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Anatomy of Business Logic
                Vulnerabilities


            Bikash Barai, Co-Founder & CEO



Jan 2013               © iViZ Security Inc   0
About iViZ
 • iViZ – Cloud based Application Penetration
   Testing
       – Zero False Positive Guarantee
       – Business Logic Testing with 100% WASC (Web Application
         Security Consortium) class coverage
 •    Funded by IDG Ventures
 •    30+ Zero Day Vulnerabilities discovered
 •    10+ Recognitions from Analysts and Industry
 •    300+ Customers
 •    Gartner Hype Cycle- DAST and Application
      Security as a Service

Jan 2013                       © iViZ Security Inc                1
Understanding Business Logic
                  Vulnerabilities




Jan 2013              © iViZ Security Inc   2
Understanding Business Logic
                  Vulnerability
 • Business Logic Vulnerabilities are security flaws due
   to wrong logic design and not due to wrong coding
 • # Business Logic Vuln/App: 2 to 3 for critical Apps
 • Only 5 to 10% of total vulnerabilities
 • Difficult to detect but has the highest impact




Jan 2013                 © iViZ Security Inc               3
7 Deadly Sins!




Jan 2013       © iViZ Security Inc   4
Increasing your Bank Balance
 • Impact
       – You can increase your bank balance just by transferring
         negative amount to somebody else
 • How does it work?
       – No server side validation of the amount field
       – Sometime client side validations are there which can be
         bypassed by manipulating “Data on Transit” (use
         Webscarab, Burp Suite, Paros etc)
 • How to fix?
       – Add server side validations in the work flow

Jan 2013                       © iViZ Security Inc                 5
Buying online for free!
 • Impact
       – Buy air tickets (or anything that you like) at what ever price
         you want!
 • How does it work?
       – Application does not validate the amount paid to the
         payment gateway. Attacker can simply use the “Call back
         URL” to get the payment success and product delivery.
 • How to fix?
       – Create validation process between the application and
         payment gateway to know the exact amount transferred

Jan 2013                        © iViZ Security Inc                       6
Stealing one time passwords
 • Impact
       – You can the steal the One Time Password of another user
         despite having access to their mobile, email etc
 • How does it work?
       – Application send the OTP to the browser for faster client
         side validation and better user experience
 • How to fix?
       – Conduct server side validation. Do not send OTP to
         browser.



Jan 2013                       © iViZ Security Inc                   7
Have unlimited discounts
 • Impact
       – You can enjoy unlimited discount
 • How does it work?
       – You can add 10 products to the cart and avail the standard
         (e.g. 10%) discount
       – Remove 9 products from cart after that but the application
         still retains the discount amount
 • How to fix?
       – Re calculate discount if there is any change in the cart


Jan 2013                        © iViZ Security Inc                   8
Get 100% discount with 10%
                discount Coupons
 • Impact
       – You can get 100% discount with a 20% discount coupon
 • How does it work?
       – Same coupon can be used multiple times during the same
         transaction
 • How to fix?
       – Expire the coupon after the first use and not after the
         session ends




Jan 2013                       © iViZ Security Inc                 9
Hijacking others account
 • Impact
       – You can hijack anybody’s (use your imagination) account.
 • How does it work?
       – Weak password recovery process
       – Choose “Do not have access to registered email access”
         option
       – Brute force the answer to secret question.
 • How to fix?
       – Create stronger password recovery option
       – Recovery links only over email

Jan 2013                      © iViZ Security Inc                   10
DOS your competition
 • Impact
       – You can stop others from buying products
 • How does it work?
       – You try to book a product and start the session but do not
         pay
       – Open millions of such threads and do not pay
       – Application does not have “expiry time” or other validation
         of IP etc
 • How to fix?
       – Session Time-Out, Anti-Automation and limit the number
         of threads from a single IP (DDOS still possible)
Jan 2013                       © iViZ Security Inc                 11
Detection and Prevention




Jan 2013            © iViZ Security Inc   12
How to detect?
 • What helps?
       – Threat Modeling and Attack surface Analysis
       – Break down the key processes into work-flows/flow chart to detect
         possible manipulations
       – Penetration Testing with Business Logic Testing by Experts
       – Design Review
 • What does not help?
       – Automated Testing with any tools (neither Static nor Dynamic)
       – Testing conducted by a team with less expertise
       – Standard Code review




Jan 2013                           © iViZ Security Inc                       13
How to prevent?
 • Design the application/use case scenarios
   keeping Business Logic Vulnerability in mind
 • Conduct Security Design Reviews
 • Independent /Third Party Tests (within or
   outside the company)
 • Comprehensive Pen Test with Business Logic
   Testing before the Application goes live


Jan 2013             © iViZ Security Inc          14
Resources




Jan 2013     © iViZ Security Inc   15
Top Free Online Resources
 • Checklist for Business Logic Vuln:
      http://www.ivizsecurity.com/50-common-logical-vulnerabilities.html


 • OWASP :
      https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_business_logic_(OWASP-
      BL-001)



 • Webscarab:
      https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WebScarab_Project


Jan 2013                           © iViZ Security Inc                     16
After 7 Sins..
           Now be prepared for Karma!




