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Reversing and
    Exploiting
   Green Dam
             [0xdf]
Valkyrie-X Security Research Lab


             VXRL 2009             1
Special Thank You
•  Mr. Byoungyoung Lee from PLUS and
   who is the mentor/advisor of Valkyrie-X




                    VXRL 2009                2
Background
•  Focus on research and studies on
   software/system exploitation, vulnerability
   and reverse engineering, penetration test
   and crypto problems.

•  Activity:We joined CTF and ranked at 68 in
   DefCon 17 Prequalifying Round out 230
   teams.
                     VXRL 2009                   3
4
Agenda
•  Reversing a few critical modules in Green
   Dam.
•  Exploitation Possibility




                    VXRL 2009                  5
Let us start 




    VXRL 2009    6
Reversing
•  XNet2.exe
  –  It is the major Green Dam service
  –  It is for installation and register software key
     to the system
  –  It is responsible for password check and reset
  –  Commander of XDaemon.exe and gn.exe
  –  Kick start a number of processes with the
     following executables:
     •  Xdaemon, gn HTAnalyzer, MPSVCC, HNCENG,
        HH, Looklog and LookPic
                       VXRL 2009                    7
Prepare and set up processes




                               8
Installation
•  Installation – Software Key Registration To
   Registry.




                                             9
More Interesting stuff is…




          VXRL 2009          10
11
Prepare a list of processes




                              12
Installation Password
•  After Green Dam converts the password
   using the MD5 algorithm, it saves it in text
   format within the kwpwf.dll file located in
   the C:WINDOWSsystem32 directory.
   When opened using Notepad, if the
   content is then replaced with
   "D0970714757783E6CF17????????????
   ????????" and saved, the password can
   then be restored to the original
   "1122??????". VXRL 2009                     13
Easy Password




    VXRL 2009   14
Green Dam – Data File
•  Decrypted file content
  –  Contain keywords for filtering
•  The data file naming convention and
   filtering classification are exactly the same
   as Cybersitter from Solid Oak.




                     VXRL 2009               15
Green Dam – Data File




                        16
VXRL 2009   17
Green Dam – Connected IPs
•  Connected IPs
  –  Connected to ISP in USA?
  –  Connected to NIST’s time server?




                     VXRL 2009          18
VXRL 2009   19
20
VXRL 2009   21
Green Dam – Monitored Software
•  Monitored software
  –  We could find it from injlib32.dll
  –  Injlib32.dll is injected to every critical process.
  –  Handle.dll is to create process/thread to
     monitor any messages received from injected
     DLL. (as it supports transmitstring).
           Handler.dll               Injlib32.dll



                                       Notepad.exe
                         VXRL 2009                     22
23
24
25
Green Dam – Exploitation
•  Possible vulnerabilities in Green Dam
   version 3.1.7
  –  As Green Dam is injected to the browser
     process and it cannot handle long URL
  –  Stack Buffer Overflow is found.
•  The exploit is published in Milw0rm.com. It
   should be the same



                      VXRL 2009                26
What is Stack Buffer Overflow?




             VXRL 2009           27
What is Stack Buffer Overflow?
          (from Wikipedia.org)




                VXRL 2009        28
How can we exploit?
•  We try out input 2048 ‘A’s and submit it as
   an URL.
•  We attach OllyDbg to the process of
   Internet Explorer named as iexplore.exe
   for debugging purpose in runtime.




                    VXRL 2009                29
Demo




VXRL 2009   30
Exploitation Summary
•  Successfully overwritten with our input.
•  Deploying shellcode will be our next
   mission.
•  No patch is provided 




                    VXRL 2009                 31
Our Conclusion




     VXRL 2009   32
Conclusion
•  We strongly suggest not installing this
   software.
•  It gives vulnerability, it is not just filtering
   but monitor the use of software and the
   content you typing into.




                        VXRL 2009                     33
Thank you for your listening
•  Anthony Lai (0xdf)
     •  0xdarkfloyd@gmail.com




                       VXRL 2009   34
Reference
•  Technical Analysis of Green Dam
    –  http://wikileaks.org/wiki/
       A_technical_analysis_of_the_Chinese_'Green_Dam_Youth-
       Escort'_censorship_software
•  Analysis of Green Dam Censorware System
    –  http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/gd/




                            VXRL 2009                          35
Tools
•  MD5 Decryption
    –  http://www.md5decrypter.com/
•  IDA Pro (Get a free version)
    –  http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/
    –  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1593271786/
       datarescuesanv




