1
National information policy
in the face of Russian aggression:
regional aspect
Analytical note on the results of the third wave of the nationwide survey
The materials prepared by the “Kalmius Group” members, consisting of
Oleksandr Dmitriiev, Mariia Zolkina, Oleksandr Kliuzhev, Oleksiy Matsuka and Vitaliy Syzov
Kyiv,
September 2018

2
Introduction
The information policy of Ukraine in Donetsk and Lu-
hansk regions, including in uncontrolled territories,
is formed on the basis of various legislative and oth-
er acts; among them, in particular, is the Doctrine of
Information Security of Ukraine and the Strategy of
Information Reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk
Regions.
An important reason for the occurrence and approval
of the above-mentioned documents was the Russian
encroachment into Ukraine in 2014. Russian-con-
trolled media have proven to be a significant tool
for influencing Ukraine’s domestic political situation.
One of the methods used by Russian mass media
during the preparation of information materials is the
demonstration of contradictions that exist in Ukraini-
an society. These contradictions have deep econom-
ic, historical, cultural and other roots, and we could
dedicate considerable time to their analysis, but the
purpose of this document is to provide advice on
how to consolidate the unity of society with the help
of state instruments, taking into account the present
situation and the current state of public opinion, not
only in Donbas, but also throughout Ukraine, that is
critically important in the face of foreign military ag-
gression and the information pressure that Ukraine
experiences on the part of the Russian Federation.
Citizens of Ukraine have already demonstrated a
high degree of unity at the beginning of the conflict,
but in the course of time the minor issues as com-
pared to the main one — to be or not to be an inde-
pendent democratic state in Ukraine — become a
source of tension in society and are used by Russian
propaganda as “evidence of the absence of Ukrainian
state system”.
The degree of Ukrainian citizens’ trust in Ukrainian and Russian media
The second stage of an all-Ukrainian sociologi-
cal survey commissioned by the “Kalmius Group”
on May 3–19, 2018 conducted by GfK Ukraine
showed that in the territory of Ukraine, regard-
less of the region, less than 1% of the respond-
ents consider Russian television to be the most
neutral source of information on the events in an
uncontrolled territory.
On the other hand, Ukrainian television is consid-
ered to be the most objective source of informa-
tion about the uncontrolled territory by 31,1% of
the citizens. However, on the government-con-
trolled part of Donbas, this ratio is twice less
— almost 17%. At the same time, the national
average trust in Russian television is less than
1% here.
The all-Ukrainian sociological survey conducted by Kyiv
International Institute of Sociology for “Detector Media”
organizationonFebruary5-21,2018showedthatonlya
quarteroftherespondents(27%)believethatUkrainian
TV channels provide objective information about events
in Ukraine and about the relations between Ukraine,
Russia and Russia-controlled “Donetsk People’s Re-
public” and “Luhansk People’s Republic”. The ratio of
peoplewhobelievethattheinformationoftheUkrainian
media is not true is a good deal more (43%). The share
of those who believe in the objectivity of Ukrainian TV
channels’ information is decreasing1
.
Thus, the low level of credibility of Russian television
among Ukrainian citizens, including in the govern-
ment-controlled territory, is not converted into their
trust in Ukrainian television.
1 Counteraction to Russian propaganda and media literacy: the results of the all-Ukrainian public opinion poll // https://detector.media/infospace/article/136017/2018-03-27-protidiya-rosiiskii-
propagandi-ta-mediagramotnist-rezultati-vseukrainskogo-opituvannya-gromadskoi-dumki/

3
“Pro-Russian sentiments”, the USSR nostalgia and other factors
of the influence of Russian propaganda
According to the results of the third stage of the
“Kalmius Group” study, almost 18,7% of respond-
ents throughout Ukraine when asked about the views
and beliefs of the people who support Russia’s pol-
icy towards Ukraine answered that they share the
views and convictions of these people themselves
(8.7% of them absolutely agree and 9.9% rather
agree).
These average figures are almost the same in differ-
ent regions of the country. For example, in the West,
there are 19% of such citizens (11.8% of them ab-
solutely agree and 7.3% rather agree), while in gov-
ernment-controlled areas of Donbas, almost 24,4%
(8.6% of them absolutely agree and 15.8% rather
agree).
