1. Somatic Modes of Attention
Author(s): Thomas J. Csordas
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 8, No. 2 (May, 1993), pp. 135-156
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2. Somatic Modes of Attention
Thomas J. Csordas
DepartmentofAnthropology
Case WesternReserveUniversity
Embodimentas a paradigmor methodologicalorientationrequiresthatthe body
be understoodas theexistentialgroundof culture-not as anobjectthatis "good
to think,"but as a subject that is "necessaryto be." To argue by analogy, a
phenomenologicalparadigmof embodimentcan be offeredas anequivalent,and
complement,to thesemioticparadigmof cultureas text.Muchas Barthes(1986)
drawsa distinctionbetween the work and the text, a distinctioncan be drawn
between the body and embodiment. For Barthes, the work is a fragment of
substance,the materialobject thatoccupies the spaceof a bookstoreor a library
shelf.Thetext,incontrast,is anindeterminatemethodologicalfieldthatexistsonly
when caught up in a discourse, and that is experiencedonly as activity and
production(1986:57-68). In parallelfashion, the body is a biological, material
entity,while embodimentcan be understoodas an indeterminatemethodological
field definedby perceptualexperienceandthe modeof presenceandengagement
in theworld.As appliedto anthropology,themodelof thetextmeansthatcultures
can be understood,for purposesof internaland comparativeanalysis, to have
propertiessimilartotexts(Ricoeur1979).Incontrast,theparadigmof embodiment
means not thatcultureshave the same structureas bodily experience, but that
embodiedexperienceis the startingpoint for analyzinghumanparticipationin a
culturalworld.
To best understandthe theoreticalorigin of this problematic,it is useful to
distinguishbetweenwhathas come to be calledtheanthropologyof thebody and
a strandof phenomenology explicitly concerned with embodiment.Although
glimpsesofthebodyhaveappearedregularlythroughoutthehistoryof ethnography
(e.g., Leenhardt1979 [1947]), an anthropologyof the body was inauguratedby
Douglas(1973),andelaboratedinthecollectionsbyBenthallandPolhemus(1975)
andBlacking(1977). The historicalworkof Foucault(1973, 1977)providednew
impetus,evidentintheworksof Scheper-HughesandLock(1987), Martin(1987),
andlike-mindedsociologist B. Turner(1984). Theworkof Bourdieu(1977, 1984)
shifted an earlierfocus on the body as the source of symbolism or means of
expressionto an awarenessof the body as the locus of social practice.This is
powerfullyevidentin Comaroff's(1985) work,whichexhibitsatheoreticalmove-
CulturalAnthropology8(2):135-156. Copyright? 1993,AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation.
135
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3. 136 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
ment from the social body of representationto the socially informedbody of
practice,while still emphasizingthetraditionalfocus on bodysymbolism.
Meanwhile, an opening for phenomenologyin anthropologicaltheory has
come withthepossibilityof articulatinga conceptof experiencearoundtheedges
of the monolithictextualistandrepresentationalistparadigmdominatedby Levi-
Strauss,Derrida,andFoucault.Geertz's(1973) concernwith cultureas text was
complementedby interestin the phenomenologyof AlfredSchutz,and with the
distinctionbetween experience-nearand experience-farconcepts. It has finally
become legitimatefor Wikan(1991) to tacklethe problemof an experience-near
anthropology,for Turnerand Bruner(1986) to espouse an "anthropologyof
experience,"andforJoanandArthurKleinman(1991) todeclarean"ethnography
of experience,"approachesthat are more or less explicitly phenomenological.
Amongsuchapproaches,afew scholars-influenced especiallybyMerleau-Ponty
(1962, 1964) and occasionallyby thinkerssuch as Marcel,Scheler,Straus,and
Schilder-have highlightedaphenomenologyof thebodythatrecognizesembodi-
ment as the existentialconditionin which cultureand self aregrounded(Corin
1990;Csordas1990;Devisch andGailly 1985;Frank1986;Jackson1989;Munn
1986;Ots 1991,in press;Pandolfi1990).They tendto takethe"livedbody"as a
methodologicalstartingpointratherthanconsiderthe bodyas anobjectof study.
Fromthesecondof thesetwoperspectives,thecontrastbetweenembodiment
andtextualitycomes into focus acrossthe varioustopics examinedby ananthro-
pology of thebody.Forexample,theinfluentialsynthesisby Scheper-Hughesand
Lock (1987) clearlylays out the analyticalterrainclaimedby ananthropologyof
the body. These authorsreworkDouglas's (1973) "two bodies"into three-the
individualbody,thesocialbody,andthebodypolitic.Theyunderstandthesebodies
as interrelatedanalyticdomainsmediatedbyemotion.To pose theproblemof the
body in termsof the relationbetweenembodimentand textualityinvites us to
reviewthisfield withaneye tothecorrespondingmethodologicaltensionbetween
phenomenologicalandsemioticapproaches.Thismethodologicaltensiontraverses
all threebodies sketchedby Scheper-HughesandLock.Thatis, eachof thethree
can be understoodeither from the semiotic/textualstandpointof the body as
representationorfromthephenomenological/embodimentstandpointof thebody
as being-in-the-world.
However, the contemporaryanthropologicaland interdisciplinaryliterature
remainsunbalancedinthisrespect.A strongrepresentationalistbiasis evidentmost
notablyin thepredominanceof Foucauldiantextualmetaphors,suchas thatsocial
realityis "inscribedin the body,"andthatouranalysesareformsof "readingthe
body."Even Jackson's (1989) predominantlyphenomenologicalformulationis
castin termsof thebody as a functionof knowledgeandthought,two termswith
strongrepresentationalistconnotation.Yet Jacksonwas perhapsthe firstto point
out the shortcomingsof representationalismin the anthropologyof the body,
arguingthatthe"subjugationof thebodilytothesemanticisempiricallyuntenable"
(1989:122).I wouldendorsethecritiquethatmeaningcannotbereducedto a sign,
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4. SOMATICMODES OF ATTENTION 137
a strategythatreinforcesaCartesianpreeminenceof mindoverabodyunderstood
as "inert,passive,andstatic"(1989:124).Thiscritiqueshouldnotbe construedas
negatingthe studyof signs withrespectto the body, butas makinga place for a
complementaryappreciationof embodimentand being in the world alongside
textualityand representation.That these are complementaryand not mutually
exclusive standpointsisdemonstratedintherapprochementbetweensemioticsand
phenomenologyin severalrecentworkson the body (Csordas1993;Good 1992;
Hanks 1990; Munn 1986; Ots 1991). Nevertheless, because for anthropology
embodimentis notyet developedenoughto be trulycomplementaryto analready
maturetextuality(Hanks1989),thisarticlehasthelimitedaimof takingameasured
steptowardfilling outembodimentas a methodologicalfield.
Reconsideringtheworkof Merleau-Ponty(1962, 1964)andBourdieu(1977,
1984)suggestsbringingintotheforegroundthenotionsof perceptionandpractice.
