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CNIT 141


Cryptography for Computer Networks
13. TLS
Updated 12-8-21
Topics
• Target Applications and Requirements


• The TLS Protocol Suite


• TLS 1.3 Improvements Over TLS 1.2


• The Strengths of TLS Security


• How Things Can Go Wrong
TLS
• Protects communications at layer 4


• Can carry any type of content


• Email, Web traffic, mobile apps, ...


• Machine-to-machine comms for IoT
TLS Vulnerabilities
• TLS grew too big and bloated


• Many attacks


• Heartbleed


• BEAST


• CRIME


• POODLE
TLS 1.3
• Overhaul of protocol


• Removed unnecessary features


• Replaced old algorithms


• Simpler, faster, and more secure
Target Applications and
Requirements
Secure Channel
• TLS ensures that data is confidential,
authenticated, and unmodified


• Prevents MiTM attacks


• By authenticating servers with trusted
Certificate Authorities
Four Requirements
• Efficient


• Minimizing CPU load compared to unencrypted
comms


• Interoperable


• Work on any hardware or OS


• Extensible


• Support additional features & algorithms


• Versatile


• Not bound to any specific application
The TLS Protocol Suite
Transport Layer
• TLS is not in the transport
layer


• It's above layer 4,
adding security to it


• Can run over TCP or UDP


• UDP version is called
DTLS


• Datagram Transport
Layer Security
History
• SSL: began in 1995, from Netscape


• SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0 had security flaws


• Should no longer be used


• TLS


• TLS 1.0 (1999): least secure


• TLS 1.1 (2006): better but contains weak
algorithms
TLS 1.2
• From 2008


• Better than previous versions


• Complex and hard to configure


• Supports AES-CBC, vulnerable to padding
oracle attacks


• Inherited dozens of features and design
choices from earlier versions


• TLS 1.3 is a major overhaul and improvement
TLS in a Nutshell
• Record protocol


• Data encapsulation


• Handshake protocol


• Key agreement
TLS Handshake
• From Cloudflare (link Ch 13a)
Hello
• ClientHello


• Lists ciphers available


• ServerHello


• Selects a cipher to use
ClientHello
ServerHello
Certificates and


Certificate Authorities (CA)
• Server uses a certificate to authenticate itself


• Verified by a CA


• CA's public keys hard-coded into browsers


• Trusted third party
Certificate
Certificate Chain
Record Protocol
Zero Padding
• Adds zeroes to plaintext for short messages


• Mitigates traffic analysis


• Deducing contents from message size
TLS 1.3 Cryptographic
Algorithms
• Three types of algorithms are used


• Authenticated encryption


• Key derivation function


• Hash function that derives secret keys
from a shared secret


• A Diffie-Hellman operation
Authenticated Ciphers
• TLS 1.3 supports only three algorithms


• AES-GCM


• AES-CCM


• Slightly less efficient than AES-GCM


• ChaCha20 stream cipher


• Combined with Poly1305 MAC


• Secret key can be 128 or 256 bits


• Unsafe 64-bit or 80-bit keys not allowed
Key Derivation Function


(KDF)
• HKDF, based on HMAC


• Uses SHA-256 or SHA-384
Diffie-Hellman


Two Options
• Elliptic Curve


• With three NIST curves, or


• Curve25519, or Curve448


• Group of integers modulo a prime number


• Traditional Diffie-Hellman


• 2048 - 8192 bits


• Security of 2048-bit group is weak link


• Less than 100 bits
TLS 1.3 Improvements
Over TLS 1.2
Removed Weak
Algorithms
• MD5, SHA-1


• RC4, AES-CBC


• MAC-then-Encrypt alorithms


• Like HMAC-SHA-1


• Replaces with authenticated ciphers


• More efficient and secure
Removed Insecure
Feature
• Optional data compression


• Enabled the CRIME attack


• Length of the compressed message
leaked information about contents
New Features
• That make TLS 1.3 more secure


