report of a presentation by Vivienne Bozalek on a normative framework for social justice in higher education

1. Social Justice and the Political
Ethic of Care – A normative
framework for socially just
pedagogies
Vivienne Bozalek
University of the Western Cape
vbozalek@uwc.ac.za

2. Care and social justice as normative
frameworks
• Moral and normative frameworks important
• How things ought to be- complex moral judgements
(Robinson, 1999; Sevenhuijsen & Svab, 2003)
• Values underpinning policies and practices
• What is important in social arrangements to promote socially
just pedagogies
• Alert us to taken-for-granted assumptions and limitations of
ways of seeing the world
• E.g work ethic vs care ethic

3. Social justice, the ethics of care
and difference
◻ Social Justice approaches are traditionally concerned with
how social resources are distributed in society
◻ Partially useful as no accommodation of difference
◻ The idea of ‘rational economic man’ who is disembodied,
autonomous, independent and equal is the normative
ideal of a citizen that John Rawls had in mind. This man is
furthermore able to enter voluntarily into exchanges of
goods and social cooperation with other citizens for his
own benefit
◻ The capabilities approaches of Sen and Nussbaum,
Nancy Fraser’s trivalent concept of justice and the political
ethics of care do in fact accommodate difference,
particularity, otherness, plurality, vulnerability and context
– the concrete other as opposed to the generalised other
about whose circumstances nothing is known (Rawls)

4. Major questions which these approaches (care
and justice) allow us to ask in relation to
various contexts and situations:
◻ What are students/lecturers able to be and to do?
What capabilities can they exercise?
◻ How are they privileged or disadvantaged and what
implications does this have for their lives?
◻ Are they able to interact on a par or an equal basis
with others?
◻ How do they fare in being able to give and receive
care (teach and learn) in situations of their own
choice?
These questions can give important information on life
circumstances and human flourishing the
implications for these on for socially just pedagogies

5. Capabilities Approach
◻ Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum pioneers of
this approach
◻ Addresses both general and particular
◻ Takes into account where people are positioned
and what they are able to do with personal, social
and material resources
◻ Does not assume that we are equally placed in
relation to resources – resources in themselves
aren’t meaningful in assessing human flourishing
◻ Particularity and context are important in deciding
which resources are needed & how effective they
will be for being able to flourish

6. Capabilities Approach (conted)
◻ Liberal idea of equality predicated on equal agents
is challenged in this approach
◻ Looks at people as ends rather than as means to
ends as valuable in their own right, and as sources
of agency, rather than aggregations e.g.
households, families
◻ The good life, according to Sen (1984; 2001) and
Nussbaum (1995; 2000; 2006) is the ability to do
valuable things and achieve valuable states, as well
as being able to choose from different livings and
meaningful affiliations, and not to be constrained
into a particular form of life.

7. Capabilities Approach (conted)
◻ In order to promote the good life, participatory parity
and human flourishing, a particular person’s needs in
terms of his/her current situation would have to be
considered. First generation literate rural vs urban
middle class student from literate home would need
more & different resources to attain the same valued
beings and doings
◻ According to the capabilities approach, individual
preferences or desires are not always reliable
indicators of human needs, as those who are
advantaged or disadvantaged easily become
accustomed to their situations and adjust their
expectations and aspirations accordingly (Sen’s small
mercies).

8. Capabilities Approach (contd) Nussbaum’s
core values for higher education
◻ Critical self-examination of self, habits and
traditions
◻ The ideal of the world citizen – bound to both
near and distant other human beings
(connected responsibility – Young, 2011)
◻ Development of narrative imagination –
understand difference

9. Nussbaum (2010:45-46) what
education should be supporting
 Capacity to see world from viewpoint of others, especially
those who are othered
 Dependency or ‘weakness’ is not shameful and to be
looked down upon – need should be acknowledged and as
opportunity for cooperation
 Geniune concern for others near and distant
 Undermine thinking of others as less than, with disgust or
contaminating
 Counter stereotypes with real and true things about others
 Promote responsibility by making students accountable
 Promote critical thinking and the courage to dissent

