An overview of nuclear power and renewable energy polices and issues in Japan (June 2015).

1. Japan’s Post-Fukushima
Energy Policy
Eric Johnston
Deputy Editor, The Japan Times
ANuclearPastor
aNon-Nuclear
Future?

2. Japan’s Energy Situation
1. Japan imports 90 percent of
energy needs.
2. Due to geopolitical problems,
little Russian oil or LNG comes
to Japan.
3. Oil and LNG is transported from
Africa, Middle East, Southeast
Asia, and coal from Australia.
Huge transportation costs and in
the case of oil, political
uncertainties add to price.
4. U.S. is exporting shale gas in
small quantities to Japan, which
will increase in coming years.
But political issues in US
Congress creating uncertainty of
guaranteed supply. Alaska wants
Japan to help build an LNG
pipeline.

3. Japan’s Energy Mix
28.6
10.7
1.7 1
1月24日 25
27.6
30.329.3
39.5
42.5 43.2
7.1
14.4
18.3
14.9
8.3 9 8.4 8.5
1.1 1.4 1.6 2.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
2010 2011 2012 2013
PERCENTAGES
Nuclear Coal LNG Oil Hydro Renewables

4. Nuclear Pre 3/11
 Before March 11, 2011, there were 54
commercial nuclear reactors in Japan
supplying about 1/3 of Japan’s electricity.
 Each reactor generated between 540
megawatts electricity (MWe) and 1.3 gigawatts
(GWe). 1,000 megawatts = 1 gigawatt.
 There had also been plans to ramp up the
share of nuclear power to as much as 40
percent by mid-century by building new
plants to replace aging ones.

5. Why Did Japan
Go Nuclear in
the first place?
ABrief(verybrief)History

6. The End of WWII and the Occupation
Japan went to war at least partially to secure oil and
gas reserves for its growing domestic industries. The
dream of becoming ``self-sufficient’’ in energy
production had haunted the country since the late
1800s, after Japan opened to the outside world after
two and a half centuries of isolation.
The postwar U.S.-led Occupation of Japan made the
country a U.S. ally in the Pacific against
communism. Japan got access to fossil fuel sources
from U.S. allies, but the independent energy dream
never died.

7. 1953: A Chance Meeting At Harvard
Yasuhiro
Nakasone Henry Kissinger

8. Dec. 1953: Atoms For Peace
Concerned about other nations, allied or
otherwise, pursuing their own nuclear technology
programs, President Dwight Eisenhower
announces in the United Nations the ``Atoms
for Peace’’ program, the practical result being
that the U.S. supplies nuclear knowhow and
technology to friendly nations like Japan
wanting it for ``peaceful purposes.’’
In March 1954, Nakasone manages to get the
first-ever budget for nuclear research passed in
parliament, thus beginning Japan’s road to
nuclear power.

9. Selling Nuclear
To A Skeptical Nation
SHORIKI MATSUTARO
Yomiuri Shimbun owner, friend of Nakasone, convicted
war criminal, CIA agent, and The Godfather of Japanese
Pro Baseball and the Japanese Nuclear Power Industry
ZENSAKU AZUMA
Japan’s Charles Lindbergh’’, extremely popular with the
public, promoted eating uranium-laced food, extolled nuclear
power (and cigarettes), and died of cancer.

10. The Three Electricity Laws:
Payoffs to the Provinces
By the early 1970s, Japan had built its first commercial
nuclear reactors using American, British, and French
technology and knowhow. But as the dangers of
nuclear power, and concerns about nuclear weapons,
grew, and following the 1973 oil shock, Japan’s leaders
realized that in order to overcome antinuclear
sentiment and build more plants, local governments
where the power plants were located needed to be
financially compensated.
In the mid-1970s, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s
government passed three new laws that provided
funding to any locality that agreed to host a nuclear
power plant. Thus was born the ``nuclear power
village’’ of national government officials, utilities, and
local governments and businesses that we know today.

11. HowMuch Official FundingDo Local GovernmentsGet?
Model Case:
Construction of a 1.35GW nuclear power plant.
Assumptions
(1) Environmental Impact Study takes three years
(2) Construction takes seven years
(3) Plant Operates for 40 years
Over a 45 year period, from beginning of environmental assessment to the 35th year of the
plant’s operation, local governments hosting the plant can receive 121.5 billion
yen, or almost 1.2 billion dollars under the Electricity Laws.
This does not include additional donations from the utility or other unofficial
forms of assistance.
TOTAL AMOUNT A LOCAL TOWN OR VILLAGE RECEIVES FOR HOSTING A NUCLEAR
POWER PLANT: Nobody Really Knows.

