SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 9
Baixar para ler offline
Azevedo
                                                                                 Page 1 of 9

In the Venezuela case study, what are the policy options available to the United
States? Of these alternatives, which one is most likely to be selected, and why? What
potential changes in the International Political System (IPS), Domestic Political
System (DPS) or National Security System (NSS) would cause the selection of
another alternative? Identify which alternative(s) these changes would favor.

       Before listing courses of action and selecting one, it is important to understand the

decision making scenario presented by the case study.

                                      Background

       The territory occupied today by Venezuela was part of the great Spanish colony in

America. Simón Bolívar, leader of the South American movement for independence from

Spain, was a Venezuelan. Independent since 1830, Venezuela was ruled in various

occasions by authoritarian regimes until 1958.

       The country, which was one of the founding members of the Organization

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has huge oil reserves and its economy is almost

completely dependent on it.

       The mismanagement of the money from oil by the government and weak

institutions was largely responsible for the inequality between classes in Venezuelan

society. This situation made possible the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Waving the

anti-corruption flag, the former Army Officer and leader of a failed attempt of coup in

1992 managed to convince the poor majority that his government would represent a

change for the better.

       During Chavez government, a new constitution was promulgated and the

president was allowed to legislate on a range of political and economic issues. Chavez

confronted Washington with his concept of Bolivarian Revolution (named after Simón

Bolívar) which is marked by anti-U.S. rhetoric and stronger ties with Fidel Castro among
Azevedo
                                                                                      Page 2 of 9

other unpopular leaders. He also politically survived a military coup in 2002, a general

strike in 2003 and recall referendum in August this year. In theory, he can remain in

power until 2011.

                                       Policy Options

       The situational factors of this case, discussed below, recommend looking at the

interactions within the Input/Output (I/O) Model through the lens of the rational actor

mainly. For that, the oil supply to the United States, the fight against terrorism and drug

trafficking and the stability in Latin America are the national interests at stake.

       Oil supply. Venezuela is one of the largest U.S. suppliers of crude oil and the

United States buys about two thirds of Venezuelan production. This interdependence is

reinforced by the fact that most of the refineries that can process Venezuelan oil in an

economic fashion are in U.S. territory.

       Despite the rhetoric attacks on the United States, so far Chavez has neither

imposed oil embargo nor signaled he is willing to nationalize foreign companies.

       OPEC did not change production and prices policy because of Chavez s urgings

to do so.

       The recent rise in the oil prices made it possible for Chavez to spend a lot of

money on his so-called social projects in order to defeat the recall vote and win the

elections for governors in October. His candidates won twenty of twenty-two states.

       Terror and drugs. The possibility of a Venezuela-Al Qaeda link, the country s

Muslim population and the unreliability of Venezuelan passports pose some threat to U.S.

homeland security.
Azevedo
                                                                                 Page 3 of 9

       If it is true that Chavez is not funding the narco-terrorist groups, the cooperation

between the two countries in fighting drug trafficking is essential because great part of

drugs in U.S. illegal market passed through Venezuelan territory.

       Regional stability. The way the United States changed from World War II Good

Neighbor policy on the region to Cold War interventionism caused a lot of resentment.

Different U.S. administrations either supported or turned a blind eye to coups d état and

to resulting authoritarian regimes as long as this helped to fight communism.

       After return to democracy and the end of Cold War, countries like Brazil and

Argentina followed the neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus and found

themselves immersed in stagnation and recession instead of sustainable economic

growth. Parties and individuals with Marxist background exploited this alleged

globalization failure to be elected and rule these countries. Once in power, their speech is

still filled with ideological content in order to impress the people but their acts are more

pragmatic and closer to market economy. A good example of that is the drive towards

regional economic integration, led by Brazil, which co-chairs the final phase of the Free

Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) negotiations with the United States and is campaigning

to be one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Another one

is the effort to convince other markets like China and European Union that the region is

economically attractive. In this South American context, Venezuelan oil does not play the

same strategic role as on the bilateral relations with the United States. The weight of

Venezuela is not enough to guarantee the export of the Bolivarian Revolution at

governmental level.
Azevedo
                                                                                  Page 4 of 9

       U.S. Department of Defense, Members of Congress and media sectors allege that

Chavez provides support to the Colombian narco-terrorist groups most notably the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de

Colombia in Spanish      FARC) in the border region. Chavez responds by accusing the

United States of political manipulation and by using the border problem as an excuse to

purchase arms from Russia. In cases like this, the media helps to make the worst-case

scenario to seem very likely. Maybe it is but it takes time. It is not just about paying for

fighters like MiG-29 and receiving them next day. Even in this hypothetical example,

fighters are useless without trained and qualified pilots.