10. What are the implications of the CA
for socially just pedagogies?
 Particular and general
 Differential positioning and what personal, social and
material and intellectual resources is needed for
learning needs
 Individual preferences not good indicators of needs
 Nussbaum’s core values for education
 Student agency and well being and working towards
social justice

11. Nancy Fraser’s views on justice
◻ For Fraser (1997; 2000; 2008; 2009) the ability to
participate in an equitable way as full partners in
interaction with others and full members of society
(participatory parity) is the ultimate goal of social justice
◻ In order to achieve this you need a redistribution of
resources (economic), recognition of status (cultural)
(bivalent view of justice) and added social belonging and
representation (political) (now trivalent view)
◻ Recognition has to do with how people are regarded in
relation to the social markers or distinctive attributes that
are ascribed to them
◻ Social belonging is about inclusion and exclusion – who
counts as a member of the community entitled to make
justice claims. Transcends the geopolitical space into
transnationalism

12. The political ethics of care
◻ In addition to who is able to do what, who is entitled to
be what, who has access to resources, who is afforded
recognition or respect, who is excluded or included, it is
also necessary to ask who gets assigned to what
responsibilities, i.e. the allocation of caring
responsibilities.
◻ The political ethics of care approach enables one to ask
questions about the distribution of caregiving work in
society, the relations of power which affect this work and
are affected by it, and the sort of practices engaged in to
ensure the care of those who need it (and those who
don’t but have grown to expect that their needs will be
serviced (Waerness, 1990). It thus raises questions
about care, dependency and vulnerability in relation to
human flourishing (Mackenzie, Rogers & Dodds, 2014;
Tronto 1993; 2013).

13. The political ethics of care
(contd)
◻ Assumption that the world consists of independent, self-sufficient,
equally placed humans is erroneous but prevalent
– we are all dependent at different times of our lives and
dependents all need to be cared for.
◻ Recognition that dependency is an inevitable condition in
human life and that it is usually assumed to be a familial
obligation is important. In terms of the ethics of care,
dependency is seen as a normal part of human life, and one
which should be considered in social sharing of burdens, just
as education, health services and road maintenance are
(Kittay 2002).
◻ Both Joan Tronto’s (1993) notion of ‘privileged irresponsibility’
and Val Plumwood’s (1993) ‘backgrounding’ which involve
the denial of dependency on another, where the services of
the other are used but not acknowledged, encapsulate a dark
side of the refusal to recognise dependency or care work as
valuable and our own vulnerability in this respect.

14. The political ethics of care
(conted)
◻ Equality and participation are seen as relational
and connection-based rather than in terms of
atomised individuals, in that care is dependent on
a caregiver and a care receiver.
◻ Care is located in the public and the private
◻ Destabilises notions of what people’s ‘natural’
responsibilities are in terms of gender and
generation, and makes moral claims for societal
responsibility to ensure that care can be both
given and received with some amount of choice
and without prejudicing those involved in the
caring practices.

15. Definition of care
 “At the most general level, care
consists of everything we do to
continue, maintain, and repair
our world so that we may live in it
as well as possible.”(Fisher and
Tronto 1990: 40) Tronto 1993, 103

16. The political ethics of care
◻ Joan Tronto’s (1993) delineation of the five phases of care, and the value
associated with each phase, is useful in that it distinguishes the different
processes in the practice of care:
◻ Caring about – noticing people’s needs (attention) listening to what people
are saying and what they are not saying
◻ Caring for – taking responsibility to ensure that people’s needs are met
(responsibility)
◻ Care-giving – the actual hands-on physical work of caring for people
(competence)
◻ Care-receiving – responding to the care that is given by the care-giver
(responsiveness)
◻ Caring with- this is the fifth phase of care which Tronto (2012;2013) has
recently added. It refers to the reiteration of the process of care, where
habits and patterns of care emerge through time and where the moral
qualities of trust and solidarity are developed. Conditions of trust are
created where reliance can be developed through the caring practices of
others. Solidarity develops when people realize that are relational beings
who are better off ‘engaged in such processes of care together rather than
alone’ (Tronto 2012, 5).

