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Cracking Into Embedded Devices - HACK.LU 2K8

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Tecnologia
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HACK.LU Luxembourg Oct 2K8
Cracking into embedded devices and beyond! Practical overview of offensive techniques against embedded devices
Quick “about me” ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Agenda ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The drive behind this research ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
The drive behind this research (pt 2) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Scope of type of environments ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Focus on (mostly) remotely exploitable bugs ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
Why “and beyond”? ,[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: stepping stone attacks ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: stepping stone attacks (pt 2)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: stepping stone attacks (pt 3)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: exploit password reuse ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: exploit password reuse (pt 2)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: exploit features creatively ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: exploit features creatively (pt 2)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: exploit features creatively (pt 2)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Why “and beyond”?: exploit features creatively (pt 3)‏ ,[object Object]
Need to take security of ‘miscellaneous’ devices seriously ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Type of bugs we have found! ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Type of bugs we have found! (pt 2) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Type of bugs we have found! (pt 3) ,[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #1: CSRF + auth bypass ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #1: CSRF + auth bypass (pt 2)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Pwning BT Home Hub: CSRF + auth bypass ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Pwning BT Home Hub: CSRF + auth bypass (pt 2) ,[object Object],[object Object]
Pwning BT Home Hub: CSRF + auth bypass (pt 3) ,[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #2: Persistent XSS on logs page ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #2: Persistent XSS on logs page (pt 2) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Owning big brother: p ersistent XSS on logs page on Axis IP camera ,[object Object],[object Object]
What gets sent to the attacker
Personal Fav. #3: Auth bypass + WAN web interface ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #4: Preauth leak + XSS on preauth URL ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Pwning BT Home Hub: preauth leak + preauth XSS ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
PWNED!!!
Personal Fav. #5: Preauth XSS + unvalidated "NewInternalClient" bug ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #5: Preauth XSS + unvalidated "NewInternalClient" bug (pt 2) ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Personal Fav. #6: Pers. XSS on admin login page ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Pers. XSS on Aruba 800 Mobility Controller's login page ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Love for auth bypass bugs ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Auth bypass: unprotected URLs ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Auth bypass: unchecked HTTP methods ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Auth bypass: exposed CGI scripts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Call jacking the BT Home Hub ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Call jacking the BT Home Hub PWNED!!! (again!)‏
Call jacking Snom IP phones ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SNOM .mario hacked Snom PWNED!!!
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],SNMP Injection: SNMP and HTTP join forces!
[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],SNMP Injection: SNMP and HTTP join forces! (cont)‏
BT Home Hub Wi-Fi insecurity (pt 1)‏ ,[object Object]
BT Home Hub Wi-Fi insecurity (pt 2)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
BT Home Hub Wi-Fi insecurity (pt 3)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
BT Home Hub Wi-Fi insecurity (pt 4)‏ ,[object Object],[object Object]
How much do you trust your ISP? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
DSL sniffing: next step in research? ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Final thoughts ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
Thank you to the HACK.lu crew and the attendees . http://www.gnucitizen.org

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