• Downgrade protection


• Single round-trip handshake


• Session resumption
Downgrade Attack
• MiTM attacker modifies ClientHello
I want 

TLS 1.3
Sending

ServerHello

for TLS 1.1
Send her

TLS 1.1

instead
Downgrade Protection
• To prevent this, 8 bytes in the ServerHello
denote the TLS version


• They are cryptographically signed so the
MiTM can't change them


• The client can check them to see what TLS
version is being provided
Single Round-Trip
Handshake
• In TLS 1.2


• Client sends some data, waits for response


• Client sends more data, waits for response


• TLS 1.3 combines it all into one round-trip


• Saves time
Session Resumption
• Leverages the pre-shared key exchanged in a
previous session


• To bootstrap a new session


• Two benefits


• Client can start encrypting immediately


• No need for certificates
The Strengths of TLS
Security
Authentication
• TLS 1.3 handshake authenticates the server
with a certificate and CA


• Client is not authenticated, but can
authenticate after the TLS handshake with:


• Username & password in a TLS record


• Secure cookie over TLS


• A client certificate (rarely used)
Forward Secrecy
• TLS 1.3 provides forward secrecy in both a
data leak and a breach


• If an attacker can steal a client's RAM


• Exposes keys and secrets for the current
session


• And any old sessions still stored in RAM


• Solution: use Secure Strings
• Provided by Microsoft


• Since 2005 in .NET 2.0


• Link Ch 13b
How Things Can Go
Wrong
Compromised CA
• Happened in 2011 to DigiNotar


• CA's private key compromised


• Attacker created fake certificates for Google
services
Compromised Client
• Attacker who controls client can


• Capture session keys


• Read decrypted data


• Or install a rogue CA certificate
Bugs in Implementation
• Heartbleed


• Leaked secrets from HTTPS servers in 2014
Improving TLS
• SSL Labs TLS test


• Lets you test any site's certificate


• Or a browser's TLS configuration


• Let's Encrypt


• Free TLS certificates for everyone
CNIT 141 13. TLS
CNIT 141 13. TLS
CNIT 141 13. TLS
CNIT 141 13. TLS

