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Demystifying ACI Security
Fabien Gandola, CSE Security for EMEA
BRKSEC-2048
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
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CONCLUSION
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
In Conclusion
• ACI helps tackling DC Security Challenges by :
 Integrating security in the Application
 Accelerating security deployment
 Automating security insertion
• Cisco Security helps better protect your DC by :
 Providing leading edge technologies
 Integrating smoothly in ACI architecture
 Providing a full security framework
BRKSEC-2048 5
LET’S TAKE A STEP BACK…
Business Trends and
Datacenter Challenges
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
What Changed ?
• Virtualization
BRKSEC-2048 8
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
What Changed ?
• Virtualization
• Requirements for security for
East-West Traffic
BRKSEC-2048 9
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
What Changed ?
• Virtualization
• Requirements for security for
East-West Traffic
• Architecture with Multiple
active Data Centers
BRKSEC-2048 10
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
What Changed ?
• Virtualization
• Requirements for security for
East-West Traffic
• Architecture with Multiple
active Data Centers
• Hybrid Data Center with
Public Cloud Solution
BRKSEC-2048 11
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Digitization generates DC Challenges
10I000 0II0 00 0III000
I00I III0I III00II 0II00II
Protect
Infrastructure and
Critical Data
24x7
Manage Data
Deluge and Device
Proliferation
Defend Across the
Extended DC
Physical + Virtual + Cloud
Enable
Business Growth
New Business Value
New Business Models
BRKSEC-2048 12
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The Cisco Advantage
• Control North/South traffic with NGFW
• Scale and HA with Clustering
• Inspect North/South traffic with NGIPS
• Segment and Protect virtual enclave with
ASAv and FTDv
An Architectural Approach
Physical
Hosts
NGIPS
NGFW
Clustering
BRKSEC-2048 13
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
…Leveraging the Infrastructure…
NGIPS
ASA FW
Clustering
BRKSEC-2048 14
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
…Leveraging the Infrastructure…
NGIPS
ASA FW
Clustering
NGA
Virtual
FlowSensor
Lancope Stealhwatch
Leverage your Cisco Infrastructure to
fight Advanced Pervasive Threats
BRKSEC-2048 15
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
…Leveraging the Infrastructure…
NGIPS
ASA FW
Clustering
NGA
Virtual
FlowSensor
Lancope Stealhwatch
Leverage your Cisco Infrastructure to
fight Advanced Pervasive Threats
TrustSec with Security Group Tagging
SGT
SGT SGT
SGT
SGT
SGT
SGT
SGT
ISE SGT
Simplify
Automate
Accelerate
Standardize
SGT
BRKSEC-2048 16
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
…Ready for Next Generation DataCenter.
Physical
Hosts
NGIPS
ASA FW
Clustering
BRKSEC-2048 17
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
…Ready for Next Generation DataCenter.
VIRTUAL ENDPOINT
ACI Fabric
PHYSICAL ENDPOINT
SERVICE NODES
SECURITY NODES
Application Centric Infrastructure
- Scalable
- Simple
- Flexible
- Reliable
- Automated
- Secured
BRKSEC-2048 18
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Feature Product Matrix
ASA/FTD FTD StealthWatch TrustSec
Access Control
Segmentation
Context Discovery
Threat Detection
Threat Protection
APT Detection
Forensic Analysis
Compliance
BRKSEC-2048 19
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Feature Product Matrix with ACI
ASA/FTD FTD StealthWatch TrustSec
Access Control
Segmentation
Context Discovery
Threat Detection
Threat Protection
APT Detection
Forensic Analysis
Compliance
BRKSEC-2048 20
The Case for SDN
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Applications All Around Us
…are the driving force of business that are being…
Rapidly developed and
Deployed at scale
…while requiring…
Frequent updates and
Highest Availability (SLAs)
BRKSEC-2048 22
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Challenge for Infrastructure
…to keep up with the pace of change
imposed on the:
Network
Security
…functions, while maintaining application:
Capacity
Resiliency
BRKSEC-2048 23
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Software-Defined Networking
…Comes to the Rescue
“…is an emerging architecture that is dynamic, manageable, cost-
effective, and adaptable, making it ideal for the high-bandwidth, dynamic
nature of today's applications. This architecture decouples the network
control and forwarding functions enabling the network control to become
directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted
for applications and network services.”
Source: www.opennetworking.org
BRKSEC-2048 24
What are the critical Security Functions
in the DataCenter ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Protect Mobile Access
to the Data Center
Micro-
Segmentation
Protect Data Center
North-South
Server Quarantine
Automation
Segment Access to
Data Center Resources
Consistent Policies across
Cloud, Virtual & Physical
Secure
Application Tiers
Application Security
Policies Automation
Critical Security Functions
BRKSEC-2048 26
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Agenda
Introduction Use Cases Conclusion
Esqueixada Mel i matóFaves a la Catalana
Use Cases
Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGFW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
Faves a la Catalana
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
About me…
Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com
TSA Cyber Security EMEAR
19 years in Cisco
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Devices Role
“App”“DB”
Service
Consumers
Leaf Nodes
Service Producers
APIC Controller
Spine Nodes
BRKSEC-2048 38
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
TRUST BASED ON LOCATION
(Traditional DC Switch)
Servers 2 and 3 can
communicate unless blacklisted
1 42 3
No communication allowed between
Servers 2 and 3 unless there is a whitelist policy
ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE
(Nexus 9K with ACI)
EPG 1
“WEB”
EPG 2
“APP”
1 2 3 4
ACI Whitelist Policy supports “Zero Trust” Model
Whitelist policy = Explicitly configured ACI contract between EPG 1 and EPG 2
allowing traffic between their members
BRKSEC-2048 39
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
External
Network
App DBWeb
QoS
Filter
QoS
Service
QoS
Filter
ACI uses a policy based approach that
focuses on the application.
The Heart of ACI
BRKSEC-2048 40
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Communication Abstraction
ACI Fabric
APIC
Security Services
“App”“DB”
BRKSEC-2048 41
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Communication Abstraction
ACI Fabric
APIC
Security Services
Security Policy
“App” → “DB”
All TCP/UDP:
- Accept
- Redirect to FW and IPS
All Other :
- Drop
“App”“DB”
BRKSEC-2048 42
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Communication Abstraction
ACI Fabric
APIC
Security Services
Security Policy
“App” → “DB”
All TCP/UDP:
- Accept
- Redirect to FW and IPS
All Other :
- Drop
“App”“DB”
BRKSEC-2048 43
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
What are the ACI Building Blocks ?
BRKSEC-2048 44
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
First, we need a way to identify and group together end points.
Web Tier App Tier DB Tier
EP EP EP
EP
EP
EP
EP
EP EP
EP
EP EP
A Policy Based on Groups
BRKSEC-2048 45
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
“EPG Web” “EPG DB”
EP EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
EP
EP EP
In the ACI model, we do this using the End Point Group (EPG).
End Point Group
BRKSEC-2048 46
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Endpoint Groups Communications
Devices within an Endpoint group can communicate, provided that they have IP reachability (provided by the
Bridge Domain/VRF).
Communication between Endpoint groups is, by default, not permitted.
“EPG Web”
EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
“EPG DB”
EP EP
EP EP
BRKSEC-2048 47
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
“EPG Web”
EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
“EPG DB”
EP EP
EP EP
Contract
Once we have our EPGs defined, we need to create policies to
determine how they communicate with each other.
BRKSEC-2048 48
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
“EPG Web”
EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
“EPG DB”
EP EP
EP EP
Contract : Kind of reflexive “Stateless” ACLs
Filters
TCP: 80
TCP: 443
A contract typically refers to one or
more ‘filters’ to define specific
protocols & ports allowed between
EPGs.
BRKSEC-2048 49
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Create a Contract
BRKSEC-2048 50
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
L3out
Access Control From Outside
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
Contract
Client-Web
Perimeter Stateless Access Control
BRKSEC-2048 51
How Secure is the Fabric to rely on it for
Security ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Fabric Security
• Whitelist Security Model
• APIC Hardening
• APIC Northbound Protocols
• APIC Northbound Authentication
• Two Factor Authentication
(RSA Secure ID)
• APIC to Switch Authentication and
Encryption
• NXOS Image Signing and Verification
• Role Based Access Control
• Audit Logs for all Changes
• Security Compliance Report
• Security Certifications
• MACsec Support
• 802.1X
BRKSEC-2048 53
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
For more information on ACI fabric security:
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/data-center-virtualization/application-centric-infrastructure/white-paper-c11-736292.html
BRKSEC-2048 54
Is there away to create Management
zones ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
A Tenant is a container for
all network, security,
troubleshooting and L4 – 7
service policies.
Engineering-Tenant Marketing-Tenant
Tenants
Tenant resources are
isolated from each other,
allowing management by
different administrators.
Tenants can provide traffic and
RBAC isolation…
ACI Fabric
IT Internet
Shared
Services
Test /
Dev
IPTV
BRKSEC-2048 56
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
“EPG Web”
EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
“EPG DB”
EP EP
EP EP
Contract
Once we have our EPGs defined, we need to create policies to
determine how they communicate with each other.
BRKSEC-2048 58
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
L3out
Segmentation Using Contracts
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
Contract
Client-Web
Contract
Web-App
Contract
App-DB
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
Load Balancer
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
BRKSEC-2048 59
But what if I want all EPGs to be able to
send syslog, query DNS, communicate
with the AD etc?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
vzAny applies rules to all EPGs in a VRF
EPG A
Provider
EPG
vzAny
EPG
vzAny
EPG
vzAny
EPG A
Consumer
EPG
vzAny
Syslog Syslog Syslog
Any EPG can
consume syslog that
EPG A provides
EPG A can consume
Syslog from any EPG
in the VRF
Any EPG in the VRF
can consume or
provide syslog
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/kb/b_KB_Use_vzAny_to_AutomaticallyApplyCommunicationRules_toEPGs.html#concept_F2BC3533BF984F
1F88A18B712ED9C072
BRKSEC-2048 61
But what if I want some EPGs to
communicate freely between
themselves?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Contract Preferred Groups
Allow traffic between a group of EPGs
EPG A EPG B
EPG C EPG D
EPG 1
EPG 2
Contract Preferred Group Alphabet
No contract required within the group Contract required
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/kb/b_APIC_Contract_Preferred_Group.html
BRKSEC-2048 63
Those 2 forms of contracts helps a lot
fighting the number of contracts in
TCAM.
Is that really helping me Compare to
traditional ACLs ????
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The abstraction layer provided by the EPG
detaches the security policy from the
infrastructure such as IP address or Vlans.
BRKSEC-2048 66
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
“EPG Web”
EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
“EPG DB”
EP EP
EP EP
Application Profile
Contract Contract
A collection of EPGs and the associated contracts that define
how they communicate form an Application Profile.
Application Profile “My Expenses”
BRKSEC-2048 67
Vmware keeps talking about NSX Micro-
segementation…
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
EPGs & Contracts
ACI Policy Model
Intra-EPG isolation
BRKSEC-2048 70
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
Intra-EPG isolation
• Functional equivalent to Isolated
Private VLAN: ALL endpoints in
EPG are isolated from each
other
• Supported since ACI 1.2(2)
• Can be combined with Micro-
segmented EPG
BRKSEC-2048 71
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Intra-EPG endpoint isolation
BRKSEC-2048 72
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
Micro-segmented EPGs
with attributes• Use of attributes to classify
endpoints in a specific kind of EPG
called µEPG
• Network-based attributes:
IP/MAC
• VM-based attributes: Guest OS,
VM name, ID, vnic, DVS,
Datacenter
• Does not create a Port Group on
VMM (no vnic reassign)
• Supported since ACI 1.1(1)
BRKSEC-2048 73
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
About Micro-segmented EPGs
• µSeg EPGs are not linked to a “Base” EPG (though virtual endpoints are still
“attached” to their corresponding Port Groups):
• They have their own Bridge Domain  Endpoints addressing must be taken into
consideration in the design
• They have their own set of Contracts  There is no contract inheritance from the “Base”
EPG.