       Another concern expressed by many in DPS and NSS is the connection between

Chavez and Castro, which is not much more than ideological. The current exchanges

between Cuba and Venezuela do not make them a Latin American version of the Axis of

Evil . Different from Cuba, Venezuela is an active participant of intergovernmental

organizations (IGO) like United Nations, Organization of American States (OAS) and

World Trade Organization (WTO).

       The policy options are the following, in order of descending likelihood:

         Bilateral diplomacy with increased intelligence activity

         Multilateral diplomacy

         Chavez isolation

         Military intervention

                        Why is bilateral diplomacy more likely?
Azevedo
                                                                                   Page 5 of 9

          The level of uncertainty in Venezuela is not as high as in other regions that supply

oil to the United States, namely the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and West

Africa.

          The most considerable uncertainty from Venezuela in this case is Hugo Chavez s

behavior. Individuals can be confused with the IPS state actors sometimes. Like Castro,

Chavez is one of them. Letting him remain in power after the recall referendum does not

suggest that the United States stopped seeing him as destabilizing influence . So far,

much of his confrontation with the United States is about rhetoric and ideology. It is

possible that he acts this way in order to get the support of the poor majority of

Venezuelan people by blaming everything that goes wrong on United States. This seems

to be part of the Caudillo Manual and the media takes care of the reverberation of the

bravados. Similar to Brazil, which is another important actor in the region, Venezuela has

not made major decisions against foreign interests in spite of the fact that the country is

theoretically ruled by a Marxist. The most serious disruption in oil supply since Chavez is

in office, for example, was not caused by any embargo but was a consequence of the

opposition-led general strike in 2003.

          In order to stick to his social agenda, he needs money for populist projects and

most of this money comes from oil revenues to the United States.

          Although Cuba is very sensitive issue of U.S. foreign police, Castro does not play

the same destabilizing role of years ago because of U.S. embargo and the end of the

Soviet Union. In another comparison with Brazil, Castro is a personal friend of President

Lula and of many others in the Brazilian government, the two countries maintain
Azevedo
                                                                                Page 6 of 9

exchanges similar in concept to the Venezuelan ones and this has not interfered at all

with the orthodox economic policies that the country has adhered to.

         A sound economic recovery is essential to solve most of the Latin American

problems such as social inequality, regional tensions and indigenous movements. The

actors    states and free trade IGOs   are getting more integrated and started negotiations

with both European Union and China. Venezuela is full member of the Andean

Community (Comunidad Andina in Spanish              CAN) and an associate member of

Southern Common Market (Mercado Comum do Cone Sul in Portuguese

MERCOSUL). This can undermine Chavez s self proclaimed independent foreign policy.

If he really wants Venezuela to be beneficiary of free trade, he needs either to

compromise control of economy or make it less subject to his mercurial temperament.

         It is probable that the economic situation will force Chavez to keep the

institutional stability needed for selling the product Venezuela.

         As seen during presidential campaign, Latin America is usually mentioned by the

different DPS and NSS actors when they address the illegal immigration problem.

Despite some effort from media and lawmakers, the debate about how to deal with

Chavez is not extensive and does not go deep into the problem. Solutions are not

proposed and the analysis is restricted to tagging the actors stances ( neo-con , moderate

and petro-friendly for example) and to polarization.

         Past the election and at the very beginning of the second term of Bush

administration, the impact from constituencies like Florida and interest groups like

Cuban-American community and multinational oil companies has much less effect on

NSS.
Azevedo
                                                                                  Page 7 of 9

       Unless the situation changes dramatically, it is unlikely that Venezuela will have a

greater influence on U.S. political environment. The fact that something like this

happened in 2003 does not mean that diplomacy must be discarded. On the contrary, it is

a good alternative for a country that has its military and intelligence overstrained around

the world in what is called Global War on Terror. Even with this restriction, intelligence

activities can collect and analyze data in order to provide early warning about Chavez s

decisions and to investigate the allegations of existing links between his government and

different narco-terrorist groups.

       For the reasons presented, to keep normal relations without becoming careless

with intelligence data gathering and analysis is the more likely policy option.

                     Potential changes and multilateral diplomacy

       The most likely changes are a new Chavez s attitude towards U.S. interests in

Venezuela (oil supply, companies and assets) and the finding of evidences of his support

to guerrilla-type nongovernmental organizations (NGO). In both scenarios, the policy

option to be adopted is multilateral diplomacy as it happened in the push for recall

referendum. During the 2002/2003 general strike, OAS sponsored the Brazilian initiative

called Friends of Venezuela Group . It was a provisional IGO, composed by the

United States, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain and Portugal, with the mission to break the

political stalemate and was welcomed by both Chavez and the opposition. The group

helped OAS and NGOs like Carter Center in the negotiations and in monitoring the

referendum.