                            VXRL 2009                       36

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Green Dam Analysis Valkyrie-X by Alnthony Lai

  • 1. Reversing and Exploiting Green Dam [0xdf] Valkyrie-X Security Research Lab VXRL 2009 1
  • 2. Special Thank You •  Mr. Byoungyoung Lee from PLUS and who is the mentor/advisor of Valkyrie-X VXRL 2009 2
  • 3. Background •  Focus on research and studies on software/system exploitation, vulnerability and reverse engineering, penetration test and crypto problems. •  Activity:We joined CTF and ranked at 68 in DefCon 17 Prequalifying Round out 230 teams. VXRL 2009 3
  • 4. 4
  • 5. Agenda •  Reversing a few critical modules in Green Dam. •  Exploitation Possibility VXRL 2009 5
  • 6. Let us start  VXRL 2009 6
  • 7. Reversing •  XNet2.exe –  It is the major Green Dam service –  It is for installation and register software key to the system –  It is responsible for password check and reset –  Commander of XDaemon.exe and gn.exe –  Kick start a number of processes with the following executables: •  Xdaemon, gn HTAnalyzer, MPSVCC, HNCENG, HH, Looklog and LookPic VXRL 2009 7
  • 8. Prepare and set up processes 8
  • 9. Installation •  Installation – Software Key Registration To Registry. 9
  • 10. More Interesting stuff is… VXRL 2009 10
  • 11. 11
  • 12. Prepare a list of processes 12
  • 13. Installation Password •  After Green Dam converts the password using the MD5 algorithm, it saves it in text format within the kwpwf.dll file located in the C:WINDOWSsystem32 directory. When opened using Notepad, if the content is then replaced with "D0970714757783E6CF17???????????? ????????" and saved, the password can then be restored to the original "1122??????". VXRL 2009 13
  • 14. Easy Password VXRL 2009 14
  • 15. Green Dam – Data File •  Decrypted file content –  Contain keywords for filtering •  The data file naming convention and filtering classification are exactly the same as Cybersitter from Solid Oak. VXRL 2009 15
  • 16. Green Dam – Data File 16
  • 17. VXRL 2009 17
  • 18. Green Dam – Connected IPs •  Connected IPs –  Connected to ISP in USA? –  Connected to NIST’s time server? VXRL 2009 18
  • 19. VXRL 2009 19
  • 20. 20
  • 21. VXRL 2009 21
  • 22. Green Dam – Monitored Software •  Monitored software –  We could find it from injlib32.dll –  Injlib32.dll is injected to every critical process. –  Handle.dll is to create process/thread to monitor any messages received from injected DLL. (as it supports transmitstring). Handler.dll Injlib32.dll Notepad.exe VXRL 2009 22
  • 23. 23
  • 24. 24
  • 25. 25
  • 26. Green Dam – Exploitation •  Possible vulnerabilities in Green Dam version 3.1.7 –  As Green Dam is injected to the browser process and it cannot handle long URL –  Stack Buffer Overflow is found. •  The exploit is published in Milw0rm.com. It should be the same VXRL 2009 26
  • 27. What is Stack Buffer Overflow? VXRL 2009 27
  • 28. What is Stack Buffer Overflow? (from Wikipedia.org) VXRL 2009 28
  • 29. How can we exploit? •  We try out input 2048 ‘A’s and submit it as an URL. •  We attach OllyDbg to the process of Internet Explorer named as iexplore.exe for debugging purpose in runtime. VXRL 2009 29
  • 31. Exploitation Summary •  Successfully overwritten with our input. •  Deploying shellcode will be our next mission. •  No patch is provided  VXRL 2009 31
  • 32. Our Conclusion VXRL 2009 32
  • 33. Conclusion •  We strongly suggest not installing this software. •  It gives vulnerability, it is not just filtering but monitor the use of software and the content you typing into. VXRL 2009 33
  • 34. Thank you for your listening •  Anthony Lai (0xdf) •  0xdarkfloyd@gmail.com VXRL 2009 34
  • 35. Reference •  Technical Analysis of Green Dam –  http://wikileaks.org/wiki/ A_technical_analysis_of_the_Chinese_'Green_Dam_Youth- Escort'_censorship_software •  Analysis of Green Dam Censorware System –  http://www.cse.umich.edu/~jhalderm/pub/gd/ VXRL 2009 35
  • 36. Tools •  MD5 Decryption –  http://www.md5decrypter.com/ •  IDA Pro (Get a free version) –  http://www.hex-rays.com/idapro/ –  http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/1593271786/ datarescuesanv VXRL 2009 36