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SACON
SACON International 2017
Moshe Ferber
CSA Israel
@Ferbermoshe
India | Bangalore | November 10 – 11 | Hotel Lalit Ashok
Architecting secure cloud services
SACON 2017
About myself
 Information security professional for over 20 years
 Founder, partner and investor at various cyber initiatives and startups
 Popular industry speaker & lecturer (DEFCON, BLACKHAT, RSA and more)
 Founding committee member for ISC2 CCSP certification.
 CCSK Certification lecturer for the Cloud Security Alliance.
 Member of the board at Macshava Tova – Narrowing societal gaps
 Chairman of the Board, Cloud Security Alliance, Israeli Chapter
SACON 2017
So, what is cloud?
SACON 2017
SaaS
PaaS
IaaS
Private Hybrid Public
Cloud Services are very different in nature
Cloud Services are very different in nature
SACON 2017Physical Security
Network & Data Center
Security
Hypervisors Security
Virtual Machines & OS
security
Data layer & development
platform
Application
Identity Management
DATA
Audit & Monitoring
IaaS PaaS SaaS
Consumer
responsibility
Provider
responsibility
The shared responsibility model
SACON 2017
The CISO Challenge
How to build secure
applications
How to correctly evaluate your
provider
IaaS/PaaS SaaS
SACON 2017
Our focus today
IaaS
PaaS
SaaS
SACON 2017
Terminology
AWS IaaS PaaS
Instance Image Snapshot
ELB
Root
Account
IAM user
SACON 2017
Architecting for availability
US WEST
Region
AZ1 AZ2
AZ3 AZ4
Singapore
Region
AZ1 AZ2
AZ3
Mumbai
Region
AZ1 AZ2
Regions vs. Availability Zones
SACON 2017
Architecting for availability
DB
Mumbai AZ-1
DB DB
Internet
Load Balancer
Redundancy in one region
Mumbai AZ-2
WWWWWW WWW
Mumbai AZ-3
SACON 2017
Architecting for availability
DB
US-EAST1
DB DB
External CDN
US-EAST2 2nd provider
Redundancy in multiple regions/clouds
WWWWWWWWW
SACON 2017
Architecting for availability
• CDN providers can add resiliency, flexibility & redundancy
• Look for vendors who can add functionality:
DDOS protection
Web application firewall
Load Balancing
DNS management
SACON 2017
Architecting for network separation
Mumbai AZ-2 Mumbai AZ-3Mumbai AZ-1
DB
WWW WWWWWW
DBDB
Understanding VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) / Virtual Network
DB
WWW WWWWWW
DBDB
VPC A: Production
VPC B: Test
SACON 2017
DB Subnet MNGT subnetWeb SUBNET
WWW
WWW
Understanding VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) / Virtual Network
WWW
Router
DB
DB
DB
MQ
Monitoring
Logs
Production VPC 192.168.0.0
192.168.2.0192.168.1.0
203.0.115.0
192.168.3.0
Architecting for network separation
SACON 2017
Understanding VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) / Virtual Network
VPC is logical grouping of subnets &
instances, virtualizing physical data
center features
Architecting for network separation
SACON 2017
Understanding Security groups
Mumbai AZ-2 Mumbai AZ-3Mumbai AZ-1
WWW WWWWWW
DBDB DB
Security Group: web-servers Allow: 80/443
Security Group: DB-servers Allow: 3306 (MYSQL)
Architecting for network separation
SACON 2017
The advantages of Micro Segmentation
Architecting for network separation
Traditional Micro segmentation
SACON 2017
Additional VPC tools
Architecting for network separation
NAT
Gateway
Direct
Connect
Bastion
Host
VPN
Gateway
Network
ACLs
Flow logs
SACON 2017
Architecting for network separation
Test VPC
Router
WWW
Application
DB
Internet
Production VPC
WWW
Application
DB
NAT
Gateway
Corporate
network
VPN
Access VPC
Bastion
Host
S3 EndPoint
SACON 2017
Web Application Firewall options
Architecting for application separation
3rd party as a
service
Internal
Provider
service
WAF Proxy
inside cloud
WAF client on
web instances
SACON 2017
Build application separation
Architecting for application separation
Utilize MQ services
to separate
application
components
Use API Gateways
