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Metasploitation 4 Adults
  it’s not family affair…


     Murtuja Bharmal
Disclaimer




   Courtesy http://entertainment.desktopnexus.com_get_4642 1
About Me
•   Now Work Busy Man….
•   Unemployed….
•   Interest…. /dev/random….
•   Co-founder of null…. :-D
•   X-IBMer’s …..
•   Dal, Roti ka jugad, Security Consulting/Training
Agenda




         Courtesy http://asonchua.com
Agenda
•   Basics
•   Metasploit Auxiliary
•   Database Integration & Exploit Automation
•   Client Side Exploit & Extended Usage
•   Post Exploitation Fun
•   Metasploit Add-ons
Basics
•   What is vulnerability?
•   What is Exploit?
•   What is Payload?
•   What is encoder?
Vulnerability




                Courtesy http://harryjerry.com
Exploit




          Courtesy http://entertainment.in.msn.com
Payload
• Use your imagination
Encoder
• Still Thinking? Ask me offline
Basics
•   Vulnerability – Opportunity Window
•   Exploit – En-cashing Opportunity
•   Payload – En-cashment Window
•   Encoder – Masking
How it works?
• Input malicious code Instead of Data
• Malicious code = Exploit Code + Payload
Payload + Exploit

   Sanitized
     You should be at ClubHACK




Courtesy http://guardian.co.uk                       Courtesy http://ivillage.com
Exploit Code
 1                                                              2




3                                                     4




Courtesy 1. advice.eharmony.com   2. superstock.com       3. good-times.webshots.com   4. sheknows.com
Metasploit Framework
•   Open Source
•   Developed in Ruby
•   Easy to Use
•   600+ Exploits
•   200+ payloads
•   25+ encoders
•   300+ auxiliary
Metasploit Auxiliary




                  Courtesy http://www.flickr.com
Metasploit Architecture




                Courtesy http://www.offensive-security.com
Directory Structure
Filesystem And Libraries
•    lib: the 'meat' of the framework code base
•   data: editable files used by Metasploit
•   tools: various useful command-line utilities
•   modules: the actual MSF modules
•   plugins: plugins that can be loaded at run-time
•   scripts: Meterpreter and other scripts
•   external: source code and third-party libraries

                       Courtesy http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed
msfconsole
msfconsole
• It is the only supported way to access most of the
  features within Metasploit.
• Provides a console-based interface to the
  framework
• Contains the most features and is the most stable
  MSF interface
• Full readline support, tabbing, and command
  completion
• Execution of external commands in msfconsole is
  possible:

                      Courtesy http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed
Exploit Modules




Confused how to explain technically?
                           Courtesy http://www.sunpacmortgage.com
Metasploit – Exploit & Payloads
• Exploit
   – Active
   – Passive
• Payload Types
   –   Inline ( Non Staged)
   –   Staged
   –   Meterpreter
   –   PassiveX
   –   NoNX
   –   Ord
   –   IPv6
   –   Reflective DLL injection
Exploit DEMO
Metasploit Auxiliary
• Helper modules for pre-exploitation phase
  – Admin, DOS, Fuzzers, Gather, Scanner, Server,
    Spoof, SQLi, Sniffer, Test etc.
• 300+ Auxiliary modules
We will cover
•   SCANNER
•   MSSQL
•   SNMP
•   FTP
Auxiliarry DEMO
Database Integration and Exploit
          Automation
Data




