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Network Security Monitoring in ICS

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Robert Caldwell and Chris Sistrunk of Mandiant at S4x15 OTDay A presentation on techniques and tools to detect attacks on your ICS.

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1 You Don’t Know What You Can’t See: Network Security Monitoring in ICS Chris Sistrunk Senior Consultant Rob Caldwell Principal Consultant S4x15
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 2 Agenda §  Overview of NSM §  Instrumenting an ICS §  Examples and Case Study §  Tools §  Conclusion §  Questions
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. If ICS are so vulnerable, why haven’t we seen more attacks?
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 4 Two Key Reasons 1.  Intention 2.  Visibility
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 5 Intention Why are targeted attacks different? •  It’s a “Who”, not a “What”… •  They are Professional, Organized & Well Funded… •  If You Kick Them Out They Will Return
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 6 Visibility We are not looking! “Prevention is ideal, but Detection is a must…”
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 7 Visibility
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 8 The IOC problem There are numerous sources of IOCs, which are a means to describe threat data like evidence of compromise/activity, attacker methodology, or malware. For example, from the recent “Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign” from ICS-CERT. What do you do with this? Most ICS operators have no capability to consume IOCs, much less generate them for “information sharing”. Common sources of ICS IOCs are ICS-CERT, US-CERT, and many of the recent “vendor” reports.
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 9 Network Security Monitoring “The collection, analysis, and escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions. NSM is a way to find intruders on your network and do something about them before they damage your enterprise.” - The Practice of Network Security Monitoring Cliff Stoll “Stalking the Wily Hacker” 1988 Todd Herberlein et al. “A Network Security Monitor” 1990 US Air Force Defense Information Systems Agency Lawrence Livermore National Lab Early 1990s NetRanger RealSecure Snort and many others Late 1990s - early 2000s Formal definition of NSM 2002
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 10 The NSM Cycle Collection DetectionAnalysis •  Model for action, based on network-derived data •  Requires people and process, not just technology •  Focuses on the adversary, not the vulnerability
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Methods of Monitoring §  Network tap – physical device which relays a copy of packets to an NSM server §  SPAN or mirrored ports – switch configuration which sends copies of packets to a separate port where NSM can connect §  Host NIC – configured to watch all network traffic flowing on its segment §  Serial port tap – physical device which relays serial traffic to another port, usually requires additional software to interpret data Fluke Networks Stratus Engineering
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Types of Data Collected §  Full content data – unfiltered collection of packets §  Extracted content – data streams, files, Web pages, etc. §  Session data – conversation between nodes §  Transaction data – requests and replies between nodes §  Statistical data – description of traffic, such as protocol and volume §  Metadata – aspects of data, e.g. who owns this IP address §  Alert/log data – triggers from IDS tools, tracking user logins, etc.
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Difficulties for NSM §  Encrypted networks §  Widespread NAT §  Devices moving between network segments §  Extreme traffic volume §  Privacy concerns Issues that most ICS do not face!
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Example ICS 14 Enterprise/IT DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Anatomy of an Attack 15 Over all Mandiant attack investigations, only a little more than half of victim computers have malware on them. While attackers often use malware to gain an initial foothold, they quickly move to other tactics to execute their attacks. EVIDENCE OF COMPROMISE Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Recon Complete Mission Move Laterally Maintain Presence Unauthorized Use of Valid Accounts Known & Unknown Malware Command & Control Activity Suspicious Network Traffic Files Accessed by Attackers Valid Programs Used for Evil Purposes Trace Evidence & Partial Files
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 16 Attacker Objectives Attacker’s goals: §  Damage equipment §  Affect or steal process info §  Cause safety or compliance issue §  Pivot from vulnerable ICS to enterprise Attacker’s options: §  Gain physical access to an ICS host §  Gain remote access to an ICS host §  Compromise a highly-privileged client machine with access to the ICS network Enterprise/IT Plant DMZ Control Web Historian or other DB SCADA HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. NSM Collection 17 •  Firewall Logs •  Netflow Data •  NIDS/HIDS •  Full packet capture or NetFlow •  Windows Logs and syslog •  SNMP (CPU % etc.) •  Alerts from security agents (AV, whitelisting, etc.) DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs Enterprise/ITEnterprise technology collectors Logs and/or Agent Network sensors Logs only
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 18 What Are We Looking For? §  Exceptions from baseline (e.g. A talks to B but never C) §  “Top Talkers” §  Unexpected connectivity (to Internet, Business network) §  Known malicious IPs and domains §  Logins using default accounts §  Error messages that could correlate to vulnerabilities §  Unusual system and firewall log entries §  Host-based IDS or other security system alerts §  Unexpected file and firmware updates §  Antivirus alerts §  And others….
