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Reference:
Corporate & Network Security, Chapter 1
Raymond R. Panko
:
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 The threat environment—attackers and their
attacks
 Basic security terminology
 Employee and ex-employee threats
 Traditional external attackers
 The criminal era and competitor threats
 Cyberwar and cyberterror
2
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Traditional Hackers
3
In the 1970s, malware writers were joined
by external hackers who began to break
into corporate computers that were
connected to modems. Today nearly every
firm is connected to the Internet which
harbors millions of external hackers
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Traditional Hackers
◦ Motivated by thrill, validation of skills, sense of
power
◦ Motivated to increase reputation among other
hackers
◦ Often do damage as a byproduct
◦ Often engage in petty crime
4
ComputerWeekly.com
2008
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Traditional Hackers
5
In 2009, vandals broke into a computerized road
sign in Austin, Texas, and changed its message
to read: “The end is near ! Caution ! Zombies
Ahead !”
Dallasnews.com, January 2009
Raymond Torricelli, broke into NASA computers
and used up processor time, money, and disk
resources to divert chat users to a website for
which he admitted to being paid USD 400 per
week.
Cybercrime.gov, 2001
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
6
Just like a thief who wants to rob a home does
reconnaissance of the neighborhood and gathers
information to determine which house to break into,
hackers also tend to do reconnaissance before
breaking into a computer.
As the figure shows, the attacker often sends probe
packets into a network. These probe packets are
designed to elicit replies from internal hosts and
routers.
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Anatomy of a Hack
◦ Reconnaissance probes (see figure)
 IP address scans to identify possible victims
 Identify active hosts
 ICMP Echo and Echo reply messages
 Port scans (connection requests) to learn which
services are open on each potential victim host
7
Port 80 is the well known port for HTTP web servers.
There are many well known port numbers between 0
and 1023. each indicates the presence of a
particular type of application.
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
8
Corporate Site
128.171.17.13
128.171.17.47
Attacker
1.
IP Address Scanning Packet
Response Conf irms a Host at
128.171.17.13
3.
Exploit
Packet
128.171.17.22
2.
Port Scanning Packet
to Identif y Running
Applications
1. ICMP Echo and Echo reply
2. Connection requests
On a particular port number
3. Exploit or break-in
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Anatomy of a Hack
◦ The exploit
 The specific attack method that the attacker uses
to break into the computer is called the attacker’s
exploit
 The act of implementing the exploit is called
exploiting the host
9
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
10
128.171.17.13
128.171.17.47
Attacker
1.
Spoof ed Packet to 128.171.17.13
Source IP address = 128.171.17.47
Instead of 10.6.4.3 10.6.4.3
2.
Reply goes to
Host 128.171.17.47
IP Address Spoof ing
Hides the Attacker's Identity .
But Replies do Not Go to the Attacker,
So IP address Spoof ing
Cannot be Used f or All Purposes
Some exploit packets cannot be spoofed so the
attacker uses chain of attack
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Chain of attack computers (see figure)
◦ The attacker attacks through a chain of victim
computers
◦ Probe and exploit packets contain the source IP
address of the last computer in the chain
◦ The final attack computer receives replies and
passes them back to the attacker
◦ Often, the victim can trace the attack back to the
final attack computer
◦ But the attack usually can only be traced back a few
computers more
11
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
12
Target Host
60.168.47.47
Attacker
1.34.150.37
Compromised
Attack Host
3.35.126.7
Compromised
Attack Host
123.125.33.101
Usually Can Only Trace Attack
to Direct Attacker (123.125.33.101)
or Second Direct Attacker (3.35.126.7)
Log In Log In
Attack
Command
For probes whose replies must
be received, attacker sends
probes through a chain of
attack computers.
Victim only knows the identity
of the last compromised host
(123.125.33.101)
Not that of the attacker
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Social Engineering
◦ Social engineering is often used in hacking
◦ Social engineering (as we saw earlier) is attempting
to trick users into doing something that goes
against the interests of security
◦ Often successful because it focuses on human
weaknesses instead of technological weaknesses
13
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Social Engineering
 Call and ask for passwords and other confidential
information
14
In one social engineering ploy, a hacker
calls a secretary claiming to be working
with the secretary’s boss. The hacker then
asks for sensitive information such as a
password or sensitive file.