       This alternative is more appropriate for damage control as shown in Haiti,

earlier this year, where U.S. Marines were relieved by the UN stabilization mission. It is
Azevedo
                                                                                 Page 8 of 9

not considered as first option to deal with Venezuela because this would bring an extra

issue to the already intricate network of regional negotiations such as FTAA, considering

everything else stable. It would also surrender part of the U.S. influence in the region to

OAS and Brazil, which is not desirable given the number of left-wing parties that are

governing countries of the region.

        Another reason for bringing other countries and organizations to the decision-

making process is to guarantee the legitimacy of any U.S. policy change in case the crisis

escalates. U.S. interventionist policy in the region during the Cold War is still a delicate

issue. Many in Latin America simply disregard U.S. statements about commitment with

democracy by the simple fact that they are not considered consistent with the help given

to dictators in exchange for suppressing communism in recent past. If its policy has any

sign of unilateral interference in the sovereignty of a country in the region, the United

States will not receive support.

        This option is flexible in the sense that U.S. policy can move back to the previous

one when the change effects cease or can become more aggressive if the confrontation

persists.

                                        Conclusion

        The existing contradictions in the relations between the United States and

Venezuela are resulting of the fact that both administrations are determined not to

concede to each other. The difference is that the Venezuelan foreign policy is practically

decided by Hugo Chavez while the U.S. policy is theoretically governed by a

sophisticated decision-making system.
Azevedo
                                                                                  Page 9 of 9

       Bearing this in mind and considering the way war on terror is being fought, it is

not likely that the United States will escalate problems with Venezuela instead of

disregarding the aggressive and confrontational Chavez s rhetoric. In case he decides to

put his ideology into practice, this is not going to happen in a split of second and the

connections within the region do not give him much leeway to implement it.

       The situation points in the direction of keeping normal relations with Venezuela

without compromise of U.S. values and interests. This policy also prevents Chaves from

gaining more popular support at the expense of the United States.

       If, by chance, Chavez sets a collision course for Venezuelan foreign policy in

relation to the United States or the regional stability, the response needs to be coordinated

with other countries and organizations. Unilateralism reminds this region of the Cold War

interventionism and the resulting anti-Americanism can jeopardize other U.S. interests.

       It is challenging to conduct a diplomatic policy when dealing with a foreign

leader who acts in such a provocative way and during wartime but it proves to be valid if

the risks involved are not considered high after the proper analysis of the situation

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...
UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY  : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY  : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...
UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...Keshav Prasad Bhattarai
 
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12John Paul Tabakian
 
POLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior Capstone
POLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior CapstonePOLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior Capstone
POLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior CapstoneDylan Jenks
 
Gobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa Criminal
Gobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa CriminalGobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa Criminal
Gobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa CriminalAngel Monagas
 
Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...
Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...
Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...James Darnbrook
 
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuelaJeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuelaRepentSinner
 
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuelaJeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuelaRepentSinner
 
The U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic Representation
The U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic RepresentationThe U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic Representation
The U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic Representationelegantbrain
 
PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST
PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST
PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST Keshav Prasad Bhattarai
 
A Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4S
A Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4SA Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4S
A Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4SSteve Didier
 
Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952
Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952
Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952Shane Snow
 
Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)
Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)
Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)Beth Frisby
 
2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup
2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup
2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela CoupVogelDenise
 
SYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS
SYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKSSYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS
SYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKSVogelDenise
 

Mais procurados (20)

Venezuela toward civil war
Venezuela toward civil warVenezuela toward civil war
Venezuela toward civil war
 
UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...
UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY  : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY  : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...
UNLEARNED LESSONS OF HISTORY : AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, LEBANON, AND SOME O...
 
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12
Tabakian Pols 7 Fall/Spring 2014 Power 12
 
POLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior Capstone
POLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior CapstonePOLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior Capstone
POLS 4701 - Dylan Jenks Political Science Senior Capstone
 
New Jersy 2015
New Jersy 2015New Jersy 2015
New Jersy 2015
 
Gobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa Criminal
Gobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa CriminalGobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa Criminal
Gobierno de Maduro Gran Empresa Criminal
 
Cadavid Analytical Paper
Cadavid Analytical PaperCadavid Analytical Paper
Cadavid Analytical Paper
 
Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...
Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...
Propensity for Intrastate Conflict in Four Carbon-Fuel Rich States. Measuring...
 