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CNIT 141 13. TLS

  • 1. CNIT 141 Cryptography for Computer Networks 13. TLS Updated 12-8-21
  • 2. Topics • Target Applications and Requirements • The TLS Protocol Suite • TLS 1.3 Improvements Over TLS 1.2 • The Strengths of TLS Security • How Things Can Go Wrong
  • 3. TLS • Protects communications at layer 4 • Can carry any type of content • Email, Web traffic, mobile apps, ... • Machine-to-machine comms for IoT
  • 4. TLS Vulnerabilities • TLS grew too big and bloated • Many attacks • Heartbleed • BEAST • CRIME • POODLE
  • 5. TLS 1.3 • Overhaul of protocol • Removed unnecessary features • Replaced old algorithms • Simpler, faster, and more secure
  • 7. Secure Channel • TLS ensures that data is confidential, authenticated, and unmodified • Prevents MiTM attacks • By authenticating servers with trusted Certificate Authorities
  • 8. Four Requirements • Efficient • Minimizing CPU load compared to unencrypted comms • Interoperable • Work on any hardware or OS • Extensible • Support additional features & algorithms • Versatile • Not bound to any specific application
  • 10. Transport Layer • TLS is not in the transport layer • It's above layer 4, adding security to it • Can run over TCP or UDP • UDP version is called DTLS • Datagram Transport Layer Security
  • 11. History • SSL: began in 1995, from Netscape • SSL 2.0 and SSL 3.0 had security flaws • Should no longer be used • TLS • TLS 1.0 (1999): least secure • TLS 1.1 (2006): better but contains weak algorithms
  • 12. TLS 1.2 • From 2008 • Better than previous versions • Complex and hard to configure • Supports AES-CBC, vulnerable to padding oracle attacks • Inherited dozens of features and design choices from earlier versions • TLS 1.3 is a major overhaul and improvement
  • 13. TLS in a Nutshell • Record protocol • Data encapsulation • Handshake protocol • Key agreement
  • 14. TLS Handshake • From Cloudflare (link Ch 13a)
  • 15. Hello • ClientHello • Lists ciphers available • ServerHello • Selects a cipher to use
  • 18.
  • 19. Certificates and Certificate Authorities (CA) • Server uses a certificate to authenticate itself • Verified by a CA • CA's public keys hard-coded into browsers • Trusted third party
  • 23. Zero Padding • Adds zeroes to plaintext for short messages • Mitigates traffic analysis • Deducing contents from message size
  • 24. TLS 1.3 Cryptographic Algorithms • Three types of algorithms are used • Authenticated encryption • Key derivation function • Hash function that derives secret keys from a shared secret • A Diffie-Hellman operation
  • 25. Authenticated Ciphers • TLS 1.3 supports only three algorithms • AES-GCM • AES-CCM • Slightly less efficient than AES-GCM • ChaCha20 stream cipher • Combined with Poly1305 MAC • Secret key can be 128 or 256 bits • Unsafe 64-bit or 80-bit keys not allowed
  • 26. Key Derivation Function (KDF) • HKDF, based on HMAC • Uses SHA-256 or SHA-384
  • 27. Diffie-Hellman Two Options • Elliptic Curve • With three NIST curves, or • Curve25519, or Curve448 • Group of integers modulo a prime number • Traditional Diffie-Hellman • 2048 - 8192 bits • Security of 2048-bit group is weak link • Less than 100 bits
  • 29. Removed Weak Algorithms • MD5, SHA-1 • RC4, AES-CBC • MAC-then-Encrypt alorithms • Like HMAC-SHA-1 • Replaces with authenticated ciphers • More efficient and secure
  • 30. Removed Insecure Feature • Optional data compression • Enabled the CRIME attack • Length of the compressed message leaked information about contents
  • 31. New Features • That make TLS 1.3 more secure • Downgrade protection • Single round-trip handshake • Session resumption
  • 32. Downgrade Attack • MiTM attacker modifies ClientHello I want TLS 1.3 Sending ServerHello for TLS 1.1 Send her TLS 1.1 instead
  • 33. Downgrade Protection • To prevent this, 8 bytes in the ServerHello denote the TLS version • They are cryptographically signed so the MiTM can't change them • The client can check them to see what TLS version is being provided
  • 34. Single Round-Trip Handshake • In TLS 1.2 • Client sends some data, waits for response • Client sends more data, waits for response • TLS 1.3 combines it all into one round-trip • Saves time
  • 35. Session Resumption • Leverages the pre-shared key exchanged in a previous session • To bootstrap a new session • Two benefits • Client can start encrypting immediately • No need for certificates
  • 36.
  • 37. The Strengths of TLS Security
  • 38. Authentication • TLS 1.3 handshake authenticates the server with a certificate and CA • Client is not authenticated, but can authenticate after the TLS handshake with: • Username & password in a TLS record • Secure cookie over TLS • A client certificate (rarely used)
  • 39. Forward Secrecy • TLS 1.3 provides forward secrecy in both a data leak and a breach • If an attacker can steal a client's RAM • Exposes keys and secrets for the current session • And any old sessions still stored in RAM • Solution: use Secure Strings
  • 40. • Provided by Microsoft • Since 2005 in .NET 2.0 • Link Ch 13b
  • 41. How Things Can Go Wrong
  • 42. Compromised CA • Happened in 2011 to DigiNotar • CA's private key compromised • Attacker created fake certificates for Google services
  • 43.
  • 44.
  • 45.
  • 46. Compromised Client • Attacker who controls client can • Capture session keys • Read decrypted data • Or install a rogue CA certificate
  • 47. Bugs in Implementation • Heartbleed • Leaked secrets from HTTPS servers in 2014
  • 48. Improving TLS • SSL Labs TLS test • Lets you test any site's certificate • Or a browser's TLS configuration • Let's Encrypt • Free TLS certificates for everyone