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Mitre ATT&CKAdversarial Tactics, Techniques, and
Common Knowledge
15 min
Från den lilla
människan till
den stora
myndigheten
ATT&CK – ett modernt
IT-säkerhetsramverk
Alternativ titel:
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Mattias Almeflo
5.2.20193
The Security Engineer
• Systems Integrator | Information Security Architect | Team Leader
• IT security, Systems Engineering, Team Leader
2016
2010
2017
2018 • Principal Security Consultant
• Senior Information Security Architect
• Specializing in military security frameworks
• Team Leader | Information Security Architect
• Part of the founding team of Saab Cyber Security Division
• Thesis Worker | Software Developer
• Databases, .NET software development
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Mattias Almeflo
5.2.20194
And the Domains of Warfare
2010 – 2013: Land
Created the Secure
Operating Environment
(SOE) for the Swedish
Army (H/R)
2013 – 2015: Air
Windows Security in L16
Backbone (H/S, NS)
2015 – 2016: Naval
Docker Security in naval
systems (H/S)
2016 – 2017: Cyber
R&D Defensive Cyber Warfare
2017 –
Development
Environments (H/S)
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
The complexity of the domain is staggering
5.2.20195
and my areas of focus
COMPANY UNCLASSIFIED | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | UNCLASSIFIED
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
This is Nixu
5.2.20196
Interruption
in security
support
Cyber security
specialists
The trusted go-to partner
for cybersecurity services
in Northern Europe
Founded in
1988
publicly listed
2014
10 Locations
Finland, Sweden,
Netherland, US,
Romania and
Australia and more
300+
98%
of our clients
recommend Nixu
Vision:
Keep the digital
society running
Mission:
Best workplace for
cyber security
specialists
Cyber security services
from board decisions to
deep forensic investigations
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
The post-breach / “assume breach” age
"High-risk enterprises should assume that they are already compromised
- there is no product or combination of products that provides 100% protection"
- 2012, NSS Labs Analysis,
Brief – Cybercrime Kill Chain vs. Defense Effectiveness
5.2.20197
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
MITRE’s “assume breach” initiative
History:
• 2010 - researching data sources and analytic processes for detecting APTs
more quickly through the use of endpoint telemetry data
• 2013 - developed a process for modeling an adversary’s post-compromise
behavior at a granular level. This model is named ATT&CK
(Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge).
• 2015 - ATT&CK is released to the world
• 2018 - The first dedicated ATT&CK conference
5.2.20198
and the rise of the ATT&CK framework
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
The post-breach / “assume breach” age
5.2.20199
Dwell time – Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends 2018 report
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK
5.2.201910
PRE-ATT&CK ENTERPRISE
ATT&CK
• Persistence
• Privilege Escalation
• Defense Evasion
• Credential Access
• Discovery
• Lateral Movement
• Execution
• Collection
• Exfiltration
• Command and Control
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
ATT&CK – A more scientific way
An empirical/curated knowledge base
that helps model cyber adversaries’
tactics and techniques – and then shows how to
detect or stop them.
 The real hacker playbook (+200 techniques)
5.2.201911
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
APT Groups aka advance threat actors
Currently the ATT&CK framework have 78 different threat actors in its
catalogue.
Roughly 43% are attributed to countries
• 13 are presumed to be Chinese-based
• 12 are presumed to be Iranian-based
• 7 are presumed to be Russia-based
• 2 are presumed to be North Korea-based
5.2.201912
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
The post-breach / “assume breach” age
5.2.201913
and how ATT&CK can help you leverage what you already have
1. “Think like an attacker”
by studying their blueprints
2. Fighting the digital sleeper
agents of IT-modern systems
by behaviour monitoring
through Tactics, Techniques
and Procedures (TTP)
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
ATT&CK and living off the land binaries (LOLBins)
“Fileless Malware Attacks on the Rise, Microsoft Says” – 2018, october
• LOLBins have been around in the wild since 2014
• Recently experienced explosive growth
• 52% of non-malware attacks in 2017 involved the abuse of two
legitimate programs (powershell & WMI)
• increasing at a rate of 6.8% per month
5.2.201914
or homesteading in the enterprise with fileless attacks
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
The digital sleeper agents of modern IT-systems
Living of the land binaries:
• Authorized, trusted applications that are used by malicious actors
• Usually never writes to disk (they are already there)
• Live in memory
• Be one with the network
• Use tools already in place, use protocols already used
• (Don’t talk when the network is quiet)
• Make their infrastructure work for you
5.2.201915
or the rise of living of the land binaries (LOLBins)
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Biancos “Pyramid of Pain”
5.2.201916
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Simple examples of TTP
TTP in a windows environment
• “a privilege escalation via the Microsoft Connection Manager Profile
Installer (CMSTP.exe) ”
Using a non-cyber analogy
• “a specific approach to counterfeiting $100 dollar bills can be thought
of as a TTP while the specific guidance for detecting bills (wrong
color, bad watermark, etc.) using this approach can be thought of as
Indicators.”
