Kremlinology - Stratfor

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Introduction
Like nearly all of the peoples of North and South America, most Americans are not originally
from the territory that became the United States. They are a diverse collection of peoples
primarily from a dozen different Western European states, mixed in with smaller groups
from a hundred more. All of the New World entities struggled to carve a modern nation and
COPYRIGHT STRATFOR ENTERPRISES LLC 2015 1
Reviving Kremlinology

Introduction
Winston Churchill once said, "Kremlin political intrigues are comparable to a
bulldog ﬁght under a rug. An outsider only hears the growling, and when he
sees the bones ﬂy out from beneath it is obvious who won." It is true that
studying the Kremlin's internal struggles is more an art than a science. Stratfor
uses systematic approaches in much of its work, though the art of Kremlinology
involves watching hundreds of seemingly unconnected events and pieces move
while attempting to draw common threads into a narrative. It is an imperfect art
but an important one nonetheless, and it is back in demand now that the
Kremlin is facing multiple crises.
This study was originally published by Stratfor in May 2015 as a four-part series.
*“Red Square, Moscow, Russia” is used here under terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
license. The image has not been altered in any way. Terms of the license are viewable here:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en.
Source: Wikimedia Commons, Bundesarchiv
Bild
Source: Wikimedia Commons* Source: kremlin.ru

Table of Contents
Introduction 1

Introduction 2

Table of Contents 3

Part 1: 4
Studying the Kremlin in Soviet Times 4
Part 2: Deciphering the Kremlin Today 8
The Kremlin Elite 9
Figure: Russia’s Circles of Inﬂuence 10
Russia's Turning Point 13
Part 3: The Kremlin’s Current Intrigues 14
Part 4: Current Intrigues  
and Emerging Clues 17
Accelerating Oddities 18
Questions Linger After Putin's Absence 20
Appendix: Timeline of Events 
December 2013-May 2015 22

Part 1:
Studying the Kremlin in Soviet Times
Soviet-era Kremlinology was akin to sifting through mounds of pine needles before stepping
back to see the whole forest. Kremlinologists studied every meeting to see who participated,
looked at published photos to see who stood next to whom, and took note of who attended
social events, such as the Bolshoi Ballet, to see which box each member of the elite sat in.
Certain factions used various media outlets to publish formal agendas, gossip, slander and
disinformation. The Communist Party used Pravda; the Soviet military used Red Star.
Through these varying levels of hints and information, a Kremlinologist could make sense of
the ever changing web of alliances, rivals and influencers. These relationships and the
struggles between them reflected the power and stability of the leader of the Soviet Union,
the power and distribution of assets of Russia's most influential institutions, and the overall
strength of the state. The difficulty for outside observers lay in the fact that changes in these
relationships and balances of power mostly took place in secret.
After Josef Stalin's death, a power struggle took shape among members of the Kremlin elite.
The fight lasted five years, until Nikita Khrushchev managed to purge his opponents. During
the struggle, alliances and clans among the elite constantly shifted between personalities,
XIV Communist Party Congress, April 1925. From left to
right: Mikhail Lashevich, Mikhail Frunze, Vlas Chubar,
Alexei Rykov, Klim Voroshilov, Josef Stalin, Nikolai
Skrypnik, Alexei Bubnov and Sergo Ordzhonokidze.
(Public domain)
Manipulated image of XIV Party Congress, showing
Mikhail Frunze, Klim Voroshilov, Josef Stalin and Sergo
Ordzhonokidze. (Public domain)

control of assets and levels of power. For example, in the months after Stalin's death,
Khrushchev aligned with the head of the secret police, Lavrenti Beria, to oust Communist
Party leader Georgy Malenkov. Three months later, Khrushchev teamed up with Malenkov to
remove Beria.
At the time, it was inconceivable to outside observers that anyone other than the deceased
Stalin could take down Beria. He was, after all, in charge of the most powerful organization
in the Soviet Union: the NKVD, which later evolved into the KGB and today's FSB. Malenkov
and Khrushchev, who believed Beria would take them down eventually, were careful in their
plan, understanding that Beria had eyes and ears in every dark corner. The men knew the
only way to take Beria out of the picture was with the support of the Soviet military. They
spread rumors that he was a U.S. agent and organized a swift confrontation by calling him to
a presidium meeting, where they laid all his transgressions before him while the military
waited in the wings to arrest him.
An important aspect of this power shift was that Malenkov and Khrushchev were able to take
down the mighty Beria in extreme secrecy. His disappearance went unnoticed for two days,
and authorities kept his arrest secret for two weeks before executing him nearly five months
later. The first evidence of Beria's fall was his absence from a performance at the Bolshoi
Ballet, followed by rumors of arrests of top NKVD officers.
Secrecy also played a key role in Leonid Brezhnev's plan to oust Khrushchev from office.
Knowing he would need a group of power players within the Communist Party on his
side, Brezhnev set his plan in motion some six months before Khrushchev stepped down.
During these months, evidence that Khrushchev was on his way out mounted: Anti-
Georgy Malenkov (Public domain) Nikita Khrushchev (Public domain) Lavrenti Beria (holding Josef Stalin’s
daughter Svetlana (Public domain)

