Intro to computer hacker and attacks and network security.

1. Network Security
Slides by Raymond Borges

2. Outline
• In the NEWS (LOIS) DDoS attacks
• Passive Network Attacks
• Active Network Attacks
• Designing a “Secure” Network
• Web 2.0
• Summary
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3. IN THE NEWS
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4. Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC)
• Primary tool being used by the script kiddies
• Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) is a web app
performance tool
• Denial of Service/testing tool
• DoS operation using HTTP/TCP/UDP requests
• DDoS voluntarily joining botnet Hive Mind
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5. How does LOIC work?
While IsFlooding is True{
1. Create/Connect a TCP Socket to webserver
2. Send standard GET request to the server
3. Read the first 64 bytes returned
4. Sleep for configured Delay
}
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6. Low Orbit Ion Cannon Hive
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7. Low Orbit Ion Cannon New
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8. Hive Mind
• The automatic mode or Hive Mind, option to
voluntarily join a botnet
• Using mode, all parameters of attack set up
remotely via IRC, including target
• IRC is a network protocol designed to provide
real-time group chat, often (miss)used to
control botnets
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9. LOIC trail
• If an anonymization network (TOR) is not used
traceable IP address records can be logged by
its recipient
• Logs kept by the ISP used to identify users
• Many users arrested using LOIC
• LOIC not anonymous
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10. LOIC/ Wireshark Demo
1. Turn on VMware WinXP machine
2. Turn on Wireshark
3. Turn on LOIC
4. Start packet capture in Wireshark
5. Start LOIC
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11. LOIC Mitigation
Attack vector old as the HTTP protocol
• Best approach is to use a good rule based
firewall, allow for rules on connection limits
per IP per second
Legitimate uses for this tool:
• Performance base lines
• Measuring server performance
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12. PASSIVE NETWORK ATTACKS
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13. FTP Password Attack Setup
1. Install virtual machine or connect to network
2. Install Internet Information Services (IIS) on
Windows and File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
3. Setup FTP with a password
4. Run Wireshark while attempting FTP
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14. FTP Password Attack
1. Run Wireshark on LAN in promiscuous mode
2. Wait till someone connects to host with FTP
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15. Passive online attack
0.http://www.httprecipes.com/1/2/forms.php
1.Run Wireshark
2.Filter http
3.Find post method
4.Follow TCP stream
5.You have username and password in the clear
if server isn’t using https SSL or other encryption
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16. ACTIVE NETWORK ATTACKS
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17. Replay and Man-in-the-middle
• When passwords can’t be caught in plaintext
Man-in-the-middle
• ARP poisoning
Replay attack
Session hijacking
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18. Cain and Abel (ARP poisoning)
1. Install Cain and Abel
2. Connect to a network
3. Select sniffer tab
4. Start sniffer and select network interface
5. Select hosts on bottom and press then ok
6. Select bottom APR tab and click top window
7. Press and select target IP then hit Ok
8. Hit then select passwords tab, (http)
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19. NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE
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20. Policy
• Network security
• Company goals lead to  security policy
• Network infrastructure design policy
• Network design meets requirements
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21. So how do we go from?
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22. Data Classification
• Policy develops from information flow
• Who can access what?
Common classifications:
• Public
• Secret
• Confidential
• Group based
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23. User Classifications
• Serves same purpose as data classification
• Who can access what?
Common classifications:
• Outsiders
• Employees
• Executives
• Owners
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24. Access Control Matrix (ACM)
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25. Network Organization
• Network infrastructure design using ACM
• Layered security measures
• Separation of information
• Fairly standard corporate network
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26. Network Organization
Public network firewall Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
Public or
External Network
Internal network firewall
Internal Network
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27. Firewalls
Firewalls filter based on:
• IP Addresses, destination
• Ports
Filtering firewall based on:
• Packet Headers
• Source addresses
Proxy or application level firewalls based on message content:
• Virus scanner
• Key terms?