17. The political ethics of care
◻ These five phases should lead to integrity of
care if it is to be viewed as a well-accomplished
caring practice.
◻ The moral integrity of care means that
participation is co-constructed meaning-making
and dialogue in relation to lived
human experience.
◻ The viewpoint of the other is important in the
care process. Good caring practice requires
negotiation and dialogue between those
giving and receiving care, rather than an
abstract, impartial view as required by rights-based
approaches.

18. Institutional Care – warning signs
(Tronto, 2010)
 Misfortune causes the need for care
 Needs are taken as given in the organisation
 Care is considered a commodity not a process
 Care receivers are excluded from making judgements because they
lack expertise
 Care is narrowed to care giving, rather than understanding the full
process of care which includes attentiveness to needs and the
allocation of responsibility
 Care givers see organizational requirements as hindrances to,
rather than support for care
 Care work is distributed along lines of class, caste, gender, and race

19. Comprehensive framework
Indicators of social justice
&
political ethics of care
Social Marker
Race Gender Generation
Ability
Resources
Recognition
Responsibilities
Representation
Goals of socially just
pedagogies
Participatory parity, human flourishing/well-being/
ability to give and receive care in situations of
choice

20. Questions to ask re social justice in
relation to the framework
◻ Are people able to receive and to give care in
situations of their choice?
◻ Are people able to participate on a par and as
full members of society?
◻ Are people able to flourish or are they
prevented from doing so?

21. Giving and receiving care
◻ Democracy is the allocation of caring responsibilities
and assuring that everyone can participate in those
allocations of care as completely as possible (Tronto,
2012)
◻ Negotiating needs, dialogically practices seeing care as
political
◻ If certain groups of people (e.g. women and children)
spend a great deal of their time meeting other people’s
needs, they are not able to participate on an equal
footing, as their own needs are not being met by
someone else, and they would not have the time to
pursue other activities such as studying or researching if
one regards teaching as a caregiving process.

22. Resources
Certain groups in society may have access to
less resources than others to be able to
participate on a par and achieve valuable
beings and doings
Dependency workers also have less access to
resources as their work is not adequately
compensated or seen as valuable
Differently abled persons often also have less
access to adequate resources to meet their
needs so that they can participate on a par
with others

23. Recognition
◻ The framework may be useful in assessing how
people’s attributes are appreciated or unappreciated, in
how their attributes are valued or devalued.
◻ Participatory parity i.e. acting as equals or peers may
be rarely achieved for culturally devalued categories
such as those associated with particular institutions,
disciplines or identities
◻ What people whose attributes are devalued can desire,
say or do may be different from those who have more
status can desire, say or do. It may be culturally
unthinkable for certain groups to desire certain things,
for example, to have their needs prioritised above those
who are more valued, and that therefore they would not
consider contemplating this.
◻ Also misframing and social belonging

24. Responsibility
 How are responsibilities allocated and who has a say
in this
 Who is exempted from certain responsibilities
 Iris Marion Young social connection model of
responsibility
 Margaret Urban Walker – relational view of
responsibilities – theoretical-juridical abstract vs
expressive-collaborative theories – ordinary people

25. Representivity
Certain groups in the university can be seen as
more vulnerable in that they may not be
accorded much voice (representivity) and may
have to do what is expected of them by those in
more powerful positions
Those who are involved in paid and unpaid
dependency work (e.g. teaching or cleaning)
may not have the opportunity to participate in
public fora and have their needs listened to
Certain groups of people may not have the
means for getting their voices heard

26. Complexity in relation to participatory
parity and human flourishing
◻ Distribution of resources and the recognition or
misrecognition of ascribed characteristics in terms of status
can be seen as complexly intertwined. For example
students only be allowed to access certain items on their
financial aid and live in certain places, may not be permitted
to move about freely due to safety issues and may not be
afforded the same educational opportunities, both because
resources are denied them and because of their diminished
status in relation to others
◻ In addition to this, the responsibilities which are ascribed
women students may prevent them from being able to fully
engage in other pursuits such as education, leisure activities
or from having their own needs for self-care met – being
able to give and receive care. They may also have
diminished voice (representivity) in social deliberations

