The document discusses various models of internet governance, including multilateralism, minilateralism, and multistakeholderism. It examines these approaches within institutions like the IETF, ICANN, ITU, and through collaborations between countries. Minilateralism is defined as cooperation between the smallest number of countries needed to have the largest impact. Both inclusive and exclusive forms of minilateralism are discussed. The document also addresses criticisms of multistakeholderism and calls for more rigorous and holistic examination of different governance models and their real-world impacts and limitations.

1. MINILATERALISM OR
MULTISTAKEHOLDERISM?
MEASUREMENT OF EFFECT
@ChrisTMarsden
WTI Berne workshop
8 December 2013
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2. Where do we locate Internet governance?
• Much attention to putative multistakeholder model
• In both plurilateral and multilateral institutions
• E.g. ICANN, OECD, ITU, IGF post-WSIS
• Some attention to standards-making and implementing
• IETF, W3C, ETSI, NIST
• Significant recent light shed on unilateralism
• US role in NSA revelations #postsnowden;
• Historically, USTR Special 301 measures on copyright important
• China Great Wall much-derided example now out of fashion
• Some light shed on minilateralism
• Fewest parties that can make an international agreement effective
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3. Minilateralism: Five or More Eyes?
• Often overlooked: 5 Eyes intercontinental colonial alliance
• US, UK, Canada, Australia, NZ
• Based on WWII settlement
• Very significant contribution from shy NATO allies
• Including France, Germany
• With significant corporate involvement to make it work
• Verizon, Vodafone, BT, Level3, Global Crossing
• Inheritors of Eastern Telegraph and ITT?
• Does it meet minilateralism definition?
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4. Minilateralism: a ‘coalition of the willing’?
• Moisés Naím, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy, 1 July 2009
• http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/minilateralism
• Bemoans lack of progress on trade liberalisation and nuclear
non-proliferation, Kyoto Protocol etc.
• “These failures represent not only the perpetual lack of
international consensus, but also a flawed obsession with
multilateralism as the panacea for all the world's ills.”
• “We need to abandon that fool's errand in favor of a new idea.
• “By minilateralism, I mean a smarter, more targeted approach:
• We should bring to the table the smallest possible number of
countries needed to have the largest possible impact on
solving a particular problem.
• “Think of this as minilateralism's magic number.”
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5. Eckersley, Robyn (2012) Moving Forward in the
Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?
• Global Environmental Politics Vol. 12, No. 2, Pages 24-42
• July 24, 2012 (doi:10.1162/GLEP_a_00107)
• “inclusive multilateralism is unlikely to produce a timely
climate treaty, while exclusive minilateralism is elitist,
procedurally unjust, and likely to be self-serving.
• “Instead, I defend inclusive minilateralism,
• based on “common but differentiated representation,”
• “or representation by the most capable, the most
responsible, and the most vulnerable.”
• Sounds like the IETF?
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6. Oxford Martin School (2012)
Now for the Long Term
• “inclusive minilateralism” and “multi-stakeholder coalition”:
• countries (a “C-20” utilizing the existing G-20),
• companies (a “C-30” selecting 30 companies affiliated to the World
Business Council for Sustainable Development), and
• cities (working through the existing C40 Cities initiative).
• “We also discuss the idea that if the US and China, a C-2
could come to an agreement, others would fall into line”
• McDonald, L. (2013) What to Make of the Warsaw COP – Michele de Nevers
http://international.cgdev.org/blog/what-make-warsaw-cop-%E2%80%93-michele-de-nevers
• Not unlike 2001 Digital Opportunities Taskforce
• G8/corporate partnership
• Which somewhat led to UNCTAD ICT4D Taskforce
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7. Develops from a few (liberal) states?
• See “Regulating Code”
• Case studies in policy transfer US->UK->EU
• Copyright enforcement policy
• SOPA and TTIP
• Pushback from old Europe?
• Privacy and surveillance policy
• Developed from encryption debate
• Social networking and behavioural ads
• More in rhetoric than reality
• Network neutrality
• Ongoing saga – EU Regulation stalled
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8. Illiberal alternative minilateralism?
• WCIT disagreement 2012
• BRIC suggestions of re-routing BGP
• ‘Splinternet’ post-Sao Paolo
• http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2013/
11/18/unified-field-the-splinternet/
• Storms in tea-cups?
• High-level cooperation
• ICANN’s many many panels
• http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/high-level-panel-organizes-to-address-
future-of-internet-governance-232274461.html
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9. Machiavellian minilateralism;
Bismarckian ‘might is right’
• Who will be at the table in new Congress of Vienna or
Congress of Berlin, how would it affect multistakeholders?
• “Many issues around surveillance centre on national
security, state sovereignty and international law.
• “IGF, with its multi-stakeholder framework and weak
governance structures, is ill-equipped to respond.
• “Most importantly there is little actual power – either
functional or discursive – located within the IGF.”