There are interesting figures about the level of nos-
talgia for the Soviet past, which is often used by the
Russian Federation, positioning itself as the Soviet
Union successor. 43% of the overall respondents
and 51% of the residents of the government-con-
trolled areas of Donbas believe that their life or the
lives of their families was better in the USSR times,
however those who disagree are 41,6% and 31%,
respectively. Strong nostalgia for the Soviet period is
typical for all regions, except for the West — but it is
also noticeable there. Here the life in the past seems
better for almost 30,9%, and almost 54% do not
agree to this point of view.
A quarter of the Ukrainian population (25,3%) and
a third of government-controlled Donbas population
(36,4%) would like the USSR to revive and Ukraine
to be a part of it, but even more — 68,1% and
54,1% respectively, would not like this to happen.
It should be recalled that despite such a high level
of “pro-Russian sentiments” and nostalgia for the
Soviet past, the degree of trust in the Russian media
that can use these levers of influence remains ex-
tremely low.
At the same time, half of the polled citizens in gener-
al (49%) and 37,1% of Donbas residents absolute-
ly or rather support decommunization in Ukraine,
while a third of Ukrainians (34,5%) and about half
of Donbas population (45,9%) do not support it.
The most common reasons for the failure to support
decommunization are respect for the Soviet past and
the belief that there are more pressing problems
now than decommunization.
Thus, in spite of the high degree of nostalgia, the ab-
solute majority of the citizens do not support the re-
vival of the USSR. The Soviet past remains a strong
potential lever of influence on the consciousness of
modern Ukraine citizens even after 27 years of in-
dependence. At the same time, the official Ukraini-
an authorities refuse to be aware of the conditional
post-Soviet reflection and deliberately give the con-
trol of this process into hands of the Russian author-
ities, which, if we take into account Russia’s being
the successor of that state, independently forms the
discourse on the past, systematically using it in its
own anti-state propaganda against Ukraine.

4
Regional differences in relation to historical memory as part
of the Russian disinformation campaign
Given the results obtained on the second stage of
“Kalmius Group” study, more than a third of the
Ukrainian citizens polled are experiencing significant
differences between different regions, in particular,
in economic development (44%), traditions and cul-
ture (39,8%) and the political climate (38,1%).
Another 38,2% mentioned minor differences be-
tween the regions in the field of economic develop-
ment, 46,6% see them in traditions and culture and
34,3% — in the political climate.
According to the respondents, the West is most
distinguished among the other regions (this is the
opinion of 48% of respondents), as well as the East
(28,8%). The residents of government-controlled
part of Donbas noted the difference between Donbas
and other regions twice as often as overall Ukrainian
population (19,1% vs. 10,3%, respectively).
Two thirds of the population (64,9%) did not feel that
the attitude of people to them is determined by their
native region. 15,2% of the population of Ukraine
and 21,5% of Donbas residents faced with the fact
that people’s attitude to them is getting worse when
the people become aware which region the respond-
ent is from.
As for the events, personalities and countries that
may influence Ukraine’s integrity, the poet Taras
Shevchenko (mentioned by 83,6% of the re-
spondents ) and famous sportsmen such as Andrii
Shevchenko, Oleksandr Usik, Yana Klochkova and
others (73,6%) are considered capable of positive-
ly influencing the integrity. The rating is similar for
Donbas: 81,5% of Donbas residents have mentioned
Taras Shevchenko, 69,9% — famous sportsmen.
Zaporizhzhia Cossacks, popular performers or pop
bands as well as Bohdan Khmelnytskyi appeared
in 60–65,9% of the overall population’s responses
and 53,3–62,9% of Donbas residents’ answers.
The majority of the population as a whole refers to
Russia (68,6%), about half of it — to Joseph Stalin
(44%), and to the abolition of the law on region-
al languages ​​(42%), as the events, individuals and
countries that can separate Ukraine.
