The document discusses the development of an Asset Integrity Assessment and Management (AIM) program for an FPSO (floating production, storage, and offloading) facility and associated subsea infrastructure. It describes the key components of the FPSO and subsea system, outlines an approach to developing an AIM program including collecting design and operational data, conducting risk assessments, and prioritizing maintenance. The summary highlights the need to fill data gaps, develop performance indicators to monitor asset degradation, and implement risk management processes to guide the AIM program and ensure the integrity of the offshore oil and gas assets.
Asset Integrity Management for purpose-built FPSOs and subsea system facilities
1. Asset Integrity Assessment and
Management Program for life
preservation of a purpose-built
FPSO and associated subsea
system facilities
Dr Abe Nezamian â Director, Asset Integrity Management
2. Low oil price
During challenging market conditions,
effective integrity management of offshore
assets is more important than ever to
ensure theyâre safe and reliable.
3. FPSO
Floating facilities for production, storage and offloading
(FPSO) and subsea facilities are effective options for
exploiting offshore oil and gas resources in remote
marginal fields.
4. While they offer the industry significant benefits,
they also present a number of complex
challenges to the Asset Integrity Manager
7. Jabiru Venture
Most FPSOs were built after 1997, having less than
19 years in operation.
Some may be taken to dry dock
Rubby PrincessNan Hai Kai Tuo
Schiehallion needed to
be replaced by 2015Challis Venture
Studied FPSO
8. Lack of data
Although there is considerable growth for these type of
facilities, itâs generally recognized that when compared
to trading tankers, FPSO/FSOs have limited experience
from which to draw historical data and trends.
As a result, there is limited data for Asset Integrity
Management decision making.
9. Schiehallion FPSO
Source: NOV team
âą Non-disconnectable purpose-built FPSO, with a design life of 20 years
âą Design constrained
âą Built with the best available construction
âą Production fluids worse than expected
âą Increasing defects (operations expenditure 50% higher)
âą Operations efficiency down to 60%
âą Expecting major obsolescence âhitâ
âą Has been replaced
10. The Schiehallion FPSO
needed to be replaced by 2015
Source: NOV team
âŠdue to poor integrity and field performance â 3 years
short of its initial design life
Shutdown period is about 1 year, requiring:
âą New risers, umbilicals and mostly new mooring lines (12 to 20)
âą Re-used flowlines/SS hardware
11. Out of all the potential failures to occur on a
FPSO, almost all happened to this facility
High
Low
Low High
Manageability
Consequence (Mmbbls)
Polytropic
tubing
Switchboard
connections
Fare tip
PSV failures
Emergency
gen fails
Framo System
Major Leak
Tree corrosion
/ erosion
Shuttle tanker
incident
Main Gen
failure
Subsea pipe corrosion
/ erosion
Drill centre
disabled
Seawater
system failure
Production
equip failure
T/S sand impact
Thruster failure
Turret manifolds
Swivel fails
Riser failureFire â air
compressor
Mooring
integrity
Ware/green
water damage
Hull + pipe-
work defects
Low IR Turret
struct
1 5 10 20 40
Major events as developed for the Joe Leghorn review:
Incident occurred on Schiehallion FPSO
12. These integrity issues regarding
Schiehallon are not unique, but rather
common with FPSOs
14. For an FPSO part of the deep-water oil and gas
development in Africa, an AIM program needed to
be developed to prioritize and maximize resources for
availability, while maintaining the risk profile of the
facility (âas low as reasonably practicableâ)
15. Key features of the facility include:
âą FPSO hull and topsides + mooring lines + suction piles
âą Modular topsides
âą SPM buoy
âą Flow lines, risers and export line
âą Umbilicals
âą Drilling wells
âą Subsea manifolds
âą Other subsea equipment
16. Asset Groups
Asset Group Asset Type
Main Field Wells
Subsea Systems
Subsea Flowline Systems
FPSO
Risers and Umbilicals
Mooring System
Hull
Topsides â Main Facilities
Topsides â Utilities
SPM
Mooring System
Offloading System
SPM Buoy
The asset data was grouped into three parts, based on functionality:
17. Data was stored and secured
in a unique database and
accessible in real-time by
anyone who was acting on
the AIM activities.
18. AIM Process
Data Evaluation Strategy Program
Managed system
for recording,
archive and
retrieval of AIM
data and other
pertinent records
Evaluation of
integrity and
fitness-for-
service;
development of
remedial actions
Overall
inspection,
monitoring,
maintenance,
mitigation and
decommissioning
philosophies
Detailed work
scopes for
inspection
activities and
execution to
ensure integrity
of asset
Design DecommissionData update
19. The most critical part of the process is
data capture and gap analysis
20. Data Requirements
Design Basis Data
Requirements
General Facility Data
Design Data
Fabrication Data
Installation Data
Environmental Data
Requirements
Metocean
Seismic
Soil Data
Weather Events
Regulatory Data
Requirements
Certification Authority
Facilities Safety Case
Scheme of Examinations
Operational Process
Data Requirements
Heat & Mass Balance
Original & Current
Operational Performance
Process Chemistry
Process Description
Production Limitations
Production Rates
What is developed in the design stage of a development is often based off
presumptions. Once all the required data has been collected, what is done in
the design stage can be recalibrated - data from operations is now available
and therefore uncertainty can be narrowed and reliability increased.