Briefly, whereas studies of perceptionin anthropologyand psychology are, in
effect, studiesof perceptualcategoriesandclassifications,Merleau-Pontyfocused
on the constitutionof perceptualobjects.ForMerleau-Ponty,perceptionbeganin
thebodyand,throughreflectivethinking,endsinobjects.Onthelevelofperception
thereis notyet a subject-objectdistinction-we aresimplyin theworld.Merleau-
Pontyproposedthatanalysisbeginwith thepre-objectiveactof perceptionrather
thanwith alreadyconstitutedobjects.He recognizedthatperceptionwas always
embeddedin a culturalworld, such thatthe pre-objectivein no way implies a
"pre-cultural."At the same time, he acknowledgedthat his own work did not
elaboratethestepsbetweenperceptionandexplicitculturalandhistoricalanalysis
(Merleau-Ponty1964:25).
Preciselyat thispointwhereMerleau-Pontyleft off, it is valuableto reintro-
duce Bourdieu's (1977, 1984) emphasis on the socially informedbody as the
groundof collective life. Bourdieu'sconcern with the body, workedout in the
empiricaldomainof practice, is paralleland compatiblewith Merleau-Ponty's
analysisin thedomainof perception.To conjoinBourdieu'sunderstandingof the
"habitus"as an unself-consciousorchestrationof practiceswith Merleau-Ponty's
notionof the "pre-objective"suggeststhatembodimentneed not be restrictedto
thepersonalordyadicmicro-analysiscustomarilyassociatedwithphenomenology,
butis relevantas well to socialcollectivities.
Definingthedialecticbetweenperceptualconsciousnessandcollectiveprac-
tice is one wayto elaborateembodimentasamethodologicalfield (Csordas1990).
It is withinthis dialecticthatwe move fromthe understandingof perceptionas a
bodilyprocessto a notionof somaticmodesof attentionthatcanbe identifiedin a
varietyof culturalpractices.Ourelaborationof this constructwill provide the
groundsfor a reflectionon theessentialambiguityof ourown analyticconcepts,
as well as on theconceptualstatusof "indeterminacy"intheparadigmof embodi-
mentandin contemporaryethnography.
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5. 138 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
A Working Definition
AlfredSchutz,thepremiermethodologistofphenomenologicalsocialscience,
understoodattentionto lie in the
full alertnessandthe sharpnessof apperceptionconnectedwith consciously turning
towardanobject,combinedwith furtherconsiderationsandanticipationsof its char-
acteristicsanduses. [1970:316]
Merleau-Ponty goes further, pointing out that attention actually brings the
object into being for perceptual consciousness:
To payattentionis notmerelyfurtherto elucidatepre-existingdata,itis tobringabout
a new articulationof them by takingthem asfigures. They are performedonly as
horizons,theyconstituteinrealitynew regionsin thetotalworld.... Thusattentionis
neitheran associationof images,northereturnto itselfof thoughtalreadyin control
of its objects,but the active constitutionof a new objectwhich makes explicit and
articulatewhatwasuntilthenpresentedas no morethananindeterminatehorizon.
[1962:30]
Whatis theroleof attentionintheconstitutionof subjectivityandintersubjectivity
as bodilyphenomena?If, as Schutzsays, attentionis a consciousturningtoward
anobject,this"turningtoward"wouldseemtoimplymorebodilyandmultisensory
engagementthanwe usuallyallowforinpsychologicaldefinitionsof attention.If,
as Merleau-Pontysays, attentionconstitutesobjectsoutof anindeterminatehori-
zon,theexperienceof ourownbodiesandthoseof othersmustlie somewherealong
thathorizon.I suggestthatwhereit lies is preciselyattheexistentiallyambiguous
pointat whichthe actof constitutionandthe objectthatis constitutedmeet-the
phenomenological"horizon"itself.If thatis so, thenprocessesinwhichwe attend
toandobjectifyourbodiesshouldholdaparticularinterest.Thesearetheprocesses
to whichwe alludewith the termsomatic modesof attention.Somaticmodes of
attentionareculturallyelaboratedways of attendingto and with one's body in
surroundingsthatincludetheembodiedpresenceof others.
Because attentionimpliesboth sensoryengagementandan object,we must
emphasizethatourworkingdefinitionrefersbothtoattending"with"andattending
"to"thebody.To a certainextentit mustbe both.To attendto abodily sensation
is nottoattendtothebodyasanisolatedobject,buttoattendtothebody'ssituation
in the world.The sensationengages somethingin the worldbecausethe body is
"alwaysalreadyin the world."Attentionto a bodily sensationcanthusbecome a
modeof attendingtotheintersubjectivemilieuthatgiverisetothatsensation.Thus,
one is payingattentionwithone's body.Attendingwithone's eyes is reallypartof
this same phenomenon,but we less often conceptualizevisual attentionas a
"turningtoward"thanas a disembodied,beam-like"gaze."We tendto thinkof it
as a cognitive functionratherthanas a bodily engagement.A notionof somatic
mode of attentionbroadensthe field in which we can look for phenomenaof
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6. SOMATICMODESOF ATTENTION 139
perceptionand attention,and suggests that attendingto one's body can tell us
somethingabouttheworldandotherswho surroundus.
Becausewe arenotisolatedsubjectivitiestrappedwithinourbodies,butshare
anintersubjectivemilieuwithothers,we mustalso specify thata somaticmodeof
attentionmeans not only attentionto and with one's own body, but includes
attentionto thebodiesof others.Ourconcernis theculturalelaborationof sensory
engagement,notpreoccupationwith one's own bodyas anisolatedphenomenon.
Thus,we mustinclude,forexample,theculturalelaborationof aneroticsensibility
that accompaniesattentionto attractivenessand the elaborationof interactive,
moral,andaestheticsensibilitiessurroundingattentionto "fatness."These exam-
ples of attentionto thebodilyformof othersalso includeattendingwithone's own
body-there is certainlya visceralelementof eroticattention,andtherecan be a
visceralcomponenttoattendingtootheraspectsof others'bodilyforms.Attending
toothers'bodilymovementsis evenmoreclearcutincasesof dancing,makinglove,
playingteamsports,andin theuncannysense of a presenceoverone's shoulder.
In all of these,thereis a somaticmode of attentionto thepositionandmovement
of others'bodies.
It is a truismthat,althoughourbodies arealwayspresent,we do not always
attendto andwiththem.Let me reiterate,however,thattheconstructI am trying
to elucidateincludesculturallyelaboratedattentionto andwiththe body in the
immediacyof an intersubjectivemilieu. Althoughthereis undoubtedlya cultural
componentin anyactof attentionto one's own or another'sbody,it wouldbe too
impreciseto label any such act as an exampleof a somaticmode of attention.If
you cut yourfingerwhile slicing bread,you'll attendto yourfingerin a way that
is moreorlessculturallydetermined(Isitspirituallydangerous?Isitembarrassing?
MustI see a doctor?).Whenyou notice someone who weighs 275 pounds,your
reactionis alsoculturallydetermined(thatpersonlooksfat,attractive,strong,ugly,
friendly,nurturant).To define somatic modes of attentionin such broadterms
would probablyonly serve to organize a varietyof existing literaturesinto an
overbroadcategory.I suspect,for example, thatwe could identify such loosely
defined somatic modes of attentionassociated with a wide variety of cultural
practicesandphenomena.Mauss(1950)pointedoutthatthereiswhatwearecalling
a somaticmodeof attentionassociatedwiththeacquisitionof anytechniqueof the
body,butthatthismodeof attentionrecedesintothehorizononcethetechniqueis
mastered.The imaginalrehearsalof bodily movements by athletesis a highly
elaboratedsomaticmodeof attention,asistheheightenedsensitivitytomuscletone
and the appetitefor motion associated with health-consciousnessand habitual
exercise. The sense of somatic contingency and transcendenceassociated with
meditationandmysticstateswouldalso be withinourpurview.Therearecertainly
somatic modes of attentionto basic bodily processes, such as pregnancyand
menopause,in differentcultures.On the pathologicalside, the hyper-vigilance
associatedwithhypochondriaandsomatizationdisorder,andthevariousdegrees
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7. 140 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
of vanityor tolerancefor self-mortificationassociatedwithanorexiaandbulimia,
couldbe saidto defineparticularsomaticmodesof attention.
