Portfolio Assessment Narrative_1

THOMAS EDISON STATE COLLEGE
PORTFOLIO ASSESSMENT NARRATIVE
on
PRISONERS' RIGHTS LAW & POLICY
[ FROM A JA I LHOUSE LAWYER' S PERSPECTIVE]
13 y-
r F2 _ .7o1iris t on.Jr _
Student No. 139-40-6069
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE/HUMAN SERVICES
LEGAL SERVICES SPECIALIZATION
.4„. xto.7Peridiz-77&4•Avell
gx, ../77‘ &thxon •

TABLEOFCONTENTS
BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
LEGAL CONTRAST BETWEEN
PRO SE LITIGANT & JAILHOUSE LAWYER 2
NONTRADITIONAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE
IN PRISONER'S RIGHTS LAW & POLICY 15
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 30
TABLE OF CASES 32
INDEX 34
A

PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT
924 CHERRY STREET, SUITE 523
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19107
ANGUS R. LOVE PHONE. (215) 925-2966
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FAX: (215) 925-5337
December 19, 1996
Thomas A. Edison State College
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
RE: Hiram R. Johnston, Jr.
Dear Sir/Madam:
I am writing a letter of verification per the request of the above-referenced
individual. I am the Executive Director of the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project.
We are a legal aid organization that provides free legal services of a civil nature to the
over 60,000 institutionalized persons in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Prior to
holding this position, I was a staff attorney for Montgomery County Legal Aid.
I first met Hiram Johnston. around 1980, when he was housed in the Delaware
County Jail. I found him to be a bright, articulate and well-intentioned individual. I
have kept in touch with him over the years, comparing legal notes, case reviews and
strategies. His work product is thorough, well researched and articulate. He has been
a tremendous benefit to our office on a number of occasions.
The plight of the jailhouse lawyer is not an easy one. Needless to say, the
jailers have little appreciation for the efforts of individuals such as Hiram. Thus the
working environment is not of the highest caliber. Despite these obstacles, Hiram has
made a conscientious effort to move forward and advances the causes that he believes
in. I have taken the time to review his portfolio assessment narrative on prisoners'
rights law and policy. I find it to be of the highest caliber. He has hit all the key points
and mentioned the key cases. His analysis of those cases in the prison context is done
in a very professional manner. He is up-to-date on the latest developments, including
the recent passage of the Prisoners Rights Litigation Act, This guide can be quite
useful to less experienced jailhouse lawyers and novices in the areas of prisoners'
rights. This work is consistent with past efforts of Hiram's that I have reviewed over the
years.

Siy,
g us Love
ALJral
cc: File
December 19, 1996
Page Two
I hope this information is helpful. Please feel free to follow up on any and all
issues raised or any additional concerns you may have.
1

2
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
Pennsylvania Moves to Tighten Commutation Process
by Angus R. Love, Esq.
The new administration in Harrisburg has taken several
steps to reform the commutation process Immediately upon tak-
ing office, Governor Tom Ridge made good on his campaign
promises by calling the legislature into a special session on
crime. Included in the session were several bills aimed at
changing the procedures of the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons,
which governs the commutation process. The proposed legisla-
tion would require a unanimous vote of the five-member board,
prior to sending a recommendation for commutation to the gov-
ernor.
Angus R. Love, President
Other proposals which have been enacted give
victims greater input into the process, recommend
variations in the board's composition, and change requirements
for a public hearing. The unanimity bill was passed and signed
by Governor Ridge. However, it does not yet become law, since
these changes involve the Pennsylvania Constitution. The bill
must be passed in two consecutive legislative sessions and be
approved by a voter referendum before the changes can be
implemented.
Governor Ridge made the commutation process a
central issue in his campaign last fall. After the arrest of com-
muted lifer Reginald McFadden on a murder charge, Ridge
blasted his opponent, who had voted for McFadden's release.
He promised changes, if elected, and has delivered on that
promise. Unfortunately, many important facts about the process
were lost in the public debate.
Pennsylvania already has one of the strictest policies in the
country regarding release of those serving life sentences. All but
a few states have a set term of years for a life sentence, followed
by eligibility for parole release. Generally, the minimum num-
ber of years served is from 15 to 30 in most states. However, the
only release mechanism available in Pennsylvania for those
serving a life term is through the commutation process.
Pennsylvania also utilizes a broad set of parameters in
determining who is given a life sentence. Individuals
sentenced to first or second degree murder receive life.
Pennsylvania's felony murder rule also allows for individuals
not directly involved in a murder to be sentenced to life.
Juveniles certified as adults can also receive a life term. All these
unique sentencing provisions have resulted in one of the largest
lifer populations behind bars in our country.
Historically, the commutation process has worked as a safety
valve for lifers who have no chance of parole. Until 1980, gov-
ernors routinely commuted a few dozen sentences each year.
Prosecutors were aware of the process and took that into con-
sideration when seeking a second degree murder conviction.
Such sentences were usually commuted after 10 to 15 years had
been served. Around 1978, with the election of Governor
Richard Thornburgh, the commutation process was sharply
curtailed in response to the new governor's tough law and order
stance. Only seven people were commuted during his eight
years in office; a judge's son and a police officer's son were
among those commuted. Governor Casey continued this trend;
though he did commute 25 sentences in eight years, many dur-
ing his last years in office.
The Pennsylvania Prison Society supports a viable release
mechanism for individuals serving a life sentence. We believe
that it is important to keep hope alive for those who are serving
life. Additionally, the benefits of such a policy extend to prison
officials, who then have an additional management tool
available to them in addressing the burgeoning lifer population.
Governor Ridge indicated that he will only consider
recommendations for commutation if innocence is at issue, or if
the person is near death. We urge the governor to reevaluate his
position, as there are already adequate judicial mechanisms in
place for such cases. We believe that many other cases are
worthy of consideration, such as second degree convictions,
women suffering from battered women syndrome, juveniles
sentenced as adults, accomplices, and those whose sentences
were disproportionate to others involved in the same crime.
Our criminal justice system is not foolproof. We need mech-
anisms like the commutation process so that injustices can be
remedied. But only a viable process that is not subject to shifting
political winds can provide this safety valve against injustice. It
is important to maintain such a system, so that compassion and
redemption remain constitutive elements of our system of
criminal justice.
DOI§OR.OPTION PLAN -400094
(0.x.199§ifall,CaMpaign,iS poclerta)yPlease
remember: the Prison Society through the Donor Option Plan.
PPS's"donor I.D. is # 00094.

PENNSYLVANIA INSTITUTIONAL LAW PROJECT
924 CHERRY STREET, SUITE 523
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19107
46*
OV
cl4S1<C
Hiram Johnston
AM3014
R.D. 3, Box 500
Hunlock Creek, PA 18621-9580
1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111
1 I 1 1 I I 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 111,111„11,11"111„1111.1„,1,1.14,1.11.fillml

PRISONERS' RIGHTS LAW & POLICY
PORTFOLIO ASSESSMENT N AR RAT IVE
By
HIRAM R. JOHNSTON, JR./Student No. 139-40-6069
(BRIEF PROCEDURAL HISTORY]
My pito 6e experience in the field of law encompasses two decades of seA-
Flap atigation experience. This experience began shortly following my
arrest on June 11, 1976 in New Brunswick, NJ by the FBI on charges of
unlawful flight to avoid prosecution. I was subsequently charged on
criminal indictments in the jurisdictions of Camden, NJ and Chester, PA.
I was initially lodged in the Camden County Jail in lieu of one million
dollars cash bail on charges of felony homicide stemming from a 1974
armed robbery of a supermarket where a bystander was killed during an
exchange of gunfire between escaping bandits and police. A detainer was
lodged against my liberty by the Delaware County District Attorney,
Media, PA charging me with being a fugitive stemming from a 1974 armed
robbery of a supermarket in Chester, PA where an off-duty police
detective moonlighting as a security guard was shot in the arm during an
unsuccessful attempt to apprehend two bandits in the course of the
theft.
On August 25, 1976 I was extradited to PA to stand trial on the PA
indictments prior to the commencement of the Camden, NJ trial
procedures. Unable to afford paid counsel and unsatisfied with court
appointed counsel I proceeded under the legal authority of Faretta -vs.-
Califorina, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) to waive the appointment of court
appointed counsel and act as my own attorney. Trial and extradition
procedures spanned a period exceeding five years and resulted in a
conviction on the PA indictments [following seven months of pre-trial
proceedings and an eleven day trial] and an acquittal on the NJ
indictments [following nine months of pre-trial proceedings and an eight
day trial].
During this period I acquired a vast amount of theoretical and applied
traditional legal expertise in the field of criminal and civil law
through nontraditional means of pu) 6,e litigation and icatitowe taullgA

