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em Metrologia Legal
Antônio Lacerda
Researcher – Inmetro
Cryptology
I Workshop Interamericano de
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em Metrologia Legal
Antônio Lacerda
Inmetro's Researcher
Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to
everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and
diplomatic communications.
It's time for cryptography to step out of the shadows of spies and the
military, and step into the sunshine and be embraced by the rest of us.
(The Code Book, Simon Singh)
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Emitter Receiver
Communication
Channel
Normal Flow of Communication
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What is Cryptology?
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Cryptology is the science whose goal is to protect
communication against intentional and not allowed
interferences.
Cryptology is supported by several other areas: mathematics,
computer science, physics, psychologhy, philolgy etc.
Is Cryptology a branch of mathematics? I disagree!
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Cryptology is a new old science!
Old because it is a millennial science.
In fact, “protection of sensitive information is a desire reaching
back to the beginnings of human culture” (Otto Horak).
New because the first time we saw an announced lecture series
under the open title “Cryptology” took place in German in 1981.
Before this, the few ones took place under the name “Special
Problems of Information Theory”.
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Cryptology is divided in two (or four) subareas:
- Cryptography (and its counterparty: cryptanalysis)
- Steganography (and its counterparty: steganalysis)
From Greek:
- kryptos = hidden
- steganos = covered
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Cryptography aims to protect the communication in a insecure
channel.
Emitter Receiver
Insecure Communication
Channel
Cryptanalisys aims to break the cryptography.
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Steganography aims to protect the existence of the
communication.
Emitter Receiver
Communication
Channel
Steganalisys aims to break the steganography and to discover
the existence of the communication.
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Cryptography: overt secret writing
Steganography: covert secret writing
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Steganography
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What is steganography?
Part of Cryptology involving knowledge and techniques to hide
or to camouflage a message inside another.
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Steganography
Steganography
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Steganography by kids:
Inglourious Bastards
Notting Hill
Mission: Impossible
Edward Scissorhands
True Lies
Raiders of the Lost Ark
October Sky
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Steganography by kids:
Inglourious Bastards
Notting Hill
Mission: Impossible
Edward Scissorhands
True Lies
Raiders of the Lost Ark
October Sky
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Ancient steganography:
- Tattooed messages on head of messengers.
- Messages in stomach of hunted animals.
- Messages on wood logs covered with wax.
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Modern steganography:
- Invisible inks.
- Microdots.
- LSB (Least Significant Bit).
- Covert channels.
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Modern steganography: Invisible ink
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Cryptography
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What is cryptography?
Part of cryptology involving knowledge and techniques to
transform information in its original form into an illegible form,
so that only the emitter and receiver can access the original
content by using a secret.
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Services provided by Cryptography:
- Confidentiality: To allow access only to authorized people.
- Integrity: To assure that the content of the message was not
modified.
- Authenticity: To assure that the emitter and receiver are who
they claim they are.
- Non-repudiation (non-retractability): The emitter cannot deny
he is the message sender.
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Attention
There isn't an algorithm that is capable to provide all
cryptographic services. For each service, you will need one or
more algorithms.
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Attacks to communication
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Emitter Receiver
Communication
Channel
Again: Normal Flow of Communication
Every modification in normal flow not allowed by emitter or
receiver is an attack.
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Interception
The attacker has access to the content of the message.
Interception is an attack against confidentiality.
Emitter Receiver
Attacker
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Modification
The attacker has access to the content of the message,
furthermore he/she modify the content of the message.
Modification is an attack against integrity.
Emitter Receiver
Attacker
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Fabrication
The attacker yields a message and send it to the receiver,
inserting counterfeit data.
Fabrication is an attack against authenticity.
Emitter Receiver
Attacker
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Interruption
The attacker interrupts the communication.
Interruption is an attack against availability.
Cryptology is useless in this case!
Emitter Receiver
Attacker
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Integrity
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Modification
The attacker has access to the content of the message,
furthermore he/she modify the content of the message.
Modification is an attack against integrity.
Emitter Receiver
Attacker
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How to guarantee the integrity of a message against intentional
modification? Answer: Hash Function.
