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SESSION ID:SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Paula Januszkiewicz
Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows
Infrastructure: Mandatory Check List
TECH-W10
CEO, Security Expert, Penetration Tester & Trainer, MVP
CQURE
@paulacqure | paula@cqure.us
#RSAC
#RSAC
#RSAC
Agenda
#RSAC
Session Goal
Be familiar with the possibilities of the operating
system
From the user mode and kernel mode
We are NOT talking about the forensics!
… just doing a little hacking + conclusions
My goal: See one of the ways hacker can act
#RSAC
Agenda
#RSAC
Know your victim
#RSAC
Know the services
#RSAC
Attack Users
Users
Users rarely have software up to date
Awareness issues
... But for hacker it may be not enough
Administrators
Local account
Password reuse for workstations
Different password for workstations
Domain account
Domain user being local administrator
Domain administrator
#RSAC
The meaning of scripts
#RSAC
Make your backdoor persistent
Services
DLLs
Startup (Menu Start)
Task Scheduler
LSA Providers
Run, Run Once
GPO
Notification Package
Winlogon
Image Hijacking
Drivers
Etc.
#RSAC
Stay Persistent
#RSAC
Stay undetected
If you are not ready to
attack: stay stealth and do
not change the system
behavior
Hide your traces
Processes
Files
Infrastructure performance
Network traffic
Server / Client Platform Performance
#RSAC
Stay undetected
#RSAC
Leverage your position
#RSAC
Victim Recon
#RSAC
Use victims to attack more targets
Create the remotely
controlled network
Automate next scans
Create your own botnet
What can be the hacker’s goal
in your infrastructure?
#RSAC
Agenda
#RSAC
Apply
Offline access protection, implementation of solutions like BitLocker.
Implementation of the process execution prevention (AppLocker etc.)
Log centralization, log reviews - searching for the anomalies, certain log error
codes. Performing the regular audits of code running on the servers (fe.
Autoruns).
Maintenance: Backup implementation and regular updating.
Review of the services running on the accounts that are not built in. Change them
to gMSAs where possible, set up SPNs.
Get rid of NETBIOS. Try to avoid NTLMv2, especially if you do not have AppLocker
in place or SMB Signing.
Client protection: Implement of the anti-exploit solutions.
#RSAC
Apply What You Have Learned Today
Next week you should:
Implement Local Admin Password Management or other password management solution
Build the plan of the periodical configuration reviews and penetration tests (security checks)
In the first three months following this presentation you should:
Implement the Security Awareness Program among employees and technical training for
administrators
Review the configuration of client-side firewall and enabling the programs that can
communicate through the network
Limit of the amount of services running on the servers (SCW and manual activities)
Within six month you should:
Implement scoping (role management) for permissions and employee roles (SQL Admins,
Server Admins etc.)
Review network segmentation (+ IPSec Isolation, DNSSec etc.)
#RSAC
Apply What You Have Learned Today
Next week you should:
Implement Local Admin Password Management or other password management solution
Build the plan of the periodical configuration reviews and penetration tests (security checks)
In the first three months following this presentation you should:
Implement the Security Awareness Program among employees and technical training for
administrators
Review the configuration of client-side firewall and enabling the programs that can
communicate through the network
Limit of the amount of services running on the servers (SCW and manual activities)
Within six month you should:
Implement scoping (role management) for permissions and employee roles (SQL Admins,
Server Admins etc.)
Review network segmentation (+ IPSec Isolation, DNSSec etc.)

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RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastructure: Mandatory Check List

  • 1. SESSION ID:SESSION ID: #RSAC Paula Januszkiewicz Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastructure: Mandatory Check List TECH-W10 CEO, Security Expert, Penetration Tester & Trainer, MVP CQURE @paulacqure | paula@cqure.us
  • 5. #RSAC Session Goal Be familiar with the possibilities of the operating system From the user mode and kernel mode We are NOT talking about the forensics! … just doing a little hacking + conclusions My goal: See one of the ways hacker can act
  • 9. #RSAC Attack Users Users Users rarely have software up to date Awareness issues ... But for hacker it may be not enough Administrators Local account Password reuse for workstations Different password for workstations Domain account Domain user being local administrator Domain administrator
  • 11. #RSAC Make your backdoor persistent Services DLLs Startup (Menu Start) Task Scheduler LSA Providers Run, Run Once GPO Notification Package Winlogon Image Hijacking Drivers Etc.
  • 13. #RSAC Stay undetected If you are not ready to attack: stay stealth and do not change the system behavior Hide your traces Processes Files Infrastructure performance Network traffic Server / Client Platform Performance
  • 17. #RSAC Use victims to attack more targets Create the remotely controlled network Automate next scans Create your own botnet What can be the hacker’s goal in your infrastructure?
  • 19. #RSAC Apply Offline access protection, implementation of solutions like BitLocker. Implementation of the process execution prevention (AppLocker etc.) Log centralization, log reviews - searching for the anomalies, certain log error codes. Performing the regular audits of code running on the servers (fe. Autoruns). Maintenance: Backup implementation and regular updating. Review of the services running on the accounts that are not built in. Change them to gMSAs where possible, set up SPNs. Get rid of NETBIOS. Try to avoid NTLMv2, especially if you do not have AppLocker in place or SMB Signing. Client protection: Implement of the anti-exploit solutions.
  • 20. #RSAC Apply What You Have Learned Today Next week you should: Implement Local Admin Password Management or other password management solution Build the plan of the periodical configuration reviews and penetration tests (security checks) In the first three months following this presentation you should: Implement the Security Awareness Program among employees and technical training for administrators Review the configuration of client-side firewall and enabling the programs that can communicate through the network Limit of the amount of services running on the servers (SCW and manual activities) Within six month you should: Implement scoping (role management) for permissions and employee roles (SQL Admins, Server Admins etc.) Review network segmentation (+ IPSec Isolation, DNSSec etc.)
  • 21. #RSAC Apply What You Have Learned Today Next week you should: Implement Local Admin Password Management or other password management solution Build the plan of the periodical configuration reviews and penetration tests (security checks) In the first three months following this presentation you should: Implement the Security Awareness Program among employees and technical training for administrators Review the configuration of client-side firewall and enabling the programs that can communicate through the network Limit of the amount of services running on the servers (SCW and manual activities) Within six month you should: Implement scoping (role management) for permissions and employee roles (SQL Admins, Server Admins etc.) Review network segmentation (+ IPSec Isolation, DNSSec etc.)