Donbas residents think something different: more
than half of them are sure that Ukraine is most di-
vided by Euromaidan (57,3% think that it divides and
23.3% think that it unites Ukraine), the United States
and Stepan Bandera (54,9% for each), the Ukraini-
an Insurgent Army (51%) and Russia (48,7%). The
opinion that Euromaidan has divided the country
prevails in general in the East (36.4% think that it
unites Ukraine vs. 44.5% who think that it divides
the country) and the South (36.7% — “unites” vs.
49.4% — “divides”). The leader of the OUN, Stepan
Bandera, cause controversy among the respondents
of all macro-regions except the West.
Ukraine’s information policy should take into ac-
count these indicators and local peculiarities and
be implemented especially sensitively and gently.
In general, the citizens in Donbas would like to
know more about historical events in the region.
The life of Zaporizhzhia Cossacks in Donbas and
the Resistance Movement in Donbas during the
Second World War cause The greatest interest (the
answers are “very/rather interesting” — 76,8%
and 75,9% respectively).
A bit less popular topics are: Donbas during the pe-
riod of the Ukrainian cultural revival of the 1920s
and Donbas industrialization in the 1920–30s
(71,4%, 71,3% respectively) and Holodomor in
Donbas in 1932–1933 (69%).
The least interesting for Donbas residents is the dissi-
dent movement in Donbas — the topic was the option
of half the people (50%). This may be because the topic it
is the least known and understandable, since the ques-
tion of whether such a topic would be interesting of all
thosetopicsthatmightbeinterestingtotherespondents,
receivedthelargestratioof“undecided”options.
According to a study by the Hybrid Warfare Analyti-
cal Group2
, one third of all the news on top Russian
TV channels is devoted to Ukraine. More than 90%
of references to Ukraine are negative. The main ob-
jects of Russian media attention are Ukrainian state
institutions, which, according to the Russian media,
represent a radical minority of the state.
2 Thirty percent of the news on Russian TV is dedicated to Ukraine — UCMC research http://uacrisis.org/ru/66976-grupa-z-analizu-gibridnih-zagroz-ucmc

5
The problems of internal communication
Communication of Ukrainian state authorities with
the citizens of the eastern regions of Ukraine could
play one of the key roles in the process of minimizing
the influence of Russian disinformation campaigns.
According to monitoring the communication of state
authorities on Donbas during the first half of 2018,
conducted by “Detector Media”, the Cabinet of Min-
isters of Ukraine mostly referred to Donbas for the
promotion of various achievements. To be precise,
to interpret certain actions and events as achieve-
ments3
.
In many cases, communication is not built for the
sake of Donbas, but around Donbas. According to the
monitoring, the number of references to the issues
of Donbas in their reports is the primacy in the pres-
idential party “Solidarity”. However, the “Opposition
block” outstripped it by the focus of the messages.
The results of the recent parliamentary elections are
in line with this trend — the “Opposition Bloc” has a
much higher support in Donbas than a presidential
party4
.
At the last Donbas Media Forum, held in July 2018,
a considerable part of the event was devoted to the
issue of restoring Donbas’s confidence in Ukrainian
media. Nataliia Likhachova, the director of “Detector
Media” organization, said that journalistic standards
can only keep the media from extremes and help to
maintain the trust of different groups of citizens. The
audience is tired of excessive politicization of the
content. It’s worth mentioning that according to the
researches of her organization, that if the content is
qualitative, the language of content (either Russian
or Ukrainian) does not affect its choice5
.
The Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Spe-
cial Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, Alexander Hug,
who has access to an uncontrolled territory and can
directly communicate with the citizens living there,
believes that some media make “more of a hin-
drance than a help” for their audience and readers
polarizing society even deeper. They select and cover
just the facts that are beneficial to their parties, thus
creating vital lie. According to Hug, such media “con-
tribute more to the problem, than to its solution”. The
Donbas residents’ confidence can only be restored
by facts, not their representations6
.