Integrity
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In Portuguese:
Substantivo
1 - Prato feito de carne moída
misturada com batata assada
ou frita.
2 - Bagunça, confusão.
Verbo
1 - Cortar em pequenos
pedaços.
2 - Misturar, confundir.
What does “hash” means?
In English:
Noun
1 - A dish of chopped meat,
potatoes, and sometimes
vegetables, usually browned.
2 - Mess, confusion.
Verb
1 - To chop into pieces.
2 - To mix or mess up
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In Portuguese:
função de confusão (strange!)
função de dispersão (it sounds better!)
função hash (it's more common.)
So what does “hash function” means?
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It receives as input a sequence of bits, of any size (can be a
character, a string, or even a file) and generates another
sequence of bits of fixed length, called hash or digest.
The digest works as a security seal, because a simple change
in one of the input bits completely changes the original
digest.
A hash function is a one-way function. That is, it's not
possible to recover the original message from the digest.
Hash Function
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Nonsense!?
If the original data can not be recovered from the digest, then
why use hash functions?
Although it seems contradictory, it's exactly because this
feature that hash functions are so useful.
Hash Function
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MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5): Algorithm of 128 bits
developd in 1991 by Ron Rivest.
SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm): A family of algorithms
developed by NIST and NSA.
Whirlpool: Algorithm developed by Paulo Barreto (USP) and
Vincent Rijmen (co-author of AES).
Some very known Hash Functions
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MD5("Inmetro") = 0101001111101001000011010111000
101011110001000000101100110100010111100101111100
0010101110010100111000111010110011001001001010100
MD5("inmetro") = 0101101100110000101010010001100
110110111001001111101000011110000100110100000011
1100110101000000001100100101111011111100000010110
An example with MD5
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Bits 001-032: 0101.0011.1110.1001.0000.1101.0111.0001
Bits 001-032: 0101.1011.0011.0000.1010.1001.0001.1001
Bits 033-064: 0101.1110.0010.0000.0101.1001.1010.0010
Bits 033-064: 1011.0111.0010.0111.1101.0000.1111.0000
Bits 065-096: 1111.0010.1111.1000.0101.0111.0010.1001
Bits 065-096: 1001.1010.0000.0111.1001.1010.1000.0000
Bits 097-128: 1100.0111.0101.1001.1001.0010.0101.0100
Bits 097-128: 0110.0100.1011.1101.1111.1000.0001.0110
Result: 59 bits changed. 46% of bits affected. (Avalanche
Effect)
An example with MD5
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Confidentiality
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Interception
The attacker has access to the content of the message.
Interception is an attack against confidentiality.
Emitter Receiver
Attacker
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Confidentiality was the first service provided by Cryptology.
It can be reached by ciphers and codes.
Confidentiality
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Contrary to layman's perception, code and cipher are not
synonymous.
Cipher is a manipulation in the representation of the message.
Code is a manipulation in the meaning of the message.
Cipher X Code
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Confidentiality
by Code
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Replace each word or phrase in the original message with
another character or symbol (or a set of them).
The list of replacements is contained in a codebook.
Code is not flexible. If a codebook is leaked, then the emitter
and receiver must re-writing the entire codebook.
Code
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Morse code
NATO phonetic code
Q code
Bar code
QR code
Examples of Public Codes
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Famous example: Zimmermann Telegram
Arthur Zimmermann, State
Secretary for Foreign Affairs of
the German Empire, sent a
telegram to the German
ambassador in Mexico, asking
him to propose an alliance to
Mexico's president to attack the
USA.
The aim was to force the USA to
the World War I.
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Famous example: Zimmermann Telegram
The telegram is not ciphered; it is coded.
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Famous example: Zimmermann Telegram
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The Zimmermann telegram was decoded by famous “Room 40”.
Room 40
↓
Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS)
↓
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
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Confidentiality
by Cipher
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Imagine you have a message well represented. Then you
“mess” this representation in a pre-defined mean that permit
you recover the message in its original representation.
The pre-defined mean is called algorithm. Another input to this
algorithm is the key.