It is evident thatsome of theseexamplessuggest more or less spontaneous
culturalelaboration,whereasotherssuggestmodesthatareconsciouslycultivated
(cf. Shapiro1985).Someemphasizeattendingtothebodyandsomewiththebody;
some emphasizeattendingto one's own body, some attendingto others'bodies,
andsometo others'attentionto ourbodies.My pointis thattheways we attendto
andwithourbodies,andeven thepossibilityof attending,areneitherarbitrarynor
biologicallydetermined,butareculturallyconstituted.Leenhardt's(1979 [1947])
classic study of the Canaquesof New Caledoniadescribednot only a way of
conceptualizingthebodyradicallydistinctfromourown, buttheexclusionof the
body per se as an object of consciousnessuntil the people were introducedby
missionariesto theobjectifiedbodyof Christianculture.Thissuggeststhatneither
attendingto nor attendingwith the body can be takenfor granted,but mustbe
formulatedas culturallyconstitutedsomatic modes of attention.I elucidatethis
constructwithexamplesfromtheethnographicrecordinthefollowingdiscussion.
Somatic Attention and Revelatory Phenomena
Thesomaticmodeof attentionI will delineatein thissectionis thatof healers
who learnabouttheproblemsandemotionalstatesof theirclientsthroughbodily
experiencesthoughtto parallelthoseof the afflicted.I describethe phenomenon
forbothpredominantlyAnglo-American,middle-classCatholicCharismaticheal-
ers andforPuertoRicanspiritistmediums.
TheCatholicCharismaticRenewalis areligiousmovementwithintheRoman
CatholicChurch.CatholicCharismaticshave elaboratedPentecostalfaithhealing
intoasystemthatdistinguishesamongphysical,emotional,demonic,andancestral
sourcesof affliction,andaddresseseach with specific ritualtechniques(Csordas
1983, 1988). A variety of somatic experiences is cultivated in ritualhealing
practice,butI shall focus on two types of experiencereportedby healersduring
theirinteractionwithsupplicants.Oneis called"anointing,"thesecond,"wordof
knowledge."
Althoughthephysicalactof anointingpartof thebody,typicallytheforehead
orhands,withholy oil is acommonformof blessingamongcharismaticsengaged
in healingpractice,a differentuse of the termis of interestin thepresentcontext.
A healerwho reportsan "anointing"by Godrefersto a somaticexperiencethatis
takentoindicateeitherthegeneralactivationofdivinepower,orthespecifichealing
of anindividual.A conventionalanthropologyof ritualhealingwouldsay simply
thatthehealergoes intotrance,assumingtranceto be a unitaryvariableorakind
of blackbox factoredintotheritualequation,andperhapsassumingthatsomatic
manifestationsareepiphenomenaof trance.The analysiswouldgo nofurtherthan
informants'reportsthattheseepiphenomena"function"asconfirmationsof divine
power and healing. Within the paradigmof embodiment,in contrast,we are
interestedinaphenomenologythatwill leadtoconclusionsbothaboutthecultural
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8. SOMATICMODES OF ATTENTION 141
patterningof bodilyexperience,andalso abouttheintersubjectiveconstitutionof
meaningthroughthatexperience.
The anointingis describedby somehealersas a generalfeeling of heaviness,
or as a feeling of lightness almost to the point of levitation. The healer may
experiencetingling,heat,oranoutflowof "power"similarto anelectricalcurrent,
ofteninthehands,butattimesinotherpartsof thebody.Thehandsof somehealers
visiblytremble,andIhavefeltthisvibrationasahealerlaidahandonmyshoulder.
Amonghealersthemselves,however,the"authenticity"of thisvisiblevibrationas
a manifestationof divine power is sometimes questioned,in the sense that the
anointingmaybefeignedorsensationalized.Inalargegrouphealingservice,when
thehealermoves fromindividualto individual,layinghandson each,thestrength
of theanointingmayvarywitheachsupplicant.Onehealerdescribedanemotional
complementof theanointingas a feeling of empathy,sympathy,andcompassion.
If thisfeeling were absentas he cameto a particularpersonin line forhis prayer,
he mightpassover thatperson,assumingthatGoddid notplanto healheratthat
moment.
The second Catholic Charismaticphenomenon in this somatic mode of
attentionisthe"wordof knowledge."Itis understoodasa"spiritualgift"fromGod
by meansof which healerscome to know facts aboutsupplicantsthroughdirect
inspiration,withoutbeingtoldby theafflictedpersonoranyoneelse. The wordof
knowledgeis sometimesexperiencedas anindeterminate"sense"thatsomething
is the case, butvery often occursin specific sensorymodalities.The healermay
see an afflictedbody partin the"mind'seye"orhearthenameof a body partor
diseasewith"theheart."Onehealerdistinguishedclearlythatwhentheproblemis
internal,she typically"sees"theorgan,or cancer,appearingas a blackmass,but
whentheproblemis external,she typically"hears"thewordnamingtheillness or
thebodypart,suchas armsandlegs.
Onehealerreportedthatasnappinginhisearmeanssomeoneintheassembly
isundergoinganearhealing,andthatintensepaininhisheartmeansahearthealing.
Anotherreportedheatin herelbow on one occasion,interpretingthis as a sign of
healingof aninjuryorarthritis.Somehealersreportbeingableto detectheadache
orbackacheinasupplicantthroughtheexperienceof similarpainduringthehealing
process.
Queasinessorconfusedagitationmayindicatetheactivityof evil spirits,and
an unexpectedsneeze or a yawn may indicatethata spiritis passing out of the
supplicantthroughthe healer. One healercommonly reportedan experienceof
"painbackup"frompersonsfilledwithresentmentorpreviouslyengagedinoccult
activities.Thepainwouldenterherarmas she laidhandson theperson.It would
be necessaryto remove her armand "shakeout"the pain, while the supplicant
wouldfeel nothing.Withone handon the supplicant'schest andthe otheron his
orherback,sheclaimsto feel what'sgoingon insidetheperson.Forexample,she
can tell if thepersonis in bondageto Satan,andshe gets anunspecifiedsensation
as thepersonis set free.Theodorof burningsulphurorof somethingrottingalso
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9. 142 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
indicatesthe presence of evil spirits, while the aromaof flowers indicates the
presenceof GodortheVirginMary.
Themostcomprehensivephenomenologicalreportwasgivenby ahealerwho
distinguishedthree componentsof word of knowledge. First was the sense of
certaintythatwhathe would say was actuallyhappening.Secondwas a series of
wordsthatwouldcome tohim in abbreviatedsequence,suchas"heart.. of alady
N yearsold ... seatedin the lastpew...." He wouldcall these wordsout to the
assembly,muchasone wouldreadfromateleprompter,exceptthatheheardrather
thanreadthem.Finally,atthe sametimehe wouldfeel afingerpressingsoftly on
thepartof his bodycorrespondingto theafflictedpartof thepersonbeinghealed.
