SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 13
When Things Break
Dr. Ron Graham, editor
a Clarity Strategic production
Contents

What is an engineering failure?

What are some examples?

What lessons can be learned?

How can failures be avoided?

Can engineered systems be truly “safe?”

Oh GOD! I've had a failure! What do I DO???
The conscientious, effective engineer is a virtuous engineer.
- Samuel Florman
What is an engineering failure?

failure (n) == malfunction + loss of opportunity

risk (n) == the chance of something going
wrong

hazard (n) == what happens if something goes
wrong

Murphy (n) == the guy who says something will
go wrong

bug (n) == what makes software not work as
advertised
What are some examples?

Tacoma Narrows Bridge

Space Shuttle Challenger

Kansas City Hyatt Regency skywalk

Union Carbide Bhopal, India

THERAC-25 radiation device
These are just a few of the popular examples – those students have really
responded to in the past.
What can be learned?

Better design techniques

Enhanced safety precautions

More rigorous testing (and simulation)

More enlightened management

Discovery of new failure modes (not just what
initiates the failure, but also what propagates it)

Better estimates of cost and risk
For we can demonstrate by geometry that the large machine is not
proportionately stronger than the small. - Galileo
How can failures be avoided?

Design

Redundancy and spare parts

Watch out for discontinuities and interfaces

Problems of scale (not just changing size)

Operation

Massive manned tests

Training and retraining (with updated manuals)

Carefully designed rules for alarms
How can failures be avoided?

Management

Exercise controls

Employ verification and validation

Pay attention to systems engineering

Maintenance

Examine repair v. replacement

Have procedures that disconnect energy

Examine self- and remote-test capability
How can failures be avoided?

Materials

Use materials well within their load limits

Production

Be sure equipment works properly and operators
are qualified

Use inspection and testing to separate defective
components (especially at fastened joints)

Adhere to relevant codes
Can engineered systems be truly
“safe?”

Make sure development and support staff are
not all the same people

Complete, timely, readable diagnostics

Backup “human-in-the-loop” options

Guard against power failure, surges, and EMI

Give yourself enough duty cycle for multiple
tasks
Can engineered systems be truly
“safe?” (Life or property at risk)

Redundant fastening to prevent collapse

Containment of explosions or hazardous flows

Adequate shielding

Sufficient alarms

Buffer zone between system and neighbors

Make dangerous releases or shrapnel dissipate
or reach a low-energy state quickly
Oh GOD! I've had a failure!
What do I DO???

Get hold of yourself

Prepare for a failure investigation – and LEARN
from it!

Be prepared for a critical look at

Your experience base

Safety margins

Self-limiting phenomena

Worst-case environments

The importance of observation
Sources

Casey, Set Phasers on Stun

Florman, The Civilized Engineer

Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering

Jones, Engineering Materials 3: Materials Failure
Analysis – Case Studies and Design Implications

Kepner, The New Rational Manager

Kletz, What Went Wrong?

Kletz, An Engineer's View of Human Error

Kletz, Learning From Accidents

LaPierre and Moro, Five Past Midnight in Bhopal

Levy and Salvadori, Why Buildings Fall Down

Lovell and Kluger, Apollo 13

Murray and Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon

Nishida, Failure Analysis in Engineering Applications

Peterson, Fatal Defect: Chasing Killer Computer Bugs

Petroski, To Engineer is Human

Petroski, Design Paradigms: Case Histories of Error
and Judgment in Engineering

Rogers et. al. "Report to the President by
the Presidential Commission on the

Space Shuttle Challenger Accident."
Washington DC, June 1986.

Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision
An online example:
Union Carbide Bhopal Accident
Causal factors include three protective systems
out of service:

refrigeration system out of service because of operating costs

high temperature alarm was reset high

scrubber inadequately sized for large release, under repair

flare stack out of commission; inlet line under repair
Read MUCH more here: http://is.gd/UCBhopal

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

CS5032 Lecture 2: Failure
CS5032 Lecture 2: FailureCS5032 Lecture 2: Failure
CS5032 Lecture 2: FailureJohn Rooksby
 
Bowties - a visual view of risk
Bowties - a visual view of riskBowties - a visual view of risk
Bowties - a visual view of riskPaul McCulloch
 
2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety
2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety
2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safetyAndy Brazier
 
Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries
 Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries
Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical IndustriesKarishmaRK
 
Threat modeling from the trenches to the clouds
Threat modeling from the trenches to the cloudsThreat modeling from the trenches to the clouds
Threat modeling from the trenches to the cloudsPriyanka Aash
 

Mais procurados (7)