PAGE NO. 2
related activities. Specifically as this applies to the areas of legal
writing and research, criminal law and procedure, constitutional law and
issues, civil litigation and practice, evidence, trial advocacy,
prisoners' rights and self-help litigation, administrative law, torts,
iAqteA cilia. This includes but is not limited to hundreds of hours of in-
court pto 5e litigation during criminal trials and related procedures,
federal civil rights actions, habeas corpus procedures, evidentiary
hearings, depositions, pre-trial conferences, settlement negotiations,
etc. My plo 6e activities on my own behalf eventually resulted in my
providing mutual -legal aisoi/sta,ncz to other prisoners and acquiring a
reputation as a jaithage lotuyeA. I have also worked in conjunction with
scores of attorneys, paralegals, law professors, law students, legal
programs and prisoners' rights agencies.
[LEGAL CONTRAST BETWEEN PRO SE LITIGANT & JAILHOUSE LAWYER]
Although the terms pto ae 4/litigant and faUhoude lawyert are frequently used
interchangably to imply the same mode of activity or function there is,
in fact, a marked distinction between the definition of the two terms.
It is essential to delineate this distinction in order to parallel the
types of legal experience akin to each mode of activity which
corresponds with their historical backgrounds in the field of law.
The term jai/thou/se iampA is defined by Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition
as:
"An inmate of a penal institution
who spends his time reading the
law and giving legal assistance
and advise to inmates, especially
those who are illiterate." Citing;
Johnson -vs.- Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 89
S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969).
According to Black's Law Dictionary, Id. the term pto 'Se means:

PAGE NO. 3
"For one's own behalf; in person.
Appearing for oneself; as in the
case of one who does not retain a
lawyer and appears for himself in
court."
The distinction between the two terms is quite clear. In the first
instance the term faithowse lawyer is described as an inmate of a penal
in/stitution ... who ptouides teooa co,siotance and advice to (other) inmate's. In the
second instance a pto oe litigant is ostensibly one who litigates j01 OMeO
own delta44; in pen/son, appearing X01 oneseM4.
In the former case one acts on behalf of another while in the latter one
acts as an advocate on one's own behalf (which no doubt gave birth to
the expression that: "an individual who has himself for a client has a
fool for an attorney.") Another observation between this distinction is
that in the case of the self-advocate or plo 6e tikigant, this individual
is not necessarily an inmate of a pima institution, while in the latter
instance a jail/Lowe tawym is only authorized or empowered to dispense
such legal services while under conditions of incarceration. Otherwise,
a laymen who provides such 4.e401,1 amsi/stame and adoi/se to other laymen may be
subject to a charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Thus, it appear that inmates are the only class of individuals who are
not members of the legal profession who are legally authorized to
dispense iegat aMiStatice and aMMe to other laymen. Such legal
authorization derives directly from the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
Johnson - vs. - Avery, supra. However, in Johnson, Id. the Supreme Court
referred to inmates who provide legal assistance and advise as w't
wliten/s instead of foalltowe tawyem. Accordingly, it would appear that (vat
WPAite4 is the original generic term for this class of individuals which
has subsequently come to be referred to as jailhowse
Despite the general acceptance of the term faiihmve iatlyytA by most
judicial authorities, the term continues to remain subject to individual

PAGE NO. 4
interpretation by the various courts. One federal court maintained that
the term icalhmoe i4141/WA enjoys no definition. The federal district court
in Tillery -vs.- Owens, 719 F.Supp. 1256 (W.D.Pa. 1989), while
acknowledging the right of iaiUNI/Se Lawyeo to exist in the absence of
other sufficient alternative sources of legal assistance provided by
prison officials, stated:
"We also appreciate that a 'jailhouse
lawyer' enjoys no definition. Any
inmate can claim to be one. SCIP
authorities may define the term
'jailhouse lawyer' and maintain an
approved list of inmates with that
designation."
Regardless of what specific term is applied to prisoners with knowledge
of law who assist other less knowledgable prisoners, whether the term is
(vat w/mRet, jaithowe tauvelc, inmate pautega, taw clerk, etc., since Johnson, Id.
was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969, inmate who are unable to
perform their own legal research and case preparation have a
constitutional right to legal assistance from other inmates capable of
performing such legal functions, absent sufficient alternative means of
legal assistance provided by prison officials.
The central issue in determining whether a prison rule, regulation or
policy prohibiting inmates from giving or receiving legal assistance is
valid is whether prison officials have provided a reasonable alternative
to such mutual inmate assistance. Corpus -vs.- Estelle, 551 F.2d 68 (5t
Cir. 1977). Five days following the Appeal Court's decision in Corpus,
Id. the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bounds -vs.- Smith, 97 S.Ct. 1491
(1977) reaffirming its previous decision in Johnson, supra. and required
additional measures to assure rnzaningi,ut access to inmates able to present
their own causes, Id. at 1492. The Court further held that prisoners,
pen, 'se, have a fundamental constitutional right to meaningful access to
the courts and that this right requires prison authorities to assist

PAGE NO. 5
inmates in preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by
providing adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons
trained in the law, or some combination of the two measures.
Federal courts have often enjoined prison authorities from arbitrarily
interfering with established inmate legal organizations which provide
legal assistance and advise to the prison populations. In Wade - vs.-
Kane, 448 F.Supp. 678 (E.D.Pa. 1978) the district court granted a
prisoner's motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining Graterford
prison officials from closing an in-prison law clinic (Paraprofessional
Law Clinic) operated by inmates. Nine years later the same federal
court granted a permanent injunction against Graterford prison officials
enjoining them from colosing the Paraprofessional Law Clinic. See: U.S.
Ex Rel. Paraprofessional Law Clinic -vs.- Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099
(E.D.Pa. 1987). In Valentine -vs.- Beyer, 850 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1988)
the U.S. District Court for the District of NJ held that inmates at
Trenton State Prison were entitled to preliminary injunction against
implementation of changes to prison's legal assistance program and the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district
court on appeal of the issue.
The law is also well established that ical4mge lativem have a right not to
be harassed or retaliated against by prison officials for rendering
legal assistance, filing law suits against prison officials, or being
otherwise engaged in constitutionally protected activity. In Buise -
vs.- Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) the Court of Appeals held that
because a transfer of a jailhouse lawyer from state farm to state prison
violated rights of other farm inmates, jailhouse lawyer was entitled to
declaratory and injunctive relief that his transfer was improper. The
U.S. District Court, M.D. Alabama in McCray -vs.- Bennett, 467 F.Supp.
187 (1978) held that sentencing jailhouse lawyers to disciplinary
confinement for assisting other inmates to file complaints in court is
unlawful. In Vaughn -vs.- Trotter, 516 F.Supp. 886 (M.D.Tenn. 1980) the

411
PAGE NO. 6
court held that in guaranteeing the right of mutual assistance in order
to insure access to the courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has created a
derivative right, vested in jailhouse lawyers, to provide legal
assistance to other prisoners, and thus punishment or harassment of
jailhouse lawyers aimed at deterring their work is not constitutionally
permitted. Cubing; McCrav - vs. - Bennett, Supra. In Nickl - vs. - Schmidt,
351 F.Supp. 385 (W.D.Wisc. 1972) the district court held:
"It is clear that the right to
receive legal aid would be empty if
correctional authorities were free
to punish its donation. Thus in
order to protect the right of the
donee to legal help, the donor
threatened with punishment for
providing legal assistance must be
permitted to assert the donee's right."
It should be quite clear at this point that despite the negative image
often associated with the term icalitove (awye't, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized the function of jailhouse lawyers as a valuable check and
balance within the scheme of the criminal justice system. For the past
twenty seven years courts have mandated constitutional protections must
be afforded to those functioning in such capacity (although this right
is enforced increasingly more reluctantly). The right of pito ,se atigants
(self-representation) have endured for a substantially longer period.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Faretta - vs. - California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
stated:
....In the federal courts, the right of self-
representation has been protected by statute
since the beginning of our Nation. Section
35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat., 73,
92, enacted by out First Congress and signed by
President Washington one day before the Sixth
Amendment was proposed, provided that 'in all
the courts of the United States, the parties
may plead, and manage their own causes personally
or by the assistance of ... counsel....' The