• Attributes are matched using an “OR” operator with a precedence order in case
of conflict
• Any VM in the VMM Domain & Tenant matching an attribute will be put in the µSeg EPG 
Choose wisely the attribute(s) you want to match
• In the last 2 case studies, Custom Attributes would be a natural choice
BRKSEC-2048 74
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
USE CASE
Use Case #1: Securing infrastructure
Use Case #2: Quarantining compromised endpoints
Use Case #3: Securing an application through Dev,
Test & Prod stages
BRKSEC-2048 75
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
WAN
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
WAN
http://172.16.1.100
VIP - 172.16.1.100
Web Application protected
by a NGFW at the perimeter
172.16.10.0/24
Web
VM1
DB
VM
Web
VM2 Single Subnet to
simplify IPAM
tcp/3306
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Production
Environment
Load Balancer can reach
web servers, but not the
DB
Web Servers reach DB via
NGFW, but do not need to
talk to each other
BRKSEC-2048 76
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web
VM3
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 77
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Web
VM3
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 78
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Web
VM3
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 79
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Test Site:
http://172.16.1.200/acme
Web
VM3
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 80
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Test Site:
http://172.16.1.200/acme
Web
VM3
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 81
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Test Site:
http://172.16.1.200/acme
Web
VM3
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 82
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
Web
VM1
Web
VM2
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Test Site:
http://172.16.1.200/acme
Web
VM3
Pool automatically updated
by APIC when VM moves
into uEPG
New VM added to NGFW
rules allowing DB access
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 83
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Web Database
Dev
WAN
tcp/80
tcp/80
VM
MySQL
Joomla Web Application
Web Database
Prod
tcp/3306
http://172.16.1.100/acme
172.16.1.100
Test vDesktops
VM
MySQL
Web Database
Test
VM
MySQL
HAProxy
172.16.1.200
Test Site:
http://172.16.1.200/acme
Web
VM3
Pool automatically updated
by APIC when VM moves
into uEPG
New VM added to NGFW
rules allowing DB access
Use Case 3: Application life Cycle
BRKSEC-2048 84
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Micro Segmented EPGs with VM Attributes
WAN/INTERNET
V
M
V
M
V
M
V
M
V
M
V
M
V
M
V
M
vSphere Clusters MGMT &
Storage
Production
Clusters
Test
Clusters
V
M
V
M
V
M
V
M
BRKSEC-2048 85
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI has a wide segmentation support
Intra-EPG • DVS since
ACI 1.2(2)
• AVS since ACI
1.3(1)
• Roadmap • Supported
since ACI
1.2(2)
• Supported
since ACI
1.2(2)
Micro-
segmentation
• DVS since
ACI 1.3(1)
with
9300-EX
hardware
• AVS since ACI
1.1(1)
• Microsoft
Virtual
Switch
since ACI
1.2(1)
• Roadmap • IP EPG since
ACI 1.2(1)
with -E
hardware
• MAC EPG
planned
BRKSEC-2048 86
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Micro-Segmentation HW Support
1st generation (-E) (-EX)
AVS Useg (VM, IP, MAC) Yes Yes Yes
Microsoft Useg (VM, IP, MAC) Yes Yes Yes
vDS Useg (VM, IP, MAC) No No Yes
Bare-Metal (IP-EPG) No Yes* Yes*
Bare-Metal (MAC-EPG) N/A Yes Yes
Openstack (GBP) No Future Future
Container No Future Future
* Caveat: IP-EPGs must be in 2 subnets
BRKSEC-2048 87
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox
EPGs & Contracts
ACI Policy Model
Intra-EPG isolation
Micro-segmented EPGs
with attributes
Intra-EPG Contracts
BRKSEC-2048 88
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGFW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco ACI Supports Flexible East-West Security Models
L4 Stateless Security
Firewall at Each
Leaf Switch
Servers (Physical or Virtual)
► L4 Distributed Stateless Firewall
L4 Stateless Firewall Attached
to Every Server Port
Line Rate Policy Enforcement
Policy Follows Workloads
Advanced Protection with NGFW, IPS/IDS,
DDoS Services Insertion
Sizing at Scale: Can add ASA Cluster
L4-7 Security Policy Applied
Consistently for Any Workload
L4−7 Security via Cisco ACI™
Service Graph►
L4-7 Security Services
(physical or virtual,
location independent)
Cisco ACI Services
Graph
L4-7 Visibility and Control
BRKSEC-2048 90
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Why Inserting Security Services ?
• Stateless Segmentation not sufficient for compliance
• More granular Access Control (i.e. user or group based)
• Dynamic protocol requiring better inspection
• Better protection and detection mechanisms
BRKSEC-2048 91
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Where to Insert Security Services in the Fabric ?
NGFW Appliance and Virtual NGIPS Appliance and Virtual
WE DON’T REALLY CARE !!!!
BRKSEC-2048 92
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
How to Insert Security Services
• Network Stitching ACI L2 Fabric
• Service graph insertion
• Unmanaged
• Managed with Device package
• Managed Hybrid
Match the requirements and operation
model of the DC and Security Team
BRKSEC-2048 93
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Flexible Options for Services Insertion
• APIC defines Tenants
• EPG is VLAN/Subnet
• Fabric GW/Routing
• No Device Package:
-Network Policy Mode
SecOps Control Service
• Orchestrate with Vendor:
- Service Policy or
- Service Manager
Device Packages
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
Unmanaged Service Graphs
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
Managed Service Graphs
ACI L2 Fabric Service Graph
No Package
Service Graph
Managed
APIC in
Control
BRKSEC-2048 94
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
L2 Network Stitching
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
BD Web BD App BD DB
- Each Interfaces of the Firewall is
set to belong to the different EPG
- The Forwarding decision is 100%
network centric, and doesn’t
involve APIC
- NO CONTRACT NEEDED
- No Integration with APIC
When use this method :
- When policy is quite static
- When more than 2 interfaces
needed on the FW
BRKSEC-2048 95
Service Graph technology was designed to
automate and accelerate the deployment of
L4-L7 sevices in the network.
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Why Use Service Graph ?
• Security is fully inserted to the Application as the service graph is an extension
of the contract in the Application Profile
• Granular way to send traffic to the Security Service using the contract
• Configuration Templates
• Automation of the Network configuration both for Fabric and Security appliance (
with Device Package)
• Statistics and health score automatically collected for the services
• Dynamic update of the ACLs based on End point discovery in the EPG
• Insert several services seamlessly with Service Chaining
BRKSEC-2048 97
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Zero Trust Model
ACI Fabric
APIC
“App”“DB”
CONTRACT
BRKSEC-2048 98
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Build a Policy with Service Graph
ACI Fabric
APIC
Security Services
Security Policy
“App” → “DB”
All TCP/UDP:
- Accept
- Redirect to FW and IPS
All Other :
- Drop
“App”“DB”
BRKSEC-2048 99
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
“EPG Web”
EP
EP
EP
EP
“EPG App”
EP EP
EP EP
“EPG DB”
EP EP
EP EP
Service Graph
Contract Contract
In order to add L4-7 services such as security, you can add a
Service Graph to a contract to redirect traffic to a Service
Producer such as an ASA or Firepower NGIPS
BRKSEC-2048 100
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Add a Service graph to a Contract
BRKSEC-2048 101
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Script Engine
APIC Node
BRKSEC-2048 102
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
BRKSEC-2048 103
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Device Model
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
− Device specification (XML file)
BRKSEC-2048 104
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Device Model
Device-Specific Python Scripts
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
− Device specification (XML file)
− Device scripts (Python)
BRKSEC-2048 105
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Device Model
Device-Specific Python Scripts
Cisco APIC Script Interface
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
− Device specification (XML file)
− Device scripts (Python)
• Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device
using device Python scripts
BRKSEC-2048 106
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Device Model
Device-Specific Python Scripts
Cisco APIC Script Interface
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
− Device specification (XML file)
− Device scripts (Python)
• Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device
using device Python scripts
• Cisco APIC uses the device
configuration model provided in the
package to pass appropriate
configurations to the device scripts
• Device script handlers interface with
the device using its REST or CLI
interface
BRKSEC-2048 107
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Device Model
Device-Specific Python Scripts
Cisco APIC Script Interface
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
− Device specification (XML file)
− Device scripts (Python)
• Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device
using device Python scripts
• Cisco APIC uses the device
configuration model provided in the
package to pass appropriate
configurations to the device scripts
• Device script handlers interface with
the device using its REST or CLI
interface
Device Interface: REST/CLI
Service Device
Service automation
requires a vendor device
package. Itis a zip file
containing
Device specification
(XML file)
Device scripts (Python)
BRKSEC-2048 108
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Automation Through Device Package
Device Package
Device Specification
<dev type= “f5”>
<service type= “slb”>
<param name= “vip”>
<dev ident=“210.1.1.1”
<validator=“ip”
<hidden=“no”>
<locked=“yes”>
Cisco APIC – Policy Element
Device Model
Device-Specific Python Scripts
Cisco APIC Script Interface
Script Engine
APIC Node
• Service automation requires a vendor
device package. It is a zip file
containing
− Device specification (XML file)
− Device scripts (Python)
• Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device
using device Python scripts
• Cisco APIC uses the device
configuration model provided in the
package to pass appropriate
configurations to the device scripts
• Device script handlers interface with
the device using its REST or CLI
interface
Device Interface: REST/CLI
Service Device
Service automation
requires a vendor device
package. Itis a zip file
containing
Device specification
(XML file)
Device scripts (Python)
Device Manager Console
BRKSEC-2048 109
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
FTD Device Package 1.0
Hybrid Mode – NGFW configuration ownership is shared between APIC & FMC
• Service Manager Model – Firepower Management Center (FMC)
• APIC orchestrates the following FTD items using FMC REST-API:
• FTD(v) interfaces – virtual switch port-groups or VLAN sub-interfaces
• NGFW/IPS mode (Routed FW, Transparent FW BVI, or NGIPS Inline Pair)
• Consumer and Provider Security Zones, and their Rule direction: bidir or unidir
• Create a new or update existing Access Control Policy (ACP) Rule
• APIC creates a new Deny Rule(s), requiring Security Admin to update this rule before traffic is
allowed. Admin can update Rule comments to ensure the Rule remains in FMC on graph detach.
• APIC updates existing Allow Rule(s), by inserting security zones to previously configured FMC
Rules with an appropriate threat and access protocol configuration.
BRKSEC-2048 110
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
FTD Device Package Features Coming Soon
• FMC REST-APIs in upcoming releases will allow these additions to the device package:
• Dynamic or Static Routing
• Port-channels
• FTD Failover or Clustering
• Access Control Policy Rule Ports/IPs
• Upcoming Firepower NGFW features to improve ACI integration:
• FTD multiple contexts (separate Access Control Policies per Tenant)
BRKSEC-2048 111
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Why Use Managed Service Graph ?
• Full Tenant orchestration with L4-L7 services
• ACL changes on the firewall can be offloaded to custom tools, using Northbound
API
• ASA-like device package allows for very fast deployment of security
• APIC monitors the service health and validates configuration
• Flexibility gained with Device Manager model where APIC orchestrates data
plane while allowing SecOps team to manage the policy with the same
tools
BRKSEC-2048 112
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Why Use Unmanaged Service Graph ?
• Continuity of the SecOps management workflows and tools
• No device package available from a Vendor
• Quicker migration of security appliance configs and policies into ACI fabric
• Allow use of the full spectrum of product features, not just the features
supported by the device package
BRKSEC-2048 113
Can we get the benefits of the Device
Package without the Drawbacks ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Graph Hybrid Managed
• Leverage the network and interface configuration automation from APIC
with the Device Package
• Leverage the External Security management solution for the security team to
create the security policy
• Use the Service graph to tie together the policy and the network insertion
BRKSEC-2048 115
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
FTD Device Package Workflow
1. Existing Rule - Security Admin uses FMC to create an ACP Rule to be used
with the new service graph. The rule includes allowed protocols, NGIPS, and
AMP protections.
o Network Admin uses APIC to attach Security Zones to a given Rule, directing service
graph traffic to an appropriate NGFW inspections.
2. New Rule – Network Admin uses APIC to create a new security Rule on FMC
using the service graph. This is a Deny rule, preventing traffic flow until
Security Admin gets a changes to update it.
o Security Admin uses FMC to update the new ACP Rule with an appropriate allowed
protocol, NGIPS, and AMP policy. To prevent deletion of this rule on service graph
detach, Security Admin can preserve configured security policy by updating ACP Rule
comments.
BRKSEC-2048 116
Until recently, Security service insertion
was looking like that :
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
L3out
Perimeter FW Goto Mode
Enclave with Single Segment
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
Contract
Client-Web
Contract
Web-App
Contract
App-DB
Perimeter Stateful Firewall
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
Load Balancer
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
BRKSEC-2048 118
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Engineering-Tenant
VRF aka Context aka Private Network
VRF(also called contexts) are
defined within a tenant to allow
isolated and potentially
overlapping IP address space.
VRF-1
VRF-2
VRF-3
VRF-4
BRKSEC-2048 119
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Engineering-Tenant
Bridge Domain: Not a VLAN but almost…
VRF-1
VRF-2
VRF-3
VRF-4
Within a private network, one
or more bridge domains must
be defined.
A bridge domain is a L2
forwarding construct within
the fabric, used to constrain
broadcast and multicast traffic
Bridge Domain 1
Bridge Domain 2
Bridge Domain 3
Bridge Domain 4
Bridge Domain 5
Bridge Domain 7
Bridge Domain 8
Bridge Domain 6
BRKSEC-2048 120
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
In Summary
Tenant “University”
PN “Engineering” PN “Business”
Subnet 172.1.1.0/24
Subnet 172.1.2.0/24
…
Subnet 172.20.1.0/24
EPG
Web
EPG
App
Bridge Domain 172
Subnet 10.1.1.0/24
EPG
DB
Bridge Domain 10
Policy “HTTP”
Policy “SQL”
Subnet 10.1.1.0/24
Subnet 10.1.2.0/24
…
Bridge Domain 100
EPG
App
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
Policy “HTTP”
Policy “SQL”
InfrastructureApps
BRKSEC-2048 121
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Use Case 1 (Topology)
192.168.11.100/24
L3out
0.0.0.0/0
192.168.11.200/24
192.168.11.1/24
GW: 192.168.11.254
172.16.10.1
172.16.10.254
10.1.1.254 10.1.1.1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
192.168.11.254
BD: ASA-external BD: ASA-internal
Typically Web services
would be nated or load-
balanced.
BRKSEC-2048 122
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
L3out
Perimeter FW in GoTo mode
Enclave with Multiple Segment
EPG
Web
EPG
App
EPG
DB
Contract
Client-Web
Contract
Web-App
Contract
App-DB
Perimeter Stateful Firewall
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
Load Balancer
Stateless Firewall(Contract)
BRKSEC-2048 123
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Topology
VIP1: 110 TCP 80
VIP2: 120 TCP 5001
VIP3: 130 TCP 6001
192.168.10.200/24
GW: 192.168.10.254
BD: App
192.168.12.1/24
GW: 192.168.12.254
L3out
0.0.0.0/0
BD: LB
BD: DB
192.168.13.1/24
GW: 192.168.13.254
BD: Web
192.168.11.1/24
GW: 192.168.11.254
172.16.10.1
172.16.10.254
10.1.1.254 10.1.1.1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
172.16.11.1
172.16.11.254
Reuse same L4-L7 Device
• ADC Interface: reusable
• VIP: different for each deployment
BD: ASA-external BD: ASA-internal
BRKSEC-2048 124
Security Service insertion had to be
thought carefully while the fabric was
designed.
Security Service insertion had to be
thought carefully while the fabric was
designed.