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Social Engineering
15
In one study, US Treasury Dept. inspectors
posing as computer technicians called 100
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees and
managers. The treasury agents asked each
target for his or her username and asked the
user to change the password to a specific
password chosen by the “technician.” This was a
clear violation of policy but 35% fell for the ploy
in 2005.
Washington Post, March 2005
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Social Engineering
 E-mail attack messages with attractive subjects
 Piggybacking
 Shoulder surfing
 Pretexting
16
Piggybacking is following someone through a
secure door, without entering a pass code. Looking
over someone’s shoulder when he or she types a
password is shoulder surfing. In pretexting the
attacker calls claiming to be a certain customer in
order to get private information about that
customer.
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks
◦ Make a server or entire network unavailable to
legitimate users
◦ Typically send a flood of attack messages to the
victim
◦ Distributed DoS (DDoS) Attacks ( see figure)
 Bots flood the victim with attack packets
 Attacker controls the bot
17
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
18
Victim
Attacker
Bot
Bot
Bot
Attack
Command
Attack Packets
Attack Packets
Attack Packets
Attack
Command
Attack
Command
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
19
In 2001, the Code Red virus attacked the US
Whitehouse website. Fortunately the attacks were
made against the website’s IP address in stead of its
host name. The White House merely changed the IP
address of whitehouse.gov
To attack a server, the bots might flood the server
with TCP connection-opening requests (TCP SYN
segments). A server reserves a certain amount of
capacity each time it receives a SYN segment. By
flooding a computer with SYN segments, the
attacker can cause the server to run out of
resources and therefore crash.
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Bots
◦ Updatable attack programs ( see figure)
◦ Botmaster can update the software to change the
type of attack the bot can do
 May sell or lease the botnet to other criminals
◦ Botmaster can update the bot to fix bugs
20
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
21
DOS
Victim
Botmas
ter
Bot
Bot
Bot
1.
DoSAttack
Command
1.
DoSAttack Packets
2.
Spam
E-
Mail
2.
Software update
for Spam
3.
Software update
to f ix bug in the
attack so
ftware
2.
Spam
E-
Mail SpamVictims
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
22
 Bots
Jeanson Ancheta was indicted for crimes involving
a large botnet. Ancheta was charged with creating
the botnet and installing adware programs, which
constantly pop up advertisements, on these
computers for a fee. He was also charged with
renting parts of his botnet to other criminals for
spam and denial of service attacks.
http://www.cybercrime.gov (Nov 2005)
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Skill Levels
◦ Expert attackers are characterized by strong
technical skills and dogged persistence
◦ Expert attackers create hacker scripts to automate
some of their work
◦ Scripts are also available for writing viruses and
other malicious software
23
Todays hacker scripts often have easy to use graphical user
interfaces and look like commercial products. Many scripts
are available on the Internet…These easy to use scripts have
created a new type of hacker “the script kiddie”
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Skill Levels
◦ Script kiddies use these scripts to make attacks
◦ Script kiddies have low technical skills
◦ Script kiddies are dangerous because of their large
numbers
24
In February 2000 a number of major firms were affected by
devastatingly effective DDOS attacks that blocked each of
their e-commerce systems for hours at a time. Victims
included CNN, ebay, Yahoo, ZDNET, and others. At first the
attacks were thought to be work of an elite hacker. However,
the culprit was found to be a 15 year old script kiddie in
Canada
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Skill Levels
25
Virus and other Malware writers also have written
long programs for creating new malware. Viruses
have become so easy to create with these tools that
Svan Jaschan, an 18 year old German student, who
had never written a virus before, was responsible
for 70% of the virus activity in the first half of 2004.
(http://www.sophos.com)
Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010
 Skill Levels
26
Today tools are available for creating all types of
exploits. One of the most important is the
MetaSploit Framework which makes it easy to take
a new exploitation method and rapidly turn it into
a full attack program. Metasploit is used both by
attackers to launch attacks, and by security
professionals to test the vulnerability of their
systems to specific exploits.