21. Data Requirements
Condition Data Requirements
In-service Inspection Reports
Incident Reports
Modifications
Anomaly Register
Weight Report
Condition Monitoring reports
Corrosion Protection
Engineering Assessment
Engineering Evaluation
Asset Integrity Manual
Scour Trend Analysis
Marine Growth Trend Analysis
Corrosion Assessment
Damage Evaluation
Mitigation
Risk Assessment
Structural Assessment
Analyse data to build a trend for lifecycle
management - look at all the implications
and determine how these will be managed
for the life of the asset.
22. Gap Analysis Methodology
Data
Requirements
Received /
Required Data
Conclusions
Component
Breakdown
Operator Asset Management team
CDMS
(data
management
system)
Complete a couple of rounds of gap analysis to ensure all data and information has been captured
and correlated to the AIM program.
Gap Analysis
23. 1
2
3
4
5
Performance Indicators
Represents design set point
when new
Represents performance
degradation that survives
through life extension
Represents performance
degradation that survives to end
of design life
Represents performance
degradation requiring repair /
replacement but still following
the âbath tubâ wear out curve
Represents rapid degradation
before end of design life
Life
extension
1
2
3
4
5
Set point
when new
Performance Indicators (PIs)
required as aging starts
Minimum acceptable
performance level
Structural Integrity
Assessment confirms that
acceptance level is
achieved, exceeded or not
achieved
Performancestandard
Time
Original design life
The Performance Indicator area is where degradation, issues and problems can be identified. Itâs important
to have systems in place to pick up issues before they happen.
24. Asset Integrity Assessment Criteria
Risk
Assessment
Minimum
Acceptance
Action List
Condition
Assessment
Available AIM System
Optimized
Complete a couple of rounds to optimize and develop the Asset Integrity program, and to develop
an action list.
AIM program
25. Safety Management
STOP STOP STOP
Hazard
PREVENT
Containment
DETECT
Gas/flame
detection
CONTROL
ESD Blowdown
MITIGATE
Fire protection,
deluge
Release Event
As part of the review, all safety values need to be put in place as well as a sound monitoring system.
26. Risk Management
Critical throughout the management of an assetâs integrity program.
2.
Communication and
consultation
5.
Monitoring and
review
1.
Establishing the context
Risk identification
Risk analysis
Risk evaluation
4.
Risk treatment
3.Riskassessment
This underpins the
overall risk management
process, should occur
throughout the cycle
and be two-way (as
shown by the arrows)
Monitoring at every
stage, feeding back to
improvements based on
increased understanding
Review of the entire
process at intervals to
ensure it continues to be
effective
27. FPSO degradation mechanisms examples
âą Operational degradation
âą Topside facility CP and coating degradation
âą Marine growth
âą Subsea systems
âą CP system depletion
âą Subsea pipelines internal and external corrosion
âą Fatigue
âą Scouring
âą Erosion
âą Crane systems de-rating
29. FPSO degradation mechanisms root causes
Active SRB (Sulfate Reducing Bacteria) corrosion:
âą A bacteria that obtains energy by oxidizing organic compounds or molecular
hydrogen (H2) while reducing sulfate (SO2) to hydrogen sulfide (H2S)
âą âBreathes" sulfate rather than oxygen
âą Not familiar
âą Could be a driving factor for corrosion rate
âą Have been found on mooring lines and suction pile
30. SRB can lead to 2x the corrosion, not
accounted for in the design stage.
A program needs to be developed
to control these events.
31. Purposed RBI Methodology
Inspection
Plan
Asset Hierarchy
Subdivision Tag
System
Review of the
Documentation
Component
Selection
Qualitative
Assessment
(HAZID)
Quantitative
Assessment
(FDF)
Probability of
failure
Consequences of
failure
Risk
Ranking
Detailed
RBI of
Failure
(FDF <10)
Qualitative and quantitative risk assessment is required â in some cases quantitative data is not available.
32. Risk Rating and Prioritizing
The risk matrix for the project was simplified into three
ratings, helping to prioritize maintenance:
Risk Rating = 1 (unacceptable) â design
improvements/mitigations are strongly
recommended;
Risk Rating = 2 (ALARP - As Low
As Reasonably Practicable) design
improvements are suggested;
Risk Rating = 3 (acceptable)
- design features already prevent/
mitigate failures.
34. Conclusions
âą Carefully review AIM program and available data
âą Conduct a gap analysis of the data and determine the areas
for improvement
âą Update the AIM system and data management systems to optimize
the Asset Integrity Program
âą Develop a baseline of conditions
âą Conduct a risk assessment and prioritize maintenance
âą Develop an acceptance criteria
âą Determine required mitigations to achieve ALARP Level and
maintenance of fitness-for-service
âą Develop Requalification and Life Extension plans for the operating
life of the asset
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Notas do Editor
All potential failures, almost all happened in this facility
48km of flow lines
Divided because of functionality and then next level down
25,000 components
Integrity of systems, sub-systems and critical components
48km of flow lines
48km of flow lines
# 4 and 5 when it starts to degrated
In the Performance indicator area is where you can pick up degratation issues and problems, and is important ot have systems implemented at this stage to pick it up before it happens before it happens
5 -
Not accounted for in design.
Need to develop a program to control these events
Simplified the risk matrix with 3 ratings. This way what