The key is the flexible part of a cipher.
Cipher
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Remember: Code is not flexible. If a codebook is leaked, then
the emitter and receiver must re-writing the entire codebook.
If a cipher key is leaked, then emitter and receiver must choose
another key without changing the algorithm.
Cipher X Code
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Cipher
Cipher
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Code
Code
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Decipher
Decipher
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Decode
Decode
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Actor Action Input
Emitter
cipher key
code codebook
Receiver
decipher key
decode codebook
Attacker cryptanalyze (or break) - - -
Encrypt = cipher or code.
Decrypt = decipher or decode.
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Substitution Cipher
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Example
original: i n m e t r o
ciphered: L Q P H W U R
Caesar Cipher (Substitution Cipher)
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Example 1:
key: i n m e t r o i n m e t r o i n
original: w e w e r e d i s c o v e r e d
ciphered: E R I I K V R Q F O S O V F M Q
Example 2:
key: d i m e l d i m e l d i m e l d
original: w e w e r e d i s c o v e r e d
ciphered: Z M I I C H L U W N R D Q V P G
Vigenere Cipher (Substitution Cipher)
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Vigenere Cipher (Substitution Cipher)
For a layman, the Vigenere cipher seems unbreakable.
In fact, an article in Scientific American, in 1917, considered the
Vigenere cipher impossible to be broken.
Now, less than a century later, Vigenere cipher is completely
breakable.
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Transposition Cipher
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original:
we recovered the money, but we lost two men.
key: i n m e t r o
columns: w e r e c o v
e r e d t h e
m o n e y b u
t w e l o s t
t w o m e n z
ciphered: edelm wemtt reneo eroww veutz ohbsn ctyoe
Transposition Cipher
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Substitution and Transposition
to reach
Diffusion and Confusion
Apply many rounds of substitution and transposition to reach
diffusion and confusion.
Diffusion and confusion: two
concepts introduced by
Claude Shannon.
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Diffusion and Confusion
Confusion
Formal: It refers to making the relationship between the
ciphered message and the symmetric key as complex and
involved as possible.
Informal: It obscures the relationship between the original
message and ciphered message.
Diffusion
Formal: It refers to dissipating the statistical structure of
original message over bulk of ciphered message.
Informal: Each change in the original message or key affects
many parts of the ciphered message. (Avalanche Effect)
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Cryptography – Conventional Model
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
secure channel
attacker
M MC C
K K
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Conventional Model
The same key used to cipher the message must be used to
decipher. Because of this, the conventional model was called
symmetric cryptography.
Then we have the first problem, the emitter and the receiver
must agree which key will be used.
If there is the possibility of personal and physical meeting,
sharing the key can be safely performed. But the secure
channel always was the weakest part.
Is another way of cryptography possible?
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Conventional Model
Is another way of cryptography possible? Is there an
asymmetric cryptography?
The response to this question became the Holy Grail of
Cryptology.
The scientific community had given up looking for this
response, classifying the problem as unsolvable.
Only fools would insist on such nonsense.
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“The Fools”
Ralph Mekle – Martin Hellman – Whitfield Diffie
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“The Fools”
Whitfield Diffie – Martin Hellman
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The New Model
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman published their famous article “New
Directions in Cryptography”.
The article begins with “We stand today on the brink of a
revolution in cryptography”.
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The New Model
The article deals with three problems:
- key exchange
- asymmetric cryptography
- digital signature
But the article presents solution only for the key exchange
problem.
Diffie and Hellman couldn't solve the other two problems.
But it doesn't matter! They broke the paradigm!
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The New Model
They couldn't open the door, but they pointed the right door.
In fact, the two problems were resolved one year later, in 1977.
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The RSA arises!
Shamir – Rivest – Adleman
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Asymmetric Cryptography
Since the beginning of Cryptology to modern times, almost all
cryptographic systems had been based on elementary tools of
substitution and permutation.
Asymmetric cryptography has changed this paradigm, because
it's based on mathematical functions.