(http://www.metasploit.com)

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Information-Security-Lecture-7.pptx

  • 1. Reference: Corporate & Network Security, Chapter 1 Raymond R. Panko :
  • 2. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  The threat environment—attackers and their attacks  Basic security terminology  Employee and ex-employee threats  Traditional external attackers  The criminal era and competitor threats  Cyberwar and cyberterror 2
  • 3. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Traditional Hackers 3 In the 1970s, malware writers were joined by external hackers who began to break into corporate computers that were connected to modems. Today nearly every firm is connected to the Internet which harbors millions of external hackers
  • 4. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Traditional Hackers ◦ Motivated by thrill, validation of skills, sense of power ◦ Motivated to increase reputation among other hackers ◦ Often do damage as a byproduct ◦ Often engage in petty crime 4 ComputerWeekly.com 2008
  • 5. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Traditional Hackers 5 In 2009, vandals broke into a computerized road sign in Austin, Texas, and changed its message to read: “The end is near ! Caution ! Zombies Ahead !” Dallasnews.com, January 2009 Raymond Torricelli, broke into NASA computers and used up processor time, money, and disk resources to divert chat users to a website for which he admitted to being paid USD 400 per week. Cybercrime.gov, 2001
  • 6. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 6 Just like a thief who wants to rob a home does reconnaissance of the neighborhood and gathers information to determine which house to break into, hackers also tend to do reconnaissance before breaking into a computer. As the figure shows, the attacker often sends probe packets into a network. These probe packets are designed to elicit replies from internal hosts and routers.
  • 7. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Anatomy of a Hack ◦ Reconnaissance probes (see figure)  IP address scans to identify possible victims  Identify active hosts  ICMP Echo and Echo reply messages  Port scans (connection requests) to learn which services are open on each potential victim host 7 Port 80 is the well known port for HTTP web servers. There are many well known port numbers between 0 and 1023. each indicates the presence of a particular type of application.
  • 8. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 8 Corporate Site 128.171.17.13 128.171.17.47 Attacker 1. IP Address Scanning Packet Response Conf irms a Host at 128.171.17.13 3. Exploit Packet 128.171.17.22 2. Port Scanning Packet to Identif y Running Applications 1. ICMP Echo and Echo reply 2. Connection requests On a particular port number 3. Exploit or break-in
  • 9. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Anatomy of a Hack ◦ The exploit  The specific attack method that the attacker uses to break into the computer is called the attacker’s exploit  The act of implementing the exploit is called exploiting the host 9
  • 10. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 10 128.171.17.13 128.171.17.47 Attacker 1. Spoof ed Packet to 128.171.17.13 Source IP address = 128.171.17.47 Instead of 10.6.4.3 10.6.4.3 2. Reply goes to Host 128.171.17.47 IP Address Spoof ing Hides the Attacker's Identity . But Replies do Not Go to the Attacker, So IP address Spoof ing Cannot be Used f or All Purposes Some exploit packets cannot be spoofed so the attacker uses chain of attack
  • 11. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Chain of attack computers (see figure) ◦ The attacker attacks through a chain of victim computers ◦ Probe and exploit packets contain the source IP address of the last computer in the chain ◦ The final attack computer receives replies and passes them back to the attacker ◦ Often, the victim can trace the attack back to the final attack computer ◦ But the attack usually can only be traced back a few computers more 11
  • 12. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 12 Target Host 60.168.47.47 Attacker 1.34.150.37 Compromised Attack Host 3.35.126.7 Compromised Attack Host 123.125.33.101 Usually Can Only Trace Attack to Direct Attacker (123.125.33.101) or Second Direct Attacker (3.35.126.7) Log In Log In Attack Command For probes whose replies must be received, attacker sends probes through a chain of attack computers. Victim only knows the identity of the last compromised host (123.125.33.101) Not that of the attacker
  • 13. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Social Engineering ◦ Social engineering is often used in hacking ◦ Social engineering (as we saw earlier) is attempting to trick users into doing something that goes against the interests of security ◦ Often successful because it focuses on human weaknesses instead of technological weaknesses 13
  • 14. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Social Engineering  Call and ask for passwords and other confidential information 14 In one social engineering ploy, a hacker calls a secretary claiming to be working with the secretary’s boss. The hacker then asks for sensitive information such as a password or sensitive file.
