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SESSION ID:
#RSAC
Andrew Blaich, PhD
Decrease Your Circle of Trust: An
Investigation of PKI CAs on
Mobile Devices
MBS-R03
Lead Security Analyst
Bluebox Security
@ablaich
#RSAC
Who are you trusting?
2
 How much trust do you put in your phone?
 How many vendors have modified your OS?
 How many applications and services are running on your device?
 How many libraries are loaded for an app?
 How many roots of trust exist for network connections?
#RSAC
Who are you trusting?
3
 How much trust do you put in your phone?
 How many vendors have modified your OS?
 Google -> Samsung -> Qualcomm -> AT&T -> Others?
 How many applications and services are running on your device?
 300+ apps/services on a Samsung Galaxy Note 3
 How many libraries are loaded for an app?
 100+ shared libraries on a Samsung Galaxy Note 3
 How many entities are trusted for network connections?
 150 + on Android
 200+ on iOS
#RSAC
Circle of Trust
4
OEMs
Libs
Apps
CAs
Component
Suppliers
Carriers
Trust Circle
#RSAC
Trustable by Bluebox
5
Example of a brand new
out of the box device
and all the entities that
you would trust on it.
#RSAC
6
Same device, different carriers
#RSAC
7
#RSAC
Circle of Trust
8
OEMs
Libs
Apps
CAs
Component
Suppliers
Carriers
Trust Circle
#RSAC
Circle of Trust
9
OEMs
Libs
Apps
CAs
Component
Suppliers
Carriers
Trust Circle
#RSAC
Secure Connections
10
Apps CAs Network
#RSAC
11
#RSAC
12
#RSAC
13
#RSAC
#RSAC
#RSAC
…
#RSAC
17
#RSAC
18
#RSAC
19
Not only browsers…
#RSAC
Certificate Authorities
20
 What certificate authorities are on my device?
 How many are there?
 Who are these certificate authorities?
 How did they get on my device?
 What security concerns are there?
#RSAC
Objectives
21
 Learn more about who your device is trusting
 Learn about the roles CAs play in secure communications
 Learn the history behind these CAs
 Learn how you can take action to decrease your circle of trust
#RSAC
Background -
Certificate Authorities
#RSAC
Body
23
 What is a CA?
 How do they get on the device?
 How many are there?
 User installable vs. system pre-loaded (also talk about carrier and
OEM additions or removals)
 iOS VPN and Android VPN case study
#RSAC
Certificate Authorities
24
 What is a certificate authority?
 They validate that who you are talking to is who they say they are
Google
Are you Google.com?
Yes, CA-A says I am.
Trusted
CAs:
CA-A
TRUSTED CONNECTION
#RSAC
Certificate Authorities
25
 What is a certificate authority?
 They validate that who you are talking to is who they say they are
Google
Are you Google.com?
Yes, CA-M says I am.
NOT TRUSTED CONNECTION
Trusted
CAs:
CA-A
#RSAC
CA Chain of Trust
26
 What is the chain of trust?
#RSAC
Trusted Certificate Chain
27
Verified == Trusted Chain
The root CA to verify this
chain is installed on the
device making the trust
chain verifiable and thus
it is considered a trusted
and secured connection.
#RSAC
Un-trusted Certificate Chain
28
Un-verified == Un-Trusted Chain
The root CA to verify this chain is
missing from this device making
the trust chain un-verifiable and
thus not-trusted and in-secure.
#RSAC
Types of Root CAs
29
 Pre-installed root CAs
 User-installed root CAs
#RSAC
Why is this a concern?
30
 A malicious or compromised root CA can read your secure traffic
 CNNIC and MCS Holdings
 Lenovo and Superfish
 …
#RSAC
Pre-installed Root CAs
#RSAC
Root CA Approval Process
32
MicrosoftMozilla Apple
Root Certificate Programs
others
#RSAC
Mozilla Root CA Approval Process
33
Linux and Android are strongly tied to the Mozilla process.