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Asymmetric Cryptography
Diffie and Hellman algorithm has its strength based on the
difficulty to solve the discrete logarithm problem (DLP).
Whilst RSA algorithm has its strength based on the difficulty to
factorize big numbers.
Wait a moment! Why are those problems so difficult?
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Computational Complexity
In computer science we use techniques to predict how much
time a problem will take.
These main terms are used to express time growth:
Logarithmic growth
Linear growth
Polynomial growth
Exponencial growth
So the DLP and factorization of big numbers are examples of
exponential growth.
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Asymmetric Cryptography – Confidentiality
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
attacker
M C MC
Kpub Kpri
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Asymmetric Cryptography – Non-repudiation
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
attacker
M C MC
Kpri Kpub
M
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Asymmetric Cryptography – Non-repudiation
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
attacker
M C MC
Kpri Kpub
M
This is the basis for Digital Signature.
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Why the conventional model does not provide
non-repudiation?
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
secure channel
attacker
M MC C
K K
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Why the conventional model does not provide
non-repudiation?
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
secure channel
attacker
M MC C
K K
It provides protection against third party
forgeries, but do not protect against
contests between transmitter and receiver.
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Confidentiality X Authentication
Only with private/public key schemes is possible to solve the
problem of dispute between transmitter and receiver.
In fact, without asymmetric cryptography the electronic
commerce would not exist.
“The problem of authentication is perhaps an even more
serious barrier to the universal adoption of telecomrnunications
for business transactions than the problem of key distribution.
Authentication is at the heart of any system involving contracts
and billing. Without it, business cannot function.” (DH, New
Directions in Cryptography)
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avoiding mistakes
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first common mistake
1) Asymmetric cryptography is safer than symmetric
cryptography.
The security of any cryptographic scheme depends on the size
of the key and the computational work involved to break the
cipher.
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second common mistake
2) Asymmetric cryptography made symmetric cryptography
obsolete.
Due to the computational overhead of asymmetric cryptography,
symmetric cryptography is still far from becoming obsolete.
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Digital Signature
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Digital Signature
Digital signature is the apex of asymmetric cryptography.
It is the most refined service provided by modern cryptology.
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Asymmetric Cryptography – Non-repudiation
emitter receivercipher decipher
key
source
attacker
M C MC
Kpri Kpub
M
This is the basis for Digital Signature.
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Digital Signature
signer
verifiercipher decipher
key
source
attackerM
C HC
Kpri Kpub
Hash
H
Hash
H'
M M'
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Cryptology at Inmetro
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Cryptology at Inmetro
Cryptology at Inmetro is in its beginning.
The group for security of software and hardware in measuring
instruments is new.
We foresee to use cryptology in many applications.
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The Two Biggest Problems
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Second Big Problem
Brazil is a huge country!
More than 70 million electric energy measuring instruments in
the field.
How to control the software version in this kind of instrument in
the field?
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Second Big Problem
Brazil is a huge country!
More than 70 million electric energy measuring instruments in
the field.
How to control the software version in this kind of instrument in
the field?
Solution devised by Inmetro: Digital Signature of the binary file
corresponding to the approved software version.
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ACryptology at Inmetro
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First Big Problem
Brazil has more than 200.000 fuel dispensers.
A lot of frauds.
How to protect fuel dispensers against frauds?
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First Big Problem
Brazil has more than 200.000 of fuel dispensers.
A lot of frauds.
How to protect fuel dispensers against frauds?
Solution devised by Inmetro: Digital Signature of measuring
data for each output.
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Questions to answer
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Shall we build a peculiar PKI (Public Key Infrastructure): a
metrological PKI?
If so, then must Inmetro be the TTD (Trusted Third Party)?
Can we associate cryptographic levels to risk levels?
Can we simplify the process of Digital Signature?
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Obrigado!

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Cryptology - Antônio Lacerda

  • 1. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Antônio Lacerda Researcher – Inmetro Cryptology
  • 2. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Antônio Lacerda Inmetro's Researcher Cryptography used to be an obscure science, of little relevance to everyday life. Historically, it always had a special role in military and diplomatic communications. It's time for cryptography to step out of the shadows of spies and the military, and step into the sunshine and be embraced by the rest of us. (The Code Book, Simon Singh)
  • 3. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Emitter Receiver Communication Channel Normal Flow of Communication
  • 4. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal What is Cryptology?