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Policy Based Redirect is your Best Friend
Before Service graph is deployed
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: App
192.168.12.1/24
GW: 192.168.12.254
BD: DB
192.168.13.1/24
GW: 192.168.13.254
BD: DB
192.168.11.1/24
GW: 192.168.11.254
192.168.11.254 192.168.12.254 192.168.13.254
APIC relies on
Routing to forward
traffic from Server in
EPG WEB to Server
in EPB APP based
on contract
BRKSEC-2048 127
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Policy Based Redirect is your Best Friend
With PBR Service Graph
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: App
192.168.12.1/24
GW: 192.168.12.254
BD: DB
192.168.13.1/24
GW: 192.168.13.254
BD: DB
192.168.11.1/24
GW: 192.168.11.254
192.168.11.254 192.168.12.254 192.168.13.254
BD: ASA-external
L3 Enabled
BD: ASA-external
L3 Enabled
192.168.100.0/30 192.168.100.4/30
192.168.100.1 192.168.100.5
APIC relies on PBR to redirect
the traffic defined in the contract
to the Security Service
BRKSEC-2048 128
Fabien, PBR seems great to insert
service at L3 but how does that help for
segmentation ?
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
Segmentation with NGFW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
PBR for micro-Segmentation
Based only on Contract
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: MyApp
192.168.10.0/24
L3 Enabled
192.168.10.254
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
Because this is a
communication
between two End-
points in different
EPG, the
forwarding decision
is made in the leaf
switch
BRKSEC-2048 131
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
PBR for micro-Segmentation
Leveraging PBR
BD: ASA
L3 Enabled
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: MyApp
192.168.10.0/24
L3 Enabled
192.168.10.254
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
192.168.200.254
192.168.200.254
Because the traffic goes to Leaf
Switch where PBR rules are
enforced, traffic will be sent to the
security service defined in the
Service Graph.
BRKSEC-2048 132
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
PBR for micro-Segmentation
Leveraging PBR
BD: ASA
L3 EnabledEPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: MyApp
192.168.10.0/24
L3 Enabled
192.168.10.254
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
192.168.200.254
192.168.200.254
The Firewall must be in ONE ARM
as source and destination are in the
same Subnet. It must allow traffic
in and out via the same interface.
BRKSEC-2048 133
Demonstration :
Policy Based Redirect
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
There is a risk for the L4-7 Service
Graph to be bypassed if there is
more than one contract between the
2 EPGs.
Policy Based Redirect Consideration
BRKSEC-2048 135
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The most precise contract will be applied.
PBR Consideration Explanation
EPG
Web
EPG
App
Contract 1: Permit TCP any any  Service Graph Firewall
EPG
Web
EPG
App
Contract 2: Permit TCP any any eq HTTP
BRKSEC-2048 136
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The most precise contract will be applied !!!
PBR Consideration Explanation
EPG
Web
EPG
App
Contract 1: Permit TCP any any  Service Graph Firewall
EPG
Web
EPG
App
Contract 2: Permit TCP any any eq HTTP
Because contract 2 is more precise,
the HTTP traffic between EPG Web
and EPG App will not be sent to the
Firewall for inspection.
BRKSEC-2048 137
Proper RBAC configuration and
Auditing are key to enfore roles and
responsabilities
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Policy Based Redirect Requirements
• APIC must be v 2.0.1 or Higher
• The Service switch must be at least ‘-EX’ or more recent
• If not all the fabric is ‘-EX’, the Service switch must be dedicated to Services (i.e.
no workload connected with the L4-7 services)
BRKSEC-2048 139
What about IDS ?
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGW
Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
IDS Insertion in ACI
• Traditional Span mechanism based on EPG source/Destination
• NEW Copy Service :
• Specific Service graph
• As based attached to contract, leverage Subject for a more granular selection of traffic
than SPAN
- Require –EX leaf switch
- Support only one device per copy cluster
BRKSEC-2048 142
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Integration with SPAN
BRKSEC-2048 143
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Integration with SPAN
BRKSEC-2048 144
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
SPAN: Add Source
BRKSEC-2048 145
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
SPAN: Add Source
BRKSEC-2048 146
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Copy Configuration Steps
• Identify the source and destination endpoint groups.
• Configure the contract that specifies what to copy according to the subject and what is
allowed in the contract filter.
• Configure Layer 4 to Layer 7 copy devices that identify the target devices and specify the
ports where they attach.
• Use the copy service as part of a Layer 4 to Layer 7 service graph template.
• Configure a device selection policy that specifies which device will receive the traffic from
the service graph. When you configure the device selection policy, you specify the
contract, service graph, copy cluster, and cluster logical interface that is in copy device.
BRKSEC-2048 147
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Copy Service : Service Graph Template
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/1-x/L4-
L7_Services_Deployment/guide/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211_chapter_01101.html
#id_28562
BRKSEC-2048 148
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGW
 Threat Detection with IDS
Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Features
Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Full Feature-Set - NGFW
Cisco
Firepower
Threat Defense
6.2
 L2-L7 Firewall with L3 (Routed), L2 (Transparent IRB or Inline-NGIPS) Modes
 Scalable CGNAT, ACL, Dynamic Routing, Fail-to-Wire I/O modules
 Application Inspection, PKI for Site-to-Site VPN, Onbox Manager
 Inter-chassis cluster, FlexConfig, REST-APIs, Packet Tracer/Capture
 NSS Leading Next-Gen IPS - SourceFIRE
 Comprehensive Threat Prevention, L7 Application Visibility and Control
 Security Intelligence (C&C, Botnets, IP, DNS, etc.), Threat / Risk Reports
 Blocking of Files by Type, Protocol, and Direction, Protocol Rate Limiting
 Access Control: Enforcement by Application and User AD integration
 Switch, Routing, NAT Options, and ISE PxGRID integration
 URL Filtering, Malware Blocking, Continuous File Analysis
 Malware Network Trajectory, User-based IOCs, URL lookup
 AMP public & private cloud with ThreatGrid, FMC-ThreatGrid APIs
 Firepower Management Center (fka. FireSIGHT or Defense Center)
BRKSEC-2048 150
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
GoThrough Perimeter NGIPS
The Server gateway is out of the fabric
EPG
Web
192.168.12.50/24
GW: 192.168.12.254
EPG
DB
EPG
App
192.168.12.254
BD: ASA-external
L3 enabled
192.168.12.100/24
GW: 192.168.12.254
192.168.12.50/24
GW: 192.168.12.254
BD: ASA-internal
No L3
VRF
MyApp
Service Graph will not allow each Bridge Domain on each side to have L3
enabled. This might prevent to use Dynamic Update for ACL on the FW
VRF OutSide
BRKSEC-2048 151
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
NGIPS between App Tiers
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: Web
L3 Disabled
192.168.12.254
BD: ASA-external
L3 Enabled
BD: App
L3 Disabled
BD: DB
L3 Disabled
VRF
web
VRF
DB
VRF
App
VRF outside
Service Graph will not allow each Bridge Domain on each side to have L3
enabled. This might prevent to use Dynamic Update for ACL on the FW
BRKSEC-2048 152
Some Best Practices ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
My Best Practices
• For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
BD: MyApp
192.168.10.0/24
L3 Enabled
192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200
BRKSEC-2048 154
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
My Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security
zone
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 155
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
My Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 156
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is
recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the
access control of an enclave or security
zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for
segmentation
• Enhanced Segmentation and Threat
Detection with L4-7 Services in
sensitive area
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 157
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is
recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the
access control of an enclave or security
zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for
segmentation
• Enhanced Segmentation and Threat
Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive
area
• Leverage IDS for visibility and
dynamically change security policy
when potential threat detected.
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 158
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is
recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the
access control of an enclave or security
zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for
segmentation
• Enhanced Segmentation and Threat
Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive
area
• Leverage IDS for visibility and
dynamically change security policy
when potential threat detected.
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 159
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is
recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the
access control of an enclave or security
zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for
segmentation
• Enhanced Segmentation and Threat
Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive
area
• Leverage IDS for visibility and
dynamically change security policy
when potential threat detected.
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 160
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is
recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the
access control of an enclave or security
zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for
segmentation
• Enhanced Segmentation and Threat
Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive
area
• Leverage IDS for visibility and
dynamically change security policy
when potential threat detected.
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 161
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Best practices
• For new deployment PBR is
recommended when possible
• Leverage L4-7 security services for the
access control of an enclave or security
zone
• Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for
segmentation
• Enhanced Segmentation and Threat
Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive
area
• Leverage IDS for visibility and
dynamically change security policy
when potential threat detected.
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App1
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App 2
EPG
Web
EPG
DB
EPG
App
App3
BRKSEC-2048 162
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Dynamic Update to EPG Object-Group
web
Consumer
app
Provider
ACE
192.168.10.200192.168.20.200
Object-group
192.168.10.101
New
192.168.10.102
New
object-group network __$EPG$_pod37-aprof-app
network-object host 192.168.10.101
network-object host 192.168.10.102
access-list access-list-inbound extended permit tcp any object-group __$EPG$_pod37-aprof-app eq www
2: APIC create object-group for the EPG.
1: Enable “Attachment Notification”
on function connector internal.
3: APIC add new endpoints to object-group
(192.168.10.101, 192.168.102)
APIC dynamically detects new endpoint,
ASA subscribes to attach/detach event,
and ASA device package automatically
adds EPs to object-group
ASA Device Package
BRKSEC-2048 164
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
FMC to APIC Rapid Threat Containment
DB EPG
ACI Fabric
App EPG
Infected App1
Step 1: Infected End Point launches an attack
that NGFW(v), FirePOWER Services in ASA,
or FirePOWER(v) appliance blocks inline
Step 2: Intrusion event is generated and sent to
FMC revealing information about the infected host
Step 3: Attack event is configured to trigger
remediation module for APIC that uses NB API to
contain the infected host in ACI fabric
1
FMC
App2
2
34
Step 4: APIC quickly contains/quarantines
the infected App1 workload into an isolated
uSeg EPG
BRKSEC-2048 165
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Management tools for every organization
APIC GUI
API - Automation
vCenter Plugin
NX-OS
Style CLI
Choose the
right one!
BRKSEC-2048 166
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco ACI interface summary
Cisco ACI
network
APIC
(single point of
management)
CLI
Advanced GUI
Basic GUI
REST
REST client
ACI toolkit
Python SDK
Ruby SDK
Powershell SDK
BRKSEC-2048 167
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
I don’t know Anything about Scripting !!!
BRKSEC-2048 168
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sniffer: API Inspector
• API calls made by GUI are captured
• GET, POST
• Navigating through panes fetches
data with GET requests
• Submitting configuration changes
uses POST requests
• Record your GUI interaction as
JSON-based REST calls
• Modify and replay with tools like
Postman
BRKSEC-2048 169
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Capturing API Calls
BRKSEC-2048 170
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Capturing API Calls
BRKSEC-2048 171
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Capturing API Calls
BRKSEC-2048 172
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Capturing API Calls
BRKSEC-2048 173
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Capturing API Calls
BRKSEC-2048 174
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Capturing API Calls
POST
url: http://172.23.3.215/api/node/mo/uni/tn-Cisco.json
{
"fvTenant": {
"attributes": {
"name": "Cisco",
"status": "created"
},
"children": []
}
}
BRKSEC-2048 175
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Save Objects in JSON format
BRKSEC-2048 176
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Save Objects in JSON format
BRKSEC-2048 177
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Save Objects in JSON format
BRKSEC-2048 178
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Edit Your Jason Code
BRKSEC-2048 179
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Arya is a tool that takes XML or JSON
object documents as input and outputs
them as Python code leveraging the
ACI Python SDK.
