This document discusses realist perspectives on alliances, arms control, and the balance of power. Realists believe states should prepare for war to maintain peace, remain vigilant as other states cannot be fully trusted, and avoid moralizing as standards only apply to individuals, not states. Alliances can increase military capabilities but also entangle states in others' disputes. Arms control is difficult as agreements only work where not needed and some weapons prevent wars but increase destructiveness. Maintaining a balance of power through deterrence of potential aggressors is ideal but information is imperfect and worst-case thinking can spark arms races.
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Realist Road to Security Assumptions
and Policy Recommendations
Realist Policy Prescriptions Premises
Prepare for war: If you want peace, prepare for war.
Remain vigilant: No state is to be trusted further than
its national interest.
Avoid moralism: Standards of right and wrong apply to
individuals, but not states.
Remain involved and actively
intervene:
Isolationism is not an alternative to
active global involvement.
Protect with arms: Strive to increase military
capabilities; fight rather than submit.
Preserve the balance of power: Do not let any other state or coalition
become dominant.
Prevent arms races from resulting in
military inferiority with rivals:
Negotiate agreements with
competitors to maintain a favorable
military balance.
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Alliances
Two or more states combine military
capabilities; formal agreements to
coordinate behavior
Increase deterrence
Increased defense capabilities
Allies don’t ally with enemies
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Realist Criticisms
of Alliances (1 of 2)
Can increase capabilities of aggressive
states
Provoke formation of counter-alliances
Can draw in otherwise neutral states
Must try to control behavior of allies
Today’s ally may be tomorrow’s enemy
Foreclose options
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Realist Criticisms
of Alliances (2 of 2)
Reduce adaptability
Eliminate bargaining advantages that come
from ambiguity
Provoke fears of adversaries
Entangle states in disputes of allies
Stimulate envy of states outside
the alliance
Preserves existing rivalries
But alliances can still be useful
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Balance of Power
Peace most likely to be maintained when
military power is distributed so that no
single power or bloc can dominate
An ambiguous concept
Weakness invites attack, so countervailing
power must be used to deter potential
aggressors
Size principle: competing alliances are
roughly equal in power
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Rules for an Effective
Balancing Process
Stay vigilant—identify potential
threats and opportunities
Seek allies when you cannot match the
armaments of an adversary
Remain flexible in making alliances
Oppose any state that seeks hegemony
Be moderate in victory
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Criticisms of
Balance of Power Theory
The theory’s rules are contradictory
It assumes that policymakers possess
accurate, timely information about
other states
The tendency of defense planners to engage
in worst-case scenario planning can spark
an arms race.
It assumes that decision makers are
risk averse
It has not been effective
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Alternatives to Balance
of Power
Hegemonic Stability Theory
A concert of great powers
• Common sense of duty
• Normative consensus is fragile
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The Causes of War
Realism-systemic; anarchic
nature of the system
Capitalism and War
Free Trade and Peace
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State Level and Sub-State
Level Theories of War
Regime Type
Expected Utility Theory
Aggressive States
Imperialist States
Nationalism
War as a Diversion
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Individual Level Theories
Human Aggression
Theory of Natural Selection
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Individual Leaders: Madmen
and Megalomaniacs
Will to power of Adolph Hitler
Misperceptions
―The Fog of War‖
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Disagreement About Three
Different Main Causes
Causes as permissive conditions: reasons
why war is possible: especially prominent
in realist theory.
General sources of conflict: also known as
the underlying causes of war. This notion of
cause is found in many theories at the
systemic and state level.
Causes as decisions to initiate war,
especially prominent at the state and
individual levels.
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Arms Control
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM)
SALT I and SALT II
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
The Campaign to Ban Landmines
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Limits to Arms Control
Skeptics say it only works where it is
not needed.
Some weapons may help prevent
wars, but increase destructiveness.
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Arms Agreements
Arms control vs. disarmament
Bilateral agreements
Multilateral agreements
Possibilities for cooperation are low
• Prisoner’s Dilemma
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Caging the Nuclear Threat:
The Negotiated Control and Reduction of
Deployed Strategic U.S. and Russian
Warheads
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Balance of Power Models
Unipolarity
• United States just after World War II
• United States now?
Bipolarity
• United States/Soviet Union 1949–1989
• NATO–Warsaw Pact
• Extended deterrence
Multipolarity
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Future Multipolarity?
United States
China
Russia
European Union
Japan
Brazil
India
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Web Links
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
(CNS)
Federation of American Scientists
International Relations and Security
Network
NATO
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Notas do Editor
Realists believe that power has driven world politics throughout history, and place a premium on military security in shaping foreign policy.
Bandwagoning: the tendency for weak states to seek alliance with the stronger power, regardless of ideology, in order to increase security
Hegemony: the ability of one state to lead in world politics by promoting its worldviewruling over arrangements governing international economics and politics
The exact meaning of the balance of power is controversial, but generally speaking, it includes the idea that national security is enhanced when military capabilities are widely distributed, not held by primarily one state. It is believed that if one state gains overwhelming power, it will attack its weaker neighbors, causing an incentive for a defensive coalition.
One major cost that a hegemon must pay is to open its own market to less-expensive imported goods even if other countries do not open their markets. International cooperation is hard to maintain.
Expected utility theory is one type of the ideal foreign-policy model known as the rational action model.
Zeitgeist isthe “spirit of the times,” or the dominant cultural norms influencing people living in a particular time period.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is viewed as hypocritical by countries such as Iran and North Korea because it “approves” the possession of nuclear weapons in the U.S., Russia, China, Great Britain and France, while denying it to all others.
Prisoner’s Dilemma: (from game theory) a non-zero-sum situation in which two prisoners have incentives to cooperate, and if they do, both will benefit. However, if one defects, both will suffer.
The United States also currently holds a significant amount of soft power as a hub of global communication and popular culture, with the means to spread its values throughout the world. The combination of military, economic and cultural power gives the U.S. extraordinary ability to shape world events.
In multipolar systems, power appears on two playing fields: military and economic. Major players will align where issues intersect.