27. References
◻ Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya Kumar (1989) Hunger and Public Action. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
◻ Kittay, Eva (2002) ‘Love’s Labor Revisited’. Hypatia, 17(3): 237-250.
◻ Kittay, Eva Feder (1999) Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency. New York and London: Routledge.
◻ Kittay, Eva Feder (1997) ‘Taking Dependency Seriously’.In Patricia DiQuinzio and Iris Marion Young (eds.) Feminist Ethics and Social Policy.
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
◻ Fraser, Nancy (2008) ‘Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World’. In K. Olson (ed.) Adding Insult to Injury: Nancy Fraser Debates Her Critics. London &
New York: Verso.
◻ Fraser, Nancy (2009) Scales of Justice. Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World. New York: Columbia University Press.
◻ Held, Virginia (2006) The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global. New York: Oxford University Press.
◻ Nussbaum, Martha and Glover, Jonathan (eds.) (1995) Women, Culture and Development. A study of human capabilities. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
◻ Nussbaum, Martha (1995) ‘Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings’, In Martha Nussbaum and Jonathon Glover (eds.) Women, Culture and
Development. A study of human capabilities. .Oxford: Clarendon Press.
◻ Nussbaum, Martha (2000) Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
◻ Nussbaum, Martha. C. (2006) Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge & London: The Belknap Press.
◻ Nussbaum, Martha
◻ Sen, Amartya Kumar (1984) Resources Values and Development. Oxford: Blackwell.
◻ Sen, Amartya Kumar (1995) ‘Gender Inequality and Theories of Justice’. In Martha Nussbaum and Jonathon Glover (eds.) Women, Culture and
Development. A study of human capabilities. .Oxford: Clarendon Press.
◻ Mackenzie,C., Rogers, W. & Dodds, S. (eds.) (2014) Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philoaophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
◻ Sen, Amartya Kumar (2001) Development as Freedom. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
◻ Sevenhuijsen, Selma (1998) Citizenship and the Ethics of Care. Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality and Politics. London and New York:
Routledge.
◻ Sevenhuijsen, S., and A. Svab. 2003. Labyrinths of Care: The Relevance of the Ethics of Care Perspective for Social Policy. Ljubljana: Mirovni Institute..
◻ Tronto, Joan (1993) Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New York & London: Routledge.
◻ Tronto, Joan (2010) Institutional Care. Ethics in Social Welfre (incomplete reference)
◻ Tronto, J. 2012. Democratic caring and global responsibilities for care. Paper presented at the Conference Critical Care, September, Brighton, United
Kingdom.
◻ Tronto J. 2013. Caring democracy: Markets, equality, and justice. New York: New York University Press.

28. Publications on social justice and
 Bozalek, V. (2010) The effect of institutional racism on student family circumstances: A human
capabilities perspective, South African Journal of Psychology,40(4):487-494.
 Bozalek, V. (2012) Recognition and participatory parity: Students’ accounts of gendered family
practices. The Social Work Practitioner-Researcher, 24(1):66-84.
 Bozalek, V. & Boughey, C. (2012) (Mis)Framing Higher Education in South Africa. Social Policy &
Administration, 46(6):688-703.
 Bozalek, V. & Carolissen, R. (2012) The potential of critical feminist citizenship frameworks for
citizenship and social justice in higher education, Perspectives in Education, 30(4):9-18.
 Bozalek, V. & Leibowitz, B. (2012) An evaluative framework for a socially just institution. In B.
Leibowitz (ed,) Higher Education for the Public Good: Views from the South. Trentham Books and
Stellenbosch: SUN media. pp. 59-72.
 Bozalek, V., McMillan, W., Marshall, D., November, M., Daniels, A. and Sylvester, T. (2014)
Analysing the professional development of teaching and learning at UWC from a political ethics
of care perspective, Teaching in Higher Education, 19(5): 447-458.
 Zembylas, M., Bozalek, V. and Shefer, T. (2014) Tronto’s notion of privileged irresponsibility and
the reconceptualisation of care: implications for critical pedagogies of emotion, Gender and
Education, DOI:
 10.1080/09540253.2014.901718
ethics of care