https://github.com/datacenter/arya
Arya - ACI REST Python Adapter
BRKSEC-2048 180
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Arya Example
BRKSEC-2048 181
Demo : Automation with API scripts
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with ASA/NGFW
 Segmentation with ASA/NGFW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
 Behavior Anomaly Detection
More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
access-list 102 permit tcp 37.85.170.24 0.0.0.127 lt 3146 77.26.232.98 0.0.0.127 gt 1462
access-list 102 permit tcp 155.237.22.232 0.0.0.127 gt 1843 239.16.35.19 0.0.1.255 lt 4384
access-list 102 permit icmp 136.237.66.158 255.255.255.255 eq 946 119.186.148.222 0.255.255.255 eq 878
access-list 102 permit ip 129.100.41.114 255.255.255.255 gt 3972 47.135.28.103 0.0.0.255 eq 467
with TrustSec
Traditional Security Policy
TrustSec Security Policy
Security Control Automation
Simplified Access Management
Improved Security Efficacy
Network Fabric
Switch Router DC FW DC SwitchWireless
Flexible and Scalable Policy Enforcement
Segmentation
Software Defined
BRKSEC-2048 184
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Enabling Group-Based Policies across the Enterprise
• Cohesive security policy
• Simplified security management
• End-to-End segmentation
Voice Employee Supplier BYOD
Campus / Branch / Non-ACI DC
TrustSec Policy Domain
Voice
VLAN
Data
VLAN
Web App DB
ACI Fabric
Data Center
APIC Policy Domain
APIC
DC
ACI Policy DomainTrustSec Policy Domain
BRKSEC-2048 185
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Enabling Group-Based Policies across the Enterprise
• Cohesive security policy
• Simplified security management
• End-to-End segmentation
Voice Employee Supplier BYOD
Campus / Branch / Non-ACI DC
TrustSec Policy Domain
Voice
VLAN
Data
VLAN
Web App DB
ACI Fabric
Data Center
APIC Policy Domain
APIC
DC
ISE 2.1
ACI Policy DomainTrustSec Policy Domain
BRKSEC-2048 186
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Enabling Group-Based Policies across the Enterprise
• Cohesive security policy
• Simplified security management
• End-to-End segmentation
Voice Employee Supplier BYOD
Campus / Branch / Non-ACI DC
TrustSec Policy Domain
Voice
VLAN
Data
VLAN
Web App DB
ACI Fabric
Data Center
APIC Policy Domain
APIC
DC
ACI Policy DomainTrustSec Policy Domain
BRKSEC-2048 187
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
TrustSec Security Groups Provisioned in ACI
ISE Dynamically provisions TrustSec
Security Groups in ACI Fabric
ACI
TrustSec
Security Groups
TrustSec Groups represented as
External EPGs
APIC
DC
Max: 200 Security Groups
Up to 4000/32 mappings (gen1)
Up to 10K/32 mappings (gen2) (-EX)
BRKSEC-2048 188
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
TrustSec Groups Shared with ACI
BRKSEC-2048 189
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
TrustSec Groups Shared with ACI
BRKSEC-2048 190
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Application Context to TrustSec Policies
ISE dynamically learns internal EPGs
and
VM Bindings from ACI fabric
ACI
VM1
VM1000
TrustSec Domain
TrustSec
ACI Fabric
TrustSec Policies Controlling
Access to ACI Data Centers
APIC
DC
BRKSEC-2048 191
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing ACI Endpoint Groups to TrustSec
• EPG suffix added to Security Group name
•IP-SGT bindings from ACI can be propagated over SXP TrustSec devices and to pxGrid peers
BRKSEC-2048 192
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Data Plane Integration
New Capabilities:
• Take current SGT propagation methods (DMVPN, GETVPN, SXP, IPSEC, GRE, LISP/VXLAN
(campus fabric) into ACI fabric
Benefits:
• Greater scale (remove IP/Group info from leaf)
• Seamless integration
BRKSEC-2048 193
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
ACI Border Leaf
APIC
DC
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
ACI Border Leaf
5
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
SGT: 5
APIC
DC
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
ACI Border Leaf
5
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
SGT: 5
APIC
DC
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
SGT/EPG
Namespace Alignment
ACI Border Leaf
CMD iVXLAN5
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
SGT: 5
Class ID
SGT # to EPG #
Translation Table
APIC
DC
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
SGT/EPG
Namespace Alignment
ACI Border Leaf
CMD iVXLAN5
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
SGT: 5
#
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
Class ID
Class ID
SGT # to EPG #
Translation Table
APIC
DC
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
SGT/EPG
Namespace Alignment
ACI Border Leaf
CMD iVXLAN5
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
SGT: 5
#
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
Class ID
Class ID
SGT # to EPG #
Translation Table
APIC
DC
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Sharing Context Across the Enterprise
Enterprise
Backbone
ACI Policy Domain
ACI Spine (N9K)
TrustSec Policy Domain
ISE
BYOD
10.1.10.220
Web
10.1.100.52
TrustSec Border Device
(ASR 1K)
SGT/EPG
Namespace Alignment
ACI Border Leaf
CMD iVXLAN5
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
SGT: 5
#
SRC:10.1.10.220
DST: 10.1.100.52
Class ID
Class ID
SGT # to EPG #
Translation Table
APIC
DC
• Introduction
• Use Cases :
 Basic Access Control
 Basic Segmentation
 Micro-Segmentation
 Access Control with NGFW
 Segmentation with NGW
 Threat Detection with IDS
 Threat Protection with IPS
 Where is my Automation in there ?
Behavior Anomaly Detection
 More Granular Access Control
• Conclusion
Cyber Threat Defense
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Verizon Report
BRKSEC-2048 203
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 204
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 205
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 206
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 207
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 208
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 209
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
4. Data Theft
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 210
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
4. Data Theft
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 211
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
4. Data Theft
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 212
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
4. Data Theft
Kill Chain: Post Breach
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Routers
Switches
Firewall
Threat Detection
BRKSEC-2048 213
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
1. Command
and Control
2. Reconnaissance
3.Propagation
4. Data Theft
Scalable Network Defense
Firewall
IPS
Web Sec
N-AV
Email Sec
Threat Detection
Routers
Switches
Firewall
BRKSEC-2048 214
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco CTD Solution: Providing Scalable Visibility
Drilling into a single flow yields a plethora of information
BRKSEC-2048 215
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Collect & Analyze Flows
1 2
• # Concurrent flows
• Packets per second
• Bits per second
• New flows created
• Number of SYNs sent
• Time of day
• Number of SYNs
received
• Rate of connection
resets
• Duration of the flow
• Over 80+ other
attributes
Establish Baseline of Behaviors
Alarm on Anomalies & Changes in Behavior
threshold
threshold
threshold
threshold
Critical Servers Exchange Server Web Servers Marketing
Anomaly detected in
host behavior
3
Flow-based Anomaly Detection
BRKSEC-2048 216
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Behavior-Based Attack Detection
High Concern Index indicates a
significant number of suspicious events
that deviate from established baselines
Host Groups Host CI CI% Alarms Alerts
Desktops 10.10.101.118 865,645,669 8,656% High Concern
Index
Ping, Ping_Scan, TCP_Scan
BRKSEC-2048 217
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
 Reveal Data Loss. Code can be hidden in the enterprise to export of sensitive
information back to the attacker. This Data Leakage may occur rapidly or over time.
NetFlow Security Use cases
 Identify BotNet Command & Control Activity. BotNets are implanted in the enterprise
to execute commands from their Bot herders to send SPAM, Denial of Service attacks, or
other malicious acts.
 Detect Sophisticated and Persistent Threats. Malware that makes it past perimeter
security can remain in the enterprise waiting to strike as lurking threats. These may be
zero day threats that do not yet have an antivirus signature or be hard to detect for other
reasons.
 Find Internally Spread Malware. Network interior malware proliferation can occur across
hosts for the purpose gathering security reconnaissance data, data exfiltration or network
backdoors.
 Uncover Network Reconnaissance. Some attacks will probe the network looking for
attack vectors to be utilized by custom-crafted cyber threats.
It Can :
BRKSEC-2048 218
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco Network
StealthWatch
FlowCollector
StealthWatch
Management
Console
NetFlow
Users/Devices
Cisco ISE
NBAR NSEL
StealthWatch Solution Components
StealthWatch
FlowSensor
StealthWatch
FlowSensor
VE
NetFlow
StealthWatch
FlowReplicator
Other
tools/collectors
BRKSEC-2048 219
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco Netflow Generation Appliance (NGA)
StealthWatch
FlowCollector
StealthWatch
Management
Console
https
Data Center
Switch
Cisco
NGA
SPAN or
passive Tap
NetFlow
 Offloads NetFlow Generation to Dedicated High-Performance
 End-to-end flow information collected across multiple network
observation points using SPAN and passive TAP
 Up to 6 destinations
• 4x10G Monitoring Interfaces
• 80M Active Flow Cache
• Targets 200K Flow record export per sec
NGA
 Very high volume
 Less boxes and more
centralized deployment
Flow Sensor
 Less scalable
 More capabilities like Deep
Packet inspection and URL data
Create Netflow Records
BRKSEC-2048 220
How do I send Traffic to my FlowSensor ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
• Traditional Span mechanism based on EPG source/Destination
• NEW Copy Service :
• Specific Service graph
• As based attached to contract, leverage Subject for a more granular selection of
traffic than SPAN
How Send Traffic to my FlowSensor ?
- Require –EX leaf switch
- Support only one device per copy cluster
BRKSEC-2048 222
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Integration with SPAN
BRKSEC-2048 223
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACI Integration with SPAN
BRKSEC-2048 224
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
SPAN: Add Source
BRKSEC-2048 225
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
SPAN: Add Source
BRKSEC-2048 226
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Service Copy Configuration Steps
• Identify the source and destination endpoint groups.
• Configure the contract that specifies what to copy according to the subject and
what is allowed in the contract filter.
• Configure Layer 4 to Layer 7 copy devices that identify the target devices and
specify the ports where they attach.
• Use the copy service as part of a Layer 4 to Layer 7 service graph template.
• Configure a device selection policy that specifies which device will receive the
traffic from the service graph. When you configure the device selection policy,
you specify the contract, service graph, copy cluster, and cluster logical interface
that is in copy device.
BRKSEC-2048 227
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Copy Service : Service Graph Template
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/1-x/L4-
L7_Services_Deployment/guide/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211_chapter_01101.html
#id_28562
BRKSEC-2048 228
Tetration
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Tetration Analytics
Whitelist Policy
Recommendation
Recommend
Policy
Enforcement
(Future Roadmap)
Remediate*
SW
Sensors
in Cloud
3rd
Party
HW Sensors
SW Sensors
SW Sensors
Listen
Sensors
Record, Analyze
and Store
Appliance
Application Insights
Policy Simulation / Impact Analysis
Forensics and Compliance
Interact / Verify
Software
3rd Party
Feed
Integrate
*=Roadmap
Nexus 9300-EX
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Hardware Sensor and Software Sensor
Accumulated Flow Information (Volume…)
Software Sensor
Process mapping
Process ID
Process owner
Hardware Sensor
Tunnel endpoints
Buffer utilization
Burst detections
Packet drops
Flow
details
Interpacket
variations
BRKSEC-2048 231
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Tetration Analytics Highlights
Application Behavior Based Policy
Application
Insights
Automated
Whitelist Policy
Policy Impact
Assessment
Policy
Compliance
Forensics
Every Packet, Any Time, Any Where
BRKSEC-2048 232
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Shipping Form Factors for Initial Release
Full Rack Cluster
• 39 Rack Units
• 36 Servers and 3 Switches
• 8 Serving Nodes
• 12 Base Nodes
• 16 Compute Nodes
• Built on UCS C-Series
• Built-in Redundancy
• Full CLOS Network Processing including
Algorithmic Operations
Data retrieval and serving
Telemetry Collection
BRKSEC-2048 233
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Internet
DB Proxy
What Is Really Running in my Data Center?
Cisco Tetration Analytics Application Insight—Dependency Map
Use Cisco Tetration
Analytics Outcome and
Link it to Your Services
and Application CMDB
Security
Dependencies
Application
Service Offering
Service
Service Category
(Service Owner)
BRKSEC-2048 234
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Application Discovery and Endpoint Grouping
Cisco Tetration
Analytics™
Platform
BM VM VM BM
BM VM VM BM
Brownfield
BM VM VM VM BM
Cisco Nexus® 9000 Series
Bare-metal, VM, &
switch telemetry
VM telemetry
(AMI …)
Bare-metal &
VM telemetry
BM VM
BMVM
VM BM
VMVM
VM BM
BMVM
BM
Network-only sensors,
host-only sensors, or both (preferred)
Bare metal and VM
On-premises and cloud workloads (AWS)
Unsupervised machine
learning
Behavior analysis
BRKSEC-2048 235
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Whitelist Policy Recommendation
Application Discovery
App
Tier
DB
Tier
Storage
Web
Tier
Storage
Policy Enforcement
(Future Roadmap)
Whitelist Policy Recommendation
(Available in JSON, XML, and YAML)
BRKSEC-2048 236
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Visual Query with Flow Exploration
 Replay flow details like a DVR
 Information mapped across 25 different dimensions
• Thick lines indicate common flows
• Faint lines indicate uncommon flows
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Outliers
Switch on Outlier view to
highlight uncommon flows
Outlier dimension is
highlighted with purple circle
BRKSEC-2048 238
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Possible malicious DNS traffic
Show all DNS traffic with packets larger then 82 bytes and a flow duration of
greater then 6 seconds.
BRKSEC-2048 239
BETTER TOGETHER ?
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Tetration Stealthwatch
Datacenter:
Per Packet Telemetry from
Nexus 9000 & Server
Security Anomaly
Detection
Network Wide:
Switching/Routing,
Proxies, Servers, &
Endpoints
Security Forensics
Stealthwatch for Security Analysis
and Policy Monitoring
Application Behavior
Profiling
Automated
Application Grouping
Tetration for Application Analytics and
Application Segmentation
Network as a Sensor in the Data Center
Together
Unmatched
Analytics and Forensics
for
Application and Security
Automated Application
Based Segmentation
Complete Data Control for
Segmentation, Security,
and Forensics
BRKSEC-2048 241
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Campus Core Datacenter
Branch
+Cisco
Stealthwatch
Cisco
Stealthwatch Cisco
Stealthwatch
Where is Visibility Needed?
BRKSEC-2048 242
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Available Now: Investigative Pivot
Tetration
Analytics
Pivot from Stealthwatch to
Tetration interface during an
Investigation
BRKSEC-2048 243
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Monitoring Unified Policy in the Data Centre
Tetration
Analytics
Leverages Stealthwatch Host Group Automation Service
Export workspaces, clusters and applications
discovered in Tetration to Stealthwatch Host Groups
BRKSEC-2048 244
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ACIISE 2.1
Tetration
Analytics
App Policy
Shared Policy Groups
Application Based Segmentation
for the Datacenter
Identity Based
Segmentation
Only Cisco can do scalable
granular segmentation end to end
Provide Automated Granular Application Based
Segmentation optimized for in the Datacenter
Provide Identity Based Segmentation
optimized for Branch to Campus to DC
End to End SW Defined Segmentation
BRKSEC-2048 245
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Monitoring Unified SGT-ACI Policy
TrustSec Domain
ACI Domain
pci_users
SGT: 16
EV_appProfile_LOB2_App1EPG
SGT: 10005
ACI Domain
Stealthwatch Deployment
Cisco ISE
APIC-DC
syslog
NetFlow
SGT
Definitions
EPG
Definitions
Policy Plane
Integration
Tetration
Analytics
SPAN
Policy
Push
Tetration
Telemetry
BRKSEC-2048 246
Conclusion
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Cisco Spark
Questions?
Use Cisco Spark to communicate
with the speaker after the session
1. Find this session in the Cisco Live Mobile App
2. Click “Join the Discussion”
3. Install Spark or go directly to the space
4. Enter messages/questions in the space
How
cs.co/ciscolivebot#BRKSEC-2048
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
• Please complete your Online
Session Evaluations after each
session
• Complete 4 Session Evaluations
& the Overall Conference
Evaluation (available from
Thursday) to receive your Cisco
Live T-shirt
• All surveys can be completed via
the Cisco Live Mobile App or the
Communication Stations
Don’t forget: Cisco Live sessions will be available
for viewing on-demand after the event at
www.ciscolive.com/global/on-demand-library/.