Deterring Democracy
Deterring DemocracyDeterring Democracy
Deterring Democracy
 
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuelaJeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
 
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuelaJeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
Jeb bush the early years - jeb bush's cia 'noc' work in venezuela
 
The U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic Representation
The U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic RepresentationThe U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic Representation
The U.S. Military Industrial Complex: A Diagrammatic Representation
 
Leadership change in china and usa
Leadership change in china and usaLeadership change in china and usa
Leadership change in china and usa
 
PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST
PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST
PUTIN PUTS IN WHEN NATO AND EU MOVE EAST
 
A Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4S
A Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4SA Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4S
A Report on the Safety of Mexico 2014 PP4S
 
Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952
Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952
Stage 2-1 Report on Guatemala 1952
 
Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)
Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)
Tracking the Birth Pains Weekly Newsletter (10/24/15)
 
2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup
2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup
2002 U.S. Press Release - FAILED Venezuela Coup
 
SYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS
SYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKSSYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS
SYRIA CRISIS (United States of America) CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS
 
Us-China relations
Us-China relationsUs-China relations
Us-China relations
 

Destaque (20)

Brazilian Ministry of Defence
Brazilian Ministry of DefenceBrazilian Ministry of Defence
Brazilian Ministry of Defence
 
Brazilian Ministry of Defence
Brazilian Ministry of DefenceBrazilian Ministry of Defence
Brazilian Ministry of Defence
 
Brasil e a marinha
Brasil e a marinhaBrasil e a marinha
Brasil e a marinha
 
Pre Deployment Leadership Training
Pre Deployment Leadership TrainingPre Deployment Leadership Training
Pre Deployment Leadership Training
 
Annapolis
AnnapolisAnnapolis
Annapolis
 
Clausewitz e a Guerra do Vietnã
Clausewitz e a Guerra do VietnãClausewitz e a Guerra do Vietnã
Clausewitz e a Guerra do Vietnã
 
Good neighbor 21
Good neighbor 21Good neighbor 21
Good neighbor 21
 
Rwanda
RwandaRwanda
Rwanda
 
Direito Internacional Bósnia
Direito Internacional BósniaDireito Internacional Bósnia
Direito Internacional Bósnia
 
CARTAS ELETRÔNICAS
CARTAS ELETRÔNICASCARTAS ELETRÔNICAS
CARTAS ELETRÔNICAS
 
NAV INERCIAL
NAV INERCIALNAV INERCIAL
NAV INERCIAL
 
ESCOLA NAVAL (english)
ESCOLA NAVAL (english)ESCOLA NAVAL (english)
ESCOLA NAVAL (english)
 
Grand strategy
Grand strategyGrand strategy
Grand strategy
 
FINAL PRESENTATION Final
FINAL PRESENTATION FinalFINAL PRESENTATION Final
FINAL PRESENTATION Final
 
Cargo ship componenet
Cargo ship componenetCargo ship componenet
Cargo ship componenet
 
Liderança em combate MB
Liderança em combate MBLiderança em combate MB
Liderança em combate MB
 
Lesson 11 LoPs And Fixes
Lesson 11 LoPs And FixesLesson 11 LoPs And Fixes
Lesson 11 LoPs And Fixes
 
A contribuição da Escola Naval para a formação de líderes em combate para a M...
A contribuição da Escola Naval para a formação de líderes em combate para a M...A contribuição da Escola Naval para a formação de líderes em combate para a M...
A contribuição da Escola Naval para a formação de líderes em combate para a M...
 
Lesson 13 Dr And Current Sailing
Lesson 13 Dr And Current SailingLesson 13 Dr And Current Sailing
Lesson 13 Dr And Current Sailing
 
Life on sailing ship
Life on sailing shipLife on sailing ship
Life on sailing ship
 

Semelhante a Venezuela

SOC300 Honors Case Profile (400 poi.docx
SOC300 Honors Case Profile                                (400 poi.docxSOC300 Honors Case Profile                                (400 poi.docx
SOC300 Honors Case Profile (400 poi.docxwhitneyleman54422
 
From socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuela
From socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuelaFrom socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuela
From socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuelaFernando Alcoforado
 
Modern latin america
Modern latin americaModern latin america
Modern latin americaTheSpiffman
 
Modern latin america
Modern latin americaModern latin america
Modern latin americaTheSpiffman
 
Modern latin america
Modern latin americaModern latin america
Modern latin americaTheSpiffman
 
VEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdf
VEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdfVEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdf
VEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdfJose Montana
 
Presentation 1.pptx
Presentation 1.pptxPresentation 1.pptx
Presentation 1.pptxJskekGejek
 
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12John Paul Tabakian
 
Venezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflict
Venezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflictVenezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflict
Venezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflictFernando Alcoforado
 
Political and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequences
Political and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequencesPolitical and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequences
Political and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequencesFernando Alcoforado
 
Internation Rel Midterm Paper
Internation Rel Midterm PaperInternation Rel Midterm Paper
Internation Rel Midterm PaperKRISTIKATE
 
Rev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay Submission
Rev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay SubmissionRev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay Submission
Rev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay SubmissionAnthony V. John
 