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28. Firewall Operation
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29. Outer Firewall
Can be used to:
1. Restrict outside access to internal network
2. Restrict internal access to internet while
allowing access to DMZ based on Access
Control Lists (ACL’s)
3. ACL’s bind source address/port and
destinations address/ports to access rights
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30. Outer Firewall
• Public needs Web server and mail server
access, no other services
• Firewall interface allows connections to WWW
services (HTTP and HTTPS) and electronic mail
(SMTP)
• Internet sees addresses of Web and mail
servers equal—that of the firewall, NAT
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31. Internal Firewall
• Sensitive data resides in internal network
• Block all traffic except authorized traffic
(fail-safe defaults principle)
• Information comes only from DMZ, never
directly from Internet
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32. Ports/Services
20-21 FTP
22 SSH/SCP
23 Telnet
25 SMTP
53 DNS
67-68 DHCP/BOOTP
80 HTTP
443 HTTP over SSL
465 SMTP over SSL
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33. Proxies
Proxies - hosts that relay data
• Hide identity and protect privacy
• Can be used as firewalls
The Onion Routing network (TOR)
• Proxy network made of volunteer hosts
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34. DMZ and Servers
Demilitarized Zone or DMZ - area outside
internal firewall, some ports unblocked for
inbound internet access to servers
Servers – hosts which serve webpages or store
and process electronic mail for users
Web server and mail server contained in DMZ
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35. Domain Name System (DNS) Server
Knows directory name service information for:
• DMZ mail, Web, and log hosts
• Internal trusted administrative host
• Outer firewall
• Inner firewall
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36. DMZ Log Server
All other servers log messages by writing them to a
local file and then to the log server
• The log server also writes them to a file and then
to write-once media
• Confined to the DMZ
• Does not initiate transfer to inner network
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37. Internal Network
• Subnets may have firewall and servers, may
filter traffic as inner firewall does
• Subnets may share servers
• Information flow constraints  arrangement
• Firewalls impose confinement at interfaces
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38. Firewall Attacks
Attackers have 3 methods of firewall entry
• Web server ports
(HTTP) port proxy checks for invalid or illegal HTTP
requests and rejects them
• SMTP port
Mail proxy will detect and reject such attempts
• Bypass the low-level firewall checks by exploiting
firewall vulnerabilities
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39. Defense Practices
• Economy of mechanism (simple mechanisms)
Making hosts or devices do only their job
• Separation of privilege (divided jobs)
More than one host does a certain job
• Defense in depth (layered security defense)
Multiple defenses to bypass
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40. Internet Attacks
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
SYN flood
• Consumes bandwidth
• Consumes memory resources
Remedies
• TCP intercept mode
• Synkill software
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41. Attacks
Focus on what we are most concerned about:
• Successful attacks
• Failed attacks in areas where attacks ought
not to be launched e.g. DMZ.
Efforts into where we can obtain useful results
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42. Summary
• Security requirements  network infrastructure
• Security goals security policy network form
• Internal firewall limits traffic to public servers
• Outer firewall blocks external traffic from internal
• Public servers only provide one service
• Application level firewalls check contents
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43. RECENT RESEARCH
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44. Quantification of Attackers Activities on
Servers running Web 2.0 Applications
• Attackers use search-based strategies
Google
• Easiest ways to attack servers dominate
• Password cracking attacks on SSH
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45. Quantification of Attackers Activities on
Servers running Web 2.0 Applications
• Blog user accounts and vulnerability scans
• Spam attacks dominate Web 2.0 applications
such as Blogs and Wikis
• Less activity use known vulnerabilities
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46. Possible Questions
1. Why is privilege separation so important?
2. What is normally closed security?
3. What security model do you think Facebook
uses?
4. How can DNS be used to censor websites?
5. Is there another means of reaching a website
other than by URL?
6. What makes the internet impossible to bring
down completely? (Discussion erupts…)
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47. References
• Introduction to Computer Security, Matt Bishop
• Attacks by “Anonymous” WikiLeaks Proponents not Anonymous
Pras et.al. Design and Analysis of Communication Systems Group
University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands
• Quantification of Attackers Activities on Servers runningWeb 2.0
Applications, Katerina Goseva-Popstojanova, Risto Pantev, Ana
Dimitrijevikj, and Brandon Miller, Lane Department of CS and EE
WVU
• https://github.com/NewEraCracker/LOIC
• http://wasntnate.com/2012/01/analysis-of-low-orbit-ion-cannon-
loic-web-stress-tool/
• http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F6_9i-aGAa0&feature=related
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48. Questions?