PAGE NO. 7
right is currently codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654."
Thus, the right of the pto oe 1A.tigant has been codified (protected by
statute) "since the beginning of our Nation" (1789). Yet, it was not
until Faretta, supra. was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1975, 186
years later, that criminal courts were forced to recognize the right of
criminal defendants to waive the appointment of court appointed counsel
and act as their own attorney. By contrast, the right of mutual
assistance among inmates is still in its infant state of existence being
only twenty seven years old and not codified under any statute.
The right to proceed pto ,se as one's own attorney during a criminal
trial, however, is not absolute in all circumstances, U.S. -vs.-
Purnett, 910 F.2d 51, 55 (2W Cir. 1990) 1-ftiat judge moto4tigedto accept every
de4endant'6 invocation of bight to 6e4H4eptesentationl; U.S. -vs.- Watson, 1 F.3d
733, 735 (8th Cir. 1993) Ni,ght 6e44--/ept&setvtation not denied (phew ommt iwAieved
that deknciala did not wmiemtamd Of1410ge6 and could not corNoaentty 0°c:zed pro 6e].
Nor may a pto :%e defendant claim her own ineffectiveness as a ground for
appeal. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46; U.S. -vs.- Chapman, 954 F.2d
1352, 1363 (72 Cir. 1991); Menefield -vs.- Borg, 881 F.2d 696, 700 (9th
Cir. 1989) (dictum) rthe accLesed hco Utile utc.cume against the jaitilso cawsed ty his
own indAtiAcine4,5."]; See: U.S. -vs.- Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir.)
Ide4emolant, not enUtied to imp tibtaty &Num, may not argue ineihectioe am44tance on
appeal in tegaui to hies own pto 6e proceeding dosed on Limited 44vseatch wioulicw], cert
denied, 498 U.S. 986 (1990).
Accordingly, the bare right under Faretta, supra. to waive the
appointment of court appointed counsel and act as one's own attorney by
no means includes constitutional protections to insure that such
representation is meaningful. As it applies to mutual assistance, while
illiterate and uneducated prisoners have a constitutionally protected
right to receive legal assistance from jailhowe Lomoyem, this right does
not include in-court representation by jailhouse lawyers. Thus, once a

PAGE NO. 8
jailhouse lawyer has performed the required legal research, document
preparation, etc. necessary to state a cognizant cause of action
sufficient to require a hearing in court on the issues presented, there
is no further right to in-court representation at evidentiary and other
hearings integral in obtaining ultimate relief. Thus, the right of
mutual assistance (like pew ,se te0e4entation) by no means insures that such
representation is meaningful.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees verbatum
the right to the assistance of counsel, inteA a, a., in criminal cases, was
ratified in 1791. However, it was not until 1963, 172 years later, when
the U.S. Supreme Court in Gideon -vs.- Wainwright, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963)
held that indigent criminal defendants were entitled to assistance from
appointed counsel. [Ironically, the initial petition submitted in the
Gideon, supra. case was filed by a jailhouse lawyer] Prior to Gideon,
Id. thousands of indigent, illiterate, uneducated and mentally ill
persons were convicted and sent to prison without the benefit of counsel
for their defense or having knowingly and intetiAgemtty waived their right to
counsel.
Accordingly, throughout the history of the country the enforcement of
existing laws or enactment of new laws, whether statutory [taw neated
wits tegiaation] or common law Haw geneitated ty coat dimizioms] is frequently
a matter of bipartisan political expediency, i.e., whatever is most
expedient in manipulating the political climate of the time (and, of
course, the popular vote). The enforcement of law (or lack thereof) is
often a reflection of social sentiments and public apathy, inter alia.
["GET TOUGH ON CRIME- POLITICAL AGENDA -V6.- PRISONERS' RIGHTS]
In the current "get-tough-on-crime" political climate existing
Prisoners' Rights pet 'se are under constant assault. Over the last two
decades the rights of prisoners have been consistently reversed,

PAGE NO. 9
revised, restricted and undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court, federal
district and Appeal Courts around the country, and by State and Federal
Legislation. For the most part only an empty eggshell remains of the
substantive rights retained by prisoners which existed twenty years ago
in many important areas of consideration.
In 1981 the U.S. Supreme Court opened the door for prison officials
throughout the country to double the capacity of their prisons through a
process of doate ceAling prisoners in cells previously considered too
small for double occupancy. In Rhodes -vs.- Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392
(1981) the Supreme Court held that despite the findings that (1) inmates
under consideration were serving long terms of confinement, (2) the
prison under consideration housed 38% more inmates than its design
capacity, (3) the results of several scientific studies recommended that
each inmate should have at least 50-55 square feet of living quarters as
opposed to 63 square feet shared by double-celled inmates, (4) that
double-celled inmates are required to spend most of their time in the
cell with their cellmates, and (5) that double-ceiling was not a
temporary condition, these considerations fell far short of the mark of
proving an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment.
Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion in Rhodes, supra. at 2411-12
stated:
"In a double cell, each inmate has only
some 30-35 square feet of floor space...
Most of the windows in the Supreme Court
building are larger than that."
Presently, the practice of ,otced double-(2,afing in tiny cell with no regard
for length of sentences and other considerations have resulted in
cellmates murdering and seriously injuring each other with no Eighth
Amendment implications.

PAGE NO. 10
In Hewitt -vs.- Helms, 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983) the U.S. Supreme Court
severely restricted prisoners' rights to pumedwua due ',woe's's in
connection with administrative segregation. The Court held that there
was no constitutionally based liberty interest in remaining in general
population and out of administrative segregation, even though it assumed
that conditions were the same as punitive segregation. The Court
further held that prison officials could base their decision to confine
prisoners in administrative custody on mere rumor, subjective
evaluations, and intuitive judgments rather than concrete, objective
evidence. Under Hewitt, supra. an informal, nonadversary evidentiary
review is sufficient to support the decision that a prisoner represents
a security threat and the decision to confine the prisoner in
administrative segregation indefinitely.
In 1984 the U.S. Supreme Court greatly increased the standard of proof
required for criminal defendants to prove allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel (which is the most widespread ground for appellate
relief raised throughout the criminal justice system). Strickland -vs.-
Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). The Strickland, supra. Court
established a two prong test to evaluate claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. To obtain a reversal of a conviction, the
criminal defendant must prove: (1) that counsel's performance fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's
deficient performance prejudiced defendant resulting in an unreliable or
fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceedings. The Court held that
the second prong of the test requires more than a showing that the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel's
error. Additionally, if a defendant fails to satisfy one prong of the
test the court need not consider the other, and under the performance
prong of the test there is a strong presumption that counsel's
strategies and tactics fall "within a wide range of reasonable
professional assistance."

