted virtual
 Rootkits
 Moving firmware Rootkits from the realm of
 theoretical to practical
 IMPLEMENT FIXES IN THE HARDWARE!
   Create a secure computing platform for high assurance
   use
Questions and Discussion

Check out www.donkeyonawaffle.org for
interesting posts, comments, and research

Leave comments – I promise I read them!

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CarolinaCon 2008 Rootkits Then and Now

  • 1. ROOTKITS THEN AND NOW Presenter – txs www.donkeyonawaffle.org (Donkey on a Waffle)
  • 2. Who The HELL Is This GUY?! txs (aka Tyler) Security consultant for a security company I consult to fortune 500 companies, government, educational facilities Member of 0x90.org, Ghetto Hackers, Atarininja Lead researcher at Donkey On A Waffle (www.donkeyonawaffle.org) Spoke at H2K2, CarolinaCon [1,2,4], and many other major conferences Lazy bastard who makes his brother do all the grunt work and system administration for his sites
  • 3. Overview Definition History And Evolution Classes of Rootkits Application Level Library Level Kernel Level Firmware Level Detection Techniques Forensic Implications Live State Evidence Acquisition Rootkit Data as Source of Evidence Current and Future Research Questions and Discussion
  • 4. Definition What is a Rootkit?
  • 5. Definition Wikipedia says: “A rootkit is a program (or combination of several programs) designed to take fundamental control (in Unix terms "root" access, in Windows terms "Administrator" access) of a computer system, without authorization by the system's owners and legitimate managers. Access to the hardware (ie, the reset switch) is rarely required as a rootkit is intended to seize control of the operating system running on the hardware. Typically, rootkits act to obscure their presence on the system through subversion or evasion of standard operating system security mechanisms. Often, they are also Trojans as well, thus fooling users into believing they are safe to run on their systems. Techniques used to accomplish this can include concealing running processes from monitoring programs, or hiding files or system data from the operating system.”
  • 6. Definition h-spot.net says: “a set of software utilities designed to run on specifically Unix/Linux type computers and assume control of them as the root user without the knowledge or permission of the owner. More recently, the term has been broadened to encompass kits of software utilities that are able to hide files, folders, programs or processes on any type of computer and allow them to evade detection by the computer operator.” 5starsupport.com says: “A set of programs used by hackers to gain access to information contained in your operating system and can even mask its presence. The program can also be used to access computers within a network. Usually, the rootkit is written for malicious purposes.”
  • 7. Definition CompuKiss Techtionary says: “A rootkit is software that runs at the lowest level of the computer. It infiltrates the kernel of the computer. A rootkit is a technique that is often used by hackers and virus creators to hide the files they create. It has also been used by manufacturers to hide digital right management software, much to the chagrin of the average computer user.” Texas State Library and Archives says: “A hacker security tool that captures passwords and message traffic to and from a computer. A collection of tools that allows a hacker to provide a backdoor into a system, collect information on other systems on the network, mask the fact that the system is compromised, and much more. Rootkit is a classic example of Trojan Horse software. Rootkit is available for a wide range of operating systems.
  • 8. Definition TXS SAYS (don’t believe everything I say!): “Rootkit technology, as defined in this presentation, includes any code that is implemented in an effort to hide the existence of the code itself, and to allow surreptitious execution and control of a target system.” This presentation will focus on the hiding of code used to maintain long term compromise of a target system.
  • 9. History and Evolution Stealth technologies have been in existence since at least the mid 1980s First notable piece of “stealth” code was the Brain Virus Boot Sector Virus for FAT First virus in existence to include code created to hide the virus from detection Hooks INT13 and intercepts attempts to read the infected boot sector presenting a modified boot sector instead.
  • 10. History and Evolution Stealth moves into the UNIX world Modified system binaries and “log cleaning” software began to surface SUN Microsystems based machines are compromised and “kits” are detected that attackers have utilized to cover their tracks Kit Goals – continuing root level remote access, privilege escalation, hiding potential evidence, going undetected by administrators
  • 11. History and Evolution Packet capture and “sniffing” code added Captured data as it traversed the network Extended compromise to other targets Extended to libraries for quicker easier installation Mid 1990 Userland Rootkits are getting detected Too easy to detect (hashing) 1997-1999 Relocation to kernel level occurs Similar results, far more difficult to detect
  • 12. History and Evolution Kernel level rootkits in the unix world based on LKM (Loadable Kernel Modules) No longer do we have to rewrite individual binaries Rewrite the kernel code affecting all binaries In the windows world this is achieved via hooking, device drivers and direct kernel object modification (DKOM) The very core of the OS can not be trusted!
  • 13. History and Evolution Rootkit detection tools move to the kernel level to match the offensive Cat and mouse game begins Early 2000s Virtualized computing systems are created A layer is created that is lower than the kernel (Virtual Machine Monitors) If Rootkit loads under the kernel it may be possible to intercept calls from the kernel to the hardware itself.
  • 14. History and Evolution Get lower Firmware rootkits Today Continued research into virtualized rootkits Continued research into detection of virtualized rootkits
  • 15. Classes of Rootkits Application Rootkits (Userland rootkits) Library Rootkits (Userland as well) Kernel Rookits (Kernel space) Firmware Rootkits (Hardware?!)