I will now turnto what I take to be essentiallythe same somatic mode of
attentioninadifferenthealingtradition,PuertoRicanespiritismo(Harwood1977).
Two main culturaldifferences distinguishsomatic attentionin espiritismoand
Charismatichealing.First,whereasforCatholicCharismaticsanointingsaredirect
experiencesof divine power and words of knowledge are divinely empowered
directexperiencesof the supplicant'sdistress,for espiritistas,the corresponding
experiencesaretheworkof spiritsthatenterorpossess thehealer.Theseareeither
good guidingspirits,called guias, or bad,distress-causingspirits,called causas.
The spiritsdominatethe healing process in that they are essential not only to
diagnosisbutalsoto treatment;andhence,thesomaticexperiencesattendedto are
evenmoreprominentthanamongCatholicCharismatics.Specificspiritsmayhave
distinctandrecognizablevoices, odor,or impacton the healer'sbody.However,
thespiritsthemselvesaremoreoften seen andheardamongspiritiststhanamong
Charismatics,and spiritisthealerscan distinguishbetween good guias and bad
causas.
Thesecondimportantculturaldifferenceis withrespecttoconceptionsof the
bodythatgo well beyondritualhealing.The abilityto see spiritsfromin backof
theeyes (ojo oculto)maybe associatedwiththeinterpersonalsalienceof theeyes
andthe glance also found in the evil eye (ojo malo). The experienceof a spirit
enteringthroughthestomachmaybe associatedwiththeculturalemphasisonthat
organnot only as a seatof emotion,butalso as anexpressiveorganwith its own
mouth(boca del estomago).Theexperienceof spiritsasfluidos coursingthrough
the body may be associatedwith a humoralconceptionof how the body works.
Although I would not rule out any of these experiences for Anglo-American
charismatics,itis doubtfulthattheywouldbecultivatedwithintheirsomaticmode
of attention.
Despitethesedifferences,theexperiencesreportedby thetwotypesof healer
arenotablysimilar,althoughespiritistacategoriesdescribingtheseexperiencesare
even more explicit in distinguishing sensory modalities than the Charismatic
anointingsandwordsof knowledge.Based on writingsof, anddiscussionswith,
leadingresearcherson espiritismo(Koss,Harwood,andGarrison),thephenomena
appeartofall intofourcategories:seeingthespirits(videncias),hearingthespirits
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10. SOMATICMODESOF ATTENTION 143
speak(audiciones),sensing immediatelywhatis on theclient's mind(inspiracio-
nes),andfeelingthepainanddistresscausedintheclientbyspirits(plasmaciones).
Mostof thedifferenceslie invisualexperiences,sinceCharismaticstypically
see situationsor images of problems,ratherthanproblemsobjectifiedas spirits.
Perhapsmost similarare the proprioceptiveexperiences,orplasmaciones. Koss
(1988) cites use of the verbplasmar to referto mediums' molding or forming
clients' pain or emotionaldistress within theirown bodies. Harwood(personal
communication)adds thatplasmaciones aretransmittedthroughthe mediumof
plasma,whichinspiritistdoctrineis a spiritualsubstancelinkingpersonsto spirits
andto one another.
According to Harwood, the plasmaciones experienced by healers might
includepain,tingling,vibration,orafeelingof elationif possessedbyaguia spirit.
AlthoughGarrison(personalcommunication)doesnotrecognizethetermplasma-
ciones,sheacknowledgessensaciones thatmightincludeheadache,stomachache,
ortensionpickedupfromtheclient.Koss (1988, 1992)presentsthemostelaborate
inventory,includingfeeling of electricalcharge,acceleratedheartrate,pain and
othersymptomsfeltatthecorrespondingbodysite,cool airblowingacrosstheskin
startingfromthehead,tingling,energyenteringthestomachandleavingthehead
or moving like a snake in the body,fluidos like sexual energy,buzzing sounds,
body lightness, rapid thinking, feelings of contentmentand relaxation in the
presenceof a good spirit,feelings of nervousness,fatigue,or fearin thepresence
of abadspirit.Again,theprincipaldifferencesappeartobeassociatedwiththerole
of spiritsand with particularauditory,olfactory,or proprioceptiveexperiences
associatedwithparticularguias.Theelaborationof interactionwithnegativespirits
augmentsthe espiritista repertoireof negative experiencesand compulsions to
speakor hearinvoluntarily.Among CatholicCharismatics,evil spiritsareoften
ritually"bound"to preventtheirmanifestationin theformof shrieking,writhing,
vomiting, or challenging the proceedings. The acquiescence of spirits to this
practiceof bindingis doubtlessdue in partto aclass habitus(Bourdieu1977) that
encouragesbehavioralmoderationamong middle-classCharismatics.Protestant
Pentecostals,typically of more working-classprovenance,tend to requiresome
somaticmanifestationas a sign of a demon's departurefromits host. In addition,
evil spiritsintheCharismaticsystemaremanifestonly intheafflicted,notthrough
thehealer.
Related Phenomena in Nonreligious Healing
The somaticmode of attentionin both espiritistaandCatholicCharismatic
systems is indigenouslyarticulatedin termsof religious revelation.I will now
brieflyexaminerelatedphenomenain two healingsystemsthatlack suchovertly
religious character.Daniel (1984) describes the diagnostictaking of pulses by
practitionersof Siddha medicine in South Asia as a three-stageprocess that
culminateswith physicians makingtheirown pulse "confluentand concordant"
withthatof theirpatients.This final stagebearsthenamecamanilai, the stateof
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11. 144 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
equipoise.Only afterexperiencingthe sharedpulsationsof cama nilai does the
Siddha physician truly know the patient's humoraldisorder.In this instance,
divinely inspiredspontaneityis replacedby cultivateddiagnostic skill, but the
somaticmode of attentionremainscharacterizedby its referenceto anotherper-
son's suffering.
Daniel'sinterpretationof Siddhapulsediagnosisalsoraisesamethodological
issue, andrequiresus to returnfor a momentto thedomainof semioticanalysis.
Adoptingthecategoriesof Peirceiansemiotics,Danieldescribestheinitialrelation
betweenthephysician'spassivefingertipsandthepatient'spulseas indexical-in
theircontact,theyindexeachotherasnormalorabnormal.Also, theabnormalpulse
of thepatientindexeshumoralimbalance,whereasthenormalpulse of thephysi-
cian indexeshealthyhumoralbalance.As thephysician'sown pulseemergesand
becomesconfluentwith thatof the patient,the "indexicaldistance"betweenthe
signs decreases,untiltherelationshipbetweenthetwo pulses is transformedinto
aniconicone,andthetwosignsbecomeone.AccordingtoDaniel,"Atthismoment
of perfecticonicity,thephysicianmay be saidto haveexperiencedin some sense
thesufferingas well as thehumoralimbalanceof thepatient"(1984:120).