       Courtesy http://www.joy2day.com
Need of Database

Sanitized
You should be at ClubHACK
Need of Database
• Network Penetration Testing
• Easy management/storage of result
• Report Generation
Database Integration& Exploit
             Automation
• Database Support
• Nmap
• Nessus Bridge
Supported Database
• Mysql - BackTrack 4 r2, MYSQL and Metasploit work
  together "out of the box“
• Postgres
• Sqlite3 – file based database, might be pull-off   in future
Nmap
• db_nmap command to scan host/network
• Result will be stored in database
• Can view the result using db_hosts and
  db_services command
NMAP Demo
Nessus Bridge
• Can perform vulnerability scan inside
  msfconsole
• Supported using nessus bridge plugin
• Use xmlrpc to connect with nessusd
Nessus Bridge Demo
In a Finger tip
• db_autopwn
  – Automate exploitation process
  – Take target /service/vulnerability info from
    database
  – Spawns a meterpeter shell on success
  – Noisy
db_autopwn Demo
Client Side Exploit & Extended
             Usage
Client Side Exploit
Client Side Exploit & Extended Usage
•   Browser autopwn
•   Exploiting PDF
•   Payload Generation & Back-dooring EXE
•   Linux Backdoor
Browser autopwn
• Automate browser based vulnerability
  exploitation
• Perform browser finger printing
• Auxiliary module server/browser_autopwnle
Browser autopwn Demo
Exploiting PDF
• Most exploited software since last 2 years
• Universally used software for document
  format
• Favorite carrier for commercial malware
  toolkit
What all PDF do?
• JavaScript runs under the context of App
  Object Model
• File Attachment
• XML, SOAP capabilities
• Forms
• Web Services
• Database connections(ADBC)
What’s cracking up?
• Vulnerable APIs
     – util.printf() (CVE-2008-2992)
     – getIcons() (CVE-2009-0927)
     – getAnnots() (CVE-20091492)
     – customDictionaryOpen() (CVE-2009-1493)
     – Doc.media.newPlayer (CVE-2009-4324)
•   File parsing vulnerabilities
     –   JBIG2( Over a dozen CVE)
     –    libTiff (CVE-2010-0188)
•   Social engineered arbit. command execution
     –   PDF escape by Didier Stevens
     –   Not a bug (feature)
     –   Exploitation in the wild
•   Embedded Files
     –   libTiff (CVE-2010-0188)
PDF exploitation Demo
Payload Generation and Backdooring
                EXE
• Payload can be converted to various file
  format i.e. exe, dll, javascript etc.
• Encode payload to evade antivirus
• Can be embed with third party
  software/utility
msfpayload & msfencode
Linux Backdoor
• Back-dooring payload with linux package
• Embed payload with deb installation package
Linux Backdooring Demo
Metasploit Add-ons
Metasploit Add-ons




             Courtesy http://draftblogmm.blogspot.com
Fast-Track
• Easy Automation
• Utilize Metaspolit Framework on Backend
• Modes
  – Interactive
  – Web interface
Fast-Track Demo
SET(Social Engineering Toolkit)
• Weakest link in the information security chain
  is the natural human willingness to accept
  someone at their word.
• SET focuses on attacking the human element
• Develop in python
• Very easy to use
• Utilize Metaspolit Framework on Backend
SET(Social Engineering Toolkit)
• Operational Mode
  – Interactive
  – Web Interface
• Configuration file - config/set_config
SET Demo
Post Exploitation Fun
Post Exploitation Fun
What next after getting a Shell?
• One can run the command supported by
  command prompt/shell.
• So what extra bit control needed to en-cash
  the opportunity?
Meterpreter
•   Meta Interpreter
•   Post exploitation payload(tool)
•   Uses in-memory DLL injection stagers
•   Can be extended over the run time
•   Encrypted communication
What can be done?
•   Command execution
•   File Upload/Download
•   Process migration
•   Log Deletion
•   Privilege escalation
•   Registry modification
•   Deleting logs and killing antivirus
•   Backdoors and Rootkits
•   Pivoting
•   …..etc.
Demo Meterpreter
Channels
• Communication using TLV (Type-Length-Value)
• Tagging of data with channel number
• Multiple program can be run at victim
  machine using different channel
Pivoting
               2               1

             LAN                     INTERNET
Local Lan
                      Firewall/IPS
4
                     3