  • 16. Operating System Layers And Rootkit Models Executable Program (Application Level) System Libraries (Library Level) Operating System Kernel (Kernel Level) Optional Virtual Machine Monitor (Virtualized Rootkits) Hardware (Firmware Level)
  • 17. Application Layer Rootkits Also referred to as userland rootkits Recompiled binaries to replace system binaries and operate in a malicious way Modification of dll or exe files in windows world Typically Trojan binaries Binaries grouped together into “kits”, thus the term “Root Kit”
  • 18. Library Layer Rootkits Patch, hook, or replace calls to system libraries Technically reside in userspace Affects a large number of system binaries while only modifying a small number of libraries Rootkit’s library intercepts the call to the regular library, calls regular library, returns modified results.
  • 19. Kernel Layer Rootkits Implemented by replacing or creating new code in the kernel Windows Device driver code Direct Kernel Modification (DKOM) UNIX Loadable Kernel Module (LKM)
  • 20. Virtualized Rootkits Lowest level rootkit in existence Inserted below the general operating system, one layer abstracted from the hardware Can trap, drop, created, modify, all requests to the hardware Two types Software based Hardware assisted Not limited by size (bigger is easier to see)
  • 21. Software Based Uses a virtual machine monitor (VMM) to manage resources Intermediary between the hardware and the operating system Requires reboot to load under the OS Traps all requests to the hardware filtering responses Presents falsified and filtered results Nearly undetectable to tools installed even in the kernel of the OS
  • 22. Hardware Assisted Also run at one abstraction layer below the operating system Loads itself under an already running operating system Forks or migrates the OS to a guest state Hardware itself must support virtual hosts AMD-V Intel VT-x
  • 23. Firmware Layer Rootkits Implemented at the hardware level Bottom of the stack Peripheral devices, disk controllers, USB keys, processors, firmware memory, etc Firmware can be modified by administratively run code (Think flashing the BIOS!) Many pieces of firmware are run before the OS is loaded Removal is difficult
  • 24. Detection Techniques General Detection System monitoring tools Diff based detection Review multiple witnesses and different angles Differences equals liars Directly examine the underlying hardware Can be done live (does not always require a reboot) Use statically compiled tools Use tools that bypass the kernel and directly access the hardware (sleuth kit) Directly review kernel memory bypassing APIs
  • 25. Application Layer Detection Use trusted binaries Compiled offline Statically linked Use a CDROM and mount save tools What if the mount system was compromised?! Live state analysis can never be fool-proof Gather cryptographic hashes Compare against known good hashes Check configuration files for modifications Use a host based intrusion detection system (HIDS) Get to the kernel layer and check (get lower)
  • 26. Library Layer Detection Very similar to those used in Application Layer Trusted binaries This time targets libraries and not binaries Static compilation is mandatory Check configuration files Implement a strong HIDS Get to the kernel layer and check (get lower)
  • 27. Kernel Layer Detection Significantly more difficult Safe binaries wont work, still relies on kernel Detect modification of the kernel tables SSDT has an expected range of addresses Addresses outside this range are suspect Same method used for kernel hooking in Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT), Import Address Table (IAT), and Drivers’ I/O Request Packet (IRP) handler
  • 28. Kernel Layer Detection Detecting DKOM First to arrive has distinct advantage Hope to use a section of kernel that is not subverted Thread analysis Heuristic memory searching Use a virtual machine monitor Get to the virtual machine layer and check (get lower) Binary runtime analysis Check that the binaries that are run do not directly modify the kernel
  • 29. Firmware Layer Detection Theoretical and cutting edge Disassemble the ROMs ACK! No thanks Signed firmware updates Physical jumper on writeable ROMs
  • 30. Virtualized Layer Detection Install the detection engine below the Rootkit Utilize secure hardware Boot from a CDROM or other secure boot system Create the VM FIRST below the Rootkit From above the Rootkit Monitor and compare timing based functions Detect the additional overhead Can be hindered by temperature or power fluctuations Execute “buggy” behavior directly in the proccessor
  • 31. Virtualized Layer Detection Dual Core Techniques Run a counter thread on one core Execute a synchronized thread in the main core that will be intercepted by the Rootkit Compare the results, skew indicates overhead Prevention Load a preemptive hypervisor that prevents the loading of a malicious hypervisor Intercept and deny/alert on any attempt at installation of a new hypervisor Minimalist design as stealth is not a requirement, limited overhead
  • 32. Forensic Implications Turn off the machine? Results will be steadfast Loses access to data stored in memory Live state analysis? Results are less than certain Rootkits will screw with live state analysis
  • 33. Live State Analysis Determine the validity of the incident First responder activities When you don’t want the subject to know Memory acquisition Software based memory acquisition Can be subverted Hardware based memory acquisition Physical hardware required May also be subverted (in theory)
  • 34. Live Disc Data Acquisition Can be subverted by rootkits Why bother?! Dead state analysis gives same results
  • 35. Rookit As Evidence What is the goal of evidence gathering Prove or disprove that an event has occurred on the system The existence of a Rootkit can directly be used as evidence when attempting to prove events Take care not to disturb or otherwise taint the evidence
  • 36. Current and Future Research Creation and detection of virtualized Rootkits Creation and detection of hardware assisted virtual Rootkits Moving firmware Rootkits from the realm of theoretical to practical IMPLEMENT FIXES IN THE HARDWARE! Create a secure computing platform for high assurance use
  • 37. Questions and Discussion Check out www.donkeyonawaffle.org for interesting posts, comments, and research Leave comments – I promise I read them!