Khrushchev rhetoric increased in Pravda, the Communist
Party's media outlet, and Khrushchev took more vacations
away from Moscow, giving Brezhnev room to work more
openly against him.
After Brezhnev took office, hints of a significant struggle
between the new Soviet leader and Yuri Andropov emerged in
media and in anti-corruption campaigns. Brezhnev's control
over the KGB began to erode when Andropov took over the
organization, even though Andropov did not have a
background in intelligence. Andropov began a media
campaign to boost the popularity of the KGB by planting pro-
KGB stories in Pravda and other outlets on the 50th
anniversary of Soviet intelligence apparatuses and on the
100th anniversary of Soviet secret police founder Felix
Dzerzhinsky's birthday.
Andropov also began increasing the KGB's importance by lobbying Politburo members for
expanded powers to
combat infiltration by
Western intelligence.
At the same time, the
KGB spread rumors
throughout the Soviet
media that corruption
within the
government was
rampant under
Brezhnev's watch.
When the Politburo
granted the KGB jurisdiction over economic crimes, the organization launched a campaign
against Brezhnev's loyalists and family members and purged them from the KGB ranks.
These moves solidified both Andropov's power base and the KGB's weight, eventually
enabling Andropov to succeed Brezhnev.
Kremlin politics do not occur in a vacuum, though, and events throughout Russia and the
world can shape how and when such intrigues take place. For example, Beria's ouster was
postponed by a rebellion in East Germany that required a Soviet military response.
Leonid Brezhnev, April 1967
(Public domain, Bundesarchiv
Bild)
Yuri Andropov’s KGB identity card, showing expiration date of Dec. 31, 1980 (Public
domain)

In each political transition, countless seemingly unconnected pieces could be detected, but as
Churchill said, the victor was a mystery until he emerged from under the rug. The same is
true today in the Kremlin, where a struggle for power over policy, assets and funds is taking
place.
Such struggles are hardly new, but this one comes as Russia is facing a series of crises, such as
the standoff with the West over Ukraine, plummeting government revenues because of low
oil prices, and growing discontent among the Russian people. It is this confluence of factors
that makes it more difficult for Russian President Vladimir Putin to arbitrate between
members of the elite and protect his own position. But to know how significant the current
power struggle is, we must return to the old tactics of Kremlinology.

Part 2: Deciphering the Kremlin Today
Understanding current Kremlin intrigues calls for tactics similar to those used during the
Soviet period. Because Russia is more open than the Soviet Union, more pieces are visible,
which can either confuse or help Russia experts. Today's Kremlinologists still study official
meetings and personnel shifts in government posts, particularly changes in who oversees the
most influential government institutions and businesses. With the fall of the Soviet Union,
ownership or influence over both state and independent assets became crucial. Assets and
companies give the elite not only tools to shape policy but also sources of profit.
Many Kremlin factions still use particular media outlets for their preferred leaks, agendas
and gossip. For example, the Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly uses Itar-Tass, Izvestia
and Sputnik (formerly RIA Novosti) to leak information and push its agenda. It also uses
Russia Today to spread propaganda. The elite tied to Russian natural gas firm Gazprom
subtly spread information via Echo of Moscow, one of the last independent media firms in
the country. Russia's more liberal opposition groups go to Novaya Gazeta or Moskovsky
Komsomolets, and anti-FSB members of the elite reportedly push their leaks through
Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
An additional tool for watching
members of the Kremlin elite is
social media, particularly
VKontakte, Instagram, Twitter,
YouTube and Facebook. Most of
Russia's top leaders do not use
social media, though there are
some important exceptions, such
as Chechen President Ramzan
Kadyrov and Russian presidential
adviser Vladislav Surkov.
Watching the family members of
the Kremlin elite on social media is
another way to gather hints.
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov’s official Twitter profile page (Screen
capture)

The Kremlin Elite
In studying the Kremlin under Russian President Vladimir Putin, Stratfor has seen many
iterations of who and what are considered the most powerful elite and institutions because
Russia's political cycle is directly tied to the country's overall cycle of power and stability.
Putin came to power on the heels of Boris Yeltsin's disastrous presidency, which left the
country economically weak, regionally fractured, socially disillusioned and politically
disorganized — while also facing a major security problem in Russia's North Caucasus.
Putin's ascent did not eliminate the elite who were in place before he became president. He
had to contend with countless factions vying for power: Yeltsin loyalists, oligarchs,
Communists, liberal parties, the FSB, St. Petersburg politicians who bled into the FSB,
Chechen clans and more. While Putin was still Russia's FSB chief and prime minister, he
began collecting loyalists who later helped him consolidate power during the first few years
of his presidency. As he designed his power base, Putin stabilized Russia economically and
regionally and clamped down on the North Caucasus. He centralized political parties,
various institutions, assets and businesses under his new government.
During the stabilization process, Russia caught two lucky breaks. First, the West and
particularly the United States became preoccupied with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Second, oil prices skyrocketed, giving the Kremlin a massive financial windfall. Both of these
strengthened the Kremlin's ability not only
to consolidate power within Russia but
also to begin its resurgence in the former
Soviet space and beyond.
By the mid-to-late 2000s, the most
powerful influencers and institutions in
Russia began to settle into place. These are
not the richest or most vocal Russians, nor
are they necessarily connected to Putin,
but they are the parties that can change
Russian policy and strategy and make
decisions for the country both internally
and abroad. Though hundreds of players
and institutions in Russia could be
considered influential, approximately 18
personalities and 19 institutions currently
stand out.
See full graphic, pages 10-12
Russia’s Circles of Influence

Figure: Russia’s Circles of Inﬂuence
Igor
Sechin Sergei
Naryshkin
Sergei
Sobyanin
Sergei
Ivanov
Nikolai
Patrushev
Russian
Orthodox

Church
Investigative 
Committee
FSB
Sergei
Shoigu Russian

Armed

Forces
Sergei
Chemezov
RosoboronexportRostec
FSO GRU
MVDRamzan
 
Kadyrov
Vladislav 
Surkov

Camp
1

 
FSB
-‐
Agency
for
internal
intelligence
and
counterintelligence
activities, 

counterterrorism
and
border
security 
Russian
Orthodox
Church
-‐
The
largest
religious
organization
in
Russia 