5.2.201917
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
ATT&CK - Why / Benefits
Helps Determine which technologies work/fail
 Identify gaps to improve security posture/processes
 Prioritize work on detecting/detering techniques
 Evaluate new security technology
Low cost testing
 Open source/free tools
 Atomic Red Team, Caldera, APTSimulator, Adversary Emulation Plans, Att&ck Navigator
Higher cost testing optional
 Tripwire, All windows, CentoOS, Debian, Ubuntu & MacOS
 Carbon Black
Information Sharing
 Red/Blue team, Operations, Management, Government bodies
5.2.201918
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Credits 1/4
19
Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion!
Me, Myself & I
S03-06: Saab, the corporation video (6 min) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KsdPHsgR9Q
S03-06 : The domains of war - https://saab.com/land/, https://saab.com/air/, https://saab.com/naval/, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare
S03-06 : LinkedIn Cyber Security Domain Map - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/map-cybersecurity-domains-version-20-henry-jiang-ciso-cissp
S03-06 : Nixu Oy at 600Minutes Information and Cyber Security 2017 (Spotlight) - This is Nixu - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwIIJnZ8pHo
The Post-Breach Age - Quote
S07: Cybercrime Kill Chain vs. Defense Effectiveness - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258112939_Cybercrime_Kill_Chain_vs_Defense_Effectiveness
S07: Conference: Proceedings des 13. Deutschen Sicherheitskongress des BSI –
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Veranstaltungen/ITSiKongress/13ter/Stefan_Frei_16052013.pdf
MITRE’s “assume breach” initiative
S08: Finding Cyber Threats with ATT&CK™-Based Analytics –
https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/16-3713-finding-cyber-threats%20with%20att%26ck-based-analytics.pdf
S08: ATT&CK web page - https://attack.mitre.org
S08: ATT&CK conference 2018 - https://www.mitre.org/attackcon
The Post-Breach Age - Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends 2018 report
S09: Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends report - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Credits 2/4
20
Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion!
The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK
S10: TripWire, Defend Your Data Now with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io4vCTBLa78
Slides - https://www.slideshare.net/Tripwire/defend-your-data-now-with-the-mitre-attck-framework
ATT&CK – A more scientific way
S10: A short animated video about MITRE ATT&CK™ Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BEf6s1iu5g
S10: Science – It is the answer - https://www.deviantart.com/dormantflame/art/Because-Science-390410617
S10: The full ATT&CK Matrix - https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/
S10: 3 minutes on MITRE ATT&CK - https://www.rapid7.com/resources/3-minutes-on-mitre-attack
APT Groups aka advance threat actors
S11: ATT&CK Groups: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/
The post-breach / “assume breach” age and how ATT&CK can help you leverage what you already have
S09: Image - https://www.acsac.org/2017/workshops/icss/Otis-Alexander-ICS,%20Adversarial%20Tactics,%20Techniques.pdf
ATT&CK and LOLBins or homesteading in the enterprise with fileless attacks
S14: Fileless Malware Attacks on the Rise, Microsoft Says - https://www.securityweek.com/fileless-malware-attacks-rise-microsoft-says
S14: Carbon Black 2017 Threat Report -
https://www.carbonblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CB-Thread-Report-2017-122117.pdf
S14: DerbyCon 3.0 Living Off The Land A Minimalist S Guide To Windows Post Exploitation - https://youtu.be/j-r6UonEkUw
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Credits 3/4
21
Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion!
The digital sleeper agents of modern systems, or the rise of LOLBins
S15: LOLBins: Attackers Are Abusing Trusted Binaries to Target Organizations - https://blog.barkly.com/what-are-lolbins-living-off-the-land-binaries
Biancos “Pyramid of Pain”
S16: The Pyramid of Pain - http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html
Simple examples of TTP
S17: TTP vs Indicator: A simple usage overview - https://stixproject.github.io/documentation/concepts/ttp-vs-indicator/
S17: IOCs vs. TTPs - https://azeria-labs.com/iocs-vs-ttps/
ATT&CK - Why / Benefits
S18: Tools - https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/
S18: Tools - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator
S18: Tools - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team
S18: Tools - https://github.com/mitre/caldera
S18: Tools - https://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/just-released-version-2-of-the-attck%E2%84%A2
S18: Tools - https://github.com/mitre/attack-navigator
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Credits 4/4
22
Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion!