    Web            Database
    Server   DMZ   Server
Demo Pivoting
Courtesy
• http://www.metasploit.com/
• http://www.backtrack-linux.org
• http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-
  unleashed/
• http://www.secmaniac.com/
• http://securitytube.net/
• http://vimeo.com/
• http://www.irongeek.com/
• http://www.windowsecurity.com/whitepapers/Social-
  Engineering-The-Weakest-Link.html
• http://www.google.co.in
Thank You




     Murtuja Bharmal
          void@null.co.in

               Courtesy http://blingboo.com

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Metasploitation part-1 (murtuja)

  • 1. Metasploitation 4 Adults it’s not family affair… Murtuja Bharmal
  • 2. Disclaimer Courtesy http://entertainment.desktopnexus.com_get_4642 1
  • 3. About Me • Now Work Busy Man…. • Unemployed…. • Interest…. /dev/random…. • Co-founder of null…. :-D • X-IBMer’s ….. • Dal, Roti ka jugad, Security Consulting/Training
  • 4. Agenda Courtesy http://asonchua.com
  • 5. Agenda • Basics • Metasploit Auxiliary • Database Integration & Exploit Automation • Client Side Exploit & Extended Usage • Post Exploitation Fun • Metasploit Add-ons
  • 6. Basics • What is vulnerability? • What is Exploit? • What is Payload? • What is encoder?
  • 7. Vulnerability Courtesy http://harryjerry.com
  • 8. Exploit Courtesy http://entertainment.in.msn.com
  • 9. Payload • Use your imagination
  • 10. Encoder • Still Thinking? Ask me offline
  • 11. Basics • Vulnerability – Opportunity Window • Exploit – En-cashing Opportunity • Payload – En-cashment Window • Encoder – Masking
  • 12. How it works? • Input malicious code Instead of Data • Malicious code = Exploit Code + Payload
  • 13. Payload + Exploit Sanitized You should be at ClubHACK Courtesy http://guardian.co.uk Courtesy http://ivillage.com
  • 14. Exploit Code 1 2 3 4 Courtesy 1. advice.eharmony.com 2. superstock.com 3. good-times.webshots.com 4. sheknows.com
  • 15. Metasploit Framework • Open Source • Developed in Ruby • Easy to Use • 600+ Exploits • 200+ payloads • 25+ encoders • 300+ auxiliary
  • 16. Metasploit Auxiliary Courtesy http://www.flickr.com
  • 17. Metasploit Architecture Courtesy http://www.offensive-security.com
  • 19. Filesystem And Libraries • lib: the 'meat' of the framework code base • data: editable files used by Metasploit • tools: various useful command-line utilities • modules: the actual MSF modules • plugins: plugins that can be loaded at run-time • scripts: Meterpreter and other scripts • external: source code and third-party libraries Courtesy http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed
  • 21. msfconsole • It is the only supported way to access most of the features within Metasploit. • Provides a console-based interface to the framework • Contains the most features and is the most stable MSF interface • Full readline support, tabbing, and command completion • Execution of external commands in msfconsole is possible: Courtesy http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed
  • 22.
  • 23. Exploit Modules Confused how to explain technically? Courtesy http://www.sunpacmortgage.com
  • 24. Metasploit – Exploit & Payloads • Exploit – Active – Passive • Payload Types – Inline ( Non Staged) – Staged – Meterpreter – PassiveX – NoNX – Ord – IPv6 – Reflective DLL injection
  • 26. Metasploit Auxiliary • Helper modules for pre-exploitation phase – Admin, DOS, Fuzzers, Gather, Scanner, Server, Spoof, SQLi, Sniffer, Test etc. • 300+ Auxiliary modules
  • 27. We will cover • SCANNER • MSSQL • SNMP • FTP
  • 29. Database Integration and Exploit Automation
  • 30. Data Courtesy http://www.joy2day.com
  • 31. Need of Database Sanitized You should be at ClubHACK
  • 32. Need of Database • Network Penetration Testing • Easy management/storage of result • Report Generation
  • 33. Database Integration& Exploit Automation • Database Support • Nmap • Nessus Bridge