CS5032 Lecture 2: Failure
CS5032 Lecture 2: FailureCS5032 Lecture 2: Failure
CS5032 Lecture 2: Failure
 
Bowties - a visual view of risk
Bowties - a visual view of riskBowties - a visual view of risk
Bowties - a visual view of risk
 
2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety
2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety
2011 SPE - Electronic logging to improve safety
 
Human Factor Off01
Human Factor Off01Human Factor Off01
Human Factor Off01
 
Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries
 Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries
Introduction to Understanding Human errors in Pharmaceutical Industries
 
Human errors
Human errorsHuman errors
Human errors
 
Threat modeling from the trenches to the clouds
Threat modeling from the trenches to the cloudsThreat modeling from the trenches to the clouds
Threat modeling from the trenches to the clouds
 

Destaque

Presentación1 english week
Presentación1 english weekPresentación1 english week
Presentación1 english weekColegio Londres
 
Technology that Inspires: the Iron Horse
Technology that Inspires: the Iron HorseTechnology that Inspires: the Iron Horse
Technology that Inspires: the Iron HorseRon Graham
 
Business Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef Enterprises
Business Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef EnterprisesBusiness Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef Enterprises
Business Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef EnterprisesRon Graham
 
The spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous I
The spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous IThe spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous I
The spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous IRon Graham
 
Power point devo chef.
Power point devo chef.Power point devo chef.
Power point devo chef.Ron Graham
 
Presentación english week 2012
Presentación english week 2012Presentación english week 2012
Presentación english week 2012Colegio Londres
 
NSTAAB opening assembly
NSTAAB opening assemblyNSTAAB opening assembly
NSTAAB opening assemblyRon Graham
 
Stories and legends...
Stories and legends...Stories and legends...
Stories and legends...brunaxo
 
10 things youth can learn from sports
10 things youth can learn from sports10 things youth can learn from sports
10 things youth can learn from sportsRon Graham
 
PresentacióN DiseñO Frutas
PresentacióN DiseñO FrutasPresentacióN DiseñO Frutas
PresentacióN DiseñO FrutasColegio Londres
 
Verificación de requisitos de hardware
Verificación de requisitos de hardwareVerificación de requisitos de hardware
Verificación de requisitos de hardwarebrunaxo
 
10 things you may not know about BULLYING
10 things you may not know about BULLYING10 things you may not know about BULLYING
10 things you may not know about BULLYINGRon Graham
 
The Malted Meeple
The Malted MeepleThe Malted Meeple
The Malted MeepleRon Graham
 
10 things youth coaches can do
10 things youth coaches can do10 things youth coaches can do
10 things youth coaches can doRon Graham
 
Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!
Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!
Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!Ron Graham
 
Writing Over-Simplified
Writing Over-SimplifiedWriting Over-Simplified
Writing Over-SimplifiedRon Graham
 

Destaque (19)

Presentación1 english week
Presentación1 english weekPresentación1 english week
Presentación1 english week
 
B P D
B P DB P D
B P D
 
Technology that Inspires: the Iron Horse
Technology that Inspires: the Iron HorseTechnology that Inspires: the Iron Horse
Technology that Inspires: the Iron Horse
 
Business Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef Enterprises
Business Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef EnterprisesBusiness Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef Enterprises
Business Plan 2 0 for Devotional Chef Enterprises
 
The spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous I
The spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous IThe spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous I
The spirit of Innovation: the Voluminous I
 
Power point devo chef.
Power point devo chef.Power point devo chef.
Power point devo chef.
 
Presentación english week 2012
Presentación english week 2012Presentación english week 2012
Presentación english week 2012
 
NSTAAB opening assembly
NSTAAB opening assemblyNSTAAB opening assembly
NSTAAB opening assembly
 
Cameras 3rd Pt
Cameras 3rd PtCameras 3rd Pt
Cameras 3rd Pt
 
Stories and legends...
Stories and legends...Stories and legends...
Stories and legends...
 
10 things youth can learn from sports
10 things youth can learn from sports10 things youth can learn from sports
10 things youth can learn from sports
 
PresentacióN DiseñO Frutas
PresentacióN DiseñO FrutasPresentacióN DiseñO Frutas
PresentacióN DiseñO Frutas
 
Verificación de requisitos de hardware
Verificación de requisitos de hardwareVerificación de requisitos de hardware
Verificación de requisitos de hardware
 
10 things you may not know about BULLYING
10 things you may not know about BULLYING10 things you may not know about BULLYING
10 things you may not know about BULLYING
 
The Malted Meeple
The Malted MeepleThe Malted Meeple
The Malted Meeple
 
10 things youth coaches can do
10 things youth coaches can do10 things youth coaches can do
10 things youth coaches can do
 
Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!
Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!
Zero-G: a ride aboard the Vomit Comet!
 
