Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
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In this presentation Daniel Michaud-Soucy, Principal Threat Analyst at Dragos, will demonstrate three separate models in order to identify gaps in ICS security posture. First, threat modeling serves as an inward look as an ICS network defender in order to properly understand the environment, the threat actors, the impacts, the risks and the crown jewels pertaining to an industrial process. Second, the ICS cyber kill chain serves as an outward look at the steps an adversary needs to take in order to achieve their objectives. Third, the bowtie model allows a graphical representation of the threats to the environment as well as the protection, detection, and response controls that help secure it. In the end, the asset owner creates a holistic picture of the security controls in their network, pertaining to the threat actors they care about and allows identification of gaps in their strategy. Visit www.dragos.com to learn more about the Dragos industrial cybersecurity platform for increased visibility of assets, threats and guided responses.
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Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
- 1. Dressing up the ICSKill Chain DANIEL MICHAUD-SOUCY A Collision of Models
- 2. About • Daniel Michaud-Soucy,ICSSecurity guy • Current:Dragos, ThreatAnalyst • Previous: • Sempra Energy,Cybersecurity Engineer(R&D) • Red TigerSecurity, Professional ServicesDirector (vulnerabilityassessments, penetration testing, red teaming) • Universityof Ottawa: BASc ComputerEngineering
- 4. Agenda 01 THREATMODELING 02 ICSKILL CHAIN 03 BOWTIEMODEL 04 PRACTICALAPPLICATION
- 5. On Models... All models arewrong,but some areuseful - George Box Ce qui est simple est toujours faux. Ce qui ne l’est pasest inutilisable - Paul Valéry Only a Sith deals in absolutes - Obi-Wan Kenobi
- 6. Threat Modeling • Analysis of environment, threat actors, impacts, risks, crown jewels • Assists with prioritization of securitycontrols • Based on threat modeling, what security controls arein place to prevent an insider from changing logic to a controller from mycorporate network? • What about a 3rd party connection from a vendor directlyinto myOT network? • Someone else’s threat model !=your threatmodel
- 7. Threat Modeling – The Environment Corporatenetwork DMZ Operations Supervisory Control Instrumentation Vendor
- 8. Threat Modeling – The Threat Landscape INSIDER HACKTIVIST CYBERCRIME ”APT” A malicious insider, someonewith prior system knowledge and “thekeysto thekingdom” Propaganda-driven, not aswell resourced as others Financially-driven, opportunistic, commodity or custom malware Nation-state actors, well funded and resourced,most sophisticated
- 9. ICS Cyber Kill Chain • Originallycreated by Lockheed Martin as the CyberKill Chain, adapted to ICSby Michael J. Assante & Robert M. Lee • Understanding, visualizing and organizing the steps (tradecraft) required for an adversaryto achievetheir goal • Two stages: • Cyberintrusionpreparation and execution – “IT” • ICSattack development and execution – “OT” • Breaking the chainincreases adversary friction • As ICSnetwork defenders, wehave manyopportunities to do this!
- 10. ICS Cyber Kill Chain – ”APT” Style on Electric Power OSINT Spear-phishing campaign Email Malicious document Mimikatz IPv6DNS ICSnetworkbreach Info gathering Notobserved… NativeWindows commands Run payload as service Breakertrip
- 11. Bowtie Model • Risk assessment methodology • Originates from a blend of fault and event treemethodologies • Threats lead to an event on a hazardthat leads to consequences, plus barriers Hazard Event Threat Consequence Threat Consequence Barrier Barrier Barrier Barrier
- 12. Bowtie Model – Driving a Car Driving a car Car crashOther drivers Bodily injury Tire failure Vehicle totaled Car mirrors Defensive driving Airbag Bumpers Road conditions Expulsion from car ABS Seatbelt Threats Preventative Barriers Recovery Barriers Consequences Hazard Event
- 13. 01 THREAT MODELING • Wehavea waytoanalyzethethreatsthatmatter to us • Thisprovidescontextandfeedsintoourkillchain 02 ICSKILLCHAIN • Weunderstandwhatstepsan adversaryhas togo throughtoaccomplishtheirgoal • Thesestepsbecomeour“threats” 03 BOWTIE MODEL • Wehavea waytovisualizeourthreatsas wellas our barriers • Ourbarriersareoursecuritycontrols Dressing up the ICS Kill Chain
- 14. Threat Modeling – The Environment Corporatenetwork DMZ Operations Supervisory Control Instrumentation Vendor KILL CHAIN
- 15. ICS Cyber Kill Chain – ”APT” Style on Electric Power OSINT Spear-phishing campaign Email Malicious document Mimikatz IPv6DNS ICSnetworkbreach Info gathering Notobserved… NativeWindows commands Run payload as service Breakertrip Domain Admin Credentials Credential Reuse Backdoor accounts Pivoting Credential harvesting New processes Service accounts EDR Disable account Application whitelisting Threats Preventative Barriers Recovery Barriers Consequences
- 16. Practical Application – ”APT” Style on Electric Power Loss of power delivery Operating a substation Reconnaissance Weaponization Targeting Delivery Exploit Install Modify C2 Act Develop Test Delivery Install Modify Execute ICS attack Limit public information Patch management Mail proxy, web proxy Hardening, patching Disable PowerShell DNS redirect Network segmentation Backup management N/A Privileged access Privileged access Controller run mode Awareness, culture AV, IDS Awareness, report phishing Anti-exploit, sandboxing EDR tool DNS logging Access control monitoring N/A N/A Behavior analytics Behavior analytics Process data monitoring Internal reporting Patching Sinkholing SOC SOC, CSIRT SOC, CSIRT SOC, CSIRT N/A N/A SOC, CSIRT CMDB, backups and recovery Incident response plan Kill ChainStep Protection Detection Response
- 17. Practical Application – Evaluation and Gap Analysis Loss of power delivery Operating a substation Reconnaissance Weaponization Targeting Delivery Exploit Install Modify C2 Act Develop Test Delivery Install Modify Execute ICS attack Limit public information Patch management Mail proxy, web proxy Hardening, patching Disable PowerShell DNS redirect Network segmentation ? N/A Privileged access ? ? Awareness, culture AV, IDS Awareness, report phishing Anti-exploit, sandboxing EDR tool DNS logging Access control monitoring N/A N/A ? ? Process data monitoring Internal reporting Patching Sinkholing SOC SOC, CSIRT SOC, CSIRT SOC, CSIRT N/A N/A ? ? ? Kill ChainStep Protection Detection Response Control exists Partial control No control
- 18. In Conclusion… • Threatmodeling is the first step • What does mynetworklook like, what are the threats I am worried about? • Understanding the adversary’s success criteria • What are tactics, techniquesand procedures utilized by threatactors I am concernedwith? • Complete by overlaying security controls as barriers • What do I have in place that allows me to protect, detect andrespond to these threats?