  • 34. Supported Database • Mysql - BackTrack 4 r2, MYSQL and Metasploit work together "out of the box“ • Postgres • Sqlite3 – file based database, might be pull-off in future
  • 35.
  • 36. Nmap • db_nmap command to scan host/network • Result will be stored in database • Can view the result using db_hosts and db_services command
  • 38. Nessus Bridge • Can perform vulnerability scan inside msfconsole • Supported using nessus bridge plugin • Use xmlrpc to connect with nessusd
  • 39.
  • 40.
  • 42. In a Finger tip • db_autopwn – Automate exploitation process – Take target /service/vulnerability info from database – Spawns a meterpeter shell on success – Noisy
  • 43.
  • 45. Client Side Exploit & Extended Usage
  • 47. Client Side Exploit & Extended Usage • Browser autopwn • Exploiting PDF • Payload Generation & Back-dooring EXE • Linux Backdoor
  • 48. Browser autopwn • Automate browser based vulnerability exploitation • Perform browser finger printing • Auxiliary module server/browser_autopwnle
  • 50. Exploiting PDF • Most exploited software since last 2 years • Universally used software for document format • Favorite carrier for commercial malware toolkit
  • 51. What all PDF do? • JavaScript runs under the context of App Object Model • File Attachment • XML, SOAP capabilities • Forms • Web Services • Database connections(ADBC)
  • 52. What’s cracking up? • Vulnerable APIs – util.printf() (CVE-2008-2992) – getIcons() (CVE-2009-0927) – getAnnots() (CVE-20091492) – customDictionaryOpen() (CVE-2009-1493) – Doc.media.newPlayer (CVE-2009-4324) • File parsing vulnerabilities – JBIG2( Over a dozen CVE) – libTiff (CVE-2010-0188) • Social engineered arbit. command execution – PDF escape by Didier Stevens – Not a bug (feature) – Exploitation in the wild • Embedded Files – libTiff (CVE-2010-0188)
  • 54. Payload Generation and Backdooring EXE • Payload can be converted to various file format i.e. exe, dll, javascript etc. • Encode payload to evade antivirus • Can be embed with third party software/utility
  • 56. Linux Backdoor • Back-dooring payload with linux package • Embed payload with deb installation package
  • 59. Metasploit Add-ons Courtesy http://draftblogmm.blogspot.com
  • 60. Fast-Track • Easy Automation • Utilize Metaspolit Framework on Backend • Modes – Interactive – Web interface
  • 62. SET(Social Engineering Toolkit) • Weakest link in the information security chain is the natural human willingness to accept someone at their word. • SET focuses on attacking the human element • Develop in python • Very easy to use • Utilize Metaspolit Framework on Backend
  • 63. SET(Social Engineering Toolkit) • Operational Mode – Interactive – Web Interface • Configuration file - config/set_config
  • 67. What next after getting a Shell? • One can run the command supported by command prompt/shell. • So what extra bit control needed to en-cash the opportunity?
  • 68. Meterpreter • Meta Interpreter • Post exploitation payload(tool) • Uses in-memory DLL injection stagers • Can be extended over the run time • Encrypted communication
  • 69. What can be done? • Command execution • File Upload/Download • Process migration • Log Deletion • Privilege escalation • Registry modification • Deleting logs and killing antivirus • Backdoors and Rootkits • Pivoting • …..etc.
  • 71. Channels • Communication using TLV (Type-Length-Value) • Tagging of data with channel number • Multiple program can be run at victim machine using different channel
  • 72. Pivoting 2 1 LAN INTERNET Local Lan Firewall/IPS 4 3 Web Database Server DMZ Server
  • 74. Courtesy • http://www.metasploit.com/ • http://www.backtrack-linux.org • http://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit- unleashed/ • http://www.secmaniac.com/ • http://securitytube.net/ • http://vimeo.com/ • http://www.irongeek.com/ • http://www.windowsecurity.com/whitepapers/Social- Engineering-The-Weakest-Link.html • http://www.google.co.in
  • 75. Thank You Murtuja Bharmal void@null.co.in Courtesy http://blingboo.com