& Serverless
functions
SACON 2017
Architecting for application separation
Front End
Back End
Queue
Service
S3 Storage
Serverless
Function
ApplicationServices
SACON 2017
Architecting for application separation
Front End
Back End
Queue
Service
SACON 2017
Limiting blast Radius
Root Account
IAM Admin Security
Auditor
Billing
Admin
Super Admin
Service 1
Admin
Service 2
Admin
SACON 2017
Limiting blast Radius
Organization
Production
account
Test Account MNGT
Account
Production VPC
WWW
Application
DB
NAT
Test VPC
WWW
Application
DB
NAT
MNGT VPC
WWW
Application
DB
NAT
SACON 2017
Understanding storage options
Architecting for data security
Volume Storage
• Attached to a single
instance
• Not shared, accessible
only from the instance
• Useful in storing
instance OS
environment ,
application binaries ,
DB files and anything
instances need to
operate
Object Storage
• Provider managed
• Files are placed in
buckets
• Versioning & meta data
kept for all objects
• Files are accessible by
API or HTTP
• Independent from AZ
or instances
dependencies
• Useful for storing static
applications data,
backups, source code
and config files
Database service
• Provider managed
• Files are accessible by
DB API
• Vary between different
services: (structured,
unstructured and
more)
• Usually customer has
no access to underlying
DB infrastructure
CDN
• Cloud provider
proprietary service or
external 3rd party
services
• Provide flexibility and
resiliency
• Useful in serving static
content at late latency
• Usually accompanied
by additional services:
WAF, DDOS protection,
Load balancer…
SACON 2017
Volume storage
Architecting for data security
Backups
• Usually snapshots
• Customer
responsibility to keep
snapshots
inaccessible
• Don’t keep
application secrets
on disk
Redundancy
• Not redundant
• Access is made by a
service on the
instance OS (web
service I.e)
• If service fails, no
access
Encryption
• Storage encryption
with provider service
(i.e. AWS KMS, Azure
keyvault)
• Or OS Level
encryption software
(i.e. truecrypt,
bitlocker)
SACON 2017
Object storage
Architecting for data security
Backups
• Keeps versioning
system of files
• External backups
are recommended
(explore provider
services)
Redundancy
• Availability is
responsibility of
the provider
• Increased
availability can be
achieved by
replicating to other
regions
Encryption
• Service side:
Storage encryption
with provider
service (i.e. AWS
KMS, Azure key
vault)
• Or Client side using
provider SDK
SACON 2017
Database Storage (Database as a service)
Architecting for data security
Backups
• Automated backups
are made by provider
• External exports and
backups should be
made periodically,
just as any other
database
Redundancy
• Availability is
responsibility of the
provider but managed
by customer
• Architect multiple AZ
Encryption
• Service side: Storage
encryption with
provider service
usually at the
database level
• TDE can be used here
as well to encrypt at
table/ column level
SACON 2017
Encryption
Architecting for data security
OS
Storage
DB
Application
Encryption Layer
TDE
Storage Encryption
Full Disk Encryption Software
KMS
HSM
Virtual
instance
KEYS
SACON 2017
A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r C I / C D
Source: Cloud Security Alliance Guidelines
SACON 2017
A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r C I / C D
Source : AWS Security best practices
SACON 2017
A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r L o g M a n a g e m e n t
Portal Logs
• Cover API &
GUI access
Traffic Logs
• Network
traffic inside
VPC
Instances Logs
• Extracted
just like
traditional
OS
SACON 2017
A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r M o n i t o r i n g
Cloud Trail
S3
SIEM
Agent
Cloud WATCH
(Rules & Alerts)
SNS
(notifications)
VPC Flow Logs
OS Logs
SACON 2017
Questions?