• Wagner Ben (2013) After the IGF 2013 – Bali barely relevant in the run-
up to Rio (sic), http://cgcsblog.asc.upenn.edu/2013/11/12/after-the-igf-
2013-bali-barely-relevant-in-the-run-up-to-rio/
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10. Bill Drake (2011) No Paradigm Shift
• “substantial chunk of actual decision-making that shapes
Internet and its use at both the national and global levels
remains outside the model of multistakeholderism
• model is best conceived of as critically important component of the
distributed institutional architecture of Internet governance,
• rather than the embodiment of a ‘paradigm shift’”
• Drake, William (2011) Multistakeholderism: External Limitations and Internal
Limits. MIND: Multistakeholder Internet Dialog, Co:llaboratory Discussion
Paper Series No. 2, Internet Policymaking, 68-72, Berlin: Co:llaboratory.
• “considerable weight of decisions taken elsewhere [likely to]
• soon reduce this international forum to a friendly conversation
between true and false naives under disguise of enlightened debates”
• Massit-Folléa, F. and F. Musiani (2009) Recollections of Egypt
• Comments on Fourth Annual Meeting of Internet Governance Forum, Vox Internet,
http://www.csi.ensmp.fr/voxinternet/www.voxinternet.org/spipc8dd.html?article340
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11. Musiani (2013)
Re-assess or be [further] marginalised
• “Hailed in the early days of the WSIS/IGF process, multi-
stakeholderism …[needs] realistic and thorough assessment”
• “nitty gritty” details, day-to-day struggles, and material constraints of
• who participates, when, for what reasons, and how practical results
can be measured and leveraged for concrete next steps.
• revisit “categories” of stakeholders outlined by WSIS,
• in favour of a more nuanced approach
• (e.g. what actors are regrouped under the label of civil society)
• Acknowledge gap between “nominal and effective participation”
• devise creative tools to address it
• Musiani, F. (2013) WSIS+10: the self-praising feast of multi-stakeholderism in
internet governance, Policy Review http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/wsis10-
self-praising-feast-multi-stakeholderism-internet-governance
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12. IGP on ICANN: accountability meltdown?
• “ICANN is a nonprofit corporation with no voting
members;
• “it offers the industry ‘contracts’ but it has no competition
and so there are no alternatives to them;
• “it is a form of government with no effective judicial review,
• no real law guiding it, and no ability to avoid it or withdraw support.
• “Instead of real accountability, it offers us endless
opportunities for nonbinding participation and comment.”
• “Thus the accountability vacuum is built into ICANN’s DNA
• ever since membership was abolished more than a decade ago.”
• http://www.internetgovernance.org/2013/08/31/icanns-accountability-
meltdown-a-four-part-series/
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13. Council of Europe ministerial conference:
effective safeguards against mass surveillance
Press release - DC140(2013) Belgrade, 08.11.2013
• Adequate effective guarantees against electronic mass surveillance
abuses or “may undermine or even destroy democracy”
• They renew their commitment to do no harm to the Internet
and to preserve it as a universal, integral and open space.
• Examine communications data gathering by security agencies
• Guidelines for protecting journalists/others in public watchdog functions
• Guide of rights for Internet users (draft consultation with stakeholders)
• http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/belgrade2013/default_EN.asp?http
://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/media/belgrade2013/default_FR.asp?
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14. Plea for a balanced diet
• Holistic examination of Internet governance
• Not a new plea – or an idea out of time
• Likely to require significant research resource
• require networks of specialists to cross-analyze
• E.g. specialists in each of the fields identified
• Idea for Global Internet Policy Observatory (EC)?
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15. Workshop ideas
• 21 October, Bali: measuring multistakeholderism
• Plurilateral agencies (OECD, Council of Europe, European
Commission), corporations, civil society, engineers, academics
• 22 November, London:
• Post-Snowden Internet standards making
• Powell (LSE), Brown (Oxford), Clark (MIT), Marsden (Sussex)
• 3 March 2014, London: Pre-IETF 89 meeting
• Powell, Brown, Cooper (IAB), others
• Hopefully future Internet Science workshops too…
• But does not replace a fully funded research project
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16. Measurement: traditional &
innovative methodology
• Relationship between old and new methods
• interpretive and multi-method research design.
• content, design, discourse and textual analyses,
• interviews, observation, surveys and creative method
• Social network & content analysis, in-depth interviews, surveys
• Digitalisation of conventional processes
• (recording interviews and coding texts),
• combination of human research techniques with digital tools
• Relationship of researchers, and communities studied
• Ethics to engage with community members, discussions, informal
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17. Multi-stakeholderism in ICT governance:
realistic and thorough assessment?
• WSIS “summit” status
• (not a permanent intergovernmental organisation)
• only enabled it to make recommendations crafted by consensus.