  • 5. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptology is the science whose goal is to protect communication against intentional and not allowed interferences. Cryptology is supported by several other areas: mathematics, computer science, physics, psychologhy, philolgy etc. Is Cryptology a branch of mathematics? I disagree!
  • 6. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptology is a new old science! Old because it is a millennial science. In fact, “protection of sensitive information is a desire reaching back to the beginnings of human culture” (Otto Horak). New because the first time we saw an announced lecture series under the open title “Cryptology” took place in German in 1981. Before this, the few ones took place under the name “Special Problems of Information Theory”.
  • 7. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptology is divided in two (or four) subareas: - Cryptography (and its counterparty: cryptanalysis) - Steganography (and its counterparty: steganalysis) From Greek: - kryptos = hidden - steganos = covered
  • 8. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptography aims to protect the communication in a insecure channel. Emitter Receiver Insecure Communication Channel Cryptanalisys aims to break the cryptography.
  • 9. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Steganography aims to protect the existence of the communication. Emitter Receiver Communication Channel Steganalisys aims to break the steganography and to discover the existence of the communication.
  • 10. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptography: overt secret writing Steganography: covert secret writing
  • 11. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Steganography
  • 12. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal What is steganography? Part of Cryptology involving knowledge and techniques to hide or to camouflage a message inside another.
  • 13. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Steganography Steganography
  • 14. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Steganography by kids: Inglourious Bastards Notting Hill Mission: Impossible Edward Scissorhands True Lies Raiders of the Lost Ark October Sky
  • 15. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Steganography by kids: Inglourious Bastards Notting Hill Mission: Impossible Edward Scissorhands True Lies Raiders of the Lost Ark October Sky
  • 16. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Ancient steganography: - Tattooed messages on head of messengers. - Messages in stomach of hunted animals. - Messages on wood logs covered with wax.
  • 17. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Modern steganography: - Invisible inks. - Microdots. - LSB (Least Significant Bit). - Covert channels.
  • 18. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Modern steganography: Invisible ink
  • 19. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptography
  • 20. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal What is cryptography? Part of cryptology involving knowledge and techniques to transform information in its original form into an illegible form, so that only the emitter and receiver can access the original content by using a secret.
  • 21. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Services provided by Cryptography: - Confidentiality: To allow access only to authorized people. - Integrity: To assure that the content of the message was not modified. - Authenticity: To assure that the emitter and receiver are who they claim they are. - Non-repudiation (non-retractability): The emitter cannot deny he is the message sender.
  • 22. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Attention There isn't an algorithm that is capable to provide all cryptographic services. For each service, you will need one or more algorithms.
  • 23. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Attacks to communication
  • 24. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Emitter Receiver Communication Channel Again: Normal Flow of Communication Every modification in normal flow not allowed by emitter or receiver is an attack.
  • 25. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Interception The attacker has access to the content of the message. Interception is an attack against confidentiality. Emitter Receiver Attacker
  • 26. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Modification The attacker has access to the content of the message, furthermore he/she modify the content of the message. Modification is an attack against integrity. Emitter Receiver Attacker
  • 27. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Fabrication The attacker yields a message and send it to the receiver, inserting counterfeit data. Fabrication is an attack against authenticity. Emitter Receiver Attacker
  • 28. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Interruption The attacker interrupts the communication. Interruption is an attack against availability. Cryptology is useless in this case! Emitter Receiver Attacker
  • 29. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Integrity
  • 30. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Modification The attacker has access to the content of the message, furthermore he/she modify the content of the message. Modification is an attack against integrity. Emitter Receiver Attacker
  • 31. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal How to guarantee the integrity of a message against intentional modification? Answer: Hash Function. Integrity
  • 32. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal In Portuguese: Substantivo 1 - Prato feito de carne moída misturada com batata assada ou frita. 2 - Bagunça, confusão. Verbo 1 - Cortar em pequenos pedaços. 2 - Misturar, confundir. What does “hash” means? In English: Noun 1 - A dish of chopped meat, potatoes, and sometimes vegetables, usually browned. 2 - Mess, confusion. Verb 1 - To chop into pieces. 2 - To mix or mess up
  • 33. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal In Portuguese: função de confusão (strange!) função de dispersão (it sounds better!) função hash (it's more common.) So what does “hash function” means?