PAGE NO. 11
Prior to Strickland, supra. criminal defendants did not have to show how
counsel's ineffective assistance prejudiced them, rather, once it was
established that counsel was ineffective the conviction would be
reversed. The increased standard of proof has significantly reduced the
number of successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims throughout
the country.
More recently the U.S. Supreme Court in Wilson - vs. - Seiter, 111 S.Ct.
2321 (1991) increased the standard of proof necessary to prove
conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment by
requiring a showing of detikitate indifyieteztce, i.e., a state of mind
possessing actual knowledge of impending harm, easily preventable, so
that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm could be inferred
from a failure to prevent it. Wilson, supra. requires prisoners to
prove both and objective element - that the deprivation was sufficiently
serious, and a subjective element - that a prison official acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind. Young -vs.- Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351,
359-60 (3d Cir. 1992); See also: Hudson -vs.- McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995
(1992); Farmer -vs.- Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994).
Due to the heightened proof requirements set forth by the Wilson, Id.
Court many more Eighth Amendment claims brought by prisoners are
dismissed on summary judgment in favor of prison officials because of
the extreme difficulty in proving the ouipieotive state of mind prong of
the test.
Congress has recently accelerated the systematic assault upon Pli/so► et
SeA - Help Litigation by passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
[PLRA] (which became effective April 26, 1996), which in effect,
substantially modified the In Forma Pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. §1915,
et seq. as it applies to civil actions filed by prisoners. Essentially,
the PLRA tends to discourage prisoners from pursuing any form of civil
action (habeas corpus, mandamus, civil rights actions, etc.) by

PAGE NO. 12
requiring them to pay mandatory costs and fees regardless of how
destitute an individual may be.
If a prisoner has no funds in his prison account the PLRA requires that
prison officials garnish his account and remove percentages of any funds
which become available in the account (regardless of how meager the
amount). This is the current status of the law. Not only are insolvent
prisoners now required to spend half of their last dollar on litigation
costs and fees (if they are to have their legal issues heard), if their
funds are insufficient they are further required to go into retroactive
debt by having their accounts garnished or their meager prison wages
held in escrow until the costs and fees of the litigation have been
satisfied (which could take years).
More likely than not this will cause a chilling effect on indigent
prisoner litigation throughout the country and create a tremendous
disparity between the rights of indigent and affluent classes of
persons, which heretofore was considered to be an unequivocal, flagrant
denial of equal protection of the law. The U.S. Supreme Court has
previously stated that "to impose any financial consideration between an
indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue
for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the
laws." Smith - vs. - Bennett, 81 S.Ct. 895, 896 (1961).
Today it is politically expedient for Congress to pass new legislation
deliberately intended to curb the flood of prisoner litigation now in
the federal courts (rather than address the widespread inhumane
conditions of confinement brought about by extremely overcrowded
conditions of confinement, warehousing, etc. which are the actual cause
of the flood of litigation pending in the courts). Federal Appeal Court
began chipping away at prisoners' equal protection rights prior to the
passage of the PLRA in a syncronized effort to discourage in &Yana 12au
appeals of pto 6e civil rights suits by taxing costs in substantial
amounts against prisoner litigants (whether or not such appeals were

PAGE NO. 13
considered f/tivotows). See for example: Weaver -vs.- Toombs, 948 F.2d
1004 (64 Cir. 1991); Freeze -vs.- Griffith, 849 F.2d 172 (50 Cir. 1988),
and James -vs.- Quinlan, 886 F.2d 37, 40 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1989) where the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
"There is a genuine judicial concern about
the preceived recent surge in ptooe civil rights
suits by in ‘olinta paupeta/s state prisoners."
These Bills of Costs are now routinely ranging hundreds of dollars. In
PA the maximum prison wage is $0.41 per hour. At that rate paying off a
Bill of Costs ranging hundreds of dollars could take years. The actual
intent, pwtpme and leisuitt is to discourage many prisoners from pursuing
appeals of adverse decisions in civil rights cases. However, judicial
rationale is allegedly to force prisoners "to confront the initial
dilemma which faces most other civil litigants: is the merit of the
claim worth the cost of pursuing it?" Braden -vs.- Estelle, 428 F.Supp.
595, 596 (S.D.Tex. 1977). However, the fact is that most prisoners
(unlike "most other civil litigants") are destitute and, therefore, the
actual question is: "whether the merit of the claim is worth going into
debt for the next several years?", which, is not "the dilemma which
faces most other civil litigants."
In the present fervent "get-tough-on-crime" atmosphere politicians have
taken full advantage of public apathy created by election campaign
rhetoric and the like to pass omnibus crime bills and other legislation
which discontinued higher educational funding for prisoners throughout
the country, i.e., Pell Grants and Incarcerated Veteran's Benefits under
the GI Bill, etc. State agencies for higher education have followed the
federal example and discontinued providing any educational funding for
incarcerated persons. Thus, modem political agenda to "get-tough-on-
crime" apparently includes retracting educational opportunity and
systematically obstructing equal access to the courts by destitute

PAGE NO. 14
prisoners (perhaps as a form of izgri/qatioeteivaititation).
Many state legislators are currently contemplating a return to the
eighteenth century archaic "chain gang" form of prison system previously
disregarded by Modern Correctional Standards as an affront to human
dignity pet e and most legal authorities previously viewed as "violating
standards of decency which mark the progress of a maturing society."
Trop - vs. - Dulles, 78 S.Ct. 590, 598 (1958).
Under perceived unconstitutional conditions of confinement the most
cherished and important right prisoners have is their First Amendment
right to "petition the government for a redress of grievances." More
often than not imprisoned persons are unable to obtain assistance of
lawyers (whether privately retained or court appointed) and, thus, must
represent their own causes pto 6e. It would appear that the ongoing
judicial and legislative efforts to undermine prisoners' right to
meaningful, unfettered access to the courts will eventually return
prisoners to the mentality level which perpetuated the chain reaction of
prison riots throughout the country during the 60s and 70s.
Increasingly, prisoners are beginning to realize that their right to
"petition the government for a redress of grievances" is little more
than a farce. Undue political obstruction of this right by legislative
measures such as the PLRA constitutes an assault upon the very
foundation of checks and balances without which the First Amendment
right to "pe47,44u14 petition the government for a redress of grievances"
will, for the most part, become an illusion for imprisoned persons and
be replaced by more dramatic forms of protest like the insurrections at
Attica, New Mexico and more recently Camp Hill.
On April 24, 1996 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, Pub.L.No. 104 - 132 became law. This Act further regresses the
rights of prisoners in the area of criminal litigation and expedites the
demise of condemned prisoners by further constricting procedural due

PAGE NO. 15
process rights of appeal, 'WW1. aUa. Current legislation aimed at
keeping prisoners out of court and college appears to be consistent with
a systematic plan to return them to the chain gangs of yesteryear (some
states have already begun this process) and expedite the process of wide
scale execution of condemned convicts. Under the old system of liberal
procedural due process and appellate review procedures there were,
nevertheless, instances of innocent persons being executed. The
question which materializes here is: Knowing that the liberal system of
appellate review failed to prevent the execution of some innocent
individuals, why has Congress further limited the appellate review
process for condemned convicts?
Even in the face of this syncronized onslaught against prisoners'
litigation rights "the pen vs (still) migiaim than the NAyoul." The most
effective strategy to counteract the current backslide of existing
rights is effective communication with potential outside sources of ass-
istance, i.e., attorneys, prisoners' rights groups, local and national
legal organizations and law schools, news media, members of Congress and
State Legislators, etc. The more efficiently prisoners are able to
communicate their issues to society, the more likely they are to
eventually replace the present medieval system of criminal justice with
more sophisticated concepts of Modern Correctional Goals befitting
twenty first century knowledge in all areas of scientific and moral
advancements.
[NONTRADITIONAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE IN PRISONERS' RIGHTS LAW & POLICY]
I have spent the last twenty years of imprisonment in practically every
conceivable condition of confinement possible in numerous state and
federal prisons and county jails. For the most part prison officials
have viewed me as a threat to the security of the prison system and
negative influence upon other prisoners. This perception has resulted
in my having spent nearly twelve years in "the hole" [various states of

PAGE NO. 16
disciplinary and administrative custody statuses in Behavior Adjustment
Units, Maximum Security Units, Segregated Housing Units, Restricted
Housing Units, etc.] Translated in terms of reality, however, their
actual motive for isolating me was their perception of me as a
prisoners' rights activist and jailhouse lawyer with a propensity for
filing suits against prison officials on behalf of myself and other
prisoners and general threat to the status quo of overt official
oppression pervading the prison bureaucracy.
To greater and lesser degrees isolated housing units are specifically
designed to modify and control behavior patterns through various types
of neo-Pavlovian and Skinnerian techniques of Behavior Modification &
Mind Control. My years of confinement in these units, coupled with my
college background in psychology and various technical books I have read
on the subject of Behavior Modification have provided me with an
extensive insight into the nature of this subject from a personal
experience point of perspective.
When an individual has been labeled by prison officials as a "security
risk" or "behavioral problem" (particularly those with a history of
filing suits against officials) it is practically a foregone conclusion
that one will become the target of a syncronized form of systematic
harassment and retribution aimed at modifying their behavior by any
means necessary (often with fatal results).
PLO 6e civil rights complaints under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging such
violations of one's constitutionally protected rights are usually doomed
to failure because federal courts are inclined to bend over backwards to
their ankles in favor of prison officials' diwaiomm4 actiA ►0 and
routinely grant them "qualified immunity" from suit. Especially in
cases involving 1ktigi4,tornifsomem (those inclined to engage in suit against
officials). In fact, suits filed by individuals considered by the
courts as litigious prisoners are usually processed by the same federal