#RSAC
CA Trust Infrastructure
 The effectiveness of the global PKI trust infrastructure relies on
keeping the designated roots of trust fully secure and operating
correctly.
34
CA -A CA -B
Issue cert for
*.google.com
Trusted Root CAs
No.
Issue cert for
*.google.com
Ok.
Compromised CA
#RSAC
CAs on Mobile Devices
35
162
227
System
Installed
Certificates
5.1
8.3
#RSAC
Root CA Reference Links
 iOS:
 http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204132
 Trusted
 Always Ask
 Blocked
 Android:
 https://android.googlesource.com/platform/libcore/+/master/luni/src/ma
in/files/cacerts/
36
#RSAC
CA Classifications
 Known Failures in Keeping Trust
 Government-Based Roots of Trust
 Cause for Concern
 Artificial Constraints
 Everything else
37
#RSAC
Known Failures
#RSAC
Known Failures with CAs
 “Hacked” CAs:
 CNNIC/MCS Holdings [2015]
 Comodo [2011]
 DigiNotar [2011]
 GlobalSign [2011]
 India CCA [2014]
 RapidSSL (indirect) [2008]
39
#RSAC
Apple’s Blocked CA List
40
CA Name Reasons
TurkTrust Issued an inappropriate sub-CA cert that
was used to issue a *.google.com cert
Entrust Issued a wildcard cert for Apple domains
GTE CyberTrust Solutions Issued 4 sub-CA certs for DigiNotar
DigiNotar Issued itself another sub-CA cert
Entrust Issued 2 sub-CA certs for DigiNotar
Entrust Issued a sub-CA cert for Digicert Sdb. Bhd
(practices of this CA in Malaysia were
found to be inappropriate)
#RSAC
Apple’s Blocked CA List – cont’d.
41
CA Name Reasons
GTE Issued a sub-CA cert for Digicert Sdb. Bhd
Trustwave Issued a sub-CA cert to Micros Systems
Xramp Issued a sub-CA cert to Trustwave
TurkTrust Issued a sub-CA cert to KKTC Merkez
Bankasi
#RSAC
Government CAs
#RSAC
Government Related CAs
43
Allowed to use an
internal audit for
approval.
#RSAC
Causes for Concern - CAs
#RSAC
Causes for Concern
45
#RSAC
Causes for Concern – cont’d.
46
#RSAC
Causes for Concern – cont’d.
47
#RSAC
Artificial Constraints
#RSAC
Artificial Constraints
49
Cert Subject Reason For Constraint
CN=IGC/A,OU=DCSSI,O=PM/SGDN,L=Paris
,ST=France,C=FR
Issued several un-authorized certificates
for Google domains. TLD restrictions:
.fr (France), .gp (Guadeloupe) , .gf
(Guyane) , .mq (Martinique) , .re
(Réunion) , .yt (Mayotte), .pm (Saint-Pierre
et Miquelon) , .bl (Saint Barthélemy) , .mf
(Saint Martin) , .wf (Wallis et Futuna) , .pf
(Polynésie française) , .nc (Nouvelle
Calédonie) , .tf (Terres australes et
antarctiques françaises)]
#RSAC
Artificial Constraints –cont’d.
50
#RSAC
Artificial Constraints –cont’d.
51
?