  • 34. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal It receives as input a sequence of bits, of any size (can be a character, a string, or even a file) and generates another sequence of bits of fixed length, called hash or digest. The digest works as a security seal, because a simple change in one of the input bits completely changes the original digest. A hash function is a one-way function. That is, it's not possible to recover the original message from the digest. Hash Function
  • 35. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Nonsense!? If the original data can not be recovered from the digest, then why use hash functions? Although it seems contradictory, it's exactly because this feature that hash functions are so useful. Hash Function
  • 36. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal MD5 (Message-Digest algorithm 5): Algorithm of 128 bits developd in 1991 by Ron Rivest. SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm): A family of algorithms developed by NIST and NSA. Whirlpool: Algorithm developed by Paulo Barreto (USP) and Vincent Rijmen (co-author of AES). Some very known Hash Functions
  • 37. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal MD5("Inmetro") = 0101001111101001000011010111000 101011110001000000101100110100010111100101111100 0010101110010100111000111010110011001001001010100 MD5("inmetro") = 0101101100110000101010010001100 110110111001001111101000011110000100110100000011 1100110101000000001100100101111011111100000010110 An example with MD5
  • 38. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Bits 001-032: 0101.0011.1110.1001.0000.1101.0111.0001 Bits 001-032: 0101.1011.0011.0000.1010.1001.0001.1001 Bits 033-064: 0101.1110.0010.0000.0101.1001.1010.0010 Bits 033-064: 1011.0111.0010.0111.1101.0000.1111.0000 Bits 065-096: 1111.0010.1111.1000.0101.0111.0010.1001 Bits 065-096: 1001.1010.0000.0111.1001.1010.1000.0000 Bits 097-128: 1100.0111.0101.1001.1001.0010.0101.0100 Bits 097-128: 0110.0100.1011.1101.1111.1000.0001.0110 Result: 59 bits changed. 46% of bits affected. (Avalanche Effect) An example with MD5
  • 39. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Confidentiality
  • 40. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Interception The attacker has access to the content of the message. Interception is an attack against confidentiality. Emitter Receiver Attacker
  • 41. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Confidentiality was the first service provided by Cryptology. It can be reached by ciphers and codes. Confidentiality
  • 42. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Contrary to layman's perception, code and cipher are not synonymous. Cipher is a manipulation in the representation of the message. Code is a manipulation in the meaning of the message. Cipher X Code
  • 43. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Confidentiality by Code
  • 44. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Replace each word or phrase in the original message with another character or symbol (or a set of them). The list of replacements is contained in a codebook. Code is not flexible. If a codebook is leaked, then the emitter and receiver must re-writing the entire codebook. Code
  • 45. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Morse code NATO phonetic code Q code Bar code QR code Examples of Public Codes
  • 46. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Famous example: Zimmermann Telegram Arthur Zimmermann, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the German Empire, sent a telegram to the German ambassador in Mexico, asking him to propose an alliance to Mexico's president to attack the USA. The aim was to force the USA to the World War I.
  • 47. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Famous example: Zimmermann Telegram The telegram is not ciphered; it is coded.
