Seven Challenges of the Russian Protest Movement
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My presentation for a roundtable discussion at GWU in March 2013. For more details, see my paper of the same name in Russian Analytical Digest: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/DetailansichtPubDB_EN?rec_id=2462
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Seven Challenges of the Russian Protest Movement
- 1. Oleg Kozlovsky Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies George Washington University
- 2. Negotiated, limited Regime change and reform, influencing the complete recreation of authorities the state Gradual change Revolutionary change Talks and seeking Open conflict, public compromise protests, maximizing pressure Moderates Radicals
- 3. Both negotiations and open conflict require a strong movement Neither strategy can be effective in the short run Window of opportunity for negotiations closed by March 2012
- 4. Split in the ruling elites, most importantly the police force and the army, is a necessary precondition for a peaceful political change Confrontation is not only emotional, but also rational Serbian and Ukrainian experience: “victims of the regime” No coherent approach to regime defectors Defectors should be judged on a case-by-case basis
- 5. Russian protest movement is remarkably non- violent Internal crisis activates violent elements of the movement Public opinion is ambivalent about political violence (see Primorye Guerillas) May 6: succumbing to a provocation harmed the movement, opened way to government crackdown
- 6. Movement was chaotic and spontaneous from the beginning Void was filled by self-appointed Organizing Committee and other similar structures Lack of legitimate leadership undermined attempts of negotiations and impeded coordination Election of Coordinating Council in October 2012 opened new page CC still has a long way to go to prove its effectiveness
- 7. Concise message vs. broad public appeal Bringing in economic and social welfare issues may be risky Scope of demands: from bicycle lanes to “Russia without Putin” Too humble demands may be as damaging as too radical It may be easier to radicalize masses than to de- marginalize a radical movement
- 8. Apathy and pessimism are major obstacles to public participation Identifying, publicizing, and celebrating even small achievements can raise morale and people’s interest in activism Preventing ungrounded euphoria and elevated expectations just as important as fighting pessimism
- 9. Moscow has been the ground zero of protests 78% of CC members are from Moscow Moscow has 12% of voters, 22% of GDP, most federal institutions If Russia voted like Moscow in 2012, there would be 2 nd round “Sorties” to Astrakhan, Gagarin, etc. had mixed results Long-term capacity building and support is required for sustainable development of civil society in “the regions”