Complete Your Online
Session Evaluation
© 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Continue Your Education
• Demos in the Cisco campus
• Walk-in Self-Paced Labs
• Tech Circle
• Meet the Engineer 1:1 meetings
• Related sessions
250BRKSEC-2048
Thank you
Brksec 2048-demystifying aci-security

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Brksec 2048-demystifying aci-security

  • 1.
  • 2. Demystifying ACI Security Fabien Gandola, CSE Security for EMEA BRKSEC-2048
  • 3. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco Spark Questions? Use Cisco Spark to communicate with the speaker after the session 1. Find this session in the Cisco Live Mobile App 2. Click “Join the Discussion” 3. Install Spark or go directly to the space 4. Enter messages/questions in the space How cs.co/ciscolivebot#BRKSEC-2048
  • 5. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public In Conclusion • ACI helps tackling DC Security Challenges by :  Integrating security in the Application  Accelerating security deployment  Automating security insertion • Cisco Security helps better protect your DC by :  Providing leading edge technologies  Integrating smoothly in ACI architecture  Providing a full security framework BRKSEC-2048 5
  • 6. LET’S TAKE A STEP BACK…
  • 8. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public What Changed ? • Virtualization BRKSEC-2048 8
  • 9. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public What Changed ? • Virtualization • Requirements for security for East-West Traffic BRKSEC-2048 9
  • 10. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public What Changed ? • Virtualization • Requirements for security for East-West Traffic • Architecture with Multiple active Data Centers BRKSEC-2048 10
  • 11. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public What Changed ? • Virtualization • Requirements for security for East-West Traffic • Architecture with Multiple active Data Centers • Hybrid Data Center with Public Cloud Solution BRKSEC-2048 11
  • 12. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Digitization generates DC Challenges 10I000 0II0 00 0III000 I00I III0I III00II 0II00II Protect Infrastructure and Critical Data 24x7 Manage Data Deluge and Device Proliferation Defend Across the Extended DC Physical + Virtual + Cloud Enable Business Growth New Business Value New Business Models BRKSEC-2048 12
  • 13. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The Cisco Advantage • Control North/South traffic with NGFW • Scale and HA with Clustering • Inspect North/South traffic with NGIPS • Segment and Protect virtual enclave with ASAv and FTDv An Architectural Approach Physical Hosts NGIPS NGFW Clustering BRKSEC-2048 13
  • 14. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public …Leveraging the Infrastructure… NGIPS ASA FW Clustering BRKSEC-2048 14
  • 15. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public …Leveraging the Infrastructure… NGIPS ASA FW Clustering NGA Virtual FlowSensor Lancope Stealhwatch Leverage your Cisco Infrastructure to fight Advanced Pervasive Threats BRKSEC-2048 15
  • 16. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public …Leveraging the Infrastructure… NGIPS ASA FW Clustering NGA Virtual FlowSensor Lancope Stealhwatch Leverage your Cisco Infrastructure to fight Advanced Pervasive Threats TrustSec with Security Group Tagging SGT SGT SGT SGT SGT SGT SGT SGT ISE SGT Simplify Automate Accelerate Standardize SGT BRKSEC-2048 16
  • 17. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public …Ready for Next Generation DataCenter. Physical Hosts NGIPS ASA FW Clustering BRKSEC-2048 17
  • 18. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public …Ready for Next Generation DataCenter. VIRTUAL ENDPOINT ACI Fabric PHYSICAL ENDPOINT SERVICE NODES SECURITY NODES Application Centric Infrastructure - Scalable - Simple - Flexible - Reliable - Automated - Secured BRKSEC-2048 18
  • 19. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Feature Product Matrix ASA/FTD FTD StealthWatch TrustSec Access Control Segmentation Context Discovery Threat Detection Threat Protection APT Detection Forensic Analysis Compliance BRKSEC-2048 19
  • 20. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Feature Product Matrix with ACI ASA/FTD FTD StealthWatch TrustSec Access Control Segmentation Context Discovery Threat Detection Threat Protection APT Detection Forensic Analysis Compliance BRKSEC-2048 20
  • 22. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Applications All Around Us …are the driving force of business that are being… Rapidly developed and Deployed at scale …while requiring… Frequent updates and Highest Availability (SLAs) BRKSEC-2048 22
  • 23. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Challenge for Infrastructure …to keep up with the pace of change imposed on the: Network Security …functions, while maintaining application: Capacity Resiliency BRKSEC-2048 23
  • 24. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Software-Defined Networking …Comes to the Rescue “…is an emerging architecture that is dynamic, manageable, cost- effective, and adaptable, making it ideal for the high-bandwidth, dynamic nature of today's applications. This architecture decouples the network control and forwarding functions enabling the network control to become directly programmable and the underlying infrastructure to be abstracted for applications and network services.” Source: www.opennetworking.org BRKSEC-2048 24
  • 25. What are the critical Security Functions in the DataCenter ?
  • 26. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Protect Mobile Access to the Data Center Micro- Segmentation Protect Data Center North-South Server Quarantine Automation Segment Access to Data Center Resources Consistent Policies across Cloud, Virtual & Physical Secure Application Tiers Application Security Policies Automation Critical Security Functions BRKSEC-2048 26
  • 27. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Agenda Introduction Use Cases Conclusion Esqueixada Mel i matóFaves a la Catalana
  • 28. Use Cases Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGFW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control Faves a la Catalana
  • 29. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 30. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 31. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 32. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 33. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 34. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 35. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 36. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 37. About me… Fabien Gandola – fgandola@cisco.com TSA Cyber Security EMEAR 19 years in Cisco
  • 38. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Devices Role “App”“DB” Service Consumers Leaf Nodes Service Producers APIC Controller Spine Nodes BRKSEC-2048 38
  • 39. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public TRUST BASED ON LOCATION (Traditional DC Switch) Servers 2 and 3 can communicate unless blacklisted 1 42 3 No communication allowed between Servers 2 and 3 unless there is a whitelist policy ZERO TRUST ARCHITECTURE (Nexus 9K with ACI) EPG 1 “WEB” EPG 2 “APP” 1 2 3 4 ACI Whitelist Policy supports “Zero Trust” Model Whitelist policy = Explicitly configured ACI contract between EPG 1 and EPG 2 allowing traffic between their members BRKSEC-2048 39
  • 40. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public External Network App DBWeb QoS Filter QoS Service QoS Filter ACI uses a policy based approach that focuses on the application. The Heart of ACI BRKSEC-2048 40
  • 41. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Communication Abstraction ACI Fabric APIC Security Services “App”“DB” BRKSEC-2048 41
  • 42. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Communication Abstraction ACI Fabric APIC Security Services Security Policy “App” → “DB” All TCP/UDP: - Accept - Redirect to FW and IPS All Other : - Drop “App”“DB” BRKSEC-2048 42
  • 43. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Communication Abstraction ACI Fabric APIC Security Services Security Policy “App” → “DB” All TCP/UDP: - Accept - Redirect to FW and IPS All Other : - Drop “App”“DB” BRKSEC-2048 43
  • 44. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public What are the ACI Building Blocks ? BRKSEC-2048 44
  • 45. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public First, we need a way to identify and group together end points. Web Tier App Tier DB Tier EP EP EP EP EP EP EP EP EP EP EP EP A Policy Based on Groups BRKSEC-2048 45
  • 46. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public “EPG Web” “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP EP EP EP In the ACI model, we do this using the End Point Group (EPG). End Point Group BRKSEC-2048 46
  • 47. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Endpoint Groups Communications Devices within an Endpoint group can communicate, provided that they have IP reachability (provided by the Bridge Domain/VRF). Communication between Endpoint groups is, by default, not permitted. “EPG Web” EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP BRKSEC-2048 47
  • 48. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public “EPG Web” EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP Contract Once we have our EPGs defined, we need to create policies to determine how they communicate with each other. BRKSEC-2048 48
  • 49. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public “EPG Web” EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP Contract : Kind of reflexive “Stateless” ACLs Filters TCP: 80 TCP: 443 A contract typically refers to one or more ‘filters’ to define specific protocols & ports allowed between EPGs. BRKSEC-2048 49
  • 50. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Create a Contract BRKSEC-2048 50
  • 51. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public L3out Access Control From Outside EPG Web EPG App EPG DB Contract Client-Web Perimeter Stateless Access Control BRKSEC-2048 51
  • 52. How Secure is the Fabric to rely on it for Security ?
  • 53. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Fabric Security • Whitelist Security Model • APIC Hardening • APIC Northbound Protocols • APIC Northbound Authentication • Two Factor Authentication (RSA Secure ID) • APIC to Switch Authentication and Encryption • NXOS Image Signing and Verification • Role Based Access Control • Audit Logs for all Changes • Security Compliance Report • Security Certifications • MACsec Support • 802.1X BRKSEC-2048 53
  • 54. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public For more information on ACI fabric security: http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/data-center-virtualization/application-centric-infrastructure/white-paper-c11-736292.html BRKSEC-2048 54
  • 55. Is there away to create Management zones ?
  • 56. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public A Tenant is a container for all network, security, troubleshooting and L4 – 7 service policies. Engineering-Tenant Marketing-Tenant Tenants Tenant resources are isolated from each other, allowing management by different administrators. Tenants can provide traffic and RBAC isolation… ACI Fabric IT Internet Shared Services Test / Dev IPTV BRKSEC-2048 56
  • 57. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 58. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public “EPG Web” EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP Contract Once we have our EPGs defined, we need to create policies to determine how they communicate with each other. BRKSEC-2048 58
  • 59. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public L3out Segmentation Using Contracts EPG Web EPG App EPG DB Contract Client-Web Contract Web-App Contract App-DB Stateless Firewall(Contract) Load Balancer Stateless Firewall(Contract) BRKSEC-2048 59
  • 60. But what if I want all EPGs to be able to send syslog, query DNS, communicate with the AD etc?
  • 61. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public vzAny applies rules to all EPGs in a VRF EPG A Provider EPG vzAny EPG vzAny EPG vzAny EPG A Consumer EPG vzAny Syslog Syslog Syslog Any EPG can consume syslog that EPG A provides EPG A can consume Syslog from any EPG in the VRF Any EPG in the VRF can consume or provide syslog http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/kb/b_KB_Use_vzAny_to_AutomaticallyApplyCommunicationRules_toEPGs.html#concept_F2BC3533BF984F 1F88A18B712ED9C072 BRKSEC-2048 61
  • 62. But what if I want some EPGs to communicate freely between themselves?
  • 63. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Contract Preferred Groups Allow traffic between a group of EPGs EPG A EPG B EPG C EPG D EPG 1 EPG 2 Contract Preferred Group Alphabet No contract required within the group Contract required http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/kb/b_APIC_Contract_Preferred_Group.html BRKSEC-2048 63
  • 64. Those 2 forms of contracts helps a lot fighting the number of contracts in TCAM.
  • 65. Is that really helping me Compare to traditional ACLs ????