Jan 2013             © iViZ Security Inc   17
How to be bankrupt in a day?
 • Denial of Dollar Attack!
 • “Piratebay” founder proposed launching this
   attack on the law firm which fought against
   him
 • Example working model:
       – Send 1 cent online transaction to the law firm
         account. Bank deducts 1 Dollar as transaction fee.
       – Send millions of “1 Cent transaction”

Jan 2013                   © iViZ Security Inc                18
Stay safe !




Jan 2013     © iViZ Security Inc   19
Thank You
                     bikash@ivizsecurity.com
                          Blog: http://blog.ivizsecurity.com/
           Linkedin:http://www.linkedin.com/pub/bikash-barai/0/7a4/669
                      Twitter: https://twitter.com/bikashbarai1




Jan 2013                           © iViZ Security Inc                   20

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Anatomy of business logic vulnerabilities

  • 1. Anatomy of Business Logic Vulnerabilities Bikash Barai, Co-Founder & CEO Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 0
  • 2. About iViZ • iViZ – Cloud based Application Penetration Testing – Zero False Positive Guarantee – Business Logic Testing with 100% WASC (Web Application Security Consortium) class coverage • Funded by IDG Ventures • 30+ Zero Day Vulnerabilities discovered • 10+ Recognitions from Analysts and Industry • 300+ Customers • Gartner Hype Cycle- DAST and Application Security as a Service Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 1
  • 3. Understanding Business Logic Vulnerabilities Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 2
  • 4. Understanding Business Logic Vulnerability • Business Logic Vulnerabilities are security flaws due to wrong logic design and not due to wrong coding • # Business Logic Vuln/App: 2 to 3 for critical Apps • Only 5 to 10% of total vulnerabilities • Difficult to detect but has the highest impact Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 3
  • 5. 7 Deadly Sins! Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 4
  • 6. Increasing your Bank Balance • Impact – You can increase your bank balance just by transferring negative amount to somebody else • How does it work? – No server side validation of the amount field – Sometime client side validations are there which can be bypassed by manipulating “Data on Transit” (use Webscarab, Burp Suite, Paros etc) • How to fix? – Add server side validations in the work flow Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 5
  • 7. Buying online for free! • Impact – Buy air tickets (or anything that you like) at what ever price you want! • How does it work? – Application does not validate the amount paid to the payment gateway. Attacker can simply use the “Call back URL” to get the payment success and product delivery. • How to fix? – Create validation process between the application and payment gateway to know the exact amount transferred Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 6
  • 8. Stealing one time passwords • Impact – You can the steal the One Time Password of another user despite having access to their mobile, email etc • How does it work? – Application send the OTP to the browser for faster client side validation and better user experience • How to fix? – Conduct server side validation. Do not send OTP to browser. Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 7
  • 9. Have unlimited discounts • Impact – You can enjoy unlimited discount • How does it work? – You can add 10 products to the cart and avail the standard (e.g. 10%) discount – Remove 9 products from cart after that but the application still retains the discount amount • How to fix? – Re calculate discount if there is any change in the cart Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 8
  • 10. Get 100% discount with 10% discount Coupons • Impact – You can get 100% discount with a 20% discount coupon • How does it work? – Same coupon can be used multiple times during the same transaction • How to fix? – Expire the coupon after the first use and not after the session ends Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 9
  • 11. Hijacking others account • Impact – You can hijack anybody’s (use your imagination) account. • How does it work? – Weak password recovery process – Choose “Do not have access to registered email access” option – Brute force the answer to secret question. • How to fix? – Create stronger password recovery option – Recovery links only over email Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 10
  • 12. DOS your competition • Impact – You can stop others from buying products • How does it work? – You try to book a product and start the session but do not pay – Open millions of such threads and do not pay – Application does not have “expiry time” or other validation of IP etc • How to fix? – Session Time-Out, Anti-Automation and limit the number of threads from a single IP (DDOS still possible) Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 11
  • 13. Detection and Prevention Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 12
  • 14. How to detect? • What helps? – Threat Modeling and Attack surface Analysis – Break down the key processes into work-flows/flow chart to detect possible manipulations – Penetration Testing with Business Logic Testing by Experts – Design Review • What does not help? – Automated Testing with any tools (neither Static nor Dynamic) – Testing conducted by a team with less expertise – Standard Code review Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 13
  • 15. How to prevent? • Design the application/use case scenarios keeping Business Logic Vulnerability in mind • Conduct Security Design Reviews • Independent /Third Party Tests (within or outside the company) • Comprehensive Pen Test with Business Logic Testing before the Application goes live Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 14
  • 16. Resources Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 15
  • 17. Top Free Online Resources • Checklist for Business Logic Vuln: http://www.ivizsecurity.com/50-common-logical-vulnerabilities.html • OWASP : https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_business_logic_(OWASP- BL-001) • Webscarab: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_WebScarab_Project Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 16
  • 18. After 7 Sins.. Now be prepared for Karma! Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 17
  • 19. How to be bankrupt in a day? • Denial of Dollar Attack! • “Piratebay” founder proposed launching this attack on the law firm which fought against him • Example working model: – Send 1 cent online transaction to the law firm account. Bank deducts 1 Dollar as transaction fee. – Send millions of “1 Cent transaction” Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 18
  • 20. Stay safe ! Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 19
  • 21. Thank You bikash@ivizsecurity.com Blog: http://blog.ivizsecurity.com/ Linkedin:http://www.linkedin.com/pub/bikash-barai/0/7a4/669 Twitter: https://twitter.com/bikashbarai1 Jan 2013 © iViZ Security Inc 20