12. Ye Olde Nuclear Village
For over four
decades, the
``nuclear power
village’’ has kept
opposition to
nuclear power at
bay. Four years
after 3/11, though,
a powerful struggle
between the
powerful village
and renewable
energy proponents
threatens the
village as never
before.

13. RENEWABLE ENERGY:
Talkin’ `bout a Revolution!
Post-3/11
Developments
X

14. The Nuclear Village Under Attack
Inthemonthsafter3/11,polls showedthat
upto90percentofJapanesewantedoutof
nuclearpower.
Seizingtheopportunity,renewableenergy
advocatespushedhardtowinpoliticaland
financialsupport.Formonths,thenuclear
village wasunderattackbythemedia,
politicians,andthepublicatlargeasthe
nationaskeditselffundamentalquestions
aboutwhyithadembracednucleartobegin
withandhowitcouldmoveoutofnuclear
powerandintorenewables.

15. Renewable Energy advocates pushed hard for a Feed-In
Tariff after 3/11. The (then) ruling Democratic Party of Japan
favored the FIT, especially Prime Minister Naoto Kan. It was
strongly opposed by the Nuclear Power Village but passed at
the end of August, 2011– the sam day Kan resigned over his
handling of 3/11.
The new tariff went into effect on July 1st, 2012:
The New Tariff means businesses in five renewable
energy sectors can sell their power at a guaranteed
fixed rate over a fixed period of time. Utilities are
required to purchase renewable energy at that price,
but can refuse if they judge, for reasons not always
clear, that to do so would create distribution problems.

16. THE FEED-IN TARIFFS
SOLAR POWER
Output Range ABOVE 10 KW BELOW 10KW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt/hour)
(as of July 1, 2015)
27 yen/kWh 33-35yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years 10 years

17. THE FEED-IN TARIFFS
WIND POWER
TYPE BELOW 20kW ABOVE 20 kW OFFSHORE
BASIC
TARIFF
55 yen/kWh 22 yen/kWh 36 yen/kWh
PERIOD
20 years

18. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
GEOTHERMAL POWER
Output Range ABOVE
15,000 KW
BELOW
15,000 KW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt/hour)
26 yen/kWh 40 yen/kWh
PERIOD 15 years

19. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
(for NEW facilities)
MINI-HYDRO
Output
Range
1mW-
30mW
200kW-
1mW
Under
200kW
Basic Tariff
(per kilowatt
hour)
24 yen/kWh 29 yen/kWh 34 yen/kWh
PERIOD 20 years

20. THE NEW FEED-IN TARIFFS
BIOMASS
Sector Wood (unused) Wood
(general)
Building
Waste
Wood
Construction waste-
related Biomass
Methane
Type 2,000
kW or
more
Under
2,000 kW
Unused
Wood
Products
General
Wood
Various Sewer
sludge, etc.
Basic
Tariff
(per kwH)
32 40
yen/kW yen/kW
24
yen/kWh
13
yen/kWh
17 yen/kWh 39
yen/kWh
Period
20 years

21. The Current Situation
as of FEBRUARY 2015
TYPE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY CUMULATIVE CERTIFIED
CAPACITY
PV (under 10 kW) 3.633 GW
PV (over 10 kw) 70.9 GW
Wind 1.986 GW
Mini-Hydro 0.567 GW
Geothermal 0.069 GW
Biomass 1.529 GW
TOTAL 78.684 GW

22. BUT, the actual amount in operation
as of JANUARY 2015
TYPE OF RENEWABLE
ENERGY
CUMULATIVE OPERATIONAL
CAPACITY
PV (under 10 kW) 2.95 GW
PV (over 10 kw) 13.3 GW
Wind 0.255 GW
Mini-Hydro 0.044 GW
Geothermal 0.002 GW
Biomass 0.151 GW
TOTAL 16.71 GW

23. The Good News:
Photovoltaic (Solar) Systems
According to the
Yano Research
Institute, thanks to
the 2012 Feed In
Tariff, Japan was
ranked first in the
world in terms of
installed Solar PV
power generation
in 2014.
Unofficial estimate of how much
power solar energy could
``feasibly’’ generate:
100-150GW