-‐
68%
of
Russians
identify
themselves
as
Russian
Orthodox

Igor
Sechin
-‐
Former
deputy
prime
minister
and
Chairman
of
Rosneft,
FSB 

-‐
Senior
FSB
member 

-‐
Highly
influential
in
the
energy
sector,
particularly
oil 

-‐
Foreign
ties
to
Africa,
Asia
and
Latin
America

-‐
Influence
in
the
arms
export
sector

Sergei
Naryshkin
-‐
Chairman
of
the
State
Duma 

-‐
Rumored
FSB
member 

-‐
Chairman
of
Channel
One’s
Board
of
Directors

-‐
Manages
foreign
relations
portfolios
for
CIS
and
East
Asia

Nikolai
Patrushev
-‐
Secretary
of
the
Security
Council,
FSB

-‐
Former
FSB
chief,
senior
(if
not
top)
FSB
member

-‐
Influence
over
current
FSB
chief
Alexander
Bortnikov 
Sergei
Ivanov
-‐
Chief
of
Presidential
Administration,
FSB 

-‐
Senior
FSB
member 

-‐
Influence
within
the
military
industrial
complex
via
Rostec

Sergei
Sobyanin
-‐
Mayor
of
Moscow

-‐
Highly
popular
with
the
Russian
people

-‐
Influence
within
United
Russia
party

-‐
Closely
aligned
with
Orthodox
Church
and
FSB
Camp
2

 
FSO
-‐
Presidential
protection
and
communication 
GRU
-‐
Military
intelligence
for
the
Russian
army

MVD
-‐

Law
enforcement
overseeing
Interior
Ministry
troops
and
federal
police

Ramzan
Kadyrov
-‐
President
of
Chechnya

-‐
Commands
40,000
Chechen
battalion
soldiers

-‐Extremely
loyal
to
Russian
President
Vladimir
Putin

-‐
Aligned
with
former
Deputy
Chief
of
Staff
Vladislav
Surkov

Vladislav
Surkov
-‐
Former
Deputy

Chief
of
Staff

-‐
Rumored
senior
member
of
the
GRU

-‐
Influence
within
the
Kremlin’s
hybrid
strategy
in
the
periphery

-‐
Influence
within
Chechnya
and
over
Chechen
President
Kadyrov

-‐
Influence
through
political
parties,
propaganda
and
ethnic
and
social
portfolios
Index of Influencers

The power of these influential people and institutions rises and falls, as it did during the
Soviet period. Putin is also constantly adjusting the influence they hold to create a balance of
power beneath him and to address different situations inside Russia and abroad.
Thus far, Putin has acted as the grand arbitrator among these power players, and he has had
the final say in struggles between them. His personal position has rarely been called into
question during the first 15 years of his leadership, and no single actor has had the clout to
potentially challenge Putin or his presidency.
It was fairly easy for Putin to manage the competition among the elite while he was very
popular and while Russia was experiencing growing wealth, sufficient assets for each
member of the elite, a return to the international stage and stability in the North Caucasus.
However, this period of harmony has ended for both Putin and Russia.
Camp
3

 
Rostec
-‐
Russian
state’s
corporation
for
civil
and
defense
sectors,
overseeing
the
eight
largest

defense
production
complexes 
Rosoboronexport
-‐
The
state
intermediary
agency
for
Russian
arms
and
defense-‐related
exports

and
imports

Sergei
Chemezov
-‐
CEO
of
Rostec

-‐
Influence
within
the
military
industrial
complex

-‐
Influence
over
security
mouthpieces
such
as
Dmitri
Rogozin

-‐
Influence
in
foreign
military
relations
via
Rosoboronexport
Camp
4

 
Sergei
Shoigu
-‐
Defense
Minister

-‐
Highly
popular
with
the
Russian
people

-‐
Influence
within
the
Russian
military

Russian
Armed
Forces
-‐
Russia’s
military
service

Camp
5

Investigative
Committee
-‐
The
primary
federal
investigative
authority,
subordinate
to
the
office

of
the
president

Russia's Turning Point
The crisis in Ukraine has proved that neither Russia nor Putin are the unstoppable forces they
appeared to be after the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Since then, Western powers have teamed
up against Russia by cutting their large investments into the country and levying a series of
sanctions that are picking away at the Russian state and its banks and major firms. The West
has turned Putin into the new international pariah, and the Kremlin is being forced to bail
out many of Russia's large businesses and banks. Oil prices have dropped, biting into the
Kremlin's revenues, and the Russian economy has plummeted into its second recession in six
years. The Russian people are more concerned with the state of the economy than any other
issue, including Ukraine. Moreover, Russia is losing Iran, one of its tools against the United
States, as Tehran and Washington engage in negotiations.
All of these crises naturally affect the Kremlin in several ways. Members of the elite are
blaming each other for failures in Ukraine. Moreover, there is less money to go around, and
Western sanctions targeted many members of the elite or the institutions they control. This
has led to increased infighting among the most influential players in Russia. Although there
are always disagreements and power struggles among the elite, the circumstances have made
the competition more difficult to contain. Putin's ability to remain arbitrator among these
dueling factions — and Russia's unchallenged leader — is becoming increasingly uncertain.
Source: Public domain Source: Stratfor Enterprises LLC Source: Public domain