• WSIS organised civil society
• reclaimed its right to be heard alongside governments/companies
• WGIG (Working Group on Internet Governance)
• Internet Governance Forum
• embodying principle of multi-stakeholderism
• Practical results of this participation measured
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18. Some recent literature in the field
• Pavan, E. (2012) Frames and Connections in the Governance of Global
Communications: A Network Study of the Internet Governance Forum, Lexington
• Powell, Alison (2012) Assessing the Influence of Online Activism on Internet
Policy-Making: The Case of SOPA/PIPA and ACTA
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2031561
• DeNardis and Raymond (2013) Thinking Clearly About Multistakeholder Internet
Governance http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2354377
• Benkler, Yochai et al (2013) Social Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere:
Mapping the SOPA-PIPA Debate. Berkman Center No. 2013-16.
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2295953
• Brown, I. ed (2013) Research Handbook on Internet Governance:
http://www.eelgar.com/bookentry_main.lasso?currency=UK&id=14173
• Brown and Marsden (2013) 'Regulating Code' MIT Press
• Brousseau, E., Marzouki, M., Méadel, C. eds (2012) Governance, Regulations and
Powers on the Internet. Cambridge Press
• Brown, I., Clark, D., Trossen, D. (2011) “Should Specific Values Be Embedded In
The Internet Architecture?” Proceedings of the Re-Architecting the Internet
workshop. New York: ACM Press.
• Mantelero, A., “U.S. concern about the European right to be forgotten and free
speech: much ado about nothing?”, Contratto e Impresa Europa, 2012, 727-740;
[ISBN 978-88-13-31669-3]
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19. Internet Society Responds to Reports of USG
Circumvention of Encryption Technology
Lynn St. Amour:
• “Any systematic, state-level attack on Internet security
and privacy is a rejection of the global, collaborative fabric
that has enabled the Internet's growth to extend beyond
the interests of any one country.”
• deeply concerned that these principles are being eroded
• users' legitimate expectations of online security treated with contempt
• To fulfill its potential, the Internet must be underpinned by
the right combination of technology, operational
processes, legislation, policy, and governance.
• USG programmes systematically undermined some or all of those
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20. As the institutional home of the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF)
• open and transparent processes are essential for security
standardization,
• result in better outcomes than any alternative approach.
• protocols developed by IETF are open for all to see, inspect, verify,
• as are open and inclusive processes by which they are specified.
• Ah but….
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21. IETF Response To Pervasive Monitoring
• IETF 88 Vancouver stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Nov 7 2013
• “The actions of NSA and their partners (nation-state or
corporate, coerced or not) are a multi-faceted form of
attack, or are indistinguishable from that
• “We should do and be seen to be doing as much as we
can to counter this attack, and now is the time
• publicity counts and the attackers haven't just crossed a line,
they've moved it
• “NOTE: “we” in all the above means the IETF and each of
us outside the IETF”
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22. Stephen Farrell suggestions
● “There are technical things we can do that might
significantly affect the cost of pervasive monitoring and
that can improve security and privacy generally
● “Some of those are short-term “point” changes (or
BCPs), others may take time to be agreed, mature and
get deployed
● “If we're serious about tackling the problem, some
changes may affect IETF processes, long-held
positions, deployments or business models
– Mantatory-to-Implement (MTI) vs. more-than-MTI
– Confidentiality vs packet inspection
– Anonymity/pseudonymity vs authent/law
enforcement/advertising”
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23. IETF Chairman Jari Arkko:
• “IETF has a long-standing commitment to openness and
transparency in developing security protocols for the
Internet, and sees this as critical to confidence in their use
and implementation.”
• http://www.ietf.org/blog/2013/09/security-and-pervasive-monitoring/
• Security standards must be properly implemented and used.
• This is a wake-up call for technology developers and adopters to re-
examine what we can do to ensure that all links in the chain are
equally strong.
• This is key to helping restore public trust and confidence in the
Internet.
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24. To every citizen of the Internet:
• let your government representatives know that,
• even in matters of national security,
• you expect privacy, rule of law, and due process in any
handling of your data.
• we remain committed to advancing work in areas such as
• browser security, privacy settings, and digital footprint awareness
• In order to help users understand and manage their privacy and
security.
• The citizens of the Internet deserve
• a global and open platform for communication
• built on solid foundations of security and privacy.
• Security a collective responsibility involving multiple stakeholders
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25. In this regard, we call on those:
• involved in technology research and development:
• use the openness of standards processes like the IETF
• to challenge assumptions about security specifications.
• who implement technology and standards for Internet security:
• uphold that responsibility in your work,
• and be mindful of the damage caused by loss of trust.
• who develop products/services depending on trusted Internet:
• secure your own services, and
• be intolerant of insecurity in the infrastructure on which you depend.
• every Internet user:
• ensure you are well informed about good practice in online security,
and act on that information.
• Take responsibility for your own security.
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