24. The Good News: Offshore Wind Power
A 2 megawatt offshore wind power
facility was built off the coast of
Fukushima prefecture, almost within
site of the crippled nuclear power
plant.
Operation commenced in November
2013. This will be followed by two 7
MW offshore wind turbines installed
in March.
Studies show Fukushima and
Japanese coastal areas are ideal
for offshore wind farms. No
concerns about noise complaints,
and wider area of potential
establishment than land-based wind
farms, which means they can be
located closer to the grid.
Japan’s potential offshore
wind power capacity:
1,600GW

25. Local Governments, NOT Tokyo are leading the way
to a renewable future
OPERATING CAPACITY (Dec. 2014, kW)
Rank Prefecture SOLAR WIND HYDRO GEOTHERMAL BIOMASS TOTAL
1 FUKUOKA 831,653 1 23 0 190 831,867
2 MIYAGI 783,305 16,000 1,600 0 16,740 817,645
3 AICHI 767,075 12,000 0 0 0 779,075
4 HYOGO 728,185 12,000 6 0 7,457 747,648
5 CHIBA 694,784 0 330 0 1,770 696,884
6 KAGOSHIMA 628,203 33,602 1,676 0 0 663,481
7 SHIZUOKA 585,572 0 1,043 0 95 586,710
8 TOCHIGI 557,111 0 690 0 2,815 560,616
9 GUNMA 522,158 0 73 0 400 522,631
10 SAITAMA 492,850 0 326 0 1,813 494,989
NATIONWIDE
(as of Dec.31st, 2014)
15,408,838 226,922 43,701 906 136,016 15,816,382

26. But It’s Not All Good News
PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES TO
REALIZING A RENEWABLE FUTURE

27. 1 TECHINCAL/LOGISTICAL
CHALLENGS

28. CHALLENGE A: The Grid System
Grids to Major Urban
Centers (electricityusers):
locations bestsuitedfor
renewableenergyprojects,
particularlylarge-scalesolar
farmsandwind farms,often
locatedin rural areasfar
awayfromurbanusers.
Japanis divided into 60
Hz grids(for western
Japan) and 50 Hz (for
eastern and northern
Japan), meaning a
nationwiderenewable
grid is not commercially
feasible.

29. CHALLENGE A: The Grid System

30. CHALLENGE B:
Regional Utility Monopoly System
 10 major utilities largely control the generation,
distribution, and sale of electric power in Japan. They
set prices in general agreement with each other, and
new players to the energy market have to deal with
them if they want to get connected to a piece of the
national grid.
 Utilities have nearly total control over which electricity
generation sources they send down to the grid to
customers, and their motto is always the same, ``Safe,
Stable, and Secure’’ electricity supply, at a fixed price.

31. CHALLENGE B:
Regional Utility Monopoly System

32. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
SOLAR POWER
Rapidly improving solar technologies
makes Japan’s highly conservative
electricity industry cautious about installing
solar power technology now that will be out
of date in one or two years.
Worries about securing a ``safe and
stable’’ electricity supply during cloudy
nights, at night, etc., and insufficent battery
storage technologies.
Battle between Large Solar Farm
proponents and Small Solar
Products/Residential Area proponents over
direction of industry.
Nuclear lobby’s anti-solar campaign
(``nobody wants solar farms in their
backyard’’, ``it’s still too expensive’’) is
working.

33. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
WIND POWER
FIT needs to be based on wind conditions
of location, not a fixed amount of power
generation for all locations.
Noise: Local communities complain about
loud windmills
Birds: Bird strikes and migratory patterns
mean strict environmental regulations on
wind farm development.
Remoteness: Best Locations for On-Shore
windmills often located far from urban
centers, necessitating expensive grid
connections.

34. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
GEOTHERAL POWER
1) Vast majority of Japan’s geothermal
resources in National Park areas: Strict
environmental regulations.
2) Many ideal geothermal locations on,
or beside, onsens (hot spring resorts)
whose politically-connected owners
oppose geothermal development for
business reasons.
3) Geothermal requires heavy initial
investment. High cost to maintain and
repair plants.
4) Public fears, aided by pro-nuclear
propagandists, that geothermal drilling
causes earthquakes.

35. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
MINI- HYDRO POWER
 Requires rivers and streams with regular flows of water at ideal
speeds, and those can be hard to find.
 Strict gradation requirements often means construction work is
needed, creating further environmental damage.
 Remote areas of many ideal mini-hydro spots means increased
costs to deliver generated electricity.

36. PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES:
BIOMASS
1) Bureaucratic turf wars in Japan
means a regulatory nightmare, little
cooperation between ministries
(Environment, Forestry, Trade and
Industry) to promote different
biomass forms.
2) Opposition from both the pro-
nuclear business lobby and from
environmentalists who warn
burning biomass for fuel will simply
increase greenhouse gas
emissions.
3) Lack of government and major
corporate interest in biomass,
compared to solar and wind.

37. GENERAL CHALLENGES
TO GETTING OUT OF
NUCLEAR AND INTO
RENEWABLE ENERGY:

38. 1) Outdated Structure of Established
Anti-Nuclear Groups.
a) Traditional anti-nuclear NGO
leaders now well into their 60s,
70s, and 80s, and have been
protesting for over four decades.
a) Often have limited
understanding of, or interest in,
modern NGO leadership
techniques, media and public
outreach strategies, or broad-
based public education of the
issues.

39. 2) Provincialism
Because anti-nuclear groups
have traditionally been local
community-based, they can
be extremely provincial and
suspicious of outsiders.
Town A’s anti-nuclear
groups don’t talk or care
much about Town B’s anti-
nuclear groups.
When cooperation occurs, it’s
often at the ``let’s exchange
information’’ level only, not at
the political action level.

40. 3) Group-ism
Seniority, deferring to one’s
elders, and group consensus
cultural traits mean young
people (i.e. those under 50
years of age) feel shut out
by traditional anti-nuclear
groups.
As a result, such groups
played something of a
secondary role in the mass
public demonstrations
against nuclear power after
March 11, 2011.

41. 4) Divisions Within Anti-Nuke Movement
Factionalism Within Anti-Nuclear
Organizations Themselves: For
decades, many of the groups in
Japan seeking the abolishment of
nuclear weapons were actually pro-
nuclear power.
Even today, most of the main
groups that organize the yearly
protests against nuclear weapons at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki are often
reluctant to come out strongly
against nuclear power because their
members work at utilities.

42. Problems With Renewable Energy Groups
Bottom Up Versus Top Down:
Major NGOs and other
organizations promoting renewable
energy are Tokyo-based, and
generally favor a top-down
approach whereby the central
government leads and local
governments follow.
Local governments and businesses
often favor a more decentralized,
bottom-up approach (localized
small-scale renewable energy
projects with revised local
ordinances to make them happen)

43. Problems With Renewable Energy Groups
The Big Guys versus the New
Players:
Toshiba, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, Sharp,
Sanyo, Toyota, Kyocera. . . these are
just some of the huge Japanese
firms making heavy investments in
renewable energy technologies and
massive projects. Clearly, the new
FIT is tilted in their favor.
But the kind of innovation from
small and medium-sized firms like
we see in the U.S., as well as
Canada, China, South Korea, India,
and parts of Europe is not as high-
profile. It’s all occurring (mostly)
under the radar.

44. Problems with Renewable Energy Groups
``Solar? Wind? Geothermal’’?Competition And Factionalism
Within The Renewable Energy
Movement Creates Public
Confusion and Doubt:
Solar, wind, mini-hydro, biomass
and geothermal advocates lobby
hard for their chosen energy source.
Policy makers at the local and
national level want the ``best energy
mix’’ that offers ``safe, stable, and
secure’’ electricity generation.
But WHICH combination of
renewables meets the goal in the
short and medium-term? Depends
on who you talk to.

45. Problems with Renewable Energy Groups
Weakness in
Addressing Specific
Public Concerns
about Higher
Electricity Bills for
Individuals and
Possible Negative
Effects on Industries
Using Lots of
Electricity

46. HOWEVER. . .
FOR ALL OF THE
PROBLEMS WITH
RENEWABLE ENERGY, THE
PROBLEMS WITH A
RETURN TO NUCLEAR ARE
MUCH GREATER

47. Problem 1:AGING REACTORS
12 out of the 50
reactors are now over
36 years old.
SEVEN are now over 40
years old.
The life-span of Japan’s
nuclear reactors is
officially considered 40
years.
At the end of the 40
year cycle, the operator
can apply for a 20 year
extension, theoretically
extending the life of a
plant to 60 years.