Part 3: The Kremlin’s Current Intrigues
To understand how unstable the Kremlin and Russia are and whether President Vladimir
Putin could face a challenge to his hold on power, we must return to the difficult study of
Kremlinology. As in the Soviet period, the Kremlin's instability and challenges are not public
or overt. Piecing together events, rumors and media stories, however, can give indications
about significant changes on the horizon.
Stratfor is beginning to see these pieces fall into place. This is not to
say that the Russian government is on the verge of collapse, or that
Putin will soon fall from the presidency. However, it does indicate
that a dangerous struggle is underway that could bring about a
significant change in the country's power structure.
Of all the battles currently going on inside the Kremlin, one has
risen high enough to cause noticeable instability. Stratfor has
meticulously gathered a timeline of events, rumors, lies, meetings
and other clues pertaining to the actors and institutions involved in
this struggle. Because Kremlinology is not a perfect science, many
items do not fit into the narrative and many items critical to the
narrative are not known. Some items may just be coincidence, while
others could be fabrications or disinformation.
The struggle revolves primarily around influential individuals
connected to the Federal Security Service (FSB), Russia's most
powerful institution. Putin is cut from the FSB cloth, though he has
never been its center of power. Putin led the FSB in 1999, but there
have long been rumors that he relied on members of the FSB elite to
garner loyalty within the organization. Those FSB elite now hold
some of the top positions in the Kremlin: Chief of the Presidential
Administration Sergei Ivanov, Rosneft chief Igor Sechin and
Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev. In addition, the
head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, and State
Duma Chairman Sergei Naryshkin are rumored to have been
members of the FSB (or its predecessor, the KGB), and the current
mayor of Moscow is reportedly loyal to this clan and, more broadly,
the FSB.
Sergei Ivanov  
(Source: Veni Markovski*)
Igor Sechin  
(Source: Dyor, STRF.ru*)
Nikolai Patrushev 
(Source: kremlin.ru*)

Individually, none of these men can challenge Putin, but when united, they could act with
impunity. Putin knows this. On occasion he has allowed the FSB to push ahead with its
agenda, while at other times he has balanced the interests of the FSB group with those of
other clans. Putin has also ensured that many non-FSB clans and individuals such as Chechen
President Ramzan Kadyrov and presidential adviser Vladislav Surkov remain extremely
loyal to him. The FSB clan has long been at odds with Kadyrov and Surkov, and though Putin
initially acted as an impartial arbitrator in the clashes between them, he now may be forced
to choose a side.
Like most of Russia’s current troubles, the most
recent dispute likely began with the crisis in
Ukraine. Many of the indicators of a serious power
struggle within the Kremlin have emerged over the
past 17 months, since the Ukraine conflict began.
Together, they create a relatively clear narrative —
by Kremlinology standards — of a potentially
significant change in Russia’s power structure
ahead.
During the protests that led to the fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's pro-Russia
government and its replacement with a pro-West government, hints of a heavy FSB presence
emerged. Ukrainian activists claimed that the FSB aided the Ukrainian government's Berkut
security forces, which were cracking down on the opposition. Furthermore, when the West-
friendly government came to power, it accused the FSB of ordering Yanukovich to crack
down on the Maidan protesters. Overall, people ultimately regarded the FSB as having
miscalculated and failed in Kiev.
In the months following the Maidan protests, the Ukrainian government's accusations of FSB
meddling lessened, while its accusations against Russia's Main Intelligence Administration
(GRU) became more numerous. This shift was important because Ukraine had long been
considered the FSB's territory for intelligence. Media agencies independent of the FSB began
to pick up on the GRU's gains in Ukraine, reporting that Putin was bolstering the GRU and
containing the FSB. Indeed, Putin had awarded Surkov, a rumored GRU member, the
Kremlin portfolio overseeing the Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine by the start of
May 2014.
The same month, the FSB clan initiated a power grab at home by taking the Main Directorate
of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption, a key part of the Interior Ministry. The FSB has
long sought to influence the Interior Ministry because it does not have a military or police
force of its own, and the Interior Ministry commands more than 200,000 troops and police.
Stratfor’s Russia experts have
compiled a timeline of events
relevant to the ongoing power
struggle within the Kremlin. It
is presented as an appendix
at the end of this report.

In June 2014, Kadyrov announced that he would set up his own intelligence and policing
forces in Chechnya, similar to the FSB and Interior Ministry forces. Kadyrov hired a former
FSB major, Daniil Martynov, to help design the forces — a move Martynov's former cohorts
say the FSB did not sanction. Kadyrov had sidelined the FSB in Chechnya for nearly a
decade, and with his own Chechen version of the FSB (in addition to approximately 40,000
Chechen soldiers he already commands), Kadyrov would become far more powerful in both
Chechnya and Russia proper.
The jockeying for power between the FSB and Russia's other inﬂuential players is just one
signal among many that the competition within the Kremlin is becoming more volatile.
*Photos provided under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported license. These images have not been altered in any way. Terms of the license
can be viewed here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en.

Part 4: Current Intrigues  
and Emerging Clues
Kremlinology is more art than science. It requires a constant awareness of potentially pivotal
events, such as Russian President Vladimir Putin's temporary disappearance during the
spring of 2015, which fueled a great deal of speculation. Rumors that Putin is ill have
abounded for years, but his absence from the public eye at the culmination of struggles
between Federal Security Service (FSB) and non-FSB players in the Kremlin adds to the
intrigue surrounding his disappearance. Putin remains at the heart of the Kremlin, and his
brief absence could
signal his weakening
ability to arbitrate
clan feuds.
A series of odd
circumstances
surrounding Putin
began Aug. 7, 2014,
when Svoboda
Radio, a series of
Duma members and
state television
operator VGTRK
reported that Putin
planned to give an
"emergency speech"
about Ukraine that
night. Russian media
speculated that the
speech could signal a change in Russia's tactics in Ukraine and possibly a military
intervention. However, Putin's emergency speech never happened. That night, presidential
spokesman Dmitry Peskov said no speech was planned. Speculation rose that either
something was wrong with Putin or there was a division within the Kremlin on Ukraine.
 