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. •  IDS alerts •  Anomaly detection •  Firmware updates, other commands •  Login with default credentials •  High CPU or network bandwidth •  Door alarms when nobody is supposed to be working •  Devices going off-line or behaving strangely 19 NSM Detection Analyst looks at detected anomalies or alerts then escalates to IR Enterprise/IT DMZ Plant Control HMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs ! DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 20 NSM Analysis Incident responders analyze the detected anomalies to find evil Enterprise/IT DMZ Plant Control HMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs •  Application exploitation •  Third-party connections (ex. ICCP or vendor access) •  ICS-specific communication protocol attacks (ex. Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP) •  Remote access exploitation •  Direct network access due to poor physical security •  USB-delivered malware DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 21 Top Talkers FlowBat characterizes NetFlow data, showing which nodes have the most traffic Web traffic Web traffic NetBios NTP
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 22 Address Spoofing NetworkMiner can find potential ARP spoofing (as well as many other indicators)
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Bro IDS Logs Modbus DNP3 Bro parses Modbus and DNP3 packets, ELSA consolidates Bro logs
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 24 IDS GUIs Alerts in Sguil of scanning activity
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 25 Malformed Modbus Deep packet inspection of Modbus by Wireshark
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Syslog Syslog can be configured to send to the SO server, or detected in network traffic if sent elsewhere.
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 15 minutes of network traffic capture data revealed external DNS requests (to some dubious hosts…) Case Study – ICS Operator 27
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 28 Abnormal DNS Traffic “Strange” DNS requests originating from within the ICS
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 29 Abnormal DNS Traffic DNS requests shown in ELSA
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. NSM Tools Security Onion Linux distribution ‒  Easy to install and lots of documentation §  Full packet capture – Tcpdump/Wireshark/NetworkMiner §  Extracted content – Xplico/NetworkMiner §  Session data – Bro/FlowBat §  Transaction data – Bro §  Statistical data – Capinfos/Wireshark §  Meta data – ELSA (Whois) §  Alert data – Snort, Suricata, Sguil, Snorby Peel Back the Layers of Your Network
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Security Onion Tools
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 32 Security Onion Implementation §  Test in a lab first §  Select suitable hardware platform ‒  More RAM is better ‒  Bigger hard drive is better (longer retention) §  Mirrored/SPAN port on router/switch or a good network tap §  Select proper placement of SO sensor ‒  The Practice of Network Security Monitoring ‒  Applied Network Security Monitoring §  Work with the right stakeholders if placing in production
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 33 NetFlow Tools SiLK & FlowBAT §  Install on Security Onion with 2 scripts §  www.flowbat.com
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 34 Takeaways § You can implement NSM in ICS today – without impacting your operations § ICS IoCs are becoming more common – need tools to look for them
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. People… …the most important part of NSM! §  Gigabytes of data and 1000s of IDS alerts are useless without interpretation §  Analyze data collected to understand what’s normal – and what’s not §  Identify adversary TTPs and act to disrupt them Remember, adversaries are a “Who”, not a “What
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 36 Set the Right Goal DETECT ICS network instrumented with security technology and monitored by security personnel RESPOND Effective process for response to ICS cyber security incidents CONTAIN Business continuity and DR planning consider ICS asset compromise Showing evidence of conformance/compliance Finding indications of compromise
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Redefine the Win Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation Command & Control Actions on Objectives http://papers.rohanamin.com/wp-content/uploads/papers.rohanamin.com/2011/08/iciw2011.pdf Halting the attacker anywhere in the cycle stops them from achieving their objective
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. §  The Cuckoo’s Egg by Cliff Stoll https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EcKxaq1FTac 1-hour NOVA Special (1990) §  The Practice of Network Security Monitoring by Richard Bejtlich http://www.nostarch.com/nsm §  Applied Network Security Monitoring by Chris Sanders & Jason Smith http://www.appliednsm.com/ §  The NSM Wiki http://nsmwiki.org §  Security Onion distribution http://securityonion.net NSM References/Resources 38
© Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 39 Questions? chris.sistrunk@mandiant.com @chrissistrunk robert.caldwell@mandiant.com @robac3

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Network Security Monitoring in ICS

  • 1. 1 You Don’t Know What You Can’t See: Network Security Monitoring in ICS Chris Sistrunk Senior Consultant Rob Caldwell Principal Consultant S4x15
  • 2. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 2 Agenda §  Overview of NSM §  Instrumenting an ICS §  Examples and Case Study §  Tools §  Conclusion §  Questions
  • 3. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. If ICS are so vulnerable, why haven’t we seen more attacks?