48. Japan’s Aging Nuclear Reactors (as
of 2015)
Name of Utility Name of Reactor Age
KANSAI ELECTRIC
Mihama No. 1 reactor 45 years old
Mihama No. 2 reactor 43 years old
Mihama No. 3 reactor 39 years old
Oi No. 1 reactor 36 years old
Oi No. 2 reactor 36 years old
Takahama No. 1 reactor 41 years old
Takahama No. 2 reactor 40 years old
CHUGOKU ELECTRIC Shimane No. 1 reactor 41 years old
SHIKOKU ELECTRIC Ikata No. 1 reactor 38 years old
KYUSHU ELECTRIC Genkai No. 1 reactor 40 years old
NIHON GENDEN Higashiumi Dai Ni 37 years old
Tsuruga No. 1 reactor 45 years old

49. PROBLEM NUMBER TWO:
SPENT FUEL POOLS
ALMOST FULL:
``Building a nuclear power plant is like
building a house without a toilet.’’
Once nuclear fuel is burned, the resulting
spent fuel waste is removed from the reactor
and stored in cooling pools.
But. ..

50. NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER
RESTART UNTIL SPENT FUEL
POOLS ARE FULL
NAME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
AND REACTORS
LESS THAN SIX YEARS
REMAINING UNTIL
FULL
(33 of 50 reactors)
Tomari No. 1, 2 (Hokkaido);
Onogawa No. 1, 2 (Miyagi)
Fukushima Daichi 1 No. 5, 6; Fukushima Daini, No. 1-4
Kashiwazaki-Karuiwa No. 1-7 (Tepco)
Hamaoka No. 3,4 (Chubu),
Mihama No. 1, 2; Oi 1, 2; Takahama 1, 2 (Kepco)
Shimane No. 1,
Ikata No. 1,2 (Shikoku)
Genkai No. 1-4 (Kyushu)
BETWEEN SIX AND
TWELVE YEARS
REMAINING UNTIL FULL
(14 of 50 reactors)
Higashidori (Aomori)
Onogawa No. 3 (Miyagi)
Tsuruga No. 1,2 (Fukui)
Hamaoka No. 5 (Shizuoka)
Shiga No. 1,2 (Ishikawa)
Mihama No. 3 (Fukui)
Oi No. 3, 4 (Fukui)
Takahama No. 3, 4 (Fukui)
Shimane No. 2 (Shimane)
Sendai No. 2 (Kagoshima)
MORE THAN 12 YEARS
(3 reactors)
Tomari No. 3 (Hokkaido)
Ikata No. 3 (Ehime)
Sendai No. 1 (Kagoshima)

51. SO, NOW WHAT?
Currently, 14,200 tons of spent nuclear fuel sits in storage at Japan’s
nuclear power plants.
Spent fuel pools are now 70 percent full, on average
What Are The Options Each Plant Has For
Dealing With Spent Fuel?
OPTION 1:
Ship it the
Rokkasho
Reprocesssing
Plant
in Aomori
Prefecture
OPTION 2:
Move it to
specially
designed
mid-term
storage
containers
OPTION 3:
Reprocess the
spent fuel
overseas

52. OPTION 1: Ship it to Rokkasho
PROBLEMS
The Rokkasho reprocessing plant :
1) Has suffered numerous technical problems, delaying the projected start-up numerous
times.
2) Is opposed by not only traditional antinuclear activists but also international
nonproliferation experts.
3) Is not expected to go into operation anytime soon.
4) Is already storing 2,945 tons of spent fuel –
98 percent of its storage capacity
Rokkasho plant, when it goes
into operation, is supposed to
take spent nuclear fuel from
Japan’s reactors, reprocess it,
and send it back to plants to
be used again and again.

53. OPTION 2: Mid-term Storage:
(spent fuel spends 50 years in offsite facility
before ``final’’ disposal at Rokkasho)
PROBLEMS:
1) Costs involved with transporting spent fuel by truck or ship from
current location to new facility and costs of storage: Who pays?
2) Safety concerns in any locality the waste passes through: What
happens if towns and villages or fisherman’s unions oppose
shipments, forcing transportation routes to be altered? Will town
demand financial compensation from government or utilities for
allowing waste to pass through? How does that affect the ultimate
cost of ``cheap’’ nuclear power?
3) THE BIGGEST PROBLEM: Local governments around Japan have
ignored pleas from Tokyo to host facilities, which would mean
nuclear waste in their backyard for at least a half century.
THIS IS WHY TOKYO RECENTLY SAID IT WILL
DETERMINE LOCATION OF STORAGE FACILITIES
RATHER THAN ASK LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
VOLUNTEER TO TAKE THEM

54. OPTION 3: Reprocess it Overseas
This has been done on a limited scale. Reprocessing Japanese fuel, which is
then returned to Japan and reused, has taken place in England and France.
PROBLEMS:
1) Huge Expense, drives up cost/kWh.
2) International Proliferation Risks
3) Refusal of many countries to allow nuclear-laden ships to pass through
their waters.
4) Risk of an Accident or Terrorist Attack, sinking or damaging ships
transporting nuclear cargo.