  • 66. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The abstraction layer provided by the EPG detaches the security policy from the infrastructure such as IP address or Vlans. BRKSEC-2048 66
  • 67. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public “EPG Web” EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP Application Profile Contract Contract A collection of EPGs and the associated contracts that define how they communicate form an Application Profile. Application Profile “My Expenses” BRKSEC-2048 67
  • 68. Vmware keeps talking about NSX Micro- segementation…
  • 69. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 70. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox EPGs & Contracts ACI Policy Model Intra-EPG isolation BRKSEC-2048 70
  • 71. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox Intra-EPG isolation • Functional equivalent to Isolated Private VLAN: ALL endpoints in EPG are isolated from each other • Supported since ACI 1.2(2) • Can be combined with Micro- segmented EPG BRKSEC-2048 71
  • 72. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Intra-EPG endpoint isolation BRKSEC-2048 72
  • 73. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox Micro-segmented EPGs with attributes• Use of attributes to classify endpoints in a specific kind of EPG called µEPG • Network-based attributes: IP/MAC • VM-based attributes: Guest OS, VM name, ID, vnic, DVS, Datacenter • Does not create a Port Group on VMM (no vnic reassign) • Supported since ACI 1.1(1) BRKSEC-2048 73
  • 74. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public About Micro-segmented EPGs • µSeg EPGs are not linked to a “Base” EPG (though virtual endpoints are still “attached” to their corresponding Port Groups): • They have their own Bridge Domain  Endpoints addressing must be taken into consideration in the design • They have their own set of Contracts  There is no contract inheritance from the “Base” EPG. • Attributes are matched using an “OR” operator with a precedence order in case of conflict • Any VM in the VMM Domain & Tenant matching an attribute will be put in the µSeg EPG  Choose wisely the attribute(s) you want to match • In the last 2 case studies, Custom Attributes would be a natural choice BRKSEC-2048 74
  • 75. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public USE CASE Use Case #1: Securing infrastructure Use Case #2: Quarantining compromised endpoints Use Case #3: Securing an application through Dev, Test & Prod stages BRKSEC-2048 75
  • 76. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public WAN Use Case 3: Application life Cycle WAN http://172.16.1.100 VIP - 172.16.1.100 Web Application protected by a NGFW at the perimeter 172.16.10.0/24 Web VM1 DB VM Web VM2 Single Subnet to simplify IPAM tcp/3306 tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Production Environment Load Balancer can reach web servers, but not the DB Web Servers reach DB via NGFW, but do not need to talk to each other BRKSEC-2048 76
  • 77. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web VM3 Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 77
  • 78. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Web VM3 Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 78
  • 79. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Web VM3 Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 79
  • 80. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Test Site: http://172.16.1.200/acme Web VM3 Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 80
  • 81. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Test Site: http://172.16.1.200/acme Web VM3 Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 81
  • 82. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Test Site: http://172.16.1.200/acme Web VM3 Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 82
  • 83. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 Web VM1 Web VM2 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Test Site: http://172.16.1.200/acme Web VM3 Pool automatically updated by APIC when VM moves into uEPG New VM added to NGFW rules allowing DB access Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 83
  • 84. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Web Database Dev WAN tcp/80 tcp/80 VM MySQL Joomla Web Application Web Database Prod tcp/3306 http://172.16.1.100/acme 172.16.1.100 Test vDesktops VM MySQL Web Database Test VM MySQL HAProxy 172.16.1.200 Test Site: http://172.16.1.200/acme Web VM3 Pool automatically updated by APIC when VM moves into uEPG New VM added to NGFW rules allowing DB access Use Case 3: Application life Cycle BRKSEC-2048 84
  • 85. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Micro Segmented EPGs with VM Attributes WAN/INTERNET V M V M V M V M V M V M V M V M vSphere Clusters MGMT & Storage Production Clusters Test Clusters V M V M V M V M BRKSEC-2048 85
  • 86. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI has a wide segmentation support Intra-EPG • DVS since ACI 1.2(2) • AVS since ACI 1.3(1) • Roadmap • Supported since ACI 1.2(2) • Supported since ACI 1.2(2) Micro- segmentation • DVS since ACI 1.3(1) with 9300-EX hardware • AVS since ACI 1.1(1) • Microsoft Virtual Switch since ACI 1.2(1) • Roadmap • IP EPG since ACI 1.2(1) with -E hardware • MAC EPG planned BRKSEC-2048 86
  • 87. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Micro-Segmentation HW Support 1st generation (-E) (-EX) AVS Useg (VM, IP, MAC) Yes Yes Yes Microsoft Useg (VM, IP, MAC) Yes Yes Yes vDS Useg (VM, IP, MAC) No No Yes Bare-Metal (IP-EPG) No Yes* Yes* Bare-Metal (MAC-EPG) N/A Yes Yes Openstack (GBP) No Future Future Container No Future Future * Caveat: IP-EPGs must be in 2 subnets BRKSEC-2048 87
  • 88. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The ACI Micro Segmentation Toolbox EPGs & Contracts ACI Policy Model Intra-EPG isolation Micro-segmented EPGs with attributes Intra-EPG Contracts BRKSEC-2048 88
  • 89. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGFW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 90. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco ACI Supports Flexible East-West Security Models L4 Stateless Security Firewall at Each Leaf Switch Servers (Physical or Virtual) ► L4 Distributed Stateless Firewall L4 Stateless Firewall Attached to Every Server Port Line Rate Policy Enforcement Policy Follows Workloads Advanced Protection with NGFW, IPS/IDS, DDoS Services Insertion Sizing at Scale: Can add ASA Cluster L4-7 Security Policy Applied Consistently for Any Workload L4−7 Security via Cisco ACI™ Service Graph► L4-7 Security Services (physical or virtual, location independent) Cisco ACI Services Graph L4-7 Visibility and Control BRKSEC-2048 90
  • 91. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Why Inserting Security Services ? • Stateless Segmentation not sufficient for compliance • More granular Access Control (i.e. user or group based) • Dynamic protocol requiring better inspection • Better protection and detection mechanisms BRKSEC-2048 91
  • 92. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Where to Insert Security Services in the Fabric ? NGFW Appliance and Virtual NGIPS Appliance and Virtual WE DON’T REALLY CARE !!!! BRKSEC-2048 92
  • 93. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public How to Insert Security Services • Network Stitching ACI L2 Fabric • Service graph insertion • Unmanaged • Managed with Device package • Managed Hybrid Match the requirements and operation model of the DC and Security Team BRKSEC-2048 93
  • 94. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Flexible Options for Services Insertion • APIC defines Tenants • EPG is VLAN/Subnet • Fabric GW/Routing • No Device Package: -Network Policy Mode SecOps Control Service • Orchestrate with Vendor: - Service Policy or - Service Manager Device Packages EPG Web EPG App EPG DB EPG Web EPG App EPG DB Unmanaged Service Graphs EPG Web EPG App EPG DB Managed Service Graphs ACI L2 Fabric Service Graph No Package Service Graph Managed APIC in Control BRKSEC-2048 94
  • 95. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public L2 Network Stitching EPG Web EPG App EPG DB BD Web BD App BD DB - Each Interfaces of the Firewall is set to belong to the different EPG - The Forwarding decision is 100% network centric, and doesn’t involve APIC - NO CONTRACT NEEDED - No Integration with APIC When use this method : - When policy is quite static - When more than 2 interfaces needed on the FW BRKSEC-2048 95
  • 96. Service Graph technology was designed to automate and accelerate the deployment of L4-L7 sevices in the network.
  • 97. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Why Use Service Graph ? • Security is fully inserted to the Application as the service graph is an extension of the contract in the Application Profile • Granular way to send traffic to the Security Service using the contract • Configuration Templates • Automation of the Network configuration both for Fabric and Security appliance ( with Device Package) • Statistics and health score automatically collected for the services • Dynamic update of the ACLs based on End point discovery in the EPG • Insert several services seamlessly with Service Chaining BRKSEC-2048 97
  • 98. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Zero Trust Model ACI Fabric APIC “App”“DB” CONTRACT BRKSEC-2048 98
  • 99. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Build a Policy with Service Graph ACI Fabric APIC Security Services Security Policy “App” → “DB” All TCP/UDP: - Accept - Redirect to FW and IPS All Other : - Drop “App”“DB” BRKSEC-2048 99
  • 100. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public “EPG Web” EP EP EP EP “EPG App” EP EP EP EP “EPG DB” EP EP EP EP Service Graph Contract Contract In order to add L4-7 services such as security, you can add a Service Graph to a contract to redirect traffic to a Service Producer such as an ASA or Firepower NGIPS BRKSEC-2048 100
  • 101. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Add a Service graph to a Contract BRKSEC-2048 101
  • 102. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Script Engine APIC Node BRKSEC-2048 102
  • 103. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing BRKSEC-2048 103
  • 104. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Device Model Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing − Device specification (XML file) BRKSEC-2048 104
  • 105. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Device Model Device-Specific Python Scripts Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing − Device specification (XML file) − Device scripts (Python) BRKSEC-2048 105
  • 106. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Device Model Device-Specific Python Scripts Cisco APIC Script Interface Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing − Device specification (XML file) − Device scripts (Python) • Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device using device Python scripts BRKSEC-2048 106
  • 107. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Device Model Device-Specific Python Scripts Cisco APIC Script Interface Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing − Device specification (XML file) − Device scripts (Python) • Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device using device Python scripts • Cisco APIC uses the device configuration model provided in the package to pass appropriate configurations to the device scripts • Device script handlers interface with the device using its REST or CLI interface BRKSEC-2048 107
  • 108. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Device Model Device-Specific Python Scripts Cisco APIC Script Interface Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing − Device specification (XML file) − Device scripts (Python) • Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device using device Python scripts • Cisco APIC uses the device configuration model provided in the package to pass appropriate configurations to the device scripts • Device script handlers interface with the device using its REST or CLI interface Device Interface: REST/CLI Service Device Service automation requires a vendor device package. Itis a zip file containing Device specification (XML file) Device scripts (Python) BRKSEC-2048 108
  • 109. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Automation Through Device Package Device Package Device Specification <dev type= “f5”> <service type= “slb”> <param name= “vip”> <dev ident=“210.1.1.1” <validator=“ip” <hidden=“no”> <locked=“yes”> Cisco APIC – Policy Element Device Model Device-Specific Python Scripts Cisco APIC Script Interface Script Engine APIC Node • Service automation requires a vendor device package. It is a zip file containing − Device specification (XML file) − Device scripts (Python) • Cisco® APIC interfaces with the device using device Python scripts • Cisco APIC uses the device configuration model provided in the package to pass appropriate configurations to the device scripts • Device script handlers interface with the device using its REST or CLI interface Device Interface: REST/CLI Service Device Service automation requires a vendor device package. Itis a zip file containing Device specification (XML file) Device scripts (Python) Device Manager Console BRKSEC-2048 109
  • 110. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public FTD Device Package 1.0 Hybrid Mode – NGFW configuration ownership is shared between APIC & FMC • Service Manager Model – Firepower Management Center (FMC) • APIC orchestrates the following FTD items using FMC REST-API: • FTD(v) interfaces – virtual switch port-groups or VLAN sub-interfaces • NGFW/IPS mode (Routed FW, Transparent FW BVI, or NGIPS Inline Pair) • Consumer and Provider Security Zones, and their Rule direction: bidir or unidir • Create a new or update existing Access Control Policy (ACP) Rule • APIC creates a new Deny Rule(s), requiring Security Admin to update this rule before traffic is allowed. Admin can update Rule comments to ensure the Rule remains in FMC on graph detach. • APIC updates existing Allow Rule(s), by inserting security zones to previously configured FMC Rules with an appropriate threat and access protocol configuration. BRKSEC-2048 110
  • 111. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public FTD Device Package Features Coming Soon • FMC REST-APIs in upcoming releases will allow these additions to the device package: • Dynamic or Static Routing • Port-channels • FTD Failover or Clustering • Access Control Policy Rule Ports/IPs • Upcoming Firepower NGFW features to improve ACI integration: • FTD multiple contexts (separate Access Control Policies per Tenant) BRKSEC-2048 111
  • 112. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Why Use Managed Service Graph ? • Full Tenant orchestration with L4-L7 services • ACL changes on the firewall can be offloaded to custom tools, using Northbound API • ASA-like device package allows for very fast deployment of security • APIC monitors the service health and validates configuration • Flexibility gained with Device Manager model where APIC orchestrates data plane while allowing SecOps team to manage the policy with the same tools BRKSEC-2048 112
  • 113. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Why Use Unmanaged Service Graph ? • Continuity of the SecOps management workflows and tools • No device package available from a Vendor • Quicker migration of security appliance configs and policies into ACI fabric • Allow use of the full spectrum of product features, not just the features supported by the device package BRKSEC-2048 113
  • 114. Can we get the benefits of the Device Package without the Drawbacks ?
  • 115. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Graph Hybrid Managed • Leverage the network and interface configuration automation from APIC with the Device Package • Leverage the External Security management solution for the security team to create the security policy • Use the Service graph to tie together the policy and the network insertion BRKSEC-2048 115
  • 116. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public FTD Device Package Workflow 1. Existing Rule - Security Admin uses FMC to create an ACP Rule to be used with the new service graph. The rule includes allowed protocols, NGIPS, and AMP protections. o Network Admin uses APIC to attach Security Zones to a given Rule, directing service graph traffic to an appropriate NGFW inspections. 2. New Rule – Network Admin uses APIC to create a new security Rule on FMC using the service graph. This is a Deny rule, preventing traffic flow until Security Admin gets a changes to update it. o Security Admin uses FMC to update the new ACP Rule with an appropriate allowed protocol, NGIPS, and AMP policy. To prevent deletion of this rule on service graph detach, Security Admin can preserve configured security policy by updating ACP Rule comments. BRKSEC-2048 116
  • 117. Until recently, Security service insertion was looking like that :
  • 118. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public L3out Perimeter FW Goto Mode Enclave with Single Segment EPG Web EPG App EPG DB Contract Client-Web Contract Web-App Contract App-DB Perimeter Stateful Firewall Stateless Firewall(Contract) Load Balancer Stateless Firewall(Contract) BRKSEC-2048 118
  • 119. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Engineering-Tenant VRF aka Context aka Private Network VRF(also called contexts) are defined within a tenant to allow isolated and potentially overlapping IP address space. VRF-1 VRF-2 VRF-3 VRF-4 BRKSEC-2048 119
  • 120. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Engineering-Tenant Bridge Domain: Not a VLAN but almost… VRF-1 VRF-2 VRF-3 VRF-4 Within a private network, one or more bridge domains must be defined. A bridge domain is a L2 forwarding construct within the fabric, used to constrain broadcast and multicast traffic Bridge Domain 1 Bridge Domain 2 Bridge Domain 3 Bridge Domain 4 Bridge Domain 5 Bridge Domain 7 Bridge Domain 8 Bridge Domain 6 BRKSEC-2048 120
  • 121. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public In Summary Tenant “University” PN “Engineering” PN “Business” Subnet 172.1.1.0/24 Subnet 172.1.2.0/24 … Subnet 172.20.1.0/24 EPG Web EPG App Bridge Domain 172 Subnet 10.1.1.0/24 EPG DB Bridge Domain 10 Policy “HTTP” Policy “SQL” Subnet 10.1.1.0/24 Subnet 10.1.2.0/24 … Bridge Domain 100 EPG App EPG Web EPG DB Policy “HTTP” Policy “SQL” InfrastructureApps BRKSEC-2048 121
  • 122. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Use Case 1 (Topology) 192.168.11.100/24 L3out 0.0.0.0/0 192.168.11.200/24 192.168.11.1/24 GW: 192.168.11.254 172.16.10.1 172.16.10.254 10.1.1.254 10.1.1.1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App 192.168.11.254 BD: ASA-external BD: ASA-internal Typically Web services would be nated or load- balanced. BRKSEC-2048 122
  • 123. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public L3out Perimeter FW in GoTo mode Enclave with Multiple Segment EPG Web EPG App EPG DB Contract Client-Web Contract Web-App Contract App-DB Perimeter Stateful Firewall Stateless Firewall(Contract) Load Balancer Stateless Firewall(Contract) BRKSEC-2048 123
  • 124. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Topology VIP1: 110 TCP 80 VIP2: 120 TCP 5001 VIP3: 130 TCP 6001 192.168.10.200/24 GW: 192.168.10.254 BD: App 192.168.12.1/24 GW: 192.168.12.254 L3out 0.0.0.0/0 BD: LB BD: DB 192.168.13.1/24 GW: 192.168.13.254 BD: Web 192.168.11.1/24 GW: 192.168.11.254 172.16.10.1 172.16.10.254 10.1.1.254 10.1.1.1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App 172.16.11.1 172.16.11.254 Reuse same L4-L7 Device • ADC Interface: reusable • VIP: different for each deployment BD: ASA-external BD: ASA-internal BRKSEC-2048 124
  • 125. Security Service insertion had to be thought carefully while the fabric was designed.