Books you should read that might have been mentioned but aren’t represented by a slide:
- Site Reliability Engineering, How Google Runs Production Systems (552 pages) - http://shop.oreilly.com/product/0636920041528.do
- Vem kan man lita på?: den globala övervakningens framväxt (304 pages) -
http://www.adlibris.com/se/bok/vem-kan-man-lita-pa-den-globala-overvakningens-framvaxt-9789175453958
- Konsten att gissa rätt - Underrättelsevetenskapens grunder (218 pages) -
https://www.adlibris.com/se/bok/konsten-att-gissa-ratt---underrattelsevetenskapens-grunder-9789144004389
BONUS Slides
Benefits (The stuxnet saga)
S25: Mapping Stuxnet on the ATT&CK framework - http://hugoideler.com/2017/10/mapping-stuxnet-attck-framework/
Heatmap for visibility
S26: Defend Your Data Now with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io4vCTBLa78
MAP CIS20 to Att&ck for an easy start
S27: Mapping the ATT&CK Framework to CIS Controls –
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/security-controls/mapping-the-attck-framework-to-cis-controls/
Mattias Almeflo
+46 702 89 83 92
mattias.almeflo@nixu.com
nixuoy
@nixutigerteam
company/nixu-oy
nixu.com
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Q&A:
Hur har du praktiskt använt ATT&CK i ditt arbete?
24
1. Härdningspolicies
- Uppföljning och implementation
2. Arkitekturaudits / Systemgranskning
- GAP-analyser utifrån definierade hotbilder
3. SOC-förmåga / Detektion / Endpoint Protection
- GAP-analyser utifrån definierade hotbilder
4. Grafer och visuell uppföljning av systematiskt
tekniskt säkerhetsarbete
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED5.2.201925
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
Heatmap for visibility
5.2.201926
NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED
MAP CIS20 to Att&ck for an easy start
5.2.201927

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Mitre ATT&CK by Mattias Almeflo Nixu

  • 1. Mitre ATT&CKAdversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge 15 min
  • 2. Från den lilla människan till den stora myndigheten ATT&CK – ett modernt IT-säkerhetsramverk Alternativ titel:
  • 3. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Mattias Almeflo 5.2.20193 The Security Engineer • Systems Integrator | Information Security Architect | Team Leader • IT security, Systems Engineering, Team Leader 2016 2010 2017 2018 • Principal Security Consultant • Senior Information Security Architect • Specializing in military security frameworks • Team Leader | Information Security Architect • Part of the founding team of Saab Cyber Security Division • Thesis Worker | Software Developer • Databases, .NET software development
  • 4. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Mattias Almeflo 5.2.20194 And the Domains of Warfare 2010 – 2013: Land Created the Secure Operating Environment (SOE) for the Swedish Army (H/R) 2013 – 2015: Air Windows Security in L16 Backbone (H/S, NS) 2015 – 2016: Naval Docker Security in naval systems (H/S) 2016 – 2017: Cyber R&D Defensive Cyber Warfare 2017 – Development Environments (H/S)
  • 5. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED The complexity of the domain is staggering 5.2.20195 and my areas of focus COMPANY UNCLASSIFIED | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | UNCLASSIFIED
  • 6. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED This is Nixu 5.2.20196 Interruption in security support Cyber security specialists The trusted go-to partner for cybersecurity services in Northern Europe Founded in 1988 publicly listed 2014 10 Locations Finland, Sweden, Netherland, US, Romania and Australia and more 300+ 98% of our clients recommend Nixu Vision: Keep the digital society running Mission: Best workplace for cyber security specialists Cyber security services from board decisions to deep forensic investigations
  • 7. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED The post-breach / “assume breach” age "High-risk enterprises should assume that they are already compromised - there is no product or combination of products that provides 100% protection" - 2012, NSS Labs Analysis, Brief – Cybercrime Kill Chain vs. Defense Effectiveness 5.2.20197
  • 8. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED MITRE’s “assume breach” initiative History: • 2010 - researching data sources and analytic processes for detecting APTs more quickly through the use of endpoint telemetry data • 2013 - developed a process for modeling an adversary’s post-compromise behavior at a granular level. This model is named ATT&CK (Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge). • 2015 - ATT&CK is released to the world • 2018 - The first dedicated ATT&CK conference 5.2.20198 and the rise of the ATT&CK framework
  • 9. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED The post-breach / “assume breach” age 5.2.20199 Dwell time – Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends 2018 report