The following week, Putin gave a speech in Crimea that was set to air live across all Russian
time zones on multiple state television stations. However, the speech was never broadcast.
Four hours after Putin gave his speech, small pieces of footage appeared on state-controlled
television with no audio. Instead, a news anchor read a transcript published by Interfax and

Itar-Tass, both FSB-controlled media outlets. Rumors re-emerged that Putin was ill or that
something occurred that the FSB had not approved.
In early September, Putin casually mentioned in an interview that the FSB would undergo a
"restructuring." The president did not indicate what the restructuring would entail, and other
than rumors of layoffs in the middle tiers of the intelligence organization, the restructuring's
intent is unclear. The next month, Putin behaved oddly once more by celebrating his 62nd
birthday in the Siberian forests instead of in Moscow or working as he had in previous years.
With the declining economy, the critical situation in Ukraine and intensifying internal
struggles in the Kremlin, Putin's trip to Siberia could have been an indicator of the pressure
he was under or evidence of illness, as the media have frequently speculated.
By October, the competition within the Kremlin began to escalate. Rumors from media outlets
independent of FSB influence suggested that Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev would
soon resign and be replaced by First Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Zolotov. Zolotov once
served as Putin's bodyguard and is known to be extremely loyal to the president. The rumors
could indicate that Putin was concerned about the FSB's influence in the Interior Ministry
and needed to ensure that the ministry's powerful security forces were directly under his
command. Though the rumors have not yet proved to be true, they have been mentioned
frequently since they emerged.
In December 2014, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov gathered some 20,000 of his troops,
fully armed and wearing backpacks, in a sports stadium in Chechnya. Kadyrov told the
troops that they could resign and volunteer to go fight in Ukraine but that he was awaiting
Putin's order. He ended the speech by rallying the soldiers, chanting, "Long live our national
leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin!" That same month, Stratfor received a report that influential
FSB figure Nikolai Patrushev would soon be dismissed as the head of the Security Council —
a rumor that also has yet to come to fruition.
In early February, Putin began consolidating lesser intelligence groups under the Interior
Ministry, the FSB's rival. By the end of the month, events began to unfold rapidly and became
even more confusing.
Accelerating Oddities
On Feb. 27, leading Russian opposition figure Boris Nemtsov was assassinated on a bridge
near the Kremlin. On March 4, Kadyrov posted a picture on Instagram showing himself with
Putin, laughing and embracing, and posted a message that he would lay down his life for

Putin. That same day, Vladislav Surkov, Kadyrov's ally and an anti-FSB power player, left
Russia with his family. It is possible that Putin went "missing" the following day, although the
public did not know of the president's absence until March 10.
On March 8, FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov announced the arrest of two suspects in the
Nemtsov assassination and the detention of three other suspects, with a sixth having
committed suicide while being apprehended. All of the suspects were Chechens, and one of
them (Zaur Dadaev) had personal ties to Kadyrov. Kadyrov took to Instagram to call Dadaev
a "true patriot." During the next week, rumors erupted that the FSB was targeting
Kadyrov, with some theories speculating that Kadyrov ordered Nemtsov's death to show the
FSB that he could get away with such a public assassination. Meanwhile, the Kremlin
announced that Putin had awarded Kadyrov the Order of Honor, a clear sign of support for
the Chechen president.
On March 11, the Kremlin canceled Putin's March 12-13 trip to Kazakhstan to meet with the
Kazakh and Belarusian presidents, as well as a meeting with a South Ossetian delegation that
was already in Moscow. Peskov said the meetings were simply "postponed." The Kremlin
also posted a picture of Putin holding a working meeting with the head of the Republic of
Karelia — a meeting that was conﬁrmed to have taken place six days earlier, meaning that
Putin was out of the public eye and his whereabouts were unknown.
The day before the story broke that Putin was "missing," the FSB's top brass began to make a
show of important meetings. Patrushev met with Kadyrov after a Security Council meeting.
The following day, Chief of the Presidential Administration Sergei Ivanov and Moscow
Mayor Sergei Sobyanin convened with Russian Orthodox Church ofﬁcials. The FSB also held
one of its large annual meetings, which Putin missed.
Source: kremlin.ru, Global Panorama** Source: Johnny Silvercloud via Flickr** Source: Instagram screen capture

The president was not seen for 10 days, raising rampant speculation in the media about his
whereabouts, whether there was a coup, and if he was ill or dead. Rumors spread of various
members of the elite being killed or fired and of the Russian military deploying on the streets
of Moscow, none of which transpired as far as we know. Peskov was hammered with
questions about Putin's location, to which he gave a string of contradictory explanations
before ordering the media to stop asking. When Putin finally emerged 10 days later in a
meeting with his Kyrgyz counterpart, he remarked, "Life would be boring without rumors”
— a fitting response to the Kremlinologists trying to untangle this string of events.
Questions
Linger After
Putin's Absence
Though the struggles
between the FSB and
non-FSB members of
the elite are fairly
clear, two key
questions emerged
after Putin's
disappearance. First,
has the FSB
interpreted Putin's
affinity for loyalists
such as Kadyrov and
Surkov as a stance
against the FSB? If
so, then this is a
power struggle
between the FSB and
Putin. Second, has the struggle already been settled behind the scenes in the FSB's favor, and
the security agency is now acting as the puppeteer behind the Putin presidency?
Once again, we must sift through a series of clues to form a complete answer. Since Putin's
vanishing act, the FSB has made a series of power grabs in key areas. FSB counterintelligence
chief Oleg Syromolotov was appointed deputy foreign minister and charged with managing
counterterrorism operations. State Duma deputy and FSB Col. Igor Barinov was appointed
head of the newly created Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs. The two appointments put
FSB personnel in positions that oversee many issues regarding Chechnya and Kadyrov.
Source: Stratfor Enterprises LLC