55. So what’s the plan for the remaining reactors?
(as of April)
 Fukushima Dai-Ichi reactors 5 and 6 (the ones not damaged by
the quake) will be scrapped.
 Fukushima Dai-Ni’s four plants will have to be scrapped as it’s
politically impossible to restart them.
 Five reactors nationwide at least 40 years old will be
decommissioned.
 24 reactors are under review for possible restart, including two
over 40 years old.
 Two reactors in Fukui Prefecture that power Kyoto, originally
approved by Tokyo for restart, have a provisional injunction
against their restart.
 Two reactors in Kyushu are thought likely to restart this year,
but recent volcano creating concerns.
 A reactor in Ehime (Shikoku) could be first to restart

56. ``So, just extend the older
plants’ lives past 40 years.’’
Questions about Safety
 Would a plant that is 40
years old pass the stricter
safety standards that went
into effect in 2013?
 Would the operating
utility be required to beef
up safety measures before
government permission for
extension past 40 years is
granted?
 Would local governments
hosting the plant need to
implement any additional
safety measures?
Questions about Money
Though not a legal requirement,
would local authorities grant
permission for plant’s life to be
extended past 40 years?
How much money would they
demand (in the form of, for example,
``stronger safety measures’’) from
either Tokyo or the operating utility
before granting permission?
How long would these negotiations
over money take, and, ultimately,
would they cost the taxpayers money
in the form of higher utility bills?
Would a nuclear reactor more than
40 years old generate electricity at an
economically competitive price?

57. By The Way. . .
National Energy
Policy requires
planning for the
mid and long-
term –decades,
not years.
Obviously, the
most basic
question is,
how big will your
domestic
electricity market
be by, say, 2030
or 2040?

58. Future Electricity Demand: Supplying
Power to a Smaller, Older Japan
Japan’s Population faces a steep decline
between now and 2040
2010
population
2015
population
2020
population
2025
population
2030
population
2035
population
2040
population
128.057
million
126.597
million
124.100
million
120.659
million
116.618
million
112.124
million
107.276
million
The Working Age Population (15-64) was 81 million in 2010
By 2040, it will be 57 million – a decline of 30 percent

59. Who is Going to Need Electricity?
 In Tokyo, the overall
population is expected to
decline by just seven
percent by 2040,
compared to 2010.
 However, one-third of
Tokyoites (34%) will be
over 65 years old (20% in
2010) and 17% (9% in
2010) will be over 75
years old by 2040.
 In Osaka, the overall
population will decline by 16%
by 2040 compared to 2010.
 36% of Osakans will be over 65
years old in 2040 (22% in 2010).
20% will be over 75 years old
(10% in 2010).
 Nationwide, 36% of the
population, on average, will be
over 65 years old by 2040.
 Over one-fifth, 21% ,of
Japan will be over 75
years old in 2040.

60. And What If. . .?
 20% of the world’searthquakes 5.0 and above on the RichterScale
occur in Japan.
 Accordingthe Japanesegovernment, the numberaftershocks(not
earthquakes)thatmeasured5.0 and above on the differentscaleJapan
uses betweenMarch11, 2013 and March10, 2014 was``only’’56.
That’sdownfrom653 betweenMarch11, 2011 and March10, 2012.
 Do you reallywantbuildmorenuclearreactorsgiventhis seismic
reality?

61. So, To Sum Up. . . In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country that
has 16% less people than it had in 2010 (128 million down to
107 million).
 In 2040, Japan’s electricity demand will be for a country where,
overall, more than one-third of the population (36%) has
reached retirement age and, presumably, will be consuming
less electricity in the workplace than at present.
 In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will include the
needs of the one-fifth of the country (20%) who are 75 years and
above.
 In 2040, Japan’s domestic electricity market will provide power
to consumer products and businesses that are likely to be far
more energy-efficient than is the case today, as technological
innovation continues.