SACON 2017
KEEP IN TOUCH
Cloud Security Course Schedule can be find at:
http://www.onlinecloudsec.com/course-schedule

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Architect secure cloud services.

  • 1. SACON SACON International 2017 Moshe Ferber CSA Israel @Ferbermoshe India | Bangalore | November 10 – 11 | Hotel Lalit Ashok Architecting secure cloud services
  • 2. SACON 2017 About myself  Information security professional for over 20 years  Founder, partner and investor at various cyber initiatives and startups  Popular industry speaker & lecturer (DEFCON, BLACKHAT, RSA and more)  Founding committee member for ISC2 CCSP certification.  CCSK Certification lecturer for the Cloud Security Alliance.  Member of the board at Macshava Tova – Narrowing societal gaps  Chairman of the Board, Cloud Security Alliance, Israeli Chapter
  • 4. SACON 2017 SaaS PaaS IaaS Private Hybrid Public Cloud Services are very different in nature Cloud Services are very different in nature
  • 5. SACON 2017Physical Security Network & Data Center Security Hypervisors Security Virtual Machines & OS security Data layer & development platform Application Identity Management DATA Audit & Monitoring IaaS PaaS SaaS Consumer responsibility Provider responsibility The shared responsibility model
  • 6. SACON 2017 The CISO Challenge How to build secure applications How to correctly evaluate your provider IaaS/PaaS SaaS
  • 7. SACON 2017 Our focus today IaaS PaaS SaaS
  • 8. SACON 2017 Terminology AWS IaaS PaaS Instance Image Snapshot ELB Root Account IAM user
  • 9. SACON 2017 Architecting for availability US WEST Region AZ1 AZ2 AZ3 AZ4 Singapore Region AZ1 AZ2 AZ3 Mumbai Region AZ1 AZ2 Regions vs. Availability Zones
  • 10. SACON 2017 Architecting for availability DB Mumbai AZ-1 DB DB Internet Load Balancer Redundancy in one region Mumbai AZ-2 WWWWWW WWW Mumbai AZ-3
  • 11. SACON 2017 Architecting for availability DB US-EAST1 DB DB External CDN US-EAST2 2nd provider Redundancy in multiple regions/clouds WWWWWWWWW
  • 12. SACON 2017 Architecting for availability • CDN providers can add resiliency, flexibility & redundancy • Look for vendors who can add functionality: DDOS protection Web application firewall Load Balancing DNS management
  • 13. SACON 2017 Architecting for network separation Mumbai AZ-2 Mumbai AZ-3Mumbai AZ-1 DB WWW WWWWWW DBDB Understanding VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) / Virtual Network DB WWW WWWWWW DBDB VPC A: Production VPC B: Test
  • 14. SACON 2017 DB Subnet MNGT subnetWeb SUBNET WWW WWW Understanding VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) / Virtual Network WWW Router DB DB DB MQ Monitoring Logs Production VPC 192.168.0.0 192.168.2.0192.168.1.0 203.0.115.0 192.168.3.0 Architecting for network separation
  • 15. SACON 2017 Understanding VPC (Virtual Private Cloud) / Virtual Network VPC is logical grouping of subnets & instances, virtualizing physical data center features Architecting for network separation
  • 16. SACON 2017 Understanding Security groups Mumbai AZ-2 Mumbai AZ-3Mumbai AZ-1 WWW WWWWWW DBDB DB Security Group: web-servers Allow: 80/443 Security Group: DB-servers Allow: 3306 (MYSQL) Architecting for network separation
  • 17. SACON 2017 The advantages of Micro Segmentation Architecting for network separation Traditional Micro segmentation
  • 18. SACON 2017 Additional VPC tools Architecting for network separation NAT Gateway Direct Connect Bastion Host VPN Gateway Network ACLs Flow logs
  • 19. SACON 2017 Architecting for network separation Test VPC Router WWW Application DB Internet Production VPC WWW Application DB NAT Gateway Corporate network VPN Access VPC Bastion Host S3 EndPoint
  • 20. SACON 2017 Web Application Firewall options Architecting for application separation 3rd party as a service Internal Provider service WAF Proxy inside cloud WAF client on web instances
  • 21. SACON 2017 Build application separation Architecting for application separation Utilize MQ services to separate application components Use API Gateways & Serverless functions
