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Firewall Defense Against Covert
Channels
Rich Savacool
Chief Security Officer
Why protect against covert channels?
• Ponemon [1]: Data breaches on the rise, costly
– 94% C-levels report data attacked within last 6 months
– $204 per user record in 2009
– Data breach laws ensure negative publicity
• 2008 CSI [2]: Perimeter defenses
– 94% Network-layer firewalls
– 69% Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
– 54% Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS)
– 53% Application-layer firewalls
• Covert channels represent threat to confidentiality
Information Hiding
• Goals of information hiding
– Confidentiality – Disclosure
– Integrity – Alteration
– Availability – Destruction
• Three main branches
– Cryptography
– Steganography
– Metaferography (Covert Channels)
Cryptography
Cryptography – encryption
– From the Greek κρυπτό (kryptos)
– Means “hidden” writing [3]
– Scrambles the message text
– Writing in plain view, though unreadable
Examples of Cryptography
Skytale (transposition)
Confederate Cipher
Disc (substitution)
Examples of Cryptography (cont.)
GNU Privacy Guard (gpg)
Steganography
Steganography – stego
– From the Greek στεγανό (steganos)
– Means “covered” writing [4]
– Hides the message within another message
– Presence of a message concealed
Examples of Steganography
Masked letter
Examples of Steganography (cont.)
Image w/ embedded msg
Original image
Examples of Steganography (cont.)
Letter from California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger [5]
Metaferography
Metaferography – covert channels
– From the Greek μεταφέρό (metaferos)
– Means “carried” writing [3]
– Covert channels refers to specific implementation of
metaferography
– Hides the message within a carrier
– Presence of a message concealed
Examples of Metaferography
Covert channels
– Wax tablets warning of Persian invasion
– Tattooed message on shaved scalp of slave
– Invisible ink used for counter-intelligence in WWII
– Microdot printing also used in spycraft during WWII
http://www.americainwwii.com/
images/cloakcamera.jpg
http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Wax_tablet
OSI Network Model
Layer 7 — Application
Layer 6 — Presentation
Layer 5 — Session
Layer 4 — Transport
Layer 3 — Network
Layer 2 — Data Link
Layer 1 — Physical
Network-layer Firewalls
• Example: Check Point, PIX, Sonicwall, Juniper
• Prevent network-layer attacks
– spoofing
– flooding
– port scanning
• While some have add-ons for HTTP or SMTP, protection
primarily limited to network attacks
• Previous research indicates not effective in detecting or
preventing covert channels
Network-layer Firewalls (cont.)
Check Point Firewall-1 Management GUI
Application-layer Firewalls
• Example: McAfee, ISA, Palo Alto
• Prevent application-layer attacks
– Javascript attacks
– ActiveX attacks
– FTP bounce
• Offer strong protection against user-based attacks
• Require constant updates as applications evolve
• Previous research indicates limited success with L3 covert
channels ― no success with L7 channels
Application-layer Firewalls (cont.)
McAfee Enterprise Firewall Management GUI
Covert channel tools
• Covert_tcp
– network-layer storage channel
– uses IPID, ISN, or ACK fields
• CCTT
– application-layer storage channel
– TCP/IP tunneling through TCP, UDP, HTTP POST, or HTTP CONNECT
messages
• Wsh
– application-layer storage channel
– remote shell using HTTP POST requests
• Leaker/Recover
– application-layer timing channel
– timestamps of specially-encoded HTTP GET requests to attacker's web
server
Covert_tcp
CCTT
Wsh
Leaker/Recover
Demo
Firewall Defenses
• Perform strict protocol enforcement (prevent HTTP
CONNECT over 21/tcp)
• Disable unused services or protocol features
– Ex. if you do not need HTTP POST, turn it off
• Using a proxy will re-write any network-layer header-
based channels
• Beware of generic socket-based protocols such as telnet
• Do not just rely on vendor-provided signatures – sample
and analyze traffic
• Create custom signatures to deal with automated attacks
Final Thoughts
• Signatures require a priori knowledge of channel
– antivirus/malware “arms” race
• Need heuristic or behavioral detection if unknown
• Next generation firewall will also need to understand
applications, not just application-layer
• Existing IDS/IPS on firewall unlikely to replace
NIDS/NIPS appliances in short-term
• Long-term trend of perimeter consolidation expected
to continue
References
1. Ponemon Institute, LLC. (2010, January). 2009 annual study: Cost of a
data breach. Retrieved from PGP Corporation website:
http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/Ponemon_COB_2009_US.
pdf
2. Richardson, R. (2008). Computer Security Institute (CSI). 2008 CSI
Computer Crime and Security Survey. Retrieved from
http://www.cse.msstate.edu/~cse6243/readings/CSIsurvey2008.pdf
3. Kypros-Net lexicon [Greek-English Dictionary]. (n.d.). Retrieved March
20, 2009, from http://www.kypros.org/cgi-bin/lexicon
4. Gilbert, R. (2001, October 10). Steganography (noun). Message posted
to http://www.rbgilbert.com/log/ronslog022.html
5. Woo, S. (2009, October 27). Schwarzenegger’s veto message delivers
another message [Web log post]. Retrieved from Washington Wire:
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/10/27/schwarzeneggers-veto-
message-delivers-another-message/
Questions?