Final Project: Venezuela Situation
Final Project: Venezuela Situation Final Project: Venezuela Situation
Final Project: Venezuela Situation MireyaRosado1
 

Semelhante a Venezuela (16)

SOC300 Honors Case Profile (400 poi.docx
SOC300 Honors Case Profile                                (400 poi.docxSOC300 Honors Case Profile                                (400 poi.docx
SOC300 Honors Case Profile (400 poi.docx
 
Essay On Venezuela
Essay On VenezuelaEssay On Venezuela
Essay On Venezuela
 
From socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuela
From socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuelaFrom socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuela
From socialism of xxi century to social fascism in venezuela
 
Modern latin america
Modern latin americaModern latin america
Modern latin america
 
Modern latin america
Modern latin americaModern latin america
Modern latin america
 
Modern latin america
Modern latin americaModern latin america
Modern latin america
 
Venezuela crisis
Venezuela crisisVenezuela crisis
Venezuela crisis
 
VEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdf
VEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdfVEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdf
VEN WTH CHAVEZ.pdf
 
latin-america-2020 (1).pdf
latin-america-2020 (1).pdflatin-america-2020 (1).pdf
latin-america-2020 (1).pdf
 
Presentation 1.pptx
Presentation 1.pptxPresentation 1.pptx
Presentation 1.pptx
 
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12
Political Science 7 – International Relations - Power Point #12
 
Venezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflict
Venezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflictVenezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflict
Venezuela under the risk of civil war and international conflict
 
Political and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequences
Political and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequencesPolitical and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequences
Political and social convulsion in venezuela and its consequences
 
Internation Rel Midterm Paper
Internation Rel Midterm PaperInternation Rel Midterm Paper
Internation Rel Midterm Paper
 
Rev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay Submission
Rev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay SubmissionRev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay Submission
Rev. William F. Hartigan Medal - Essay Submission
 
Final Project: Venezuela Situation
Final Project: Venezuela Situation Final Project: Venezuela Situation
Final Project: Venezuela Situation
 

Mais de Guilherme Azevedo

Mais de Guilherme Azevedo (13)

A medida do tempo
A medida do tempoA medida do tempo
A medida do tempo
 
Lesson 6 Rt Procedures
Lesson 6 Rt ProceduresLesson 6 Rt Procedures
Lesson 6 Rt Procedures
 
Aids To Navigation
Aids To NavigationAids To Navigation
Aids To Navigation
 
Deck Equipment And Marlinespike Seamanship
Deck Equipment And Marlinespike SeamanshipDeck Equipment And Marlinespike Seamanship
Deck Equipment And Marlinespike Seamanship
 
Lesson 12 Navigational Instruments
Lesson 12 Navigational InstrumentsLesson 12 Navigational Instruments
Lesson 12 Navigational Instruments
 
Lesson 2 Deck Equipment And Marlinspike Seamanship
Lesson 2 Deck Equipment And Marlinspike SeamanshipLesson 2 Deck Equipment And Marlinspike Seamanship
Lesson 2 Deck Equipment And Marlinspike Seamanship
 
Lesson 10 Gyro And Magnetic Compass
Lesson 10   Gyro And Magnetic CompassLesson 10   Gyro And Magnetic Compass
Lesson 10 Gyro And Magnetic Compass
 
Lesson 14 Precise Piloting
Lesson 14 Precise PilotingLesson 14 Precise Piloting
Lesson 14 Precise Piloting
 
Lesson 1 Ship Characteristics
Lesson 1 Ship CharacteristicsLesson 1 Ship Characteristics
Lesson 1 Ship Characteristics
 
Lesson 8 - Navigation and time
Lesson 8 - Navigation and timeLesson 8 - Navigation and time
Lesson 8 - Navigation and time
 
RIPEAM
RIPEAMRIPEAM
RIPEAM
 
GMDSS
GMDSSGMDSS
GMDSS
 
NAV DOPPLER
NAV DOPPLERNAV DOPPLER
NAV DOPPLER
 

Último

Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...
Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...
Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...RKavithamani
 
Activity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdf
Activity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdfActivity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdf
Activity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdfciinovamais
 
mini mental status format.docx
mini    mental       status     format.docxmini    mental       status     format.docx
mini mental status format.docxPoojaSen20
 
Introduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher Education
Introduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher EducationIntroduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher Education
Introduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher Educationpboyjonauth
 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptxSOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptxiammrhaywood
 
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdfssuser54595a
 
Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...
Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...
Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...EduSkills OECD
 
Contemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptx
Contemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptxContemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptx
Contemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptxRoyAbrique
 
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and ModeMeasures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and ModeThiyagu K
 
Separation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and Actinides
Separation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and ActinidesSeparation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and Actinides
Separation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and ActinidesFatimaKhan178732
 
Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17
Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17
Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17Celine George
 
“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...
“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...
“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...Marc Dusseiller Dusjagr
 
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdfBASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdfSoniaTolstoy
 
Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...
Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...
Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...Krashi Coaching
 
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory InspectionMastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory InspectionSafetyChain Software
 
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot GraphZ Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot GraphThiyagu K
 
Arihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdf
Arihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdfArihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdf
Arihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdfchloefrazer622
 
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application )
Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  ) Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  )
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application ) Sakshi Ghasle
 

Último (20)

Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...
Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...
Privatization and Disinvestment - Meaning, Objectives, Advantages and Disadva...
 