62. ``Nuclear power will continue to play an important
role in Japan’s future energy mix’’.
A Reality Check…
 In 2040, 45 of the current 50 commercial nuclear power plants
will be at least 40 years old
(By 2020, 12 will have already reached 40 years of operation)
 Assuming their life is extended to 60 years (involving unknown
additional costs), 17 of the 50 reactors would be at least 50
years old in 2040.
 12 reactors would be over 60 years old by 2040 and would be
undergoing decommissioning – including 8 of 14 reactors in
Fukui Pref. which supply power to the Kansai region.
 You have decommissioning costs of between 35 and 83 billion
yen per reactor that will have to be paid, either after 40 or 60
years of operation, ON TOP OF any other costs. ALL OF
THESE ARE GOING TO GET PASSED ON TO CONSUMERS.

63. What all this means is. . .
 By 2020, long-term decisions will have to be made on the first 12
reactors that have reached, or surpassed, 40 years of operation.
Continuing their operations means:
1) Getting local permission to operate for another 20 years. This
will involve increased use of national tax money for local pet
construction projects in return for permission.
2) Making whatever safety and engineering adjustments are
needed to get approval for another 20 years. Who pays for such
measures? How long will they take to implement?
3) Operating an aging plant, more likely to be in need of increased
monitoring and repairs. Will such plants continue to operate at a
capacity that keeps the cost per kilowatt hour competitive with
LNG or even some renewables?

64. Oh, and don’t forget about those
nearly full spent fuel pools.
 Even if you extend the life of a 40 year old
reactor for 20 years, you still have the problem
of what to do with the spent fuel it generates.
 Remember, 33 of the nation’s 50 reactors will
see their spent fuel pools filled to the brim
within about six years if operations are
restarted tomorrow. Another 14 will be full a
dozen years after being restarted. AND
THERE ARE NO NEW STORAGE
FACILITIES BEING BUILT AT PRESENT.

65. And just who is going to be
operating those nuclear plants?
 Japan has three undergraduate and nine master’s
degree courses with either ``nuclear’’ or ``atomic’’ in
their names. Most are under-enrolled.
 Majority of nuclear plant workers entered workforce
in the 1970s, now facing retirement.
 Japan Atomic Industrial Forum reported that 80
percent fewer students participated in annual
recruitment events in Tokyo and Osaka in 2012,
compared to 2010.
 The lack of interest in nuclear power among the
younger generations comes as aging plants must be
continued or decommissioned after 40 years,
requiring a new generation of skilled workers.

66. BUT HERE IS THE
REAL PROBLEM:
Japan says it is doing all it can to save energy
and electricity and is far more efficient than
most nations in using electricity.
Is it?

67. Not Legally Required to Cut Usage
 Despite all of the nuclear power village
warnings about possible electricity
shortages without nuclear power, there
are no mandatory electricity savings
measures in place.
 What Japan has are ``voluntary’’
reductions on electricity use that carry
no legal weight.

68. ``Don’t Worry, Be Happy’’
 Urban residents have made very few major changes to their
lifestyles since 3/11. Many cities have not curbed the use of
neon lighting, while some retail stores operate with their
doors and windows open and their air conditioners on. The
utilities run ads on TV encouraging people to use MORE not
less electricity.

69. A Small Example: Vending Machines
 Few curbs on things like electricity-guzzling vending machines.
(``Vending machines serve as an emergency lifeline in times of natural
disaster– a Coca-Cola spokeswoman in Tokyo after the Tohoku quake)
 Japan has over 5 million vending machines –in country with a
population of 127 million.
 The U.S, with a population of 317 million, has about 4.6 million vending
machines.

70. Limits on What Households Can Do
Traditional
Japanese Homes:
Not Designed with
Efficient Use of
Electricity In Mind.
Modern Homes:
Often lack
insulation,
central heating,
double-glazed
windows, and

71. In Conclusion
 To continue with nuclear power will be far more
expensive than the Nuclear Power Village claims,
carries all sorts of safety risks, and runs the risk of
investing in a technology that, like the steam
engine, has had its day.
 To switch to renewables will take time and huge
amounts of money, angers the politically powerful
Nuclear Power Village, and involves technologies
still being developed.
 Japanese are addicted to a hyper-urban, hyper-
convenient lifestyle that uses lots of electricity.
Getting them to change their habits is the toughest
challenge, but demographics may do it anyway.

72. THANKS FOR
LISTENING!