PAGE NO. 17
judge and magistrate team. With very few exceptions such suits are
usually disposed of on summary judgment, often on the basis of purely
illogical reasoning, misrepresentation of facts and law, as well as what
appears to be a deliberate misinterpretation of the English language
itself. In most instances appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeals and
on certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court fair no better.
By 1979 federal courts around the country were deferring to the "hands
off policy" regarding discretionary functions of the prison
administrations which has traditionally been considered the province of
prison officials rather than federal courts. Specifically as this appl-
ies to matters relating to internal order, discipline and institutional
security. In Bell -vs.- Wolfish, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877 (1979) the U.S.
Supreme Court held:
"Prison administrators ... should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in
the adoption and execution of policies
and practices that in their judgment
are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain instit-
utional security."
The "hands off policy" (and scores of other tegat Loopholes) enables prison
officials to impose all sorts of de facto punishments upon prisoners
simply by relabeling their actions. For example, it is illegal for
prison officials to retaliate against prisoners for exercising their
constitutional right to sue them, so instead of overtly retaliating
against a prisoner by throwing him in the hole for filing a suit the
officials may confine the prisoner in the hole on other pretenses, i.e.,
under the guise of "administrative custody" for "investigative" or any
number of other reasons. As stated in the foregoing, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Hewitt -vs.- Helms, supra. held that prison officials could
base their decision to confine prisoners in administrative custody
(which is substantially the same as disciplinary custody in every

PAGE NO. 18
respect) on mere rumor, subjective evaluations and intuitive judgment
rather than concrete evidence. It is practically impossible for most
prisoners to prove that actions taken against them by prison officials
is in retribution for the exercise of constitutionally protected right.
See: McDonald -vs.- Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 18 (ld Cir. 1979); Johnston -vs.-
Lehman, 609 A.2d 880, 884 (Pa.Comwlth. 1992).
Typically, long term confinement in the hole entails a severe
restriction of physical mobility. One is usually confined in a cell 23
hours per day with one hour of physical exercise in an outside caged
area not much larger than a confinement cell five days per week (one
must spend the other two days per week in the cell 24 hours per day).
Whenever one leaves the cell for any reason one is handcuffed and under
escort of club wielding guards. All meals are served in the cell.
Visitation is usually non-contact, therefore, other than intrusive and
humiliating pat-down and strip searches, one is cut off from all forms
of human contact. Year in and year out one's entire universe is
primarily limited to the four walls of a tiny cell.
Long periods of confinement in the hole, to greater and lesser degrees
of intensity, further results in producing a psychological condition
referred to as "sensory deprivation." Sensory deprivation occurs when
all normal sensory stimulation of an individual is severely reduced or
made monotonous as possible. The effects of sensory deprivation were
first studied scientifically during the 1950s. The phenomena of sensory
deprivation have since been extensively explored. Symptoms of sensory
deprivation vary widely and may include visual and/or audible
hallucinations, difficulty in concentration, inability to distinguish
between reality and fantasy, iitte4 atia. Other finding include
characteristic changes in electrical activity of the brain and the
conclusion that certain personality traits leads to greater tolerance
for sensory deprivation.

PAGE NO. 19
Finally, sensory deprivation tends to increase susceptibility to
propaganda. Mental illness, delirium, delusions, and dementia are
common consequences of long term confinement in the hole absent
sufficient sensory stimulation required for normal psychological
function. Self-destructive conduct such as suicide and self-mutilation
are also routine. These are negative considerations of sensory
deprivation. However, there does appear to be a positive side as well.
Reduced sensory stimulation in some individuals with greater tolerance
for sensory deprivation tends to increase and enhance their perceptions
in certain areas of mental concentration. Apparently, the reduction of
normal sensory stimuli embellishes some individual's ability to
elaborate upon the sensory stimuli which is available and allows their
mind to greatly magnify every small piece of information available to
the extent where one may become hyper-perceptive in certain areas of
reality. Specifically as this applies to reading, writing and one's
imagination.
Following the Supreme Court decision in Hewitt, supra., which severely
restricted prisoners' rights to pweedwtat due pitoce46 relating to
administrative segregation procedures, etc., state and federal prison
officials now have sufficient legal grounds to confine prisoners in the
hole for the remainder of their imprisonment (regardless of how long a
period that may entail). Consequently, many more prisoners will be
exposed to the phenomena of long term sensory deprivation and caused to
function somewhere between the psychological states of psychosis and
hyper perceptivity.
Another area of unbridled power wielded by prison officials is their
authority to transfer prisoners practically anywhere they choose "for
any reason or no reason at all." It is a well known fact in both state
and federal prison systems that jailhouse lawyers and other activist
prisoners often find themselves systematically transferred from prison
to prison, hole to hole, hundreds and even thousands of miles from their
nearest relatives, friends and legal represenatives (on the so-called

PAGE NO. 20
"merry-go-round" or "diesel therapy").
The transfer tactic is part and parcel of behavior modification methods.
Prisoners with weak personalities are rendered incommunicado, isolated,
more prone to intimidation and other conven method's when they are
effectively severed from all meaningful outside contact and at the
complete mercy of prison officials. Under such conditions many
prisoners lose their sense of self-awareness, personal identity and
become prone to propaganda and brainwashing techniques.
Since 1976 when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Meachum -vs.- Fano, 96
S.Ct. 2543 (1976) that there is no constitutional right which protects
convicted prisoners from transfer from one prison to another within the
state prison system, (or to another state, Olim -vs.- Wakinekona, 103
S.Ct. 1741 (1983)) and that prison officials were free to transfer
prisoners "for any reason or no reason at all," prison officials have
repeatedly subjected me to systematic transfers throughout the state
prison system and, eventually, to the Federal Bureau of Prisons under 18
U.S.C. §5003 (a federal statutory provision which authorizes federal
prison authorities to contract with state officials for custody of state
prisoners). See also: Brown -vs.- Smith, 580 F.Supp. 1576 (1984);
Shoats -vs.- PA Dept. of Corrections, 591 A.2d 326 (1991); Bickerstaff -
vs.- Thornburgh, 755 F.Supp. 977 (D.Kan. 1991); Stevenson -vs.-
Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 1214 (10th Cir. 1991).
Since the beginning of my confinement on June 11, 1976 I have been
confined at the following institutions: (1) Camden Co. Jail, Camden, NJ,
(2) Camden Co. Jail Annex, Blackwood, NJ, (3) Atlantic Co. Prison,
Atlantic Co., NJ, (4) Delaware Co. Prison, Thornton, PA, (5)
Philadelphia Detention Center, Philadelphia, PA, (6) Holmesburg Co.
Prison, Philadelphia, PA, (7) Graterford State Correctional Institution
(SCI), Graterford, PA, (8) Dallas SCI, Dallas, PA, (9) Pittsburgh SCI,
Pittsburgh, PA, (10) Huntingdon SCI, Huntingdon, PA, (11) Camp Hill SCI,

PAGE NO 21
Camp Hill, PA, (12) Allegheny Co. Jail, Pittsburgh, PA, (13) Lewisburg
Federal Penitentiary, Lewisburg, PA, (14) Atlanta Federal Penitentiary,
Atlanta, GA, (15) El Reno Federal Penitentiary, El Reno, OK, (16)
Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS, (17) Frackville SCI,
Frackville, PA, (18) Mahanoy SCI, Mahanoy, PA, (19) Retreat SCI, Hunlock
Creek, PA. I have also been transferred to many of these institutions
on several different occasions.
Transfers are an extremely disruptive process which often results in the
loss of property (especially important legal materials), mail is
frequently delayed and lost in the delivery channels (especially legal
mail), and everyone on one's mailing and visitor's list must be notified
of the change of address and visitors provided with new travel
directions for visitation. One must also become acquainted with a
completely new set of prison regulations, policies, practices and
customs as well as personality characteristics of prisoners and
officials with whom one must coexist and interact with in the
environment.
Long distance transfers minimize social and business contacts with
relatives, friends and legal represenatives. For the most part
prisoners are only permitted to place collect phone calls, which are
more expensive than direct calls. Consequently, long distance phone
contact is often very limited or cut off completely because many
individuals can not afford to accept such calls on a regular basis. The
same applies to visitation due to great distances between visitors and
the institution. Eventually, over long periods of confinement
meaningful family ties, social and business contacts, etc. deteriorate.
Many prisoners become estranged and alienated from their families and
friends. Consequently, the negative impact of the "merry-go-round" and
"diesel therapy" produces an equally adverse affect upon the relatives
and friends of prisoners as it does upon the prisoners.