Activity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdf
Activity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdfActivity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdf
Activity 01 - Artificial Culture (1).pdf
 
mini mental status format.docx
mini    mental       status     format.docxmini    mental       status     format.docx
mini mental status format.docx
 
Introduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher Education
Introduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher EducationIntroduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher Education
Introduction to ArtificiaI Intelligence in Higher Education
 
Código Creativo y Arte de Software | Unidad 1
Código Creativo y Arte de Software | Unidad 1Código Creativo y Arte de Software | Unidad 1
Código Creativo y Arte de Software | Unidad 1
 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptxSOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT - LFTVD.pptx
 
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
18-04-UA_REPORT_MEDIALITERAСY_INDEX-DM_23-1-final-eng.pdf
 
Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...
Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...
Presentation by Andreas Schleicher Tackling the School Absenteeism Crisis 30 ...
 
Contemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptx
Contemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptxContemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptx
Contemporary philippine arts from the regions_PPT_Module_12 [Autosaved] (1).pptx
 
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and ModeMeasures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
Measures of Central Tendency: Mean, Median and Mode
 
Separation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and Actinides
Separation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and ActinidesSeparation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and Actinides
Separation of Lanthanides/ Lanthanides and Actinides
 
Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17
Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17
Advanced Views - Calendar View in Odoo 17
 
Staff of Color (SOC) Retention Efforts DDSD
Staff of Color (SOC) Retention Efforts DDSDStaff of Color (SOC) Retention Efforts DDSD
Staff of Color (SOC) Retention Efforts DDSD
 
“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...
“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...
“Oh GOSH! Reflecting on Hackteria's Collaborative Practices in a Global Do-It...
 
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdfBASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK  LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
BASLIQ CURRENT LOOKBOOK LOOKBOOK(1) (1).pdf
 
Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...
Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...
Kisan Call Centre - To harness potential of ICT in Agriculture by answer farm...
 
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory InspectionMastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
Mastering the Unannounced Regulatory Inspection
 
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot GraphZ Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
Z Score,T Score, Percential Rank and Box Plot Graph
 
Arihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdf
Arihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdfArihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdf
Arihant handbook biology for class 11 .pdf
 
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application )
Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  ) Hybridoma Technology  ( Production , Purification , and Application  )
Hybridoma Technology ( Production , Purification , and Application )
 