  • 10. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK 5.2.201910 PRE-ATT&CK ENTERPRISE ATT&CK • Persistence • Privilege Escalation • Defense Evasion • Credential Access • Discovery • Lateral Movement • Execution • Collection • Exfiltration • Command and Control
  • 11. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED ATT&CK – A more scientific way An empirical/curated knowledge base that helps model cyber adversaries’ tactics and techniques – and then shows how to detect or stop them.  The real hacker playbook (+200 techniques) 5.2.201911
  • 12. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED APT Groups aka advance threat actors Currently the ATT&CK framework have 78 different threat actors in its catalogue. Roughly 43% are attributed to countries • 13 are presumed to be Chinese-based • 12 are presumed to be Iranian-based • 7 are presumed to be Russia-based • 2 are presumed to be North Korea-based 5.2.201912
  • 13. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED The post-breach / “assume breach” age 5.2.201913 and how ATT&CK can help you leverage what you already have 1. “Think like an attacker” by studying their blueprints 2. Fighting the digital sleeper agents of IT-modern systems by behaviour monitoring through Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP)
  • 14. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED ATT&CK and living off the land binaries (LOLBins) “Fileless Malware Attacks on the Rise, Microsoft Says” – 2018, october • LOLBins have been around in the wild since 2014 • Recently experienced explosive growth • 52% of non-malware attacks in 2017 involved the abuse of two legitimate programs (powershell & WMI) • increasing at a rate of 6.8% per month 5.2.201914 or homesteading in the enterprise with fileless attacks
  • 15. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED The digital sleeper agents of modern IT-systems Living of the land binaries: • Authorized, trusted applications that are used by malicious actors • Usually never writes to disk (they are already there) • Live in memory • Be one with the network • Use tools already in place, use protocols already used • (Don’t talk when the network is quiet) • Make their infrastructure work for you 5.2.201915 or the rise of living of the land binaries (LOLBins)
  • 16. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Biancos “Pyramid of Pain” 5.2.201916
  • 17. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Simple examples of TTP TTP in a windows environment • “a privilege escalation via the Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer (CMSTP.exe) ” Using a non-cyber analogy • “a specific approach to counterfeiting $100 dollar bills can be thought of as a TTP while the specific guidance for detecting bills (wrong color, bad watermark, etc.) using this approach can be thought of as Indicators.” 5.2.201917 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
  • 18. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED ATT&CK - Why / Benefits Helps Determine which technologies work/fail  Identify gaps to improve security posture/processes  Prioritize work on detecting/detering techniques  Evaluate new security technology Low cost testing  Open source/free tools  Atomic Red Team, Caldera, APTSimulator, Adversary Emulation Plans, Att&ck Navigator Higher cost testing optional  Tripwire, All windows, CentoOS, Debian, Ubuntu & MacOS  Carbon Black Information Sharing  Red/Blue team, Operations, Management, Government bodies 5.2.201918
  • 19. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Credits 1/4 19 Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion! Me, Myself & I S03-06: Saab, the corporation video (6 min) - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2KsdPHsgR9Q S03-06 : The domains of war - https://saab.com/land/, https://saab.com/air/, https://saab.com/naval/, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare S03-06 : LinkedIn Cyber Security Domain Map - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/map-cybersecurity-domains-version-20-henry-jiang-ciso-cissp S03-06 : Nixu Oy at 600Minutes Information and Cyber Security 2017 (Spotlight) - This is Nixu - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwIIJnZ8pHo The Post-Breach Age - Quote S07: Cybercrime Kill Chain vs. Defense Effectiveness - https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258112939_Cybercrime_Kill_Chain_vs_Defense_Effectiveness S07: Conference: Proceedings des 13. Deutschen Sicherheitskongress des BSI – https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Veranstaltungen/ITSiKongress/13ter/Stefan_Frei_16052013.pdf MITRE’s “assume breach” initiative S08: Finding Cyber Threats with ATT&CK™-Based Analytics – https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/16-3713-finding-cyber-threats%20with%20att%26ck-based-analytics.pdf S08: ATT&CK web page - https://attack.mitre.org S08: ATT&CK conference 2018 - https://www.mitre.org/attackcon The Post-Breach Age - Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends 2018 report S09: Mandiant/FireEye M-Trends report - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/collateral/en/mtrends-2018.pdf