  • 48. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Famous example: Zimmermann Telegram
  • 49. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal The Zimmermann telegram was decoded by famous “Room 40”. Room 40 ↓ Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) ↓ Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
  • 50. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal
  • 51. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Confidentiality by Cipher
  • 52. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Imagine you have a message well represented. Then you “mess” this representation in a pre-defined mean that permit you recover the message in its original representation. The pre-defined mean is called algorithm. Another input to this algorithm is the key. The key is the flexible part of a cipher. Cipher
  • 53. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Remember: Code is not flexible. If a codebook is leaked, then the emitter and receiver must re-writing the entire codebook. If a cipher key is leaked, then emitter and receiver must choose another key without changing the algorithm. Cipher X Code
  • 54. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cipher Cipher
  • 55. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Code Code
  • 56. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Decipher Decipher
  • 57. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Decode Decode
  • 58. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Actor Action Input Emitter cipher key code codebook Receiver decipher key decode codebook Attacker cryptanalyze (or break) - - - Encrypt = cipher or code. Decrypt = decipher or decode.
  • 59. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Substitution Cipher
  • 60. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Example original: i n m e t r o ciphered: L Q P H W U R Caesar Cipher (Substitution Cipher)
  • 61. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Example 1: key: i n m e t r o i n m e t r o i n original: w e w e r e d i s c o v e r e d ciphered: E R I I K V R Q F O S O V F M Q Example 2: key: d i m e l d i m e l d i m e l d original: w e w e r e d i s c o v e r e d ciphered: Z M I I C H L U W N R D Q V P G Vigenere Cipher (Substitution Cipher)
  • 62. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal
  • 63. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Vigenere Cipher (Substitution Cipher) For a layman, the Vigenere cipher seems unbreakable. In fact, an article in Scientific American, in 1917, considered the Vigenere cipher impossible to be broken. Now, less than a century later, Vigenere cipher is completely breakable.
  • 64. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Transposition Cipher
  • 65. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal original: we recovered the money, but we lost two men. key: i n m e t r o columns: w e r e c o v e r e d t h e m o n e y b u t w e l o s t t w o m e n z ciphered: edelm wemtt reneo eroww veutz ohbsn ctyoe Transposition Cipher
  • 66. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Substitution and Transposition to reach Diffusion and Confusion Apply many rounds of substitution and transposition to reach diffusion and confusion. Diffusion and confusion: two concepts introduced by Claude Shannon.
  • 67. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Diffusion and Confusion Confusion Formal: It refers to making the relationship between the ciphered message and the symmetric key as complex and involved as possible. Informal: It obscures the relationship between the original message and ciphered message. Diffusion Formal: It refers to dissipating the statistical structure of original message over bulk of ciphered message. Informal: Each change in the original message or key affects many parts of the ciphered message. (Avalanche Effect)
  • 68. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptography – Conventional Model emitter receivercipher decipher key source secure channel attacker M MC C K K
  • 69. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Conventional Model The same key used to cipher the message must be used to decipher. Because of this, the conventional model was called symmetric cryptography. Then we have the first problem, the emitter and the receiver must agree which key will be used. If there is the possibility of personal and physical meeting, sharing the key can be safely performed. But the secure channel always was the weakest part. Is another way of cryptography possible?
  • 70. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Conventional Model Is another way of cryptography possible? Is there an asymmetric cryptography? The response to this question became the Holy Grail of Cryptology. The scientific community had given up looking for this response, classifying the problem as unsolvable. Only fools would insist on such nonsense.
  • 71. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal “The Fools” Ralph Mekle – Martin Hellman – Whitfield Diffie
  • 72. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal “The Fools” Whitfield Diffie – Martin Hellman
  • 73. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal The New Model In 1976, Diffie and Hellman published their famous article “New Directions in Cryptography”. The article begins with “We stand today on the brink of a revolution in cryptography”.
  • 74. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal The New Model The article deals with three problems: - key exchange - asymmetric cryptography - digital signature But the article presents solution only for the key exchange problem. Diffie and Hellman couldn't solve the other two problems. But it doesn't matter! They broke the paradigm!
  • 75. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal The New Model They couldn't open the door, but they pointed the right door. In fact, the two problems were resolved one year later, in 1977.
  • 76. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal The RSA arises! Shamir – Rivest – Adleman
  • 77. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Asymmetric Cryptography Since the beginning of Cryptology to modern times, almost all cryptographic systems had been based on elementary tools of substitution and permutation. Asymmetric cryptography has changed this paradigm, because it's based on mathematical functions.