  • 4. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 4 Two Key Reasons 1.  Intention 2.  Visibility
  • 5. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 5 Intention Why are targeted attacks different? •  It’s a “Who”, not a “What”… •  They are Professional, Organized & Well Funded… •  If You Kick Them Out They Will Return
  • 6. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 6 Visibility We are not looking! “Prevention is ideal, but Detection is a must…”
  • 7. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 7 Visibility
  • 8. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 8 The IOC problem There are numerous sources of IOCs, which are a means to describe threat data like evidence of compromise/activity, attacker methodology, or malware. For example, from the recent “Ongoing Sophisticated Malware Campaign” from ICS-CERT. What do you do with this? Most ICS operators have no capability to consume IOCs, much less generate them for “information sharing”. Common sources of ICS IOCs are ICS-CERT, US-CERT, and many of the recent “vendor” reports.
  • 9. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 9 Network Security Monitoring “The collection, analysis, and escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions. NSM is a way to find intruders on your network and do something about them before they damage your enterprise.” - The Practice of Network Security Monitoring Cliff Stoll “Stalking the Wily Hacker” 1988 Todd Herberlein et al. “A Network Security Monitor” 1990 US Air Force Defense Information Systems Agency Lawrence Livermore National Lab Early 1990s NetRanger RealSecure Snort and many others Late 1990s - early 2000s Formal definition of NSM 2002
  • 10. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 10 The NSM Cycle Collection DetectionAnalysis •  Model for action, based on network-derived data •  Requires people and process, not just technology •  Focuses on the adversary, not the vulnerability
  • 11. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Methods of Monitoring §  Network tap – physical device which relays a copy of packets to an NSM server §  SPAN or mirrored ports – switch configuration which sends copies of packets to a separate port where NSM can connect §  Host NIC – configured to watch all network traffic flowing on its segment §  Serial port tap – physical device which relays serial traffic to another port, usually requires additional software to interpret data Fluke Networks Stratus Engineering
  • 12. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Types of Data Collected §  Full content data – unfiltered collection of packets §  Extracted content – data streams, files, Web pages, etc. §  Session data – conversation between nodes §  Transaction data – requests and replies between nodes §  Statistical data – description of traffic, such as protocol and volume §  Metadata – aspects of data, e.g. who owns this IP address §  Alert/log data – triggers from IDS tools, tracking user logins, etc.
  • 13. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Difficulties for NSM §  Encrypted networks §  Widespread NAT §  Devices moving between network segments §  Extreme traffic volume §  Privacy concerns Issues that most ICS do not face!
  • 14. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Example ICS 14 Enterprise/IT DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
  • 15. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Anatomy of an Attack 15 Over all Mandiant attack investigations, only a little more than half of victim computers have malware on them. While attackers often use malware to gain an initial foothold, they quickly move to other tactics to execute their attacks. EVIDENCE OF COMPROMISE Initial Compromise Establish Foothold Escalate Privileges Internal Recon Complete Mission Move Laterally Maintain Presence Unauthorized Use of Valid Accounts Known & Unknown Malware Command & Control Activity Suspicious Network Traffic Files Accessed by Attackers Valid Programs Used for Evil Purposes Trace Evidence & Partial Files
  • 16. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 16 Attacker Objectives Attacker’s goals: §  Damage equipment §  Affect or steal process info §  Cause safety or compliance issue §  Pivot from vulnerable ICS to enterprise Attacker’s options: §  Gain physical access to an ICS host §  Gain remote access to an ICS host §  Compromise a highly-privileged client machine with access to the ICS network Enterprise/IT Plant DMZ Control Web Historian or other DB SCADA HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
  • 17. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. NSM Collection 17 •  Firewall Logs •  Netflow Data •  NIDS/HIDS •  Full packet capture or NetFlow •  Windows Logs and syslog •  SNMP (CPU % etc.) •  Alerts from security agents (AV, whitelisting, etc.) DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs Enterprise/ITEnterprise technology collectors Logs and/or Agent Network sensors Logs only
  • 18. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 18 What Are We Looking For? §  Exceptions from baseline (e.g. A talks to B but never C) §  “Top Talkers” §  Unexpected connectivity (to Internet, Business network) §  Known malicious IPs and domains §  Logins using default accounts §  Error messages that could correlate to vulnerabilities §  Unusual system and firewall log entries §  Host-based IDS or other security system alerts §  Unexpected file and firmware updates §  Antivirus alerts §  And others….