In addition, Russian commentators in social media and on Russian television channel NTV
frequently mention the feud between Patrushev and Surkov over the Ukraine portfolio. It is
possible that this battle could lead to an attack on Surkov. For example, Russian ultra-
nationalist Ilya Goryachev will be going on trial any day now for allegedly masterminding 10
high-profile murders carried out in recent years by the Militant Organization of Russian
Nationalists. Goryachev has said Surkov was actually the mastermind behind the
assassinations, and media outlets have said the FSB is orchestrating the trial to give
Goryachev the opportunity to accuse Surkov.
The biggest indicator that the FSB has gained the upper hand in the ongoing struggle
involves reports from Ukraine that pro-Russian Chechen forces fighting there are leaving. If
Surkov and Patrushev were struggling over control of the separatists in Ukraine, the exodus
of the forces that report to Kadyrov, Surkov's right hand, could signal that the FSB has greater
influence over the Ukraine portfolio.
Together, the indications that the FSB has gained strength could explain why both Kadyrov
and Surkov have once again begun acting strangely. When Interior Ministry forces killed a
suspected criminal in Grozny on April 19, Kadyrov took to the media to order Chechen
interior forces to "shoot to kill" any non-Chechen forces in the republic. Later that day, he
again took to the media to clarify that he was not at war with the FSB. A week later, on April
30, Kadyrov said that he was prepared to resign from the Chechen presidency and that he
had asked Putin to allow him to do so. All of these events could signal an FSB-induced
crackdown on Kadyrov behind the scenes. In addition, Surkov took to Instagram during
Victory Day celebrations to congratulate the FSB on the holiday, an odd singling out of the
security services.
Each day a few more clues emerge, but the direction and magnitude of the Kremlin struggle
are difficult to see clearly. Like many previous competitions for power, it could take days or
years for the most recent contest to settle or spur a change within the Russian government.
As Winston Churchill said, the nature of the Kremlin's intrigues is not clear until a victor
emerges from the obscured fight.
**Photos provided under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic license. These images have not been altered in any way. Terms of
the license can be viewed here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/.

Appendix: Timeline of Events 
December 2013-May 2015
Note: This is a timeline of events possibly related to the power struggle among the elite
in the Kremlin. It is not a perfect or complete list, and some of these events may not be
connected to the inﬁghting. Keep in mind that rumors, news reports and their sources
can be false or deliberately misleading. This timeline is meant as a general guide to the
atmosphere in the Kremlin. 
This timeline was last updated May 12, 2015.
December
2013-‐March
2014

Protests in Ukraine lead to the fall of Viktor Yanukovich's Russia-friendly government and to
the installation of a pro-Western government. In response, Russia annexes Crimea from
Ukraine on March 16, 2014. 
Ukrainian activists claim Russia's Federal Security Services (FSB) helped Ukraine’s Berkut
security forces crack down on the Maidan protests.
When the West-friendly government comes to power, it accuses the FSB of having ordered
Yanukovich to crack down on the Maidan protesters.
February
2014

Maj. Gen. Borys Kolesnikov and Lt. Gen. Denis Sugrobov, chief and deputy chief of the Main
Directorate of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption, are arrested on corruption charges.
Investigative Committee chief Alexander Bastrykin begins lobbying for the Main Directorate
of Economic Security and Anti-Corruption to become independent of the Interior Ministry.
Ukrainian Security Service chief Valentyn Nalyvaichenko accuses Russian presidential aide
Vladislav Surkov of being in Kiev during the Maidan uprising.
Spring
2014

Russian President Vladimir Putin reshufﬂes 18 governors, mostly in May. 

Surkov takes the portfolio for the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, according to Igor Girkin
(also known as Igor Strelkov).
 
May
2014

The Ukrainian government begins accusing the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) — not
the FSB — of supporting separatists in Ukraine’s eastern regions and in Crimea. 
Russian media (Interpreter, RT and Novaya Gazeta) report that Putin has given the GRU
more authority in Ukraine, limiting the FSB’s role.
 
FSB Maj. Gen. Dmitri Mironov is named head of the Main Directorate of Economic Security
and Anti-Corruption.
 
Russian media (RBC, Moscow Times) report that Federal Protective Service chief Evgeny
Murov will soon retire.
 
June
2014
Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov announces that he will set up his own intelligence and
policing forces, modeled after the FSB and Interior Ministry. Kadyrov says he has hired
former FSB Maj. Daniil Martynov to help design the group. Media report that the FSB did not
sanction Martynov’s participation. 
July
2014

July 31: Russian Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev signs into law the new rules expanding
how the government regulates the Internet and personal data, despite Deputy Prime Minister
Arkady Dvorkovich's refusal to sign the directives per protocol. According to a leak from the
Communications Ministry to the New Times, Medvedev waited until Dvorkovich was on
vacation to sign the laws per FSB instructions. 
August
2014

Aug. 6: Putin quietly dismisses several Interior Ministry ofﬁcials, ranging from the head of
the intelligence services to regional deputy commanders of the Interior Ministry troops. 
Aug. 7: Svoboda Radio, a series of Duma members and state television all report that Putin is
planning an “emergency speech” about Ukraine. Russian media speculate that the speech
could mean a change in tactics for Ukraine and possibly a military intervention. Later the
same night, presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov says no speech had been planned.