PACE NO. 22
Over years of confinement I have been directly affected by practically
every type of issue within the spectrum of prisoners' rights. On
occasion this has not only involved self-help litigation but more
dramatic forms of protest such as work strikes, political fasts (hunger
strikes), boycotts, prison riots, hostage situations, ixvIteA &Uzi. From my
point of perspective as a prisoner my learning experience in the area of
prisoners' rights law developed as a survival mechanism through force of
necessity.
Prisoners' rights is an esoteric area of law which is primarily illusory
in most areas of actual application. Idealistically, the judicial
application of prisoners' rights entail three areas of consideration:
(1) that lawful confinement conditions in itself necessarily involve a
limitation of the range of rights applicable to the free world, (2) that
a prisoner does not lose all of his/her rights and a residuum of
fundamental rights remain during confinement (with severe limitation),
and (3) prison officials are clothed with broad and nearly omnipotent
powers of discretion over prisoners' conditions of confinement and,
unless fundamental constitutional rights or protected liberty interests
are involved, federal courts will not disturb the determinations of
prison officials. The fact is that even in the protected areas of
fundamental constitutional rights and state created liberty interests
most of these judicial considerations are premised upon one or more catch
22 provisos which, in essence, permits prison officials to slip through
4.4,..tga4 'Loophole's to escape the consequence of their otherwise illegal
conduct.
Current trend of common law tends to shield officials from suit by
affording them numerous effective legal defenses and de facto methods of
using the ends to justify the means (while in contrast prisoners'
standards of proof are extremely difficult burdens to carry). In Whitley
-vs.- Albers, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986) the U.S. Supreme Court heightened
its version of the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard

PAGE NO. 23
applicable to Eighth Amendment claims by holding that a prison
official's shooting of an unarmed prisoner during quelling of a riot,
without prior verbal warning, did not violate the prisoner's right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Legal relief is rarely granted in most pto 6e cases. The so-called
Weutt corvAiwotion 'Lae (whereby courts are supposedly required to review
oo óe complaints and pleadings on "less stringent standards than the
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers," See: Haines - vs. - Kerner, 92
S.Ct. 594 (1972); Hughes - vs. - Rowe, 101 S.Ct. 173 (1980)), appears to
apply more to the Deputy Attorney Generals who represent the interest of
prison officials than it does to pto ,se prisoners representing their own
interests.
To all intent and purpose prisoners' rights are actually governed more by
political influences than judicial precedent and common law. The latter
appear to be merely an assortment of legal rhetoric and rationalization
mechanisms based on deductive and inductive reasoning which may be
conveniently applied to iwtild moving in whatever political direction is
consistent with the agenda of the political party of the elected
officials. Since the mid 1970s the U.S. Supreme Court has halted and/or
reversed the majority of its progress in the area of prisoners' rights.
Today the U.S. Supreme Court is more conservative than it has been in
any era since the Taft/Hughes Court between 1921-1931. The prevailing
attitude of most courts today is far right wing conservatism. Elected
politicians control who is appointed to serve as Supreme Court justices
and federal judges. Since incarcerated felons, for the most part, have
been disenfranchised of their voting rights they have no control over
the electoral candidates who ultimately determine their fate. By and
large prisoners are politically impotent and as long as this condition
prevails prisoners' rights shall continue to remain largely illusory.
Owens -vs.- Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (1983), ceM denied, 104 S.Ct. 400;
Richardson -vs.- Ramirez, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974).

PAGE NO. 24
There is no doubt that the basic foundation of prisoners' rights law has
considerable potential to support a fundamentally sound construction of
progressive reform more appropriate for twenty first century
consideration than the present backsliding, eighteenth century plans to
return to chain gang medieval mentality, retraction of educational
funding for prisoners and systematic denial of meaningful access to the
courts, 1:414te4 wad. Traditionally, prisoners have been stripped of
practically every type of responsibility and self-determination as a
consequence of imprisonment. Restoration of voting rights and other
forms of social responsibilities would appear consistent with Modern
Correctional efforts to alleviate rather than perpetuate antisocial
personality characteristics prevalent in a large percentage of
prisoners.
In a very basic sense /Ai/swum' //tights and tehaititation are inextricably
interwoven to the extent where one may not be realistically considered
in the absence of the other. According to Black's Law Dictionary, Id.
the term keitalyaitation means:
"Investing or clothing again with some right,
authority, or dignity. Restoring person or
'thing to a former capacity; reinstating;
qualifying again. In i.e Cotermem, D.C.Ky., 21
F.Supp. 923, 924, 925. Restoration of individual
to his greatest potential, whether physically,
mentally, socially, or vocationally. Jones
Giannet Cotp., 362 A.2d 139, 143."
Accordingly, as long as prisoners' rights remain illusory for the most
part so, too, will a true sense of rehabilitation remain primarily an
illusion and the recidivist rate will continue to climb. The
fundamental political rights embodied in the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, i.e., freedom of speech, association, and beliefs have
been all but completely eradicated in the prison environment. See for
example, Jones - vs. - North Carolina Prisoners Labor Union, Inc., 97
S.Ct. 2532 (1977); Sostre -vs.- McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2W Cir. 1971);

PAGE NO. 25
Goodwin -vs.- Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2W Cir. 1972); Matter of Prisoners
Labor Union -vs.- Helsbv, 354 N.Y.S. 2d 694 (1974); Prisoners' Labor
Union at Marquette -vs.- State Dep't. of Corrections, 232 N.W.2d 699
(1975).
In modern society it is absurd to suggest that a convict can be
"restored to his greatest (social) potential" absent some meaningful
opportunity to exercise the fundamental political rights essential to
realizing one's "greatest potential" as a Aeimaid, 4.&spoormilke citizen.
The very idea of di/slitancivi/sement of fundamental political rights (such as
voting) as a consequence for conviction of a crime is an antithesis to
the very concept of tehalyWitation. Particularly if the primary goal of
itehaiki.tation is "restoration of individual to his greatest (social)
potential" as a citizen. Black's Law Dictionary, Id. describes the term
citizen as:
"One who, under the Constitution and laws of
the United States, or of a particular state,
is a member of the political community, owing
allegiance and being entitled to the enjoyment
of full civil rights...'Citizens' are members
of a political community who, in their assoc-
dated capacity, have established or submitted
themselves to the dominion of a government for
their individual as well as collective rights.
Heivviott City ol& Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 48, 500 P.2d
101, 109."
According to this definition one of the primary ingredients of the term
citizen is being "a member of the political community." By logical
extension of reasoning one who has been stripped of the right to vote
(and otherwise meaningfully participate in political processes) may no
longer be characterized as a "member of the political community" [no
more so than an attorney who has been disbarred and stripped of the
right to practice law may any longer be characterized as an attorney].
Nonetheless, incarcerated felons are cUizems according to law, i.e.,

PAGE NO. 26
members of the political community. While courts have already held that
the right of convicted felons to vote is not fundamental, Owens - vs.-
Barnes, supra. at 27 citing Richardson - vs. - Ramirez, supra., it may be
reasonably argued that the right to vote is a fundamental right inherent
in the status of citizenship itself. However, the question which
materializes at this point is whether an individual who has been
diisenktancia/sed of the fundamental political rights enjoyed by the
"political community" maybe realistically regarded as a member of the
political community? In the same sense may such an individual be
legitimately classified as a citizen, or is the title of oftiun as
applicable to such an individual nothing but an empty Mat title, an
illusory description?
The law should not have it both ways. Either an incarcerated felon
cli/seancivi/sed of the right to vote should not be considered a citizen and,
thus, no longer a member of the political community, or such individual
should be considered a citizen but as such may not be stripped of
fundamental political rights without which the term citizen would be
devoid of any meaning other than an itiuwity tWe.
The current status of the law provides that states are free to
cli/sem1044chiise convicted felons of their right to vote based upon the
language of §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Richardson, supra.,
(implying that "the right to vote at any election" may not be "denied or
in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime...") The Court further stated that the standard of equal
protection scrutiny to be applied when the state makes classifications
relating to disenfranchisement of felons is the traditional itatiAma 44241:6
6twukirtd. See also: Williams -vs.- Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 514 (5th Cir.
1982); Shepard -vs.- Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (5th Cir. 1978).
The bottom line is that as long as the law remains as it is, i.e.,
states are free to have it both ways and strip convicted felons of the
fundamental political rights which are necessarily inherent in the