  • 78. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Asymmetric Cryptography Diffie and Hellman algorithm has its strength based on the difficulty to solve the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Whilst RSA algorithm has its strength based on the difficulty to factorize big numbers. Wait a moment! Why are those problems so difficult?
  • 79. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Computational Complexity In computer science we use techniques to predict how much time a problem will take. These main terms are used to express time growth: Logarithmic growth Linear growth Polynomial growth Exponencial growth So the DLP and factorization of big numbers are examples of exponential growth.
  • 80. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Asymmetric Cryptography – Confidentiality emitter receivercipher decipher key source attacker M C MC Kpub Kpri
  • 81. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Asymmetric Cryptography – Non-repudiation emitter receivercipher decipher key source attacker M C MC Kpri Kpub M
  • 82. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Asymmetric Cryptography – Non-repudiation emitter receivercipher decipher key source attacker M C MC Kpri Kpub M This is the basis for Digital Signature.
  • 83. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Why the conventional model does not provide non-repudiation? emitter receivercipher decipher key source secure channel attacker M MC C K K
  • 84. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Why the conventional model does not provide non-repudiation? emitter receivercipher decipher key source secure channel attacker M MC C K K It provides protection against third party forgeries, but do not protect against contests between transmitter and receiver.
  • 85. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Confidentiality X Authentication Only with private/public key schemes is possible to solve the problem of dispute between transmitter and receiver. In fact, without asymmetric cryptography the electronic commerce would not exist. “The problem of authentication is perhaps an even more serious barrier to the universal adoption of telecomrnunications for business transactions than the problem of key distribution. Authentication is at the heart of any system involving contracts and billing. Without it, business cannot function.” (DH, New Directions in Cryptography)
  • 86. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal avoiding mistakes
  • 87. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal first common mistake 1) Asymmetric cryptography is safer than symmetric cryptography. The security of any cryptographic scheme depends on the size of the key and the computational work involved to break the cipher.
  • 88. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal second common mistake 2) Asymmetric cryptography made symmetric cryptography obsolete. Due to the computational overhead of asymmetric cryptography, symmetric cryptography is still far from becoming obsolete.
  • 89. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Digital Signature
  • 90. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Digital Signature Digital signature is the apex of asymmetric cryptography. It is the most refined service provided by modern cryptology.
  • 91. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Asymmetric Cryptography – Non-repudiation emitter receivercipher decipher key source attacker M C MC Kpri Kpub M This is the basis for Digital Signature.
  • 92. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Digital Signature signer verifiercipher decipher key source attackerM C HC Kpri Kpub Hash H Hash H' M M'
  • 93. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptology at Inmetro
  • 94. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Cryptology at Inmetro Cryptology at Inmetro is in its beginning. The group for security of software and hardware in measuring instruments is new. We foresee to use cryptology in many applications.
  • 95. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal The Two Biggest Problems
  • 96. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Second Big Problem Brazil is a huge country! More than 70 million electric energy measuring instruments in the field. How to control the software version in this kind of instrument in the field?
  • 97. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Second Big Problem Brazil is a huge country! More than 70 million electric energy measuring instruments in the field. How to control the software version in this kind of instrument in the field? Solution devised by Inmetro: Digital Signature of the binary file corresponding to the approved software version.
  • 98. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal ACryptology at Inmetro
  • 99. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal First Big Problem Brazil has more than 200.000 fuel dispensers. A lot of frauds. How to protect fuel dispensers against frauds?
  • 100. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal First Big Problem Brazil has more than 200.000 of fuel dispensers. A lot of frauds. How to protect fuel dispensers against frauds? Solution devised by Inmetro: Digital Signature of measuring data for each output.
  • 101. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Questions to answer
  • 102. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Shall we build a peculiar PKI (Public Key Infrastructure): a metrological PKI? If so, then must Inmetro be the TTD (Trusted Third Party)? Can we associate cryptographic levels to risk levels? Can we simplify the process of Digital Signature?
  • 103. I Workshop Interamericano de Segurança de Software e Hardware em Metrologia Legal Obrigado!