The semioticanalysisis of value in allowingDaniel to compareSiddhaand
similar traditionalhealing systems with Westernbiomedicine in terms of the
relativepowerof indexicalityor iconicity institutionalizedwithinthem (cf. Kir-
mayer 1992 and Ots 1991). Fromthe perspectiveof embodiment,however, the
notionof indexicaldistanceis too abstract,andthe semioticanalysisallows only
the conclusionthatsufferingis shared"in some sense."Daniel is forced into a
neologismto expresshis understandingthat,insofaras the processof takingthe
pulseneutralizesthedivide betweenpatientandphysician,objectivityis replaced
by "consubjectivity."The problematicof embodimentwouldpick uppreciselyat
this point, with a phenomenologicaldescriptionof "consubjectivity"as charac-
teristicof aparticularsomaticmodeof attention.
A finalexampleof this somaticmodeof attentioncomes fromcontemporary
psychotherapy.Typically reportedclinical experiencesinclude a stirringin the
penisin themale therapist'sencounterwitha "hystericalfemale,"or apropensity
to yawn whenfaced with anobsessive patient.Suchphenomenaoccurspontane-
ously inpsychotherapy,as in thereligioussettingsdescribedabove,butthemode
of attentionto them is not consistently elaboratedas indicative of something
importantaboutthe patientor the conditionbeing treated.Only certainschools,
suchasexperiential,transpersonal,andanalyticalpsychology,appearsympathetic
to more explicit recognitionof these phenomena.Samuels, for example, gives
severalexamplesof countertransferenceas a "physical,actual,material,sensual
expressionin the analyst of something in the patient'spsyche" (1985:52). He
includesbodilyandbehavioralresponses,suchas wearingthesameclothesas the
patient,walkingintoalamp-post,sensationinthesolarplexus,painin aparticular
partof the body; affectiveresponses, such as anger,impatience,powerfulness,
powerlessness;andfantasyresponses, suchas suddendelusionalthoughts,mental
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12. SOMATICMODESOF ATTENTION 145
imagery,or sensorydistortions.Most important,he arguesthatsuchexperiences
arecommunicationfrompatients,andagainsttraditionaltheoriesof countertrans-
ferencethatimpugnthemas pathologicalreactionsof thetherapist.
Thisnewexampleraisesanothermethodologicalissue,thatof thesubject-ob-
jectrelationshipasitpertainstotheinterpretiveframeworkswe bringtotheobjects
of ouranalyses.HereI am not referringto our"objective"analysisof subjective
phenomena,suchassomaticmodesof attention,buttothewayourowninterpretive
subjectivityconstitutesor objectifies the phenomenaof interest.For the present
discussion,workon countertransferencefromanalyticalpsychology may appear
toofferavalidinterpretiveframework.How canthisbe,however,whenanalytical
psychology is itself the source of precisely the kind of datawe wish to analyze
under the heading of somatic mode of attention?Are we to place words of
knowledge,plasmaciones, cama nilai, and embodiedcountertransferenceon an
equalfooting as phenomenato be interpreted,or can we justify using the last of
theseas a frameworkfor interpretingtheformerthree?
The natureof this problemis illustratedby the following vignettefrommy
fieldwork.The settingwas a CatholicCharismatichealingsession conductedby a
healerwho was also a trainedpsychotherapist,and who made particularuse of
"bodywork"techniques.Inthissession, sheaskedtheclient,a 37-year-oldman,to
performtheposturesof a techniqueknownas "grounding,"andto reportwhathe
felt in his body. In the context of ongoing therapeuticattentionto the theme of
overdisciplineandexcessive needforcontrol,itwasnotsurprisingthatheobserved
thathisfistswereclenchedandhiskneeslocked.However,atthementionof locked
knees,my own crossedleg jumpedas if it hadbeentappedby adoctor'shammer
in atestof reflexes.
Insofar as my own somatic mode of attentionwas circumscribedby the
motivesof ethnography,I didnothesitatetousemyownexperienceasanoccasion
fordatacollection.Ilateraskedthehealerhow shewouldaccountformykneejerk,
andif it werepossible fora non-believerto experiencethedivinely inspiredword
of knowledge.She respondedthatthe experiencecould not be definitivelyinter-
preted,butthatit couldbe one of threethings:a somaticresponsecausedby God,
a consequenceof my sharingsome of thesamepersonalityissues as theclient, or
a naturalresultof deepattachmentto another'sexperience.This"nativeexegesis"
subsumesnotions of divine agency, countertransference,and a psychosomatic
understandingof empathy.In its postmoder juxtapositionof interpretivepossi-
bilities, it poses a challengeof reflexivityfor the participantobserver,and in so
doing,it arguesthatthedomainof interpretivepossibilitiesis continuousbetween
thoseof observerandthoseof observed.
It may be arguedthat,althougha categorysuch as countertransferencemay
not be morecorrect,it may be morevaluablefor a comparativeanalysisof such
phenomena,andthatcomparisonitself is thesourceof validity.Nevertheless,this
exampleremindsus thatobjectiveanalyticcategoriesbecomeobjectivethrougha
reflectivemovement within the process of analysis.I would arguethatit is the
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13. 146 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
perspectiveof embodimentitselfthatfacilitatesthisinsight.Ifthesameinsightcan
alsobe arrivedatthroughotherapproaches,I wouldatleastarguethatembodiment
offersawayto understanditinmoredepth.Inanyevent,itis necessarytoelaborate
thefindingthattheattempttodefineasomaticmodeof attentiondecentersanalysis
such thatno categoryis privileged,andall categoriesarein flux betweensubjec-
tivity andobjectivity.
The Flux of Analytical Categories
All theexampleswehavecalledupontoillustratethenotionof somaticmodes
of attentionaredrawnfromthedomainof healing.If suchmodesof attentionare
generalphenomenaof humanconsciousness, we would expect thatthey can be
identifiedin otherdomainsas well. Forexample,Becker(in press)has observed
that in Fijian culturethe body is not a function of the individual"self"as in
Euro-America,butof the community.An ongoing surveillance,monitoring,and
commentaryon body shape includes the changes that begin when a woman
becomespregnant.Fijiansregardit as essentialthata womanmakeherpregnancy
knownpublicly,lest thepowerof its secrecyresultin boatscapsizing,contamina-
tionof food, andthespoilingof groupendeavors.Unrevealedpregnanciescan be
manifestinthebodilyexperiencesof others:illness orweightloss causedby food
cooked by the pregnantwoman; loss of hair caused by cutting it; a lactating
mother'smilkdryingupbecauseof aglance.Thisphenomenonwasfullycultivated
as asomaticmodeof attentionbyonewomanwhoexperiencedanitchinherbreast
whenevera memberof herfamily becamepregnant.Such evidencetypicallyled
theheadof thehouseholdto summonthefamily's young womenandurgeone of
themto revealherpregnancybeforesomethinguntowardoccurred.
An approachto culturalphenomenathroughembodimentshouldalso make
possible the reinterpretationof data already analyzed from other standpoints
(Csordas1990).Weshouldthennotonlybeabletodiscoverundocumentedsomatic
modes of attentionas in the Fijiancase, butalso be able to recognizethemright
underourethnographicnoses in well-documentedsituations.I submit(basedon
observationsmadewhilemy wife andI wereexpectingthebirthof ourtwins)that
such a reinterpretationof couvadeis in order.The coreof thephenomenonis that
anexpectantfatherexperiencesbodily sensationsattunedto thoseof his pregnant
mate. Couvadehas been understoodin one of two ways in the literature.On the
one hand,it is thoughtof as a ratherodd customin which theman"simulates"or
"imitates"labor(Broude1988;Dawson 1929;Munroeet al. 1973).Ontheother,
it is regardedas a medicalphenomenon,or "syndrome"(EnochandTrethowan
1991;Klein 1991;Schodt1989).Thus,couvadeis eitherexoticizedas aprimitive
charade,orpathologizedas a psychosomaticoveridentification.Reconceivedas a
somatic mode of attention,it appearsinstead as a phenomenonof embodied
intersubjectivitythatis performativelyelaboratedin certainsocieties, while it is
eitherneglectedorfearedas abnormalin others.