PACE NO. 27
status of dtizen/A40 itself, yet, continue to classify such individuals as
citizens (members of the political community), a on Nultuitivi material
fallacy of law shall exist [it simply does not follow logically].
The fact is that there is no such thing as varying degrees of c.iitizenAhip;
either one Vs or vs not a oitiz.en, i.e., one either i4 or i4 not "a member of
the political community." It is illogical to classify one who has been
stripped of all fundamental political rights as "a member of the
political community" or, otherwise, classify such an individual as a
citizen. There appear to be no tatiotua 142/5i.5 for classifying persons who
have been stripped of all political rights inherent in the very concept
of aitiamysizip itself as citizens. To all intent and purpose, an individual
who has been diAentitancivi4ed of all political powers within the community,
and who only maintains a residuum of civil rights, falls more precisely
within the legal definition of avititotnuntaws (civilly dead).
Black's Law Dictionary, Id. describes the term civil death as:
"The state of a person who, though possessing
natural life, has lost all civil rights and as
to them is considered civilly dead. HiAoko
Kato*Ua Hama Lawa, Cat.App., 258 P.2d 1039, 1042.
In some states, persons convicted of serious
crimes are declared to be civilly dead which
means that certain civil rights and privileges
of the convicted offender including the right to
vote and contract and to sue and be sued are for-
feited."
Most incarcerated felons have no right to vote or contluwA and, to all
judicial and legislative intent and purpose, it appear that their right
to sue is rapidly becoming an empty egg6iumtt as well. Moving from this
premise it is evident that in the absence of fundamental civil and
political rights prisoners are not much better off today than they were
125 years ago when the law universally considered incarcerated felons
oi,uitty dead and tempo any staves of the ,state. In 1871 the court in Ruffin -
vs. - Commonwealth, 62 VA 790, 795-96 (1871) reasoned that:

PAGE NO. 28
"A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity
punishes by confinement in the penitentiary instead
of with death, is subject while undergoing that
punishment, to all the laws the Legislator in its
wisdom may enact for the government of that instit-
ution and the control of its inmates. For the time
being, during his term of service in the penitentiary,
he is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He
has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited
his liberty, but all his personal rights except those
the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the
time being the slave of the State. He is oivititeit moM'au6;
and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that
of a dead man."
Striping away all of the idealized imagery and illusory descriptions
applied to the present legal concept of a convicted felon, there does
not appear to be any difference between the autuat 4egat MattO of today's
incarcerated felons and that of those referred to by the Ruffin, supra.
court, except the Superintendent is no longer vested by law with
authority "to punish (prisoners) by stripes, or the iron mask, or the
gag...if he commits an offence not amounting to a felony." The overall
status of oivititet movtato and that of a terapoitaity 'stove o6 the State appears to
remain in tact. If Fyodor Dostoyevski's statement "[t]he level of a
civilization can be judged by entering its prisons" is true, it is
evident that there is very little actual difference between "Ow towet of
oluitizaaon" today and that of civilization 125 years ago with regard to
the legal capacity of incarcerated felons.
In the clearest sense of perspective, then, the term 4e-habilitation implies
restoring a convicted felon to his/her "greatest (social) potential,"
which is that of a tiv3powsiAke citizen. This is patently impossible under
the traditional penological methods of punishment, retribution, and
disenfranchisement of the basic rights, privileges and immunities
integral to the composition of a law abiding, responsible citizen. Such
methods have been tried, tested, and proven to dehumanize and perpetuate
the very type of arptiweiat attitudes and behavior which are completely
inconsistent with any conception of itehalyititation.

PAGE NO. 29
It would, therefore, appear that the primary focal point and goal of
modern prisoners' rights activist should be the restoration of
fundamental rights, privileges and immunities integral in the
composition of the very concept of the term teisporysitte c.Wzen, including,
but not limited to the right to vote. The concept of civititeA. =vamps is
diametrically opposed to the concept of niminat tehaiiitation ostensibly
because tegatty dead peoms may not be realistically considered Avsporysidte or
oitizero [both of which terms are essential components of the term
itehabititatim as applied to incinzeAcuted Wows]. Until the political rights
of prisoners have developed to the extent where they may memm 7Agitaily
participate as "members of the political community" they will not be
capable, for the most part, of reaching their "greatest (social)
potential" as teJsporoale aitiwo and the present concept of citimina
Aeltaititation shall continue to remain largely a myth.
Prepared by:
E,6'401/,1?,
Hiram R. Johnston, Jr.
Student No. 139-40-6069
Completed: November 28, 1996

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
PAGE NO. 30
PRISONERS SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL, Revised Second Edition, by
Manville & Boston, (Oceana Publications, Inc. 1986)
PRISONERS AND THE LAW, Edited by Ira P. Robbins, (Clark Boardman
Company, 1985)
THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, Fourth Edition, by Rudovsky, Bronstein, Koren,
& Cade (So. ILL. University Press, 1988)
PRIMER FOR JAIL LITIGATORS, 14 Ed., (Nat. Prison Project of the ACLU
Foundation, 1984)
A JAILHOUSE LAWYER MANUAL, Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Columbia
University School of Law, 435 W. 1160 Street, New York, NY 10014
LOGIC FOR LAWYERS, A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking, by Aldisert (Clark
Boardman Co., Ltd. 1989)
CASES & MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS AND PRISONERS'
RIGHTS, 40 Ed., by Krantz & Brannam, (West Publishing Co. 1991)
THE PA PRISON SOCIETY, CORRECTIONAL FORUM, 200 Spring Garden Street,
Philadelphia, PA 19130-3805
GRATERFRIENDS, (Prison Newsletter), SCI-Graterford, P.O. Box 426,
Graterford, PA 19426
GORILLA LAW, PRISONERS' SURVIVAL MANUAL, INSIDE/OUT PRESS, 366 N. Van
Ness, Fresno, CA 93701
FLORIDA CLEARINGHOUSE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE NEWSLETTER, 306 E. Park
Avenue, #102, Tallahassee, FL 32301
C.P.R. NEWSLETTER, COALITION FOR PRISONERS RIGHTS, P.O. BOX 1911, Santa
Fe, NM 87501
THE PRISONERS' UNION JOURNAL, PRISONERS' UNION, 1909 60 Street,
Sacramento, CA 95814
SOUTHERN COALITION REPORT ON JAILS & PRISONS, P.O. Box 120044,
Nashville, TN 37212
P.L.A.P. PRACTICE MANUALS, PRISON LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, Austin Hall,
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA 02138
PRISON DECISIONS, University of Toledo, College of Law, Toledo, OH 43606
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION -- LAW & LEGISLATION -- UNITED STATES, by Martin

SELECTEDBIBLIOGRAPHY
[Continued]
PAGE NO. 31
Reed (Research Press, 1975)
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION -- CORRECTIONAL REHABILITATION & MANAGEMENT; A
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM, by Teodoro Ayllon (A Wiley Interscience
Publication, 1979)
TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION, From Propaganda To Brainwashing, by J.A.C.
Brown (Penguin Press, 1963)
THE PEOPLE SHAPERS, by Vance Packard, (Bantam Books, 1977)
THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS, by Vance Packard, (Pocket Books, 1957)
A