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Firewall Defense against Covert Channels

  • 1. Firewall Defense Against Covert Channels Rich Savacool Chief Security Officer
  • 2. Why protect against covert channels? • Ponemon [1]: Data breaches on the rise, costly – 94% C-levels report data attacked within last 6 months – $204 per user record in 2009 – Data breach laws ensure negative publicity • 2008 CSI [2]: Perimeter defenses – 94% Network-layer firewalls – 69% Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) – 54% Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) – 53% Application-layer firewalls • Covert channels represent threat to confidentiality
  • 3. Information Hiding • Goals of information hiding – Confidentiality – Disclosure – Integrity – Alteration – Availability – Destruction • Three main branches – Cryptography – Steganography – Metaferography (Covert Channels)
  • 4. Cryptography Cryptography – encryption – From the Greek κρυπτό (kryptos) – Means “hidden” writing [3] – Scrambles the message text – Writing in plain view, though unreadable
  • 5. Examples of Cryptography Skytale (transposition) Confederate Cipher Disc (substitution)
  • 6. Examples of Cryptography (cont.) GNU Privacy Guard (gpg)
  • 7. Steganography Steganography – stego – From the Greek στεγανό (steganos) – Means “covered” writing [4] – Hides the message within another message – Presence of a message concealed
  • 9. Examples of Steganography (cont.) Image w/ embedded msg Original image
  • 10. Examples of Steganography (cont.) Letter from California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger [5]
  • 11. Metaferography Metaferography – covert channels – From the Greek μεταφέρό (metaferos) – Means “carried” writing [3] – Covert channels refers to specific implementation of metaferography – Hides the message within a carrier – Presence of a message concealed
  • 12. Examples of Metaferography Covert channels – Wax tablets warning of Persian invasion – Tattooed message on shaved scalp of slave – Invisible ink used for counter-intelligence in WWII – Microdot printing also used in spycraft during WWII http://www.americainwwii.com/ images/cloakcamera.jpg http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Wax_tablet
  • 13. OSI Network Model Layer 7 — Application Layer 6 — Presentation Layer 5 — Session Layer 4 — Transport Layer 3 — Network Layer 2 — Data Link Layer 1 — Physical
  • 14. Network-layer Firewalls • Example: Check Point, PIX, Sonicwall, Juniper • Prevent network-layer attacks – spoofing – flooding – port scanning • While some have add-ons for HTTP or SMTP, protection primarily limited to network attacks • Previous research indicates not effective in detecting or preventing covert channels
  • 15. Network-layer Firewalls (cont.) Check Point Firewall-1 Management GUI
  • 16. Application-layer Firewalls • Example: McAfee, ISA, Palo Alto • Prevent application-layer attacks – Javascript attacks – ActiveX attacks – FTP bounce • Offer strong protection against user-based attacks • Require constant updates as applications evolve • Previous research indicates limited success with L3 covert channels ― no success with L7 channels
  • 17. Application-layer Firewalls (cont.) McAfee Enterprise Firewall Management GUI
  • 18. Covert channel tools • Covert_tcp – network-layer storage channel – uses IPID, ISN, or ACK fields • CCTT – application-layer storage channel – TCP/IP tunneling through TCP, UDP, HTTP POST, or HTTP CONNECT messages • Wsh – application-layer storage channel – remote shell using HTTP POST requests • Leaker/Recover – application-layer timing channel – timestamps of specially-encoded HTTP GET requests to attacker's web server
  • 20. CCTT
  • 21. Wsh
  • 23. Demo
  • 24. Firewall Defenses • Perform strict protocol enforcement (prevent HTTP CONNECT over 21/tcp) • Disable unused services or protocol features – Ex. if you do not need HTTP POST, turn it off • Using a proxy will re-write any network-layer header- based channels • Beware of generic socket-based protocols such as telnet • Do not just rely on vendor-provided signatures – sample and analyze traffic • Create custom signatures to deal with automated attacks
  • 25. Final Thoughts • Signatures require a priori knowledge of channel – antivirus/malware “arms” race • Need heuristic or behavioral detection if unknown • Next generation firewall will also need to understand applications, not just application-layer • Existing IDS/IPS on firewall unlikely to replace NIDS/NIPS appliances in short-term • Long-term trend of perimeter consolidation expected to continue
  • 26. References 1. Ponemon Institute, LLC. (2010, January). 2009 annual study: Cost of a data breach. Retrieved from PGP Corporation website: http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/Ponemon_COB_2009_US. pdf 2. Richardson, R. (2008). Computer Security Institute (CSI). 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey. Retrieved from http://www.cse.msstate.edu/~cse6243/readings/CSIsurvey2008.pdf 3. Kypros-Net lexicon [Greek-English Dictionary]. (n.d.). Retrieved March 20, 2009, from http://www.kypros.org/cgi-bin/lexicon 4. Gilbert, R. (2001, October 10). Steganography (noun). Message posted to http://www.rbgilbert.com/log/ronslog022.html 5. Woo, S. (2009, October 27). Schwarzenegger’s veto message delivers another message [Web log post]. Retrieved from Washington Wire: http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/10/27/schwarzeneggers-veto- message-delivers-another-message/