  • 126. Security Service insertion had to be thought carefully while the fabric was designed.
  • 127. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Policy Based Redirect is your Best Friend Before Service graph is deployed EPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: App 192.168.12.1/24 GW: 192.168.12.254 BD: DB 192.168.13.1/24 GW: 192.168.13.254 BD: DB 192.168.11.1/24 GW: 192.168.11.254 192.168.11.254 192.168.12.254 192.168.13.254 APIC relies on Routing to forward traffic from Server in EPG WEB to Server in EPB APP based on contract BRKSEC-2048 127
  • 128. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Policy Based Redirect is your Best Friend With PBR Service Graph EPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: App 192.168.12.1/24 GW: 192.168.12.254 BD: DB 192.168.13.1/24 GW: 192.168.13.254 BD: DB 192.168.11.1/24 GW: 192.168.11.254 192.168.11.254 192.168.12.254 192.168.13.254 BD: ASA-external L3 Enabled BD: ASA-external L3 Enabled 192.168.100.0/30 192.168.100.4/30 192.168.100.1 192.168.100.5 APIC relies on PBR to redirect the traffic defined in the contract to the Security Service BRKSEC-2048 128
  • 129. Fabien, PBR seems great to insert service at L3 but how does that help for segmentation ?
  • 130. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW Segmentation with NGFW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 131. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public PBR for micro-Segmentation Based only on Contract EPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: MyApp 192.168.10.0/24 L3 Enabled 192.168.10.254 192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200 Because this is a communication between two End- points in different EPG, the forwarding decision is made in the leaf switch BRKSEC-2048 131
  • 132. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public PBR for micro-Segmentation Leveraging PBR BD: ASA L3 Enabled EPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: MyApp 192.168.10.0/24 L3 Enabled 192.168.10.254 192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200 192.168.200.254 192.168.200.254 Because the traffic goes to Leaf Switch where PBR rules are enforced, traffic will be sent to the security service defined in the Service Graph. BRKSEC-2048 132
  • 133. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public PBR for micro-Segmentation Leveraging PBR BD: ASA L3 EnabledEPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: MyApp 192.168.10.0/24 L3 Enabled 192.168.10.254 192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200 192.168.200.254 192.168.200.254 The Firewall must be in ONE ARM as source and destination are in the same Subnet. It must allow traffic in and out via the same interface. BRKSEC-2048 133
  • 135. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public There is a risk for the L4-7 Service Graph to be bypassed if there is more than one contract between the 2 EPGs. Policy Based Redirect Consideration BRKSEC-2048 135
  • 136. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The most precise contract will be applied. PBR Consideration Explanation EPG Web EPG App Contract 1: Permit TCP any any  Service Graph Firewall EPG Web EPG App Contract 2: Permit TCP any any eq HTTP BRKSEC-2048 136
  • 137. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The most precise contract will be applied !!! PBR Consideration Explanation EPG Web EPG App Contract 1: Permit TCP any any  Service Graph Firewall EPG Web EPG App Contract 2: Permit TCP any any eq HTTP Because contract 2 is more precise, the HTTP traffic between EPG Web and EPG App will not be sent to the Firewall for inspection. BRKSEC-2048 137
  • 138. Proper RBAC configuration and Auditing are key to enfore roles and responsabilities
  • 139. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Policy Based Redirect Requirements • APIC must be v 2.0.1 or Higher • The Service switch must be at least ‘-EX’ or more recent • If not all the fabric is ‘-EX’, the Service switch must be dedicated to Services (i.e. no workload connected with the L4-7 services) BRKSEC-2048 139
  • 141. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGW Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 142. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public IDS Insertion in ACI • Traditional Span mechanism based on EPG source/Destination • NEW Copy Service : • Specific Service graph • As based attached to contract, leverage Subject for a more granular selection of traffic than SPAN - Require –EX leaf switch - Support only one device per copy cluster BRKSEC-2048 142
  • 143. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Integration with SPAN BRKSEC-2048 143
  • 144. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Integration with SPAN BRKSEC-2048 144
  • 145. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public SPAN: Add Source BRKSEC-2048 145
  • 146. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public SPAN: Add Source BRKSEC-2048 146
  • 147. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Copy Configuration Steps • Identify the source and destination endpoint groups. • Configure the contract that specifies what to copy according to the subject and what is allowed in the contract filter. • Configure Layer 4 to Layer 7 copy devices that identify the target devices and specify the ports where they attach. • Use the copy service as part of a Layer 4 to Layer 7 service graph template. • Configure a device selection policy that specifies which device will receive the traffic from the service graph. When you configure the device selection policy, you specify the contract, service graph, copy cluster, and cluster logical interface that is in copy device. BRKSEC-2048 147
  • 148. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Copy Service : Service Graph Template https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/1-x/L4- L7_Services_Deployment/guide/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211_chapter_01101.html #id_28562 BRKSEC-2048 148
  • 149. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGW  Threat Detection with IDS Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 150. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Features Cisco Firepower Threat Defense Full Feature-Set - NGFW Cisco Firepower Threat Defense 6.2  L2-L7 Firewall with L3 (Routed), L2 (Transparent IRB or Inline-NGIPS) Modes  Scalable CGNAT, ACL, Dynamic Routing, Fail-to-Wire I/O modules  Application Inspection, PKI for Site-to-Site VPN, Onbox Manager  Inter-chassis cluster, FlexConfig, REST-APIs, Packet Tracer/Capture  NSS Leading Next-Gen IPS - SourceFIRE  Comprehensive Threat Prevention, L7 Application Visibility and Control  Security Intelligence (C&C, Botnets, IP, DNS, etc.), Threat / Risk Reports  Blocking of Files by Type, Protocol, and Direction, Protocol Rate Limiting  Access Control: Enforcement by Application and User AD integration  Switch, Routing, NAT Options, and ISE PxGRID integration  URL Filtering, Malware Blocking, Continuous File Analysis  Malware Network Trajectory, User-based IOCs, URL lookup  AMP public & private cloud with ThreatGrid, FMC-ThreatGrid APIs  Firepower Management Center (fka. FireSIGHT or Defense Center) BRKSEC-2048 150
  • 151. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public GoThrough Perimeter NGIPS The Server gateway is out of the fabric EPG Web 192.168.12.50/24 GW: 192.168.12.254 EPG DB EPG App 192.168.12.254 BD: ASA-external L3 enabled 192.168.12.100/24 GW: 192.168.12.254 192.168.12.50/24 GW: 192.168.12.254 BD: ASA-internal No L3 VRF MyApp Service Graph will not allow each Bridge Domain on each side to have L3 enabled. This might prevent to use Dynamic Update for ACL on the FW VRF OutSide BRKSEC-2048 151
  • 152. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public NGIPS between App Tiers EPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: Web L3 Disabled 192.168.12.254 BD: ASA-external L3 Enabled BD: App L3 Disabled BD: DB L3 Disabled VRF web VRF DB VRF App VRF outside Service Graph will not allow each Bridge Domain on each side to have L3 enabled. This might prevent to use Dynamic Update for ACL on the FW BRKSEC-2048 152
  • 154. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public My Best Practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible EPG Web EPG DB EPG App BD: MyApp 192.168.10.0/24 L3 Enabled 192.168.10.100 192.168.10.200 BRKSEC-2048 154
  • 155. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public My Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 155
  • 156. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public My Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 156
  • 157. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation • Enhanced Segmentation and Threat Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive area EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 157
  • 158. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation • Enhanced Segmentation and Threat Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive area • Leverage IDS for visibility and dynamically change security policy when potential threat detected. EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 158
  • 159. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation • Enhanced Segmentation and Threat Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive area • Leverage IDS for visibility and dynamically change security policy when potential threat detected. EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 159
  • 160. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation • Enhanced Segmentation and Threat Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive area • Leverage IDS for visibility and dynamically change security policy when potential threat detected. EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 160
  • 161. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation • Enhanced Segmentation and Threat Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive area • Leverage IDS for visibility and dynamically change security policy when potential threat detected. EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 161
  • 162. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Best practices • For new deployment PBR is recommended when possible • Leverage L4-7 security services for the access control of an enclave or security zone • Leverage Contracts within an Enclave for segmentation • Enhanced Segmentation and Threat Detection with L4-7 Services in sensitive area • Leverage IDS for visibility and dynamically change security policy when potential threat detected. EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App1 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App 2 EPG Web EPG DB EPG App App3 BRKSEC-2048 162
  • 163. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 164. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Dynamic Update to EPG Object-Group web Consumer app Provider ACE 192.168.10.200192.168.20.200 Object-group 192.168.10.101 New 192.168.10.102 New object-group network __$EPG$_pod37-aprof-app network-object host 192.168.10.101 network-object host 192.168.10.102 access-list access-list-inbound extended permit tcp any object-group __$EPG$_pod37-aprof-app eq www 2: APIC create object-group for the EPG. 1: Enable “Attachment Notification” on function connector internal. 3: APIC add new endpoints to object-group (192.168.10.101, 192.168.102) APIC dynamically detects new endpoint, ASA subscribes to attach/detach event, and ASA device package automatically adds EPs to object-group ASA Device Package BRKSEC-2048 164
  • 165. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public FMC to APIC Rapid Threat Containment DB EPG ACI Fabric App EPG Infected App1 Step 1: Infected End Point launches an attack that NGFW(v), FirePOWER Services in ASA, or FirePOWER(v) appliance blocks inline Step 2: Intrusion event is generated and sent to FMC revealing information about the infected host Step 3: Attack event is configured to trigger remediation module for APIC that uses NB API to contain the infected host in ACI fabric 1 FMC App2 2 34 Step 4: APIC quickly contains/quarantines the infected App1 workload into an isolated uSeg EPG BRKSEC-2048 165
  • 166. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Management tools for every organization APIC GUI API - Automation vCenter Plugin NX-OS Style CLI Choose the right one! BRKSEC-2048 166
  • 167. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco ACI interface summary Cisco ACI network APIC (single point of management) CLI Advanced GUI Basic GUI REST REST client ACI toolkit Python SDK Ruby SDK Powershell SDK BRKSEC-2048 167
  • 168. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public I don’t know Anything about Scripting !!! BRKSEC-2048 168
  • 169. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sniffer: API Inspector • API calls made by GUI are captured • GET, POST • Navigating through panes fetches data with GET requests • Submitting configuration changes uses POST requests • Record your GUI interaction as JSON-based REST calls • Modify and replay with tools like Postman BRKSEC-2048 169
  • 170. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Capturing API Calls BRKSEC-2048 170
  • 171. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Capturing API Calls BRKSEC-2048 171
  • 172. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Capturing API Calls BRKSEC-2048 172
  • 173. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Capturing API Calls BRKSEC-2048 173
  • 174. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Capturing API Calls BRKSEC-2048 174
  • 175. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Capturing API Calls POST url: http://172.23.3.215/api/node/mo/uni/tn-Cisco.json { "fvTenant": { "attributes": { "name": "Cisco", "status": "created" }, "children": [] } } BRKSEC-2048 175
  • 176. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Save Objects in JSON format BRKSEC-2048 176
  • 177. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Save Objects in JSON format BRKSEC-2048 177
  • 178. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Save Objects in JSON format BRKSEC-2048 178
  • 179. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Edit Your Jason Code BRKSEC-2048 179
  • 180. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Arya is a tool that takes XML or JSON object documents as input and outputs them as Python code leveraging the ACI Python SDK. https://github.com/datacenter/arya Arya - ACI REST Python Adapter BRKSEC-2048 180
  • 181. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Arya Example BRKSEC-2048 181
  • 182. Demo : Automation with API scripts
  • 183. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with ASA/NGFW  Segmentation with ASA/NGFW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ?  Behavior Anomaly Detection More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 184. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public access-list 102 permit tcp 37.85.170.24 0.0.0.127 lt 3146 77.26.232.98 0.0.0.127 gt 1462 access-list 102 permit tcp 155.237.22.232 0.0.0.127 gt 1843 239.16.35.19 0.0.1.255 lt 4384 access-list 102 permit icmp 136.237.66.158 255.255.255.255 eq 946 119.186.148.222 0.255.255.255 eq 878 access-list 102 permit ip 129.100.41.114 255.255.255.255 gt 3972 47.135.28.103 0.0.0.255 eq 467 with TrustSec Traditional Security Policy TrustSec Security Policy Security Control Automation Simplified Access Management Improved Security Efficacy Network Fabric Switch Router DC FW DC SwitchWireless Flexible and Scalable Policy Enforcement Segmentation Software Defined BRKSEC-2048 184
  • 185. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Enabling Group-Based Policies across the Enterprise • Cohesive security policy • Simplified security management • End-to-End segmentation Voice Employee Supplier BYOD Campus / Branch / Non-ACI DC TrustSec Policy Domain Voice VLAN Data VLAN Web App DB ACI Fabric Data Center APIC Policy Domain APIC DC ACI Policy DomainTrustSec Policy Domain BRKSEC-2048 185
  • 186. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Enabling Group-Based Policies across the Enterprise • Cohesive security policy • Simplified security management • End-to-End segmentation Voice Employee Supplier BYOD Campus / Branch / Non-ACI DC TrustSec Policy Domain Voice VLAN Data VLAN Web App DB ACI Fabric Data Center APIC Policy Domain APIC DC ISE 2.1 ACI Policy DomainTrustSec Policy Domain BRKSEC-2048 186