Writing Over-Simplified
Writing Over-SimplifiedWriting Over-Simplified
Writing Over-Simplified
 
English week 2014
English week 2014English week 2014
English week 2014
 

Semelhante a When Things Break

Resilience Engineering & Human Error... in IT
Resilience Engineering & Human Error... in ITResilience Engineering & Human Error... in IT
Resilience Engineering & Human Error... in ITJoão Miranda
 
Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...
Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...
Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...Shola Yemi-Jonathan
 
Massive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience Design
Massive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience DesignMassive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience Design
Massive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience Designgsmith
 
PSM Fast Presentation
PSM    Fast PresentationPSM    Fast Presentation
PSM Fast PresentationEssam Osmaan
 
Enterprise security management II
Enterprise security management   IIEnterprise security management   II
Enterprise security management IIzapp0
 
2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems
2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems
2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systemsJaap van Ekris
 
Extreme Simulation Scenarios
Extreme Simulation ScenariosExtreme Simulation Scenarios
Extreme Simulation ScenariosUKH+
 
DARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders Ellerstrand
DARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders EllerstrandDARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders Ellerstrand
DARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders EllerstrandPeter O'Leary
 
Software safety in embedded systems & software safety why, what, and how
Software safety in embedded systems & software safety   why, what, and how Software safety in embedded systems & software safety   why, what, and how
Software safety in embedded systems & software safety why, what, and how bdemchak
 
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systemsJaap van Ekris
 
Fitt's list presentation
Fitt's list presentationFitt's list presentation
Fitt's list presentationAndrew Tong
 
Presentation Paris 08 Dahlstrom
Presentation Paris 08 DahlstromPresentation Paris 08 Dahlstrom
Presentation Paris 08 DahlstromNicklasD
 
Increasing Value Of Security Assessment Services
Increasing Value Of Security Assessment ServicesIncreasing Value Of Security Assessment Services
Increasing Value Of Security Assessment ServicesChris Nickerson
 
Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...
Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...
Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...juliekannai
 
Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes congreso preven...
Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes   congreso preven...Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes   congreso preven...
Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes congreso preven...Marco Antonio
 
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards Safety
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards SafetySafety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards Safety
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards SafetyAli Sufyan
 

Semelhante a When Things Break (20)

Nakata1503 jsse
Nakata1503 jsseNakata1503 jsse
Nakata1503 jsse
 
Resilience Engineering & Human Error... in IT
Resilience Engineering & Human Error... in ITResilience Engineering & Human Error... in IT
Resilience Engineering & Human Error... in IT
 
HUMAN ERROR
HUMAN ERRORHUMAN ERROR
HUMAN ERROR
 
Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...
Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...
Demystifying the concepts of hazard avoidance in a dynamic work environment -...
 
Massive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience Design
Massive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience DesignMassive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience Design
Massive Failure: What Disasters Can Teach Us About Experience Design
 
PSM Fast Presentation
PSM    Fast PresentationPSM    Fast Presentation
PSM Fast Presentation
 
Preliminary hazard analysis (pha)
Preliminary hazard analysis (pha)Preliminary hazard analysis (pha)
Preliminary hazard analysis (pha)
 
Enterprise security management II
Enterprise security management   IIEnterprise security management   II
Enterprise security management II
 
2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems
2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems
2010-03-31 - VU Amsterdam - Experiences testing safety critical systems
 
Extreme Simulation Scenarios
Extreme Simulation ScenariosExtreme Simulation Scenarios
Extreme Simulation Scenarios
 
DARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders Ellerstrand
DARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders EllerstrandDARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders Ellerstrand
DARWIN Webinar 'The sharp end' by Anders Ellerstrand
 
Software safety in embedded systems & software safety why, what, and how
Software safety in embedded systems & software safety   why, what, and how Software safety in embedded systems & software safety   why, what, and how
Software safety in embedded systems & software safety why, what, and how
 
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
2011-05-02 - VU Amsterdam - Testing safety critical systems
 
Fitt's list presentation
Fitt's list presentationFitt's list presentation
Fitt's list presentation
 
Presentation Paris 08 Dahlstrom
Presentation Paris 08 DahlstromPresentation Paris 08 Dahlstrom
Presentation Paris 08 Dahlstrom
 
Increasing Value Of Security Assessment Services
Increasing Value Of Security Assessment ServicesIncreasing Value Of Security Assessment Services
Increasing Value Of Security Assessment Services
 
Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...
Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...
Preparing for a Black Swan: Planning and Programming for Risk Mitigation in E...
 