Aug. 14: Putin gives a speech in Crimea that is set to air live across all Russian time zones on
multiple state television stations. However, the speech never airs. Four hours after the
speech, small pieces of footage appear on state-controlled television, though instead of audio,
a news anchor reads a transcript published by Interfax and Itar-Tass.
Aug. 28: A leak from the presidential administration in media outlet Moskovsky
Komsomolets says Putin is organizing local militias to counter protests or Maidans in Russia.
According to the leak, one set of militias was being organized under Orthodox Christian
organizations and the others under Cossack groups.
September
2014

Sept. 3: Putin mentions in an interview at a pro-Kremlin youth forum that the FSB is
undergoing a restructuring, but gives no details. 
Sept. 8: Putin moves control of the Russian Military Industrial Commission from Medvedev's
supervision to his direct control.
October 2014
The New York Post quotes unidentified sources as saying Putin is suffering from pancreatic
cancer. Peskov replies to the report, saying, "May their tongues wither.”
Oct. 8: Putin celebrates his 62nd birthday in the Siberian forests instead of in Moscow or
working, as he has done in previous years.
Oct. 29: Rumors emerge that Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev will soon resign. The
rumors begin with a Dozhd TV report citing sources in the Defense Ministry but are picked
up by most major Russian media in the following weeks. Peskov acknowledges the rumors
Nov. 11 but does not confirm or deny them. Pravda leaks that Kolokoltsev will be replaced by
First Deputy Interior Minister Viktor Zolotov.
December
2014

Stratfor receives a report from Moscow that Nikolai Patrushev will soon be sacked as leader
of the Security Council. 
Dec. 12: Rosneft is issued approximately $10.9 billion in new bonds with a guarantee by the
Central Bank that it would back up the bonds to be used as collateral for the company’s
loans. Interfax reports that Sechin had a "secret" deal with the Central Bank chief to collapse
the price of the ruble at the same time Rosneft paid its latest debt payment in order to help
Rosneft financially. Sechin called the rumors a "provocation." 

Dec. 17: Following the mass currency devaluation, Sergei Glazyev, many Duma members,
and FSB-aligned media (Tass, Izvestia, RT) call for Medvedev's resignation. 
Dec. 28: Kadyrov gathers some 20,000 of his troops, fully armed and wearing backpacks, in a
sports stadium. Kadyrov told the troops that they could resign and volunteer to go to ﬁght in
Ukraine but that he was waiting for Putin's order. He ended the speech by rallying the
soldiers, chanting, "Long live our national leader of Russia Vladimir Putin!”
February
2015

Feb. 4: USA Today reports that the Pentagon believes Putin may have Asperger’s syndrome.
Peskov replied that the report was "stupid and didn’t deserve a comment." 
Feb. 5: RBC media group reports that Putin has decided to consolidate two smaller security
services — the Federal Drug Control Service and the Federal Migration Service — under the
Interior Ministry. 
Feb. 19-20: FSB chief Alexander Bortnikov visits Washington for a conference on
counterterrorism.
Feb. 27: Russian opposition heavyweight Boris Nemtsov is assassinated on a bridge near the
Kremlin two days before he was to help lead an anti-Kremlin march.
March
2015

March 4: Kadyrov posts a picture on Instagram of himself and Putin laughing and embracing
and praises the Russian leader, saying he would lay down his life for Putin. 
March 5-15: Putin is "missing" from public sight.
March 8: Bortnikov announces the arrest of two suspects behind the Nemtsov assassination
and the detention of three others. A sixth suspect committed suicide. All the suspects are
Chechens, and one suspect, Zaur Dadaev, has personal ties to Kadyrov. Kadyrov takes to
Instagram to call Dadaev a "true patriot." 
March 9: Novaya Gazeta quotes an anonymous FSB ofﬁcial saying Kadyrov’s cousin,
lawmaker Adam Delimkhanov, organized the Nemtsov hit. 
March 9: Kadyrov reportedly receives the Order of Honor award from Putin (it is unclear if
this actually occurred a week earlier). 

March 10: The heads of the FSB, Federal Protective Service and Interior Ministry, along with
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, hold a meeting in Crimea with 40 security ofﬁcials. 
March 10: Security Council Chief Nikolai Patrushev meets with Kadyrov on the sidelines of a
Security Council meeting.
March 10: Rumors start in Russian media (Novaya Gazeta, Moscovsky Komsomolets, Echo
Moscow) that the FSB (particularly Patrushev, Bortnikov and Ivanov) is at war with Kadyrov. 
March 10: Surkov (aligned with Kadyrov) and his family embark on a vacation in Hong
Kong. 
March 11: The Kremlin cancels Putin’s trip to Kazakhstan to meet with the Kazakh and
Belarusian presidents March 12-13 and to meet with a South Ossetian delegation that was
already in Moscow. Peskov says the meetings were simply "postponed." 
March 11: The Kremlin posts a picture of Putin holding a working meeting with the head of
the Republic of Karelia. Vesti Kareli media says the meeting was actually held on March 5,
leading to speculation that Putin had been "missing" from the public eye for six days already. 
March 11: Ivanov meets with Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and Orthodox Patriarch Kirill. 
March 11: The editor of Nezavismaya Gazeta, Kinstantin Remchukov, tweets that he was
pulled aside at the Bolshoi Ballet by a Kremlin ofﬁcial and told Sechin would be sacked the
next day. 
March 12: Peskov begins his media tour (Tass, RIA, Echo Moscow), explaining that Putin was
working but that "not all meetings are public." 
March 12: Putin misses a planned meeting with the FSB, though there is YouTube video
footage of the presidential helicopter arriving that evening at Lubyanka, FSB headquarters. 
March 12: Medvedev leads a government meeting attended by all ministers. 
March 13: The Kremlin publishes multiple meetings for Putin’s schedule (Supreme Court
chairman Vyacheslav Lebedev and another with Medvedev), though no live footage of these
meetings is given.
March 13: A rumor emerges on social media that Zolotov was assassinated after Putin tried
to make him head of the FSB. 