  • 187. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Enabling Group-Based Policies across the Enterprise • Cohesive security policy • Simplified security management • End-to-End segmentation Voice Employee Supplier BYOD Campus / Branch / Non-ACI DC TrustSec Policy Domain Voice VLAN Data VLAN Web App DB ACI Fabric Data Center APIC Policy Domain APIC DC ACI Policy DomainTrustSec Policy Domain BRKSEC-2048 187
  • 188. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public TrustSec Security Groups Provisioned in ACI ISE Dynamically provisions TrustSec Security Groups in ACI Fabric ACI TrustSec Security Groups TrustSec Groups represented as External EPGs APIC DC Max: 200 Security Groups Up to 4000/32 mappings (gen1) Up to 10K/32 mappings (gen2) (-EX) BRKSEC-2048 188
  • 189. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public TrustSec Groups Shared with ACI BRKSEC-2048 189
  • 190. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public TrustSec Groups Shared with ACI BRKSEC-2048 190
  • 191. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Application Context to TrustSec Policies ISE dynamically learns internal EPGs and VM Bindings from ACI fabric ACI VM1 VM1000 TrustSec Domain TrustSec ACI Fabric TrustSec Policies Controlling Access to ACI Data Centers APIC DC BRKSEC-2048 191
  • 192. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing ACI Endpoint Groups to TrustSec • EPG suffix added to Security Group name •IP-SGT bindings from ACI can be propagated over SXP TrustSec devices and to pxGrid peers BRKSEC-2048 192
  • 193. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Data Plane Integration New Capabilities: • Take current SGT propagation methods (DMVPN, GETVPN, SXP, IPSEC, GRE, LISP/VXLAN (campus fabric) into ACI fabric Benefits: • Greater scale (remove IP/Group info from leaf) • Seamless integration BRKSEC-2048 193
  • 194. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) ACI Border Leaf APIC DC
  • 195. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) ACI Border Leaf 5 SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 SGT: 5 APIC DC
  • 196. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) ACI Border Leaf 5 SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 SGT: 5 APIC DC
  • 197. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) SGT/EPG Namespace Alignment ACI Border Leaf CMD iVXLAN5 SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 SGT: 5 Class ID SGT # to EPG # Translation Table APIC DC
  • 198. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) SGT/EPG Namespace Alignment ACI Border Leaf CMD iVXLAN5 SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 SGT: 5 # SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 Class ID Class ID SGT # to EPG # Translation Table APIC DC
  • 199. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) SGT/EPG Namespace Alignment ACI Border Leaf CMD iVXLAN5 SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 SGT: 5 # SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 Class ID Class ID SGT # to EPG # Translation Table APIC DC
  • 200. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Sharing Context Across the Enterprise Enterprise Backbone ACI Policy Domain ACI Spine (N9K) TrustSec Policy Domain ISE BYOD 10.1.10.220 Web 10.1.100.52 TrustSec Border Device (ASR 1K) SGT/EPG Namespace Alignment ACI Border Leaf CMD iVXLAN5 SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 SGT: 5 # SRC:10.1.10.220 DST: 10.1.100.52 Class ID Class ID SGT # to EPG # Translation Table APIC DC
  • 201. • Introduction • Use Cases :  Basic Access Control  Basic Segmentation  Micro-Segmentation  Access Control with NGFW  Segmentation with NGW  Threat Detection with IDS  Threat Protection with IPS  Where is my Automation in there ? Behavior Anomaly Detection  More Granular Access Control • Conclusion
  • 203. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Verizon Report BRKSEC-2048 203
  • 204. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 204
  • 205. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 205
  • 206. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 206
  • 207. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 207
  • 208. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 208
  • 209. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 209
  • 210. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation 4. Data Theft Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 210
  • 211. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation 4. Data Theft Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 211
  • 212. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation 4. Data Theft Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 212
  • 213. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation 4. Data Theft Kill Chain: Post Breach Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Routers Switches Firewall Threat Detection BRKSEC-2048 213
  • 214. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 1. Command and Control 2. Reconnaissance 3.Propagation 4. Data Theft Scalable Network Defense Firewall IPS Web Sec N-AV Email Sec Threat Detection Routers Switches Firewall BRKSEC-2048 214
  • 215. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco CTD Solution: Providing Scalable Visibility Drilling into a single flow yields a plethora of information BRKSEC-2048 215
  • 216. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Collect & Analyze Flows 1 2 • # Concurrent flows • Packets per second • Bits per second • New flows created • Number of SYNs sent • Time of day • Number of SYNs received • Rate of connection resets • Duration of the flow • Over 80+ other attributes Establish Baseline of Behaviors Alarm on Anomalies & Changes in Behavior threshold threshold threshold threshold Critical Servers Exchange Server Web Servers Marketing Anomaly detected in host behavior 3 Flow-based Anomaly Detection BRKSEC-2048 216
  • 217. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Behavior-Based Attack Detection High Concern Index indicates a significant number of suspicious events that deviate from established baselines Host Groups Host CI CI% Alarms Alerts Desktops 10.10.101.118 865,645,669 8,656% High Concern Index Ping, Ping_Scan, TCP_Scan BRKSEC-2048 217
  • 218. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public  Reveal Data Loss. Code can be hidden in the enterprise to export of sensitive information back to the attacker. This Data Leakage may occur rapidly or over time. NetFlow Security Use cases  Identify BotNet Command & Control Activity. BotNets are implanted in the enterprise to execute commands from their Bot herders to send SPAM, Denial of Service attacks, or other malicious acts.  Detect Sophisticated and Persistent Threats. Malware that makes it past perimeter security can remain in the enterprise waiting to strike as lurking threats. These may be zero day threats that do not yet have an antivirus signature or be hard to detect for other reasons.  Find Internally Spread Malware. Network interior malware proliferation can occur across hosts for the purpose gathering security reconnaissance data, data exfiltration or network backdoors.  Uncover Network Reconnaissance. Some attacks will probe the network looking for attack vectors to be utilized by custom-crafted cyber threats. It Can : BRKSEC-2048 218
  • 219. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco Network StealthWatch FlowCollector StealthWatch Management Console NetFlow Users/Devices Cisco ISE NBAR NSEL StealthWatch Solution Components StealthWatch FlowSensor StealthWatch FlowSensor VE NetFlow StealthWatch FlowReplicator Other tools/collectors BRKSEC-2048 219
  • 220. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco Netflow Generation Appliance (NGA) StealthWatch FlowCollector StealthWatch Management Console https Data Center Switch Cisco NGA SPAN or passive Tap NetFlow  Offloads NetFlow Generation to Dedicated High-Performance  End-to-end flow information collected across multiple network observation points using SPAN and passive TAP  Up to 6 destinations • 4x10G Monitoring Interfaces • 80M Active Flow Cache • Targets 200K Flow record export per sec NGA  Very high volume  Less boxes and more centralized deployment Flow Sensor  Less scalable  More capabilities like Deep Packet inspection and URL data Create Netflow Records BRKSEC-2048 220
  • 221. How do I send Traffic to my FlowSensor ?
  • 222. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public • Traditional Span mechanism based on EPG source/Destination • NEW Copy Service : • Specific Service graph • As based attached to contract, leverage Subject for a more granular selection of traffic than SPAN How Send Traffic to my FlowSensor ? - Require –EX leaf switch - Support only one device per copy cluster BRKSEC-2048 222
  • 223. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Integration with SPAN BRKSEC-2048 223
  • 224. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACI Integration with SPAN BRKSEC-2048 224
  • 225. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public SPAN: Add Source BRKSEC-2048 225
  • 226. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public SPAN: Add Source BRKSEC-2048 226
  • 227. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Service Copy Configuration Steps • Identify the source and destination endpoint groups. • Configure the contract that specifies what to copy according to the subject and what is allowed in the contract filter. • Configure Layer 4 to Layer 7 copy devices that identify the target devices and specify the ports where they attach. • Use the copy service as part of a Layer 4 to Layer 7 service graph template. • Configure a device selection policy that specifies which device will receive the traffic from the service graph. When you configure the device selection policy, you specify the contract, service graph, copy cluster, and cluster logical interface that is in copy device. BRKSEC-2048 227
  • 228. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Copy Service : Service Graph Template https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/datacenter/aci/apic/sw/1-x/L4- L7_Services_Deployment/guide/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211/b_L4L7_Deploy_ver211_chapter_01101.html #id_28562 BRKSEC-2048 228
  • 230. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Tetration Analytics Whitelist Policy Recommendation Recommend Policy Enforcement (Future Roadmap) Remediate* SW Sensors in Cloud 3rd Party HW Sensors SW Sensors SW Sensors Listen Sensors Record, Analyze and Store Appliance Application Insights Policy Simulation / Impact Analysis Forensics and Compliance Interact / Verify Software 3rd Party Feed Integrate *=Roadmap Nexus 9300-EX
  • 231. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Hardware Sensor and Software Sensor Accumulated Flow Information (Volume…) Software Sensor Process mapping Process ID Process owner Hardware Sensor Tunnel endpoints Buffer utilization Burst detections Packet drops Flow details Interpacket variations BRKSEC-2048 231
  • 232. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Tetration Analytics Highlights Application Behavior Based Policy Application Insights Automated Whitelist Policy Policy Impact Assessment Policy Compliance Forensics Every Packet, Any Time, Any Where BRKSEC-2048 232
  • 233. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Shipping Form Factors for Initial Release Full Rack Cluster • 39 Rack Units • 36 Servers and 3 Switches • 8 Serving Nodes • 12 Base Nodes • 16 Compute Nodes • Built on UCS C-Series • Built-in Redundancy • Full CLOS Network Processing including Algorithmic Operations Data retrieval and serving Telemetry Collection BRKSEC-2048 233
  • 234. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Internet DB Proxy What Is Really Running in my Data Center? Cisco Tetration Analytics Application Insight—Dependency Map Use Cisco Tetration Analytics Outcome and Link it to Your Services and Application CMDB Security Dependencies Application Service Offering Service Service Category (Service Owner) BRKSEC-2048 234
  • 235. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Application Discovery and Endpoint Grouping Cisco Tetration Analytics™ Platform BM VM VM BM BM VM VM BM Brownfield BM VM VM VM BM Cisco Nexus® 9000 Series Bare-metal, VM, & switch telemetry VM telemetry (AMI …) Bare-metal & VM telemetry BM VM BMVM VM BM VMVM VM BM BMVM BM Network-only sensors, host-only sensors, or both (preferred) Bare metal and VM On-premises and cloud workloads (AWS) Unsupervised machine learning Behavior analysis BRKSEC-2048 235
  • 236. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Whitelist Policy Recommendation Application Discovery App Tier DB Tier Storage Web Tier Storage Policy Enforcement (Future Roadmap) Whitelist Policy Recommendation (Available in JSON, XML, and YAML) BRKSEC-2048 236
  • 237. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Visual Query with Flow Exploration  Replay flow details like a DVR  Information mapped across 25 different dimensions • Thick lines indicate common flows • Faint lines indicate uncommon flows
  • 238. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Outliers Switch on Outlier view to highlight uncommon flows Outlier dimension is highlighted with purple circle BRKSEC-2048 238
  • 239. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Possible malicious DNS traffic Show all DNS traffic with packets larger then 82 bytes and a flow duration of greater then 6 seconds. BRKSEC-2048 239
  • 241. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Tetration Stealthwatch Datacenter: Per Packet Telemetry from Nexus 9000 & Server Security Anomaly Detection Network Wide: Switching/Routing, Proxies, Servers, & Endpoints Security Forensics Stealthwatch for Security Analysis and Policy Monitoring Application Behavior Profiling Automated Application Grouping Tetration for Application Analytics and Application Segmentation Network as a Sensor in the Data Center Together Unmatched Analytics and Forensics for Application and Security Automated Application Based Segmentation Complete Data Control for Segmentation, Security, and Forensics BRKSEC-2048 241
  • 242. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Campus Core Datacenter Branch +Cisco Stealthwatch Cisco Stealthwatch Cisco Stealthwatch Where is Visibility Needed? BRKSEC-2048 242
  • 243. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Available Now: Investigative Pivot Tetration Analytics Pivot from Stealthwatch to Tetration interface during an Investigation BRKSEC-2048 243
  • 244. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Monitoring Unified Policy in the Data Centre Tetration Analytics Leverages Stealthwatch Host Group Automation Service Export workspaces, clusters and applications discovered in Tetration to Stealthwatch Host Groups BRKSEC-2048 244
  • 245. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ACIISE 2.1 Tetration Analytics App Policy Shared Policy Groups Application Based Segmentation for the Datacenter Identity Based Segmentation Only Cisco can do scalable granular segmentation end to end Provide Automated Granular Application Based Segmentation optimized for in the Datacenter Provide Identity Based Segmentation optimized for Branch to Campus to DC End to End SW Defined Segmentation BRKSEC-2048 245
  • 246. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Monitoring Unified SGT-ACI Policy TrustSec Domain ACI Domain pci_users SGT: 16 EV_appProfile_LOB2_App1EPG SGT: 10005 ACI Domain Stealthwatch Deployment Cisco ISE APIC-DC syslog NetFlow SGT Definitions EPG Definitions Policy Plane Integration Tetration Analytics SPAN Policy Push Tetration Telemetry BRKSEC-2048 246
  • 248. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Cisco Spark Questions? Use Cisco Spark to communicate with the speaker after the session 1. Find this session in the Cisco Live Mobile App 2. Click “Join the Discussion” 3. Install Spark or go directly to the space 4. Enter messages/questions in the space How cs.co/ciscolivebot#BRKSEC-2048
  • 249. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public • Please complete your Online Session Evaluations after each session • Complete 4 Session Evaluations & the Overall Conference Evaluation (available from Thursday) to receive your Cisco Live T-shirt • All surveys can be completed via the Cisco Live Mobile App or the Communication Stations Don’t forget: Cisco Live sessions will be available for viewing on-demand after the event at www.ciscolive.com/global/on-demand-library/. Complete Your Online Session Evaluation
  • 250. © 2018 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Continue Your Education • Demos in the Cisco campus • Walk-in Self-Paced Labs • Tech Circle • Meet the Engineer 1:1 meetings • Related sessions 250BRKSEC-2048