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14. SOMATICMODESOF ATTENTION 147
Pendingadditionalempiricaldescriptionsof somaticmodesof attention,we
can provisionally turn to the implications of the constructfor a paradigmof
embodiment.In outliningthe phenomenologyof somaticmodes of attentionin
espiritistaandCatholicCharismatichealing systems, I rigorouslyrefrainedfrom
invokinganycategoryotherthan"experience"andcastthedescriptionstrictlyin
termsof sensorymodalities.Inthesucceedingsection,I showedthatthesemodes
of attentioncannotbesubsumedentirelyunderthecategoryofreligiousexperience,
andthat,in impingingon moreconventionalcategoriessuchas countertransfer-
ence, theypose a challengeof reflexivity.The pointI wantto makenow is about
thepovertyof ouranthropologicalcategoriesforgoinganyfurtherinunderstanding
whatitistoattendtoone's bodyinamodesuchasthatdescribedabove.Weoperate
withcategoriesof cognitionandaffect,neitherone of whichalonecandojustice
tothesephenomena,andbetweenwhichthereexists anearlyunbridgeableanalytic
gulf. The categoriesof tranceandalteredstatesof consciousnessremainvirtual
blackboxes,andonecolleague'ssuggestionof"proprioceptivedelusion"is nohelp
atall.To suggestthattheyareformsof "embodiedknowledge"is provocative,but
doesn't necessarilycapturethe intersubjectivenatureof thephenomenawe have
described.In his earlyprogrammaticwork,Blackingreferredto the existence of
"sharedsomaticstates"as thebasisforakindof "bodilyempathy,"butofferedno
specificexamplesof anythingsimilarto whatwe havedescribedabove(1977:10).
I wouldliketogo furtherhereandbrieflydiscussthesephenomenaunderfour
additionalcategories,if only to emphasizethatwe remainill-equippedto interpret
them. These categories are intuition,imagination,perception,and sensation. I
restrictthediscussionin this section to the Charismaticandespiritistarevelatory
phenomenadescribedabove.
First,consideranointings,wordsof knowledge,videncias,andplasmaciones
as kindsof intuition.ThephysicianRitaCharondescribesherpracticeof writing
fiction to clarify her feelings when confused or distressedabouta patient.She
begins with known facts, tying togetherevents, complaints,and actions of the
patient,whilemakingherselfanactorin thestoryfromthepatient'spointof view.
She is "notsurprisedwhendetailsthatI imagineaboutapatientturnoutto be true.
Thereis, afterall,adeepspringof knowledgeaboutourpatientsthatisonlyslightly
tappedin ourconscious work"(1985:5). I thinkit is not difficultto conceive of
intuitionasembodiedknowledge.Thenwhynotconceiveof revelatoryphenomena
assensoryintuition?Healersaswell asphysiciansnotonlysharewiththeirpatients
ahighlyorganizedsetof bodilydispositionssummarizedbyBourdieu(1977)under
the termhabitus,butalso acquirea cumulativeempiricalknowledgeof therange
of humandistressastheyexpandtheirexperience.
Again,letustrytounderstandrevelatoryphenomenaasformsof imagination.
In currentscholarship,imaginationis discussed almost exclusively in terms of
visual imagery, which is in turn readily thought of as "mental"imagery. So
ingrainedis theconceptof mentalimagerythatthe termphysicalimagerystrikes
one almostas an oxymoron.Yet if we allow the othersensorymodalitiesequal
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15. 148 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
analyticstatuswith the visual, an expandedconcept of sensory imagerywould
allow us to avoidthe arbitrarydichotomythattemptsus to analyzeCharismatic
wordsof knowledgeintodistinctcategoriesof mentalimagesandphysicalsensa-
tions,andanalyticallytoseparatespiritistvidenciasfromplasmaciones.Wewould
then be taking a methodologicalstep away from an empiricistconception of
imaginationasabstractrepresentationtoaphenomenologicalconceptionof imagi-
nationas afeatureof thebodilysynthesis,whichMerleau-Ponty(1962) described
ascharacteristicof ahumanconsciousnessthatprojectsitselfintoaculturalworld.
Oncemore,whatif we takeseriouslytheindigenousclaimthatthesephenom-
enaareformsofperception,ifnotof thedivinethenof somethingelsewecanaccept
as concrete?This is a challenging proposition,and merits invoking Schwartz-
Salant's(1987) attemptto integratealchemicalthinkingintocurrentpsychothera-
peutictheory.He suggestsconceivingof an interactivefield betweentwo people
thatis"capableof manifestingenergywithitsowndynamicsandphenomenology."
This "in-between"field is palpableonly on certainlevels of perceptionin which
theimaginationitselfcan"becomeanorganthatperceivesunconsciousprocesses"
(1987:139).Samuels(1985), whoseworkhasbeendiscussedabove,offersarelated
formulation,which,like thatof Schwartz-Salant,is derivedfromanalyticalpsy-
chology. He elaboratesHenry Corbin's concept of the mundusimaginalis, or
imaginalworld,as a distinctorderof realitythatexists bothbetweentwopersons
intherapeuticanalysis,andbetweensenseimpressionsandcognitionorspirituality.
Althoughtheconceptionof imaginationasasenseorganhasitsattraction,itcreates
methodologicalproblemscommon to any model thattries to define "levels"of
perceptionor consciousness.In addition,it does not addresstheproblemthatwe
have no independentway of "perceiving"unconsciousprocesses so as to verify
whatis beingperceivedinrevelatoryphenomena.
Sensationis yet anothercategoryunderwhichwe mightchoose to subsume
these phenomena.Sensationis inherentlyempiricist,however,andforces a con-
ceptionof culturalmeaningasreferentialmeaningimposedonasensorysubstrate.
Therelevantquestionsbecomewhethertheheatexperiencedbythehealeris really
the sameas we feel whenwe blush,whetherthe tinglingis reallythesameas the
tinglingof anticipationwe feel in otherhighlymeaningfulsituations,whetherthe
"painbackup"in thehealer'sarmas she lays herhandson a person'sshoulderis
reallythe samefeeling we have when our arm"fallsasleep"afterremainingtoo
longinanuncomfortableposition.All of thesewouldbeinterestingdeterminations,
butwouldnotsuittheaimsof a culturalphenomenology.By reducingmeaningto
sensationorbiologicalfunction,thisapproachrequiresareconstitutionof meaning
thatbypassesthebodilysynthesisof sensoryexperienceandtheculturalsynthesis
of sacredexperience.
The indeterminacyin ouranalyticcategoriesis revealedwhen we encounter
phenomenaas essentiallyambiguousas somaticmodesof attention.This indeter-
minacy, it turnsout, is an essential element of our existence. Merleau-Ponty
objectedtoconceivingperceptionas anintellectualactof graspingexternalstimuli
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16. SOMATICMODESOF ATTENTION 149
producedby pregivenobjects.Instead,he arguedthattheperceptualsynthesisof
theobjectis accomplishedby thesubject,whichis thebodyasafieldof perception
andpractice(1964:15-16). Ineffect,Merleau-Ponty'sexistentialanalysiscollapses
the subject-objectduality in orderto pose more precisely the questionof how
attentionandotherreflectiveprocessesof the intellectconstituteculturalobjects.