  • 19. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. •  IDS alerts •  Anomaly detection •  Firmware updates, other commands •  Login with default credentials •  High CPU or network bandwidth •  Door alarms when nobody is supposed to be working •  Devices going off-line or behaving strangely 19 NSM Detection Analyst looks at detected anomalies or alerts then escalates to IR Enterprise/IT DMZ Plant Control HMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs ! DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
  • 20. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 20 NSM Analysis Incident responders analyze the detected anomalies to find evil Enterprise/IT DMZ Plant Control HMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs •  Application exploitation •  Third-party connections (ex. ICCP or vendor access) •  ICS-specific communication protocol attacks (ex. Modbus, DNP3, Profinet, EtherNet/IP) •  Remote access exploitation •  Direct network access due to poor physical security •  USB-delivered malware DMZ Plant Control Web Historian or other DB DCS HistorianHMI PLCs, Controllers, RTUs, PACs
  • 21. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 21 Top Talkers FlowBat characterizes NetFlow data, showing which nodes have the most traffic Web traffic Web traffic NetBios NTP
  • 22. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 22 Address Spoofing NetworkMiner can find potential ARP spoofing (as well as many other indicators)
  • 23. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Bro IDS Logs Modbus DNP3 Bro parses Modbus and DNP3 packets, ELSA consolidates Bro logs
  • 24. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 24 IDS GUIs Alerts in Sguil of scanning activity
  • 25. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 25 Malformed Modbus Deep packet inspection of Modbus by Wireshark
  • 26. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Syslog Syslog can be configured to send to the SO server, or detected in network traffic if sent elsewhere.
  • 27. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 15 minutes of network traffic capture data revealed external DNS requests (to some dubious hosts…) Case Study – ICS Operator 27
  • 28. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 28 Abnormal DNS Traffic “Strange” DNS requests originating from within the ICS
  • 29. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 29 Abnormal DNS Traffic DNS requests shown in ELSA
  • 30. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. NSM Tools Security Onion Linux distribution ‒  Easy to install and lots of documentation §  Full packet capture – Tcpdump/Wireshark/NetworkMiner §  Extracted content – Xplico/NetworkMiner §  Session data – Bro/FlowBat §  Transaction data – Bro §  Statistical data – Capinfos/Wireshark §  Meta data – ELSA (Whois) §  Alert data – Snort, Suricata, Sguil, Snorby Peel Back the Layers of Your Network
  • 31. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Security Onion Tools
  • 32. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 32 Security Onion Implementation §  Test in a lab first §  Select suitable hardware platform ‒  More RAM is better ‒  Bigger hard drive is better (longer retention) §  Mirrored/SPAN port on router/switch or a good network tap §  Select proper placement of SO sensor ‒  The Practice of Network Security Monitoring ‒  Applied Network Security Monitoring §  Work with the right stakeholders if placing in production
  • 33. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 33 NetFlow Tools SiLK & FlowBAT §  Install on Security Onion with 2 scripts §  www.flowbat.com
  • 34. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 34 Takeaways § You can implement NSM in ICS today – without impacting your operations § ICS IoCs are becoming more common – need tools to look for them
  • 35. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. People… …the most important part of NSM! §  Gigabytes of data and 1000s of IDS alerts are useless without interpretation §  Analyze data collected to understand what’s normal – and what’s not §  Identify adversary TTPs and act to disrupt them Remember, adversaries are a “Who”, not a “What
  • 36. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 36 Set the Right Goal DETECT ICS network instrumented with security technology and monitored by security personnel RESPOND Effective process for response to ICS cyber security incidents CONTAIN Business continuity and DR planning consider ICS asset compromise Showing evidence of conformance/compliance Finding indications of compromise
  • 37. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. Redefine the Win Reconnaissance Weaponization Delivery Exploitation Installation Command & Control Actions on Objectives http://papers.rohanamin.com/wp-content/uploads/papers.rohanamin.com/2011/08/iciw2011.pdf Halting the attacker anywhere in the cycle stops them from achieving their objective
  • 38. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. §  The Cuckoo’s Egg by Cliff Stoll https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EcKxaq1FTac 1-hour NOVA Special (1990) §  The Practice of Network Security Monitoring by Richard Bejtlich http://www.nostarch.com/nsm §  Applied Network Security Monitoring by Chris Sanders & Jason Smith http://www.appliednsm.com/ §  The NSM Wiki http://nsmwiki.org §  Security Onion distribution http://securityonion.net NSM References/Resources 38
  • 39. © Mandiant, A FireEye Company. All rights reserved. 39 Questions? chris.sistrunk@mandiant.com @chrissistrunk robert.caldwell@mandiant.com @robac3