Venezuela

  • 1. Azevedo Page 1 of 9 In the Venezuela case study, what are the policy options available to the United States? Of these alternatives, which one is most likely to be selected, and why? What potential changes in the International Political System (IPS), Domestic Political System (DPS) or National Security System (NSS) would cause the selection of another alternative? Identify which alternative(s) these changes would favor. Before listing courses of action and selecting one, it is important to understand the decision making scenario presented by the case study. Background The territory occupied today by Venezuela was part of the great Spanish colony in America. Simón Bolívar, leader of the South American movement for independence from Spain, was a Venezuelan. Independent since 1830, Venezuela was ruled in various occasions by authoritarian regimes until 1958. The country, which was one of the founding members of the Organization Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), has huge oil reserves and its economy is almost completely dependent on it. The mismanagement of the money from oil by the government and weak institutions was largely responsible for the inequality between classes in Venezuelan society. This situation made possible the election of Hugo Chavez in 1998. Waving the anti-corruption flag, the former Army Officer and leader of a failed attempt of coup in 1992 managed to convince the poor majority that his government would represent a change for the better. During Chavez government, a new constitution was promulgated and the president was allowed to legislate on a range of political and economic issues. Chavez confronted Washington with his concept of Bolivarian Revolution (named after Simón Bolívar) which is marked by anti-U.S. rhetoric and stronger ties with Fidel Castro among
  • 2. Azevedo Page 2 of 9 other unpopular leaders. He also politically survived a military coup in 2002, a general strike in 2003 and recall referendum in August this year. In theory, he can remain in power until 2011. Policy Options The situational factors of this case, discussed below, recommend looking at the interactions within the Input/Output (I/O) Model through the lens of the rational actor mainly. For that, the oil supply to the United States, the fight against terrorism and drug trafficking and the stability in Latin America are the national interests at stake. Oil supply. Venezuela is one of the largest U.S. suppliers of crude oil and the United States buys about two thirds of Venezuelan production. This interdependence is reinforced by the fact that most of the refineries that can process Venezuelan oil in an economic fashion are in U.S. territory. Despite the rhetoric attacks on the United States, so far Chavez has neither imposed oil embargo nor signaled he is willing to nationalize foreign companies. OPEC did not change production and prices policy because of Chavez s urgings to do so. The recent rise in the oil prices made it possible for Chavez to spend a lot of money on his so-called social projects in order to defeat the recall vote and win the elections for governors in October. His candidates won twenty of twenty-two states. Terror and drugs. The possibility of a Venezuela-Al Qaeda link, the country s Muslim population and the unreliability of Venezuelan passports pose some threat to U.S. homeland security.
  • 3. Azevedo Page 3 of 9 If it is true that Chavez is not funding the narco-terrorist groups, the cooperation between the two countries in fighting drug trafficking is essential because great part of drugs in U.S. illegal market passed through Venezuelan territory. Regional stability. The way the United States changed from World War II Good Neighbor policy on the region to Cold War interventionism caused a lot of resentment. Different U.S. administrations either supported or turned a blind eye to coups d état and to resulting authoritarian regimes as long as this helped to fight communism. After return to democracy and the end of Cold War, countries like Brazil and Argentina followed the neoliberal principles of the Washington Consensus and found themselves immersed in stagnation and recession instead of sustainable economic growth. Parties and individuals with Marxist background exploited this alleged globalization failure to be elected and rule these countries. Once in power, their speech is still filled with ideological content in order to impress the people but their acts are more pragmatic and closer to market economy. A good example of that is the drive towards regional economic integration, led by Brazil, which co-chairs the final phase of the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) negotiations with the United States and is campaigning to be one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Another one is the effort to convince other markets like China and European Union that the region is economically attractive. In this South American context, Venezuelan oil does not play the same strategic role as on the bilateral relations with the United States. The weight of Venezuela is not enough to guarantee the export of the Bolivarian Revolution at governmental level.
  • 4. Azevedo Page 4 of 9 U.S. Department of Defense, Members of Congress and media sectors allege that Chavez provides support to the Colombian narco-terrorist groups most notably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia in Spanish FARC) in the border region. Chavez responds by accusing the United States of political manipulation and by using the border problem as an excuse to purchase arms from Russia. In cases like this, the media helps to make the worst-case scenario to seem very likely. Maybe it is but it takes time. It is not just about paying for fighters like MiG-29 and receiving them next day. Even in this hypothetical example, fighters are useless without trained and qualified pilots. Another concern expressed by many in DPS and NSS is the connection between Chavez and Castro, which is not much more than ideological. The current exchanges between Cuba and Venezuela do not make them a Latin American version of the Axis of Evil . Different from Cuba, Venezuela is an active participant of intergovernmental organizations (IGO) like United Nations, Organization of American States (OAS) and World Trade Organization (WTO). The policy options are the following, in order of descending likelihood: Bilateral diplomacy with increased intelligence activity Multilateral diplomacy Chavez isolation Military intervention Why is bilateral diplomacy more likely?