In takingup this enterprise,we find thatthe ambiguitybetweensubjectand
objectextendsto ourdistinctionsbetweenmind andbody, andbetweenself and
other.Withregardto thefirstof thesedistinctions,if we beginwiththelivedworld
of perceptualphenomena,ourbodiesarenotobjectstous.Quitethecontrary,they
arean integralpartof the perceivingsubject.On the level of perceptionit is not
legitimatetodistinguishmindandbody,sincethebodyis itselfthe"generalpower
of inhabitingall the environmentswhich the world contains"(Merleau-Ponty
1962:311).Beginningfromperceptualreality,however,it thenbecomesrelevant
to ask how our bodies may become objectifiedthroughprocesses of reflection.
Likewise,inthelived world,we do notperceiveothersasobjects.Anotherperson
isperceivedasanother"myself,"tearingitselfawayfrombeingsimplyaphenome-
non in my perceptualfield, appropriatingmy phenomenaandconferringon them
thedimensionof intersubjectivebeing,andso offering"thetaskof atruecommu-
nication"(Merleau-Ponty1964:18). As is true of the body, other persons can
becomeobjectsfor us only secondarily,as theresultof reflection.
Itis inthisembodiedrealitythatwe havehadtobegintheanalysisof wordof
knowledge,plasmacione,camanilai,andembodiedcountertransference.Originat-
ing inprimordialexperiencecharacterizedby theabsenceof dualitybetweenmind
and body, self and other, the phenomenaare objectifiedin reflective practice,
throughaparticularsomaticmodeof attention.Farfromprovidingacausalaccount
of thesephenomena,ouranalysishasshownthedifficultyof evenfindingadequate
descriptivecategories.Whatis revealedby a returnto the phenomena-and the
consequentnecessity to collapse dualitiesof mind andbody, self and other-is
insteada fundamentalprincipleof indeterminacythatposes a profoundmethodo-
logical challengeto the scientificideal.The "turningtoward"thatconstitutesthe
objectof attentioncannotbe determinatein termsof eithersubjector object,but
only real in termsof intersubjectivity.
What's the Use of Indeterminacy?
Ironically,theapproachthroughembodimentthathasallowedus toelaborate
somaticmodesof attentionasa constructwithsomedemonstrableempiricalvalue
has also disclosed the ratherslippery notion of the essential indeterminacyof
existence.Thisis doubtlessrelatedtothediscoveryof existentialandmethodologi-
cal indeterminacyin recentethnographicwriting(cf. Favret-Saada1980;Jackson
1989; Pandolfi 1991; Stoller 1989). Inevitably,perhaps,when we try to give
theoreticalformulationto thisindeterminacy,we easilyslipbackintothelanguage
of eithertextualityor embodiment,representationor being in the world. In the
present context, I can only point to this problem by briefly summarizingthe
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17. 150 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
principleof indeterminacyasformulatedby Merleau-Pontyforperception,andby
Bourdieuforpractice.We thusreturnto thenotionof indeterminacy,notto make
it determinateas a conceptthatcan be appliedin our analyses,butto give some
theoreticalgroundsfor acceptingit as an inevitablebackgroundconditionof our
analyses.
Merleau-Ponty,havingdemonstratedthatallhumanfunctions(e.g.,sexuality,
motility,intelligence)areunifiedina singlebodilysynthesis,arguesthatexistence
is indeterminate
insofarasitistheveryprocessbywhichthehithertomeaninglesstakesonmeaning,
wherebywhathadmerelya[forexample]sexualsignificanceassumesamoregeneral
one,chanceistransformedintoreason;insofarasitistheactoftakingupadefacto
situation.Weshallgivethename"transcendence"tothisactinwhichexistencetakes
up, to its own account,andtransformssucha situation.Preciselybecauseit is
transcendence,existenceneverutterlyoutrunsanything,forin thatcasethetension
whichis essentialto it [betweenobjectiveworldandexistentialmeaning]would
disappear.Itneverabandonsitself.Whatitisneverremainsexteral andaccidentalto
it,sincethisisalwaystakenupandintegratedintoit.[1962:169]
The transcendencedescribed by Merleau-Pontyis thus not mystical, but is
groundedin the world,suchthatexistentialindeterminacybecomesthe basisfor
aninalienablehumanfreedom.
For Bourdieu, the synthesis of practicaldomains in a unitaryhabitus is
likewise basedon indeterminacy,butthis variantof indeterminacydoes not lead
to transcendence.Insteadof anexistentialindeterminacy,Bourdieu'sis a logical
indeterminacy,which
neverexplicitlyorsystematicallylimitsitselftoanyoneaspectof thetermsitlinks,
buttakeseachone,eachtime,asawhole,exploitingtothefullthefactthattwo"data"
areneverentirelyalikeinall respectsbutarealwaysalikein some respect .... [Ritual
practiceworksby]bringingthesamesymbolintodifferentrelationsthroughdifferent
aspectsorbringingdifferentaspectsof thesamereferentintothesamerelationof
opposition.[Bourdieu1977:111-112]
Logical indeterminacyis the basis for transpositionof different schemes into
differentpracticaldomains,exemplifiedinhis ethnographyby theKabyleapplica-
tion of the male-female opposition to outside-inside the house and, again, to
differentareaswithinthehouse.Itis also thebasisforthepolysemyandambiguity
epitomizedbytheKabylecookingladlethatis sometimesmale,sometimesfemale.
In sum, Merleau-Pontysees in the indeterminacyof perceptiona transcen-
dence thatdoes not outrunits embodiedsituation,but thatalways "assertsmore
thingsthanit grasps:when I say thatI see the ash-trayover there,I supposeas
completedanunfoldingof experiencewhichcouldgo onadinfinitum,andIcommit
a whole perceptualfuture"(1962:361). Bourdieu sees in the indeterminacyof
practicethat,since no personhas conscious masteryof the modusoperandithat
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18. SOMATICMODESOFATTENTION151
integratessymbolicschemesandpractices,theunfoldingof his worksandactions
"alwaysoutrunshis consciousintentions"(1977:79).Itwouldbe convenientif we
could pose these views of indeterminacyas perfectlycomplementary.Thus, we
couldsay thathumanactionis transcendentin takingup situationsandendowing
themwithmeaningthatis open-endedandinexhaustiblewithouteveroutrunning
those situations;and situations cannot be outrunbecause they are structured
accordingtoanenduringsystemof dispositionsthatregulatepracticesbyadjusting
them to other practices, thereby creating the condition of possibility for the
open-endednessof action. However, there are serious conceptual differences
betweenthetwo theoriststhatputthisinterpretationin doubt.
On Bourdieu's side, the locus of these differencesis his rejectionof the
conceptsof livedexperience,intentionality,andthedistinctionbetweenconscious-
nessinitselfandforitself.ThisrejectionrequiresBourdieutogroundtheconditions
for intelligibilityin social life entirelyon homogenizationof the habituswithin
groups or classes (1977:80), and to explain individual variationin terms of
homologyamong individuals,such thatindividuals'systems of dispositions are
structuralvariantsof thegrouphabitus,ordeviationsinrelationtoastyle(1977:86).