3 Communicative activity in clarifying the law on Donbas reintegration has decreased in Ukraine — “Detector Media” monitoring https://detector.media/infospace/article/139271/2018-07-12-v-ukraini-
znizilas-komunikativna-aktivnist-iz-rozyasnennya-zakonu-pro-reintegratsiyu-donbasu-monitoring-detektora-media/
4 Parties that, according to the voting results, gained 5% or more in the Ukraine region http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2014/wp315?PT001F01=910
5 Panel discussion “How to restore Donbas residents’ trust to the media?” https://youtu.be/vsehbi6g9jQ?t=5m55s
6 Panel discussion “How to restore Donbas residents’ trust to the media?” https://youtu.be/vsehbi6g9jQ?t=15m47s
So, Russian television uses the differences and con-
tradictions that exist in the Ukrainian society, and
some of them were listed during the study of “Kalmi-
us group”. Such processes as the formation of le-
gitimate power, civil society and respect for human
rights are accompanied in the Russian media by an
exclusively negative connotation, which lies at the
heart of Russian disinformation campaigns.
As we have already noted, the problem is not a
high degree of trust in Russian media or propa-
ganda, the problem is that it partly reflects the
existing fears and estimates of part of our society.

6
Strategy of informational reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
By order of July 26, 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine approved the Strategy of Informational Re-
integration of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions7
.
According to the document for the process of rein-
tegration to be successful, “communication with cit-
izens of Ukraine residing in the territory of Donetsk
and Luhansk regions should be based on the follow-
ing arguments:
Ukraine is a sustainable perspective state, which
despite the complexity of the current situation, pro-
vides a decent standard of living and security for its
citizens, and also offers opportunities for the devel-
opment;
Ukraine is a fair state, in which not only the rule of
law, but also the moral principle of justice prevails:
the Ukrainian state takes into account and under-
stands the circumstances, in which the residents of
the uncontrolled territory of Donetsk and Luhansk
regions found themselves as a result of the conflict.”
The ministry has limited capacity to implement these
“arguments” in their entirety without interacting with
other ministries and institutions. The “arguments”
represented should have a real basis, without which
any strategy will do any good to the degree of confi-
dence in Ukrainian media and the state, but will fur-
ther deteriorate it.
According to a qualitative study on the peculiarities
of horizontal communication between the residents
of the government-controlled part of Donetsk and
Luhansk regions and the citizens residing in the
uncontrolled territory, held by the Democratic Ini-
tiatives Foundation in February 2018 (80 respond-
ents in 8 settlements)8
, people are fully aware of
the benefits of life in the government-controlled
territories of Donbas.
In particular, the residents of uncontrolled areas see
the benefits in “peaceful life and well-being in the
territories, which were liberated”. “However, the
lack of compelling positive changes in comparison
with 2014, the decline in personal well-being and
the constant threat of the resumption of active hos-
tilities undermine the citizens’ confidence in possible
changes for the better in the foreseeable future,” the
study says.
In the researchers’ opinion, “low public confidence in
state institutions is due to the lack of positive expe-
rience as to respecting their basic rights ... respond-
ents express their surprise and indignation at the
inaction and indifference of the state and authorized
bodies that slowly respond to specific requirements
to improve certain services or living environment
(pension payments, quality of social and transport
infrastructure, simplification of the entry and exit re-
gime on the checkpoints)”.
This means, that for a person who is deprived of
pension payments and who has problems crossing
the entry-exit checkpoints it is very difficult to prove
the point of an informational strategy that “Ukraine
is a fair state, in which not only the rule of law,
but also the moral principle of justice prevails: the
Ukrainian state takes into account and understands
the circumstances, in which the residents of the un-
controlled territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions
found themselves as a result of the conflict”9
.
It is also difficult to prove it to the residents of the
liberated area, who are aware of the problems faced
by the citizens crossing the demarcation line. The re-
searchers assume that “in such a situation, people’s
lack of acceptance of the authorities’ symbolic steps,
such as ukrainization and decommunisation policy,
is intensifying”.
7 On the approval of the Strategy of informational reintegration of Donetsk and Luhansk regions https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/npas/pro-shvalennya-strategiyi-informacijnoyi-reintegraciyi-doneckoyi-
ta-luganskoyi-oblastej
8 How the temporarily uncontrolled territories of Donbas live? Peculiarities of horizontal communication of the divided region residents //https://dif.org.ua/uploads/pdf/19679939795b4f51
df073308.46033529.pdf
9 Strategy of informational reintegration of Donbas https://mip.gov.ua/files/pdf/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%B3%D1%96%D1%8F%20%D0%94%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B
1%D0%B0%D1%81.pdf

7
Unavoidable steps:
1. Auditing the content produced at the expense of the national budget for compliance with the rules of
conflict-sensitive journalism and the principles of non-use of hate speech through the introduction of national
monitoring.