Human Factors.pdf
Human Factors.pdfHuman Factors.pdf
Human Factors.pdf
 
Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes congreso preven...
Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes   congreso preven...Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes   congreso preven...
Uso efectivo de metodologías de investigación de accidentes congreso preven...
 
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards Safety
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards SafetySafety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards Safety
Safety, Risk, Hazard and Engineer’s Role Towards Safety
 

When Things Break

  • 1. When Things Break Dr. Ron Graham, editor a Clarity Strategic production
  • 2. Contents  What is an engineering failure?  What are some examples?  What lessons can be learned?  How can failures be avoided?  Can engineered systems be truly “safe?”  Oh GOD! I've had a failure! What do I DO??? The conscientious, effective engineer is a virtuous engineer. - Samuel Florman
  • 3. What is an engineering failure?  failure (n) == malfunction + loss of opportunity  risk (n) == the chance of something going wrong  hazard (n) == what happens if something goes wrong  Murphy (n) == the guy who says something will go wrong  bug (n) == what makes software not work as advertised
  • 4. What are some examples?  Tacoma Narrows Bridge  Space Shuttle Challenger  Kansas City Hyatt Regency skywalk  Union Carbide Bhopal, India  THERAC-25 radiation device These are just a few of the popular examples – those students have really responded to in the past.
  • 5. What can be learned?  Better design techniques  Enhanced safety precautions  More rigorous testing (and simulation)  More enlightened management  Discovery of new failure modes (not just what initiates the failure, but also what propagates it)  Better estimates of cost and risk For we can demonstrate by geometry that the large machine is not proportionately stronger than the small. - Galileo
  • 6. How can failures be avoided?  Design  Redundancy and spare parts  Watch out for discontinuities and interfaces  Problems of scale (not just changing size)  Operation  Massive manned tests  Training and retraining (with updated manuals)  Carefully designed rules for alarms
  • 7. How can failures be avoided?  Management  Exercise controls  Employ verification and validation  Pay attention to systems engineering  Maintenance  Examine repair v. replacement  Have procedures that disconnect energy  Examine self- and remote-test capability
  • 8. How can failures be avoided?  Materials  Use materials well within their load limits  Production  Be sure equipment works properly and operators are qualified  Use inspection and testing to separate defective components (especially at fastened joints)  Adhere to relevant codes
  • 9. Can engineered systems be truly “safe?”  Make sure development and support staff are not all the same people  Complete, timely, readable diagnostics  Backup “human-in-the-loop” options  Guard against power failure, surges, and EMI  Give yourself enough duty cycle for multiple tasks
  • 10. Can engineered systems be truly “safe?” (Life or property at risk)  Redundant fastening to prevent collapse  Containment of explosions or hazardous flows  Adequate shielding  Sufficient alarms  Buffer zone between system and neighbors  Make dangerous releases or shrapnel dissipate or reach a low-energy state quickly
  • 11. Oh GOD! I've had a failure! What do I DO???  Get hold of yourself  Prepare for a failure investigation – and LEARN from it!  Be prepared for a critical look at  Your experience base  Safety margins  Self-limiting phenomena  Worst-case environments  The importance of observation
  • 12. Sources  Casey, Set Phasers on Stun  Florman, The Civilized Engineer  Florman, The Existential Pleasures of Engineering  Jones, Engineering Materials 3: Materials Failure Analysis – Case Studies and Design Implications  Kepner, The New Rational Manager  Kletz, What Went Wrong?  Kletz, An Engineer's View of Human Error  Kletz, Learning From Accidents  LaPierre and Moro, Five Past Midnight in Bhopal  Levy and Salvadori, Why Buildings Fall Down  Lovell and Kluger, Apollo 13  Murray and Cox, Apollo: The Race to the Moon  Nishida, Failure Analysis in Engineering Applications  Peterson, Fatal Defect: Chasing Killer Computer Bugs  Petroski, To Engineer is Human  Petroski, Design Paradigms: Case Histories of Error and Judgment in Engineering  Rogers et. al. "Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the  Space Shuttle Challenger Accident." Washington DC, June 1986.  Vaughan, The Challenger Launch Decision
  • 13. An online example: Union Carbide Bhopal Accident Causal factors include three protective systems out of service:  refrigeration system out of service because of operating costs  high temperature alarm was reset high  scrubber inadequately sized for large release, under repair  flare stack out of commission; inlet line under repair Read MUCH more here: http://is.gd/UCBhopal