  • 22. SACON 2017 Architecting for application separation Front End Back End Queue Service S3 Storage Serverless Function ApplicationServices
  • 23. SACON 2017 Architecting for application separation Front End Back End Queue Service
  • 24. SACON 2017 Limiting blast Radius Root Account IAM Admin Security Auditor Billing Admin Super Admin Service 1 Admin Service 2 Admin
  • 25. SACON 2017 Limiting blast Radius Organization Production account Test Account MNGT Account Production VPC WWW Application DB NAT Test VPC WWW Application DB NAT MNGT VPC WWW Application DB NAT
  • 26. SACON 2017 Understanding storage options Architecting for data security Volume Storage • Attached to a single instance • Not shared, accessible only from the instance • Useful in storing instance OS environment , application binaries , DB files and anything instances need to operate Object Storage • Provider managed • Files are placed in buckets • Versioning & meta data kept for all objects • Files are accessible by API or HTTP • Independent from AZ or instances dependencies • Useful for storing static applications data, backups, source code and config files Database service • Provider managed • Files are accessible by DB API • Vary between different services: (structured, unstructured and more) • Usually customer has no access to underlying DB infrastructure CDN • Cloud provider proprietary service or external 3rd party services • Provide flexibility and resiliency • Useful in serving static content at late latency • Usually accompanied by additional services: WAF, DDOS protection, Load balancer…
  • 27. SACON 2017 Volume storage Architecting for data security Backups • Usually snapshots • Customer responsibility to keep snapshots inaccessible • Don’t keep application secrets on disk Redundancy • Not redundant • Access is made by a service on the instance OS (web service I.e) • If service fails, no access Encryption • Storage encryption with provider service (i.e. AWS KMS, Azure keyvault) • Or OS Level encryption software (i.e. truecrypt, bitlocker)
  • 28. SACON 2017 Object storage Architecting for data security Backups • Keeps versioning system of files • External backups are recommended (explore provider services) Redundancy • Availability is responsibility of the provider • Increased availability can be achieved by replicating to other regions Encryption • Service side: Storage encryption with provider service (i.e. AWS KMS, Azure key vault) • Or Client side using provider SDK
  • 29. SACON 2017 Database Storage (Database as a service) Architecting for data security Backups • Automated backups are made by provider • External exports and backups should be made periodically, just as any other database Redundancy • Availability is responsibility of the provider but managed by customer • Architect multiple AZ Encryption • Service side: Storage encryption with provider service usually at the database level • TDE can be used here as well to encrypt at table/ column level
  • 30. SACON 2017 Encryption Architecting for data security OS Storage DB Application Encryption Layer TDE Storage Encryption Full Disk Encryption Software KMS HSM Virtual instance KEYS
  • 31. SACON 2017 A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r C I / C D Source: Cloud Security Alliance Guidelines
  • 32. SACON 2017 A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r C I / C D Source : AWS Security best practices
  • 33. SACON 2017 A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r L o g M a n a g e m e n t Portal Logs • Cover API & GUI access Traffic Logs • Network traffic inside VPC Instances Logs • Extracted just like traditional OS
  • 34. SACON 2017 A r c h i t e c t i n g f o r M o n i t o r i n g Cloud Trail S3 SIEM Agent Cloud WATCH (Rules & Alerts) SNS (notifications) VPC Flow Logs OS Logs
  • 36. SACON 2017 KEEP IN TOUCH Cloud Security Course Schedule can be find at: http://www.onlinecloudsec.com/course-schedule