#RSAC
Apple’s Extended Trust
52
Type Count Notes
US Federal Certificates 5 4 are not on Android
1 is under review by Mozilla
Present on iOS, but requested
for removal on
Mozilla/Android
3 2 deprecated from AOL/Time Warner
1 deprecated from Danish IT
Other Entities added by Apple 15 5 from Apple
3 from Denmark
2 from Swiss Government
2 from Belgium
1 from Cisco
1 from Czech Republic
1 from Canada
#RSAC
CA Cryptography Analysis
#RSAC
Public Key-Size
54
Key Type/Size Count Notable Entities
Elliptic Curve 6 GeoTrust, VeriSign,
COMODO, Thawte, Entrust,
AffirmTrust
RSA / 1024 bit 15 FNMT, GTE CyberTrust,
Equifax, Netlock
Halozatbiztonsagi,
VeriSign, ValiCert, Thawte
Consulting, Entrust
RSA / 2048 bit 101 N/A
RSA/ 4096 bit 14 N/A
#RSAC
Hash Algorithm
55
Signature Algorithm Count Notable Entities
ecdsa-with-SHA384 6 GeoTrust, VeriSign,
COMODO, Thawte, Entrust,
AffirmTrust
md5WithRSAEncryption 6 GTE, Netlock, Equifax
sha1WithRSAEncryption 115 N/A
sha256WithRSAEncryption 28 N/A
sha384WithRSAEncryption 1 N/A
#RSAC
CA Consolidation
56
Symantec Owned Entity Number of Certificates on
Android
GeoTrust 7
Verisign 7
TC Trust Center 3
Network Solutions 1
Thawte 5
Equifax 3
Total: Symantec controls 25 of the total
156 certificates or ~16%
ownership of the Android roots
of trust
#RSAC
CA Consolidation – cont’d.
57
#RSAC
CA Consolidation – cont’d.
58
#RSAC
Additional CAs
 Some OEMs and carriers add
additional certificates into the ROM
that are not found in AOSP:
 Sony Xperia running 4.4.4 includes
two root certs for Sony
 iOS has several additional certificates
that Android does not currently* have
e.g.: Cisco and US Government
59
#RSAC
User-installed Root CAs
#RSAC
User installed root CAs
61
#RSAC
VPN Case-Study
#RSAC
VPN, Anonymization, Privacy Providers
63
 Looked at 10 of the top VPN Service Provider services in the Apple
App Store and the Google Play Store:
 iOS – App Store
 6 out of 10 of the iOS Apps used an MDM VPN Profile that DID install a
3rd party certificate
 Android –Google Play Store
 10 out of 10 of the Play Store apps did not install a 3rd party certificate
#RSAC
Decreasing your Trust Circle
 Android:
 Manually
 Settings -> Security -> Trusted credentials
 Disable or Enable each CA
 iOS:
 No direct method on iOS…
64
#RSAC
Bluebox Trust Managers
65
https://bluebox.com/technical/trust-managers/
View and Manage the Root CAs on your Device
#RSAC
Summary
66
 Learn more about who your device is trusting
 iOS and Android have an increasing amount of roots of trust
 Learn about the roles CAs play in secure communications
 Without a CA we cannot verify that who we are talking to is legitimate
 Learn the history behind these CAs
 Sometimes things go wrong with CAs
 Learn how you can take action to decrease your circle of trust
 Manual certificate management
 Download Bluebox Trust Manager for iOS and Android
#RSAC
Apply
67
 Learn more about what your device is trusting:
 Download Trustable by Bluebox
 (https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.bluebox.trust)
 View the root CAs on your device:
 Android System Settings
 Download Bluebox Trust Manager (Android and iOS)
 Manage the root CAs on your device (root/jailbreak) required:
 Android System Settings
 Download Bluebox Trust Manager (Android and iOS)

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Decrease Your Circle of Trust: An Investigation of PKI CAs on Mobile Devices

Notas do Editor

  1. We can conceptualize everything we trust on our devices into a circle of trust. These being the high level components that can affect just about anything in terms of what we trust and how much we trust. They also are attack surfaces for where an attacker can attempt to compromise a device’s data and the communications it conducts.
  2. Not all devices are released equally
  3. We’re going to classify the types of root CA’s broadly right now… There are the pre-installed root CAs that come included in the system key store (credential storage) of your device. Android and iOS OS revisions typically include changes the included root CAs (either removals or additions)