  • 20. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Credits 2/4 20 Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion! The cyber kill chain and ATT&CK S10: TripWire, Defend Your Data Now with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io4vCTBLa78 Slides - https://www.slideshare.net/Tripwire/defend-your-data-now-with-the-mitre-attck-framework ATT&CK – A more scientific way S10: A short animated video about MITRE ATT&CK™ Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BEf6s1iu5g S10: Science – It is the answer - https://www.deviantart.com/dormantflame/art/Because-Science-390410617 S10: The full ATT&CK Matrix - https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/enterprise/ S10: 3 minutes on MITRE ATT&CK - https://www.rapid7.com/resources/3-minutes-on-mitre-attack APT Groups aka advance threat actors S11: ATT&CK Groups: https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ The post-breach / “assume breach” age and how ATT&CK can help you leverage what you already have S09: Image - https://www.acsac.org/2017/workshops/icss/Otis-Alexander-ICS,%20Adversarial%20Tactics,%20Techniques.pdf ATT&CK and LOLBins or homesteading in the enterprise with fileless attacks S14: Fileless Malware Attacks on the Rise, Microsoft Says - https://www.securityweek.com/fileless-malware-attacks-rise-microsoft-says S14: Carbon Black 2017 Threat Report - https://www.carbonblack.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CB-Thread-Report-2017-122117.pdf S14: DerbyCon 3.0 Living Off The Land A Minimalist S Guide To Windows Post Exploitation - https://youtu.be/j-r6UonEkUw
  • 21. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Credits 3/4 21 Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion! The digital sleeper agents of modern systems, or the rise of LOLBins S15: LOLBins: Attackers Are Abusing Trusted Binaries to Target Organizations - https://blog.barkly.com/what-are-lolbins-living-off-the-land-binaries Biancos “Pyramid of Pain” S16: The Pyramid of Pain - http://detect-respond.blogspot.com/2013/03/the-pyramid-of-pain.html Simple examples of TTP S17: TTP vs Indicator: A simple usage overview - https://stixproject.github.io/documentation/concepts/ttp-vs-indicator/ S17: IOCs vs. TTPs - https://azeria-labs.com/iocs-vs-ttps/ ATT&CK - Why / Benefits S18: Tools - https://attack.mitre.org/resources/adversary-emulation-plans/ S18: Tools - https://github.com/NextronSystems/APTSimulator S18: Tools - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team S18: Tools - https://github.com/mitre/caldera S18: Tools - https://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/cybersecurity-blog/just-released-version-2-of-the-attck%E2%84%A2 S18: Tools - https://github.com/mitre/attack-navigator
  • 22. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Credits 4/4 22 Steal with pride, watch conference talks with a passion! Books you should read that might have been mentioned but aren’t represented by a slide: - Site Reliability Engineering, How Google Runs Production Systems (552 pages) - http://shop.oreilly.com/product/0636920041528.do - Vem kan man lita på?: den globala övervakningens framväxt (304 pages) - http://www.adlibris.com/se/bok/vem-kan-man-lita-pa-den-globala-overvakningens-framvaxt-9789175453958 - Konsten att gissa rätt - Underrättelsevetenskapens grunder (218 pages) - https://www.adlibris.com/se/bok/konsten-att-gissa-ratt---underrattelsevetenskapens-grunder-9789144004389 BONUS Slides Benefits (The stuxnet saga) S25: Mapping Stuxnet on the ATT&CK framework - http://hugoideler.com/2017/10/mapping-stuxnet-attck-framework/ Heatmap for visibility S26: Defend Your Data Now with the MITRE ATT&CK Framework - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=io4vCTBLa78 MAP CIS20 to Att&ck for an easy start S27: Mapping the ATT&CK Framework to CIS Controls – https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/security-controls/mapping-the-attck-framework-to-cis-controls/
  • 23. Mattias Almeflo +46 702 89 83 92 mattias.almeflo@nixu.com nixuoy @nixutigerteam company/nixu-oy nixu.com
  • 24. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Q&A: Hur har du praktiskt använt ATT&CK i ditt arbete? 24 1. Härdningspolicies - Uppföljning och implementation 2. Arkitekturaudits / Systemgranskning - GAP-analyser utifrån definierade hotbilder 3. SOC-förmåga / Detektion / Endpoint Protection - GAP-analyser utifrån definierade hotbilder 4. Grafer och visuell uppföljning av systematiskt tekniskt säkerhetsarbete
  • 25. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED5.2.201925
  • 26. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED Heatmap for visibility 5.2.201926
  • 27. NIXU PUBLIC | NOT EXPORT CONTROLLED | CUSTOMER UNCLASSIFIED MAP CIS20 to Att&ck for an easy start 5.2.201927