Merleau-Ponty,on theotherhand,insistson the apriorinecessityof intersubjec-
tivity,pointingout thatany actor'sadoptionof a positionpresupposeshis or her
beingsituatedin anintersubjectiveworld,andthatscience itself is upheldby this
basicdoxa.This intersubjectivityis not aninterpenetrationof intentionalities,but
aninterweavingof familiarpatternsof behavior:
Iperceivetheotherasapieceofbehavior,forexample,Iperceivethegriefortheanger
of theotherinhisconduct,inhisfaceorhishands,withoutrecoursetoany"inner"
experienceof sufferingor anger,andbecausegriefandangerare variationsof
belongingto the world,undividedbetweenthe body andconsciousness,andequally
applicabletotheother'sconduct,visibleinhisphenomenalbody,asinmyownconduct
as it is presentedto me. [Merleau-Ponty1962:356]
Thisanalysisis echoedby Jackson:
To recognizethe embodiednessof our being-in-the-worldis to discover a common
groundwhereself andotherareone,forbyusingone's bodyin thesamewayas others
in the sameenvironmentone findsoneself informedby anunderstandingwhich may
thenbeinterpretedaccordingtoone's owncustomorbent,yetwhichremainsgrounded
in a field of practicalactivity andtherebyremainsconsonantwith the experienceof
thoseamongwhom one has lived. [1989:135]
Becausebody andconsciousness areone, intersubjectivityis also a co-presence;
another'semotionis immediatebecauseit is graspedpre-objectively,andfamiliar
insofaras we sharethesamehabitus.
Intheend,Bourdieu'sprincipleof logical indeterminacybecomesthecondi-
tionforregulatedimprovisation,whereasMerleau-Ponty'sprincipleof existential
indeterminacybecomestheconditionfortranscendencein sociallife. Eachprinci-
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19. 152 CULTURALANTHROPOLOGY
pie has a weakness,basedon the implicitfavoringof textualityor embodiment,
representationorbeingintheworld.We will leave ourdiscussionwithasummary
of theseissues.
To Merleau-Ponty,authenticactsof expression"forthemselves"constitutea
world and are transcendent,but once a linguistic and culturalworld is already
constituted,reiterationof those acts is no longertranscendent,no longerprojects
itself intotheworld,andpartakesmoreof being"initself."ForMerleau-Pontythis
problem subsists primarilyin the domain of speech, where the speakingword
becomes sedimentedas thespokenword.Here,Bourdieu'sanalysisof universes
of practice subsisting alongside universes of discourse provides a corrective,
forcingus to generalizethissedimentationfromlanguageto therestof thehabitus,
and to acknowledgeMerleau-Ponty'sproblemas endemic to his conceptionof
existence. Theproblem,requiredby the (uncollapsedor uncollapsible)dualityof
the"initself"(being)and"foritself' (existence),is havingtodistinguishgenuine,
transcendentexpressionfrom reiteration.This leads directlyto the dilemmaof
havingtospecifyconditionsunderwhichpersonscanbecomeobjectstoothersand
to themselves,andunderwhichsocioeconomicclassescanbecomeobjectstoother
classes andto themselves,as opposedto beingsubjectsof theirown action.While
existenceis nottext,it is essentiallytextualizable.
Bourdieu,in rejectingthedistinctionbetween"initself"and"foritself,"can
avoid this problemby conceptualizingthe result of indeterminacyas regulated
improvisation,open-endedyetcircumscribedby thedispositionsof thehabitus.In
thishe is facedwithadifferentproblem,however:accountingforchange,creativ-
ity,innovation,transgression,andviolation.He claimsthat,"asanacquiredsystem
of generativeschemesobjectivelyadjustedto theparticularconditionsin whichit
is constituted,thehabitusengendersallthethoughts,alltheperceptions,andallthe
actionsconsistentwiththoseconditions,andnoothers"(1977:95).Thisis difficult
to conceive,he claims,if one remainslocked in thedilemmasof determinismand
freedom,conditioningand creativity.These are perhapsdualitiesthathe is too
quick to collapse,however,unless the "conditionedandconditionalfreedom"of
thehabitus's"endlesscapacityto engenderproducts"includesthecapacityfor its
own transformation(1977:95).Otherwise,theprincipleof indeterminacybecomes
a disguiseforlackof analyticspecificity,andhabitusloses its valueas ananalytic
construct.Althoughthehabitusbearssomeof theschematismofafixed text,itcan
be transcendedin embodiedexistence.
Conclusion
Approachingculturalphenomenafrom the standpointof embodimenthas
allowed us to definea constructof somaticmodes of attention,whichhas in tur
led us to a principleof indeterminacythatunderminesdualitiesbetweensubject
and object, mind and body, self and other. In our concluding comparisonof
Merleau-PontyandBourdieu,we haveseenthattherelationsbetweenembodiment
itself and textuality, and between representationand being in the world, are
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20. SOMATICMODESOF ATTENTION 153
indeterminateaswell. Theseindeterminaterelationsconstitutetheshiftingexisten-
tial groundon which contemporaryethnographysuggests we must increasingly
situateculturalphenomena.Ourattemptsto objectifyin analysisareanalogousto
thedefinitivegestureof the Senoufodivinerin strikinghis thigh(Zempleni1988)
to confirmhis pronouncement.The actis notso muchaninvocationof thesacred
as it is anembodiedstatement,in defianceof thewisdomthatone neverstepsinto
thesamerivertwice, thatone has snatcheda definitiveoutcomefromtheindeter-
minateflux of life, andthat,once andforall, "Thisis theway it is."
Itis thissameprincipleof indeterminacy,inherentinsociallife, thathascome
totheforeintheconsciousmovementof postmodernisminartandtheunconscious
dissociationof signsandreferents,symbolsanddomains,incontemporaryculture.
Itis thefundamentalindeterminacyof existencethatis sensedasmissingby those
anthropologistsattractedto thepostmodernistmethodologicalshiftfrompatternto
pastiche,fromkey symbolsto blurredgenres.Theirprojecthasbeen begunin the
semioticparadigmof textuality,but a substantialcontributioncan also be made
throughelaborationof a phenomenologicalparadigmof embodiment.Yet, if
indeterminacyis fundamentalto existence,only carefulelaborationof its defining
features,such as Merleau-Ponty'stranscendenceandBourdieu'simprovisation,
will allowittobecomeanawarenessof ourexistentialconditionwithoutbecoming
anexcuse for analyticalimprecision.
Notes
Acknowledgments.Portionsof thisarticlewerepresentedin 1988tothesymposium,
"BeyondSemanticsandRationality,"organizedbyGillesBibeauandEllenCorinatthe12th
InternationalCongressof AnthropologicalandEthnologicalSciencesinZagreb.A version
waspresentedtothesession"EmbodiedKnowledge,"organizedbyDeborahGordonand
JeanLaveatthe1988AnnualMeetingof theAmericanAnthropologicalAssociationin
Phoenix.Sincethattime,IamgratefultoJanisJenkinsforongoingscholarlydiscussionthat
challengedmetorefinemyargument.Thanksaswelltothetwoanonymousreviewersfor
CulturalAnthropology.FieldworkamongCatholicCharismaticswassupportedbyNational
InstituteofMentalHealthgrantR01MH40473.
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