March 14: Head of Russia’s Islamic Committee (and Kadyrov ally) Geydar Dzhemal says the
FSB "neutralized" Putin. 
March 15: Putin reappears in public at a meeting with Kyrgyz President Almazbek in St.
Petersburg. Putin remarks to the media, "Life would be boring without rumors."
March 15: Peskov tells the media that he will no longer discuss Putin’s health. 
March 19: FSB counterintelligence chief Oleg Syromolotov is appointed deputy foreign
minister and charged with managing counterterrorism operations. 
April
2015

April 1: Commentary appears on both NTV and on Kremlin watch blogs, such as IMRUSSIA,
on the growing feud between Patrushev and Surkov over control of the separatists in
Ukraine. 
April 6: State Duma deputy and FSB Col. Igor Barinov is appointed head of the newly
created Federal Agency for Nationality Affairs.
April 7: Putin fires 20 senior Russian civil defense figures within the Emergency Ministry. 
April 8: Andrei Patrushev, the son of Nikolai Patrushev, is named to the Board of Directors of
Gazprom Neft. 
April 8: Russia’s Investigative Committee reports that it is investigating government
subsidies to anti-Kremlin media groups: Echo Moscow, RBC, Dozhd and Moscovsky
Komsomolets. The Kremlin media watchdog Rosechat says the subsidies were part of
educational and humanitarian programs.
April 14: Russian opposition politician Ilya Yashin says that Kadyrov’s mastermind in the
Nemtsov assassination, Ruslan Geremeev, has fled Russia after the Investigative Committee
tried to question him in Chechnya. 
April 15: Finance Minister Anton Siluanov says that the retirement age in Russia should be
raised; Peskov says the Kremlin will examine the proposal. Russian Deputy Premier Olga
Golodets says she does not support the proposal. 
April 15-17: Sobyanin and a delegation of businessmen make a three-day visit to Turkey to
meet with the mayor of Ankara to discuss trade, agricultural, tourist and communication
deals. Stratfor receives a report that Russian businessmen meet with U.S. Assistant Secretary

of State Victoria Nuland while she visits Turkey. 
April 16: Putin holds his annual "direct-line" question-and-answer session with the Russian
people. During the first hour, Putin gets into an aggressive debate with Alexei Kudrin.
Kudrin criticizes Putin’s lack of economic reforms, and Putin replies that Kudrin drafted the
program. Kudrin says only 30 percent of his program was put in place. Putin ends the debate
by saying political constraints keep him from taking more dramatic steps. 
April 16: A draft law is submitted to Russia’s State Duma that would legally make the
Interior Ministry’s forces a "Federal State institution" rather than a "military unit." RIA
Novosti says this would empower the Interior Ministry. 
April 19: Interior Forces, along with police from the Stavropol region, gun down a Chechen
man, Dzhambulat Dadayev, in Grozny over a weapons violation. 
April 21: Rosneft sends a letter to Dvorkovich’s office asking for emergency funding by June
1 to avoid a shortfall in tax payments and stalls in oil production in two major fields
(Russkoye and Yurubcheno-Tokhomskoye). Previously, Rosneft asked for $25 billion and had
received $5 billion. An unnamed source in Dvorkovich’s office calls the letter "blackmail." 
April 21: Three members of the ultranationalist Militant Organization of Russian Nationalists
are given lengthy prison sentences for 10 high-profile murders, including those of a federal
judge, a human rights lawyer, a journalist, a migrant and three anti-fascist activists. Ilya
Goryachev, who is accused of being the group's ideological head, is soon to stand trial. A
former member of the group has said that it has ties to Surkov. Goryachev claims that Surkov
ordered the murders and that the FSB is behind the witch-hunt. 
April 23: Kadyrov orders Chechen law enforcement to "shoot to kill" any security forces from
other parts of Russia conducting operations in Chechnya without consent. Later that day,
Kadyrov appears on the Lifenews channel to clarify his statement and says there is no conflict
between him and the FSB, but "there are devils who seek to seed disorder on the territory of
the Russian Federation, and that’s why they make such assertions." 
April 30: Putin gives a rare personal op-ed to Pioneer Magazine, in which he discusses his
family’s hardships during World War II. 
April 30: Naryshkin, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobanin and Kirill gather at a ceremony for the
reburial of Great Prince Nikolai Romanov and his wife. 

April 30: Kadyrov says on Govorit Moskva that he is prepared to resign at any moment. He
says he has asked Putin to allow him to resign 20 times. He also reiterates that he is ready to
die for Putin. 
May
2015

May 4-6: Naryshkin travels to Central Europe and then Cuba. 
May 6: Kadyrov says he is unhappy with the media and orders them to stop publishing false
information and rumors. 
May 7: According to Ukrainian media, journalists in Ukraine’s Donetsk region say there is a
mass exodus of pro-Kremlin Chechen ﬁghters. 
May 8: Putin sacks 21 generals across the Interior Ministry, Investigative Committee,
Emergency Ministry and federal anti-narcotics branches. 
May 10: Surkov congratulates the FSB on its anniversary via Instagram. 
May 12: Rumors arise from Bloomberg that Rosneft will sell 19 percent of its shares to
Surgutneftegas. Rosneft and Surgutneftegas deny the rumors the next day. 

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