  • 5. Azevedo Page 5 of 9 The level of uncertainty in Venezuela is not as high as in other regions that supply oil to the United States, namely the Middle East, the former Soviet Union and West Africa. The most considerable uncertainty from Venezuela in this case is Hugo Chavez s behavior. Individuals can be confused with the IPS state actors sometimes. Like Castro, Chavez is one of them. Letting him remain in power after the recall referendum does not suggest that the United States stopped seeing him as destabilizing influence . So far, much of his confrontation with the United States is about rhetoric and ideology. It is possible that he acts this way in order to get the support of the poor majority of Venezuelan people by blaming everything that goes wrong on United States. This seems to be part of the Caudillo Manual and the media takes care of the reverberation of the bravados. Similar to Brazil, which is another important actor in the region, Venezuela has not made major decisions against foreign interests in spite of the fact that the country is theoretically ruled by a Marxist. The most serious disruption in oil supply since Chavez is in office, for example, was not caused by any embargo but was a consequence of the opposition-led general strike in 2003. In order to stick to his social agenda, he needs money for populist projects and most of this money comes from oil revenues to the United States. Although Cuba is very sensitive issue of U.S. foreign police, Castro does not play the same destabilizing role of years ago because of U.S. embargo and the end of the Soviet Union. In another comparison with Brazil, Castro is a personal friend of President Lula and of many others in the Brazilian government, the two countries maintain
  • 6. Azevedo Page 6 of 9 exchanges similar in concept to the Venezuelan ones and this has not interfered at all with the orthodox economic policies that the country has adhered to. A sound economic recovery is essential to solve most of the Latin American problems such as social inequality, regional tensions and indigenous movements. The actors states and free trade IGOs are getting more integrated and started negotiations with both European Union and China. Venezuela is full member of the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina in Spanish CAN) and an associate member of Southern Common Market (Mercado Comum do Cone Sul in Portuguese MERCOSUL). This can undermine Chavez s self proclaimed independent foreign policy. If he really wants Venezuela to be beneficiary of free trade, he needs either to compromise control of economy or make it less subject to his mercurial temperament. It is probable that the economic situation will force Chavez to keep the institutional stability needed for selling the product Venezuela. As seen during presidential campaign, Latin America is usually mentioned by the different DPS and NSS actors when they address the illegal immigration problem. Despite some effort from media and lawmakers, the debate about how to deal with Chavez is not extensive and does not go deep into the problem. Solutions are not proposed and the analysis is restricted to tagging the actors stances ( neo-con , moderate and petro-friendly for example) and to polarization. Past the election and at the very beginning of the second term of Bush administration, the impact from constituencies like Florida and interest groups like Cuban-American community and multinational oil companies has much less effect on NSS.
  • 7. Azevedo Page 7 of 9 Unless the situation changes dramatically, it is unlikely that Venezuela will have a greater influence on U.S. political environment. The fact that something like this happened in 2003 does not mean that diplomacy must be discarded. On the contrary, it is a good alternative for a country that has its military and intelligence overstrained around the world in what is called Global War on Terror. Even with this restriction, intelligence activities can collect and analyze data in order to provide early warning about Chavez s decisions and to investigate the allegations of existing links between his government and different narco-terrorist groups. For the reasons presented, to keep normal relations without becoming careless with intelligence data gathering and analysis is the more likely policy option. Potential changes and multilateral diplomacy The most likely changes are a new Chavez s attitude towards U.S. interests in Venezuela (oil supply, companies and assets) and the finding of evidences of his support to guerrilla-type nongovernmental organizations (NGO). In both scenarios, the policy option to be adopted is multilateral diplomacy as it happened in the push for recall referendum. During the 2002/2003 general strike, OAS sponsored the Brazilian initiative called Friends of Venezuela Group . It was a provisional IGO, composed by the United States, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Spain and Portugal, with the mission to break the political stalemate and was welcomed by both Chavez and the opposition. The group helped OAS and NGOs like Carter Center in the negotiations and in monitoring the referendum. This alternative is more appropriate for damage control as shown in Haiti, earlier this year, where U.S. Marines were relieved by the UN stabilization mission. It is
  • 8. Azevedo Page 8 of 9 not considered as first option to deal with Venezuela because this would bring an extra issue to the already intricate network of regional negotiations such as FTAA, considering everything else stable. It would also surrender part of the U.S. influence in the region to OAS and Brazil, which is not desirable given the number of left-wing parties that are governing countries of the region. Another reason for bringing other countries and organizations to the decision- making process is to guarantee the legitimacy of any U.S. policy change in case the crisis escalates. U.S. interventionist policy in the region during the Cold War is still a delicate issue. Many in Latin America simply disregard U.S. statements about commitment with democracy by the simple fact that they are not considered consistent with the help given to dictators in exchange for suppressing communism in recent past. If its policy has any sign of unilateral interference in the sovereignty of a country in the region, the United States will not receive support. This option is flexible in the sense that U.S. policy can move back to the previous one when the change effects cease or can become more aggressive if the confrontation persists. Conclusion The existing contradictions in the relations between the United States and Venezuela are resulting of the fact that both administrations are determined not to concede to each other. The difference is that the Venezuelan foreign policy is practically decided by Hugo Chavez while the U.S. policy is theoretically governed by a sophisticated decision-making system.
  • 9. Azevedo Page 9 of 9 Bearing this in mind and considering the way war on terror is being fought, it is not likely that the United States will escalate problems with Venezuela instead of disregarding the aggressive and confrontational Chavez s rhetoric. In case he decides to put his ideology into practice, this is not going to happen in a split of second and the connections within the region do not give him much leeway to implement it. The situation points in the direction of keeping normal relations with Venezuela without compromise of U.S. values and interests. This policy also prevents Chaves from gaining more popular support at the expense of the United States. If, by chance, Chavez sets a collision course for Venezuelan foreign policy in relation to the United States or the regional stability, the response needs to be coordinated with other countries and organizations. Unilateralism reminds this region of the Cold War interventionism and the resulting anti-Americanism can jeopardize other U.S. interests. It is challenging to conduct a diplomatic policy when dealing with a foreign leader who acts in such a provocative way and during wartime but it proves to be valid if the risks involved are not considered high after the proper analysis of the situation