TABLE OF CASES
PAGE NO. 32
CASES
PAGE ( s )
Beet Woqish, 99 S.Gt. 1861 (1979) 17
Bic-keit/staid, Thoutunah, 755 F.Supp. 977 (D.Kan. 1991) 20
BOWL& -(76.- Smith, 97 S.Gt. 1491 (1977) 4
731aden -vs.- Esteite, 428 F.Supp. 595 (S.D.Tex. 1977) 13
Ekown Smith, 580 F.Supp. 1576 (1984) 20
Buie Hudkirvs, 584 F.2d 223 (7th CIA. 1978) 5
Cotpu/s Estette, 551 F.2d 68 (5th U./L. 1977) 4
Foitetta Cati4olnia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) 6,7
Fa/uneA, /34ennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994) 11
Freeze Gliffilitit, 849 F.2d 172 (5th Gi/t. 1988) 13
Gideon -06.- (Alaimo/tight, 83 S.Ct. 792 (1963) 8
Goodwin -v6.- Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2[11 Gi/t. 1972) 25
Haines -vs.- KeitneA, 92 S.Ct. 594 (1972) 23
Heitniott -vs.- City of, Seattle, 81 (A)ash.2d 48, 500 P.2d 101 25
Hewitt -()5.- Heim, 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983) 10,17,19
Hiitoko Kawakita Naga/ski Lorenz, Cat.App. 258 P.2d 1039 27
Hud/son McMatian, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992) 11
Hughes -vs.- Rowe, 101 S.Ct. 173 (1980) 23
In Ite Co4man, D.C.Ky. 21 F.Supp. 923 24
James -vs.- Quinlan, 886 F.2d 37 (3d Cit. 1989) 13
Johnson Aveity, 89 S.Ct. 747 (1969) 2,3,4
Johnston -vs.- Lehman, 609 A.2d 880 (Pa.Contwith. 1992) 18
Jones -vs.- Gt.innet Cotp., 362 A.2d 139 24
Jones -vs.- Nava Carotin Pa/sone/vs Labot Union, Inc., 97 S.Ct. 2532 (1977) 24
Matte' Pki.soneivs Labot Union -cps.- Het*, 354 N.V.S. 2d 694 (1974) 25

TABLE OF CASES
PAGE NO. 33
CASES [Continued] PAGE(s)
McCtay -0.- Bennett, 467 F.Supp.187 (1978) 5,6
McDonald -0.- Halt, 610 F.2d 16 (1g Gilt. 1979) 18
Meachum -no.- Fano, 96 S.Ct. 2543 (1976) 20
Mertz4i-el-el -0.- Boitg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cit. 1989) 7
Nicht -vs.- Schmidt, 351 F.Supp. 385 (10.D.Wiisc. 1972) 6
O4Am -vs.- Wakinekona, 103 S.Ct. 1741 (1983) 20
Owens -vs.- &ones, 711 F.2d 25 (3rd Gilt. 1983) 23,26
1D/1i/sone/vs' Labot Union at Marquette -vs.- State Dep't. oi, Col/text/lows,
232 N.W. 2d 699 (1975) 25
Rhodes -vas.- Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981) 9
Richaiedson -vs.- Raraiitez, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974) 23,26
Ru.4,4,in -(16.- Commonwealth, 62 VA 790 (1871) 27
Shepard -vs.- Pcevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Gilt. 1978) 26
Shoats -vs.- PA Dept. ob Covlectiom, 591 A.2d 326 (1991) 20
Smith -vs - Bennett, 81 S. Ct. 895 (1961) 12
Sostice -v6.- McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (god Cit. 1971) 24
Stevenson -vs.- Thoinkuigh, 943 F.2d 1214 (10th Cit. 1991) 20
.Stackland -06.- Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) 10
Tip teiui -vs.- Owens, 719 F.Supp. 1256 (LO.D.PA 1989) 4
Puy -vs.- Da e/5, 78 S.Ct. 590 (1958) 14
U.S. -vs.- Chapman, 954 F.2d 1352 (7th Cit. 1991) 7
U.S. ex ARA.. Poitaptoi,essionai Law GiirtiC -VS.- Kane, 656 F.Supp. 1099 (E.D. PA (1987) 5
U.S. -vs.- Ptiltne.tt, 910 F.2d 51 (2r CiA. 1990) 7
U.S. -vs.- Smith, 907 F.2d 42 (6th Cie. 1990) 7
U.S. -06.- Watson, 1 F.3d 733 (8th Cie.. 1993) 7
Vaughn -0.5.- Ttotteit, 516 F.Supp. 886 (M.D.Tenn. 1980) 5
Wade -vs.- Kane, 448 F.Supp. 678 (E.D.PA 1978) 5
Weave. -0.- Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004 (62 Gilt. 1991) 13
Whitty -vs.- Atte/vs, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986) 22
WiUiam -0.- Tatitot, 677 F.2d 510 (5th CIA. 1982) 26
Wikson -VS.- SeiiteA, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991) 11
Young -vs.- Quintan, 960 F.2d 351 (3d Ciit. 1992) 11
AIP

Catch 22 ploviAcfrs, 22
Chain gang, 14,24
Checks & Balancers, 6,14
GivititeA Mottuuts, 27,28
Civitty dead, 27
V
Hattacinations, 18
Havtaisisment, 5
Heightened proof lequimments, 11
HypeA pe,weptivity, 19
H
De ,acto puni/shmervt, 17
De facto method's, 22
Dehumanize, 28
Detiie/tate indif4e/tence, 11
Dieset thetapy, 20,21
Di/salpiinalud custody,
(see: "The hate")
Di4eAetionaty actions, 16,17
Disenfi►ancivi/se, 23,25,26,27
Double ceiling, 9
Idealized imagery, 28
Inca/we/toted vete/tams' den4it4, 13
Ine‘kotive assistance counsel, 10
in to'M4 paupeAiis, 13
Inmate pa/tategat, 4
I,Saiated Housing Unit,
(See: "The hate")
I
INDEX
PAGE NO. 34
A E
Access to the cou/a/s, 4-8
AdminiistAative custody, 10,16-19
Anti/social attitudes, 24,28
Antite/1404/Sm & Effective Death
Penalty Act of, 1996, 14
13
Eighth Amendment, 11 ,22,23
Empty egoheti, 9,26,27
Equal protection of, -taw, 12
E3ehaviot Adjustment Unit, 16
Behavior, modif,ication, 16-21
Behavioltat ploitem, 16
Bit of, casts, 13
E3ipaitti/san potiticat expediency, 8
131thuuashing, 20
Fiipst Amendment, 14,24
G
GI Biti, 13
GeneiwA population, 10
"Get—tough-on-dime," 8,13
C

INDEX con,,i,
PAGE NO. 35
J
Jai thowse tawyeA, 2-8
Judiciany Act oj, 1789, 6
L
Law cleitiz, 4
Legality dead, 29
Legal loopholes, 17,22
Legislatovs, 14
Liteitai conistituoti.o. n rule, 23
Litigious plisoneivs, 16
Long term confinement, 18
M
Mandatory costs, 12
Maximum Sec-Laity Unit, 16
"Mevuy-go-round," 20,21
ModeAn Covtectional Goats, 15
ModeAn Comectiorull Standaluk, 14
Modem peaticat agenda, 13
Mutual legal a,,s,ststance, 2-8
PitoceduAdi due process, 10,19
Plkson Litigation Refolm
Act of 1995, 11
PlisoneAo' 'tights, 24
Propaganda, 19,20
Pro 'se litigant, 2-8
Psycho6i4, 19
R
Rational 1a/SiS standard, 26
Rehatititation, 24-29
Responsible citizen, 28,29
Restticted Housing Unit, 16
Retaliation, 5,6,17,18
Right wing conseitoati4m, 23
S
SecuAity itiisk, 16
Self-help litigation, 1-8,11
Segregated Housing Unit, 16
Sensory deprivation, 18,19
Sixth. Amendment, 8
State mind, 11
Subjective element, 11
T
Tempo/id/1y slave of, the Mate, 27,28
-The hole," 15
Pia/2*A tactic, 20
•
Objective element, 11 Voting /tights, 23,29
Omni i.u6 &vim' e WA, 13
Oveitcitowding, 9,12
Pelt Grant, 13
%Utica community, 25-29
Political influences, 23
WoAehousing, 12
Writ wAteic, 3,4

Portfolio Assessment Narrative_1

Recomendados

Recomendados

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Mais procurados (18)

Semelhante a Portfolio Assessment Narrative_1

Semelhante a Portfolio Assessment Narrative_1 (15)

Portfolio Assessment Narrative_1