2. Abandoning excessive politicization of the content (not words but deeds propaganda), produced by all
media market actors through holding industry events for media workers and implementation of the principles
of journalists’ self-regulation.
3. Taking into account local and regional peculiarities and traditions when developing of both media content
and public officials’ rhetoric.
4. Building of state-citizen communications according to the available opinion surveys data considering the
public opinion, and not “a party expediency”.
5. Building a media “message” on the national unity based on social services, civic activism and good
governance, as the main principles of democracy.
What should we do?
Despite such rather controversial indicators, there
are still prerequisites for strengthening national
integrity and noticeable trends denoting this
process.
The study of the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation
(SCORE) Index conducted in 2016 and 2018 shows
that over 2 years, there are actually no polarized
pro-Russian position among the citizens of Ukraine.
In 2016, there were 15% of the people with such po-
sition, while the number of “tolerant reformers” in-
creased significantly from 15% to 31% (those who
support changes and reforms in Ukraine and share
such values as social cohesion and diversity).
The number of “outsiders” has increased signifi-
cantly: from 35% to 45% (those who take ever less
part in the social and political life and are economi-
cally unsecured. Many of them have earlier strongly
supported Russia).
At the same time, the number of “polarized Eu-
rope-orientated” still remains at the 15% level
(those who strongly support the European future, but
does not share all the democratic values, such as
pluralism, for instance. It is highly nationalistic group
and is more prone to political violence). The support
of “pluralistic Ukrainian identity” has increased with-
in 2 years, especially in the East and South.
The researchers believe that for different groups of
citizens in the country there is “a possibility of unit-
ing around a national idea based on social services,
civic activism and good governance, as are the main
Western values.”
Now the Ministry of Information Policy has six
months to submit to the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine a plan of measures for the implementation
of the strategy already approved. It is important that
this plan considers the peculiarities of public opin-
ion in every region of the country, is based on real
achievements and will not become a tool of influ-
ence for solving political problems in the run-up to
the elections.

8
“Kalmius Group” is an informal association of Ukrainian analysts whose goal is to promote the restoration of
the country’s sovereignty in the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Motivation of
our Group’s activities is clear and transparent — to contribute eff ectively and professionally to the restoration
of the territorial integrity of the country. The name of the coalition comes from the Kalmius River, which unites
the free and temporarily occupied districts of the region and symbolizes the hope of citizens on both sides of
the demarcation line to peace-making by stopping the interstate confl ict and restoring the unity of Ukraine,
the rule of law and order in the territories aff ected by the armed confrontation.
More: www.kalmiusgroup.org
This study was presented by the “Kalmius Group” initiative under “Ukraine Confi dence Building Initiative”
(UCBI ІІ) project, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The study was
made possible thanks to the generous support of the American people through USAID. The product content is
the sole responsibility of the “Kalmius Group” and does not necessarily refl ect the views of USAID or the US
Government.
Third wave of the survey of the “Kalmius group”
The survey was conducted by GfK Ukraine. Survey method is telephone interviews with calls to phones.
Survey period: from June 04 to June 20, 2018. 1966 respondents, 540 of them from Donetsk and Luhansk
regions (territories controlled by the Ukrainian government). Weighted data for the total population (real
sample of 1966 respondents) corresponds to the population distribution by age/gender/settlement type and
macro region according to State Statistics Service of Ukraine data as of January 1, 2017; weighted data for
the population of Donetska and Luhanska oblast corresponds with the oblasts’ population distribution by age/
gender/settlement type. The data in the tables is given as weighted, and the total weighted sample of 1,500
respondents is displayed for convenience. The survey was conducted in all regions of Ukraine, except for the
uncontrolled part of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The sampling
error for the whole of Ukraine does not exceed 2.5%, for Donetsk and Luhansk regions — does not exceed
4.9%.