  • 15. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Social Engineering 15 In one study, US Treasury Dept. inspectors posing as computer technicians called 100 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees and managers. The treasury agents asked each target for his or her username and asked the user to change the password to a specific password chosen by the “technician.” This was a clear violation of policy but 35% fell for the ploy in 2005. Washington Post, March 2005
  • 16. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Social Engineering  E-mail attack messages with attractive subjects  Piggybacking  Shoulder surfing  Pretexting 16 Piggybacking is following someone through a secure door, without entering a pass code. Looking over someone’s shoulder when he or she types a password is shoulder surfing. In pretexting the attacker calls claiming to be a certain customer in order to get private information about that customer.
  • 17. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attacks ◦ Make a server or entire network unavailable to legitimate users ◦ Typically send a flood of attack messages to the victim ◦ Distributed DoS (DDoS) Attacks ( see figure)  Bots flood the victim with attack packets  Attacker controls the bot 17
  • 18. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 18 Victim Attacker Bot Bot Bot Attack Command Attack Packets Attack Packets Attack Packets Attack Command Attack Command
  • 19. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 19 In 2001, the Code Red virus attacked the US Whitehouse website. Fortunately the attacks were made against the website’s IP address in stead of its host name. The White House merely changed the IP address of whitehouse.gov To attack a server, the bots might flood the server with TCP connection-opening requests (TCP SYN segments). A server reserves a certain amount of capacity each time it receives a SYN segment. By flooding a computer with SYN segments, the attacker can cause the server to run out of resources and therefore crash.
  • 20. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Bots ◦ Updatable attack programs ( see figure) ◦ Botmaster can update the software to change the type of attack the bot can do  May sell or lease the botnet to other criminals ◦ Botmaster can update the bot to fix bugs 20
  • 21. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 21 DOS Victim Botmas ter Bot Bot Bot 1. DoSAttack Command 1. DoSAttack Packets 2. Spam E- Mail 2. Software update for Spam 3. Software update to f ix bug in the attack so ftware 2. Spam E- Mail SpamVictims
  • 22. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010 22  Bots Jeanson Ancheta was indicted for crimes involving a large botnet. Ancheta was charged with creating the botnet and installing adware programs, which constantly pop up advertisements, on these computers for a fee. He was also charged with renting parts of his botnet to other criminals for spam and denial of service attacks. http://www.cybercrime.gov (Nov 2005)
  • 23. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Skill Levels ◦ Expert attackers are characterized by strong technical skills and dogged persistence ◦ Expert attackers create hacker scripts to automate some of their work ◦ Scripts are also available for writing viruses and other malicious software 23 Todays hacker scripts often have easy to use graphical user interfaces and look like commercial products. Many scripts are available on the Internet…These easy to use scripts have created a new type of hacker “the script kiddie”
  • 24. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Skill Levels ◦ Script kiddies use these scripts to make attacks ◦ Script kiddies have low technical skills ◦ Script kiddies are dangerous because of their large numbers 24 In February 2000 a number of major firms were affected by devastatingly effective DDOS attacks that blocked each of their e-commerce systems for hours at a time. Victims included CNN, ebay, Yahoo, ZDNET, and others. At first the attacks were thought to be work of an elite hacker. However, the culprit was found to be a 15 year old script kiddie in Canada
  • 25. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Skill Levels 25 Virus and other Malware writers also have written long programs for creating new malware. Viruses have become so easy to create with these tools that Svan Jaschan, an 18 year old German student, who had never written a virus before, was responsible for 70% of the virus activity in the first half of 2004. (http://www.sophos.com)
  • 26. Copyright Pearson Prentice-Hall 2010  Skill Levels 26 Today tools are available for creating all types of exploits. One of the most important is the MetaSploit Framework which makes it easy to take a new exploitation method and rapidly turn it into a full attack program. Metasploit is used both by attackers to launch attacks, and by security professionals to test the vulnerability of their systems to specific exploits. (http://www.metasploit.com)