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Xenon Assurance Modifications to
Xen Code
     John McDermott, Naval Research Lab
Xenon
high-assurance

                      Prologue: Security
Xen




                 Strength of mechanism - any
                 conceptual flaws?
                 Assurance - any construction flaws?
Xenon
high-assurance

                        Prologue: Security
Xen




                 Security is always defined with respect
                 to a threat model.
                 A threat model has
                  threat
                  threat actor
                    capability
                    initial access
                    initial knowledge
Xenon
high-assurance

                       The Xenon Project
Xen




                 Project Goals:
                  What happens when you try to
                  develop high assurance open source?
                  Can you build a “separation kernel”
                  that supports unmodified
                  uninterpreted off-the-shelf soft ware,
                  on commodity hardware (e.g. x86_64
                  with APIC)?
Xenon
high-assurance

                            Xenon
Xen




         A “separation hyper visor”
         Not a separation kernel
         Not a “secure” replacement for Xen
         A new security-oriented product
         for specialized use
         See the Apr. ’07 slides at
         www.xen.org/xensummit
Xenon
high-assurance

                   The Xenon Prototype
Xen




            Based on 3.1
            Some features removed
            Only supports x86_64
            Refactored code
            Evidence package
Xenon
high-assurance

                              Simplicity
Xen




                 McCabe cyclomatic complexity
                 Halstead effort (sanity check)
                 Size (sanity check)
                 Xen 3.1 has approx. 3810 C
                 functions
                 Approx. 200 will have to be re-
                 factored
                 x86_emulate.c ?
Xenon
high-assurance

                 Simplicity: _evtchn_close
Xen




                                _evtchn_close - 3
                                _finish - 5
                                _chk_state - 3
                                _state_INTERDOMAIN - 17
          _evtchn_close - 34
                                _state_VIRQ - 3
                                _state_PIRQ - 2
                                _get_port - 6
                                _try_again - 3
                                _init_state - 1
Xenon
high-assurance
Xen


                 Modularity (cohesion)
                         PageAlloc
                 Xen

                 Xenon   PageAlloc

          Map            BootTime        RunTime

      XenHeap            DomHeap          Scrub

         Config            Trigger
Xenon
high-assurance

                 Encapsulating Global Data
Xen




       No global data allowed, e.g.
            v->vcpu_id
       Information hiding instead, e.g.
            loose: #define vcpu_id(v)
            strict: static inline int vcpu_id
Xenon
                  Strict encapsulation of vcpu:
high-assurance
Xen


                  schedule.c


                 get/set_vcpu_id
                 larger but just as fast
                 object size: 158744b vs. 157240b
                 sort test: 0.121s vs. 0.122s
                 search test: 0.836s vs. 0.854s
Xenon
high-assurance

                 Xenon Construction Guidelines
Xen




                 comments
                 PDL files
                 readme files
                 tool-based formatting
                 complexity, modularity, abstraction limits
                 logical completeness
                 coding practices
Xenon
high-assurance

                  Guidelines: Comments
Xen




           minimal
           don’t comment anything that could be
           understood in a first reading of the
           source
           assume the reader has a modern,
           program-slicing based source code
           browser, e.g. CodeSurfer
Xenon
high-assurance

                       Guidelines: PDL
Xen




          each source or header file has a
          companion Pseudocode Design
          Language file, e.g.
          dom_event_channel_c.pdl
          explains the intent of each line
          of code
          does not explain coding,
          algorithms or data structures
          see McConnel’s Code Complete,
          2nd ed.
Xenon
high-assurance

                       Guidelines: readme file
Xen




                 each source, header, and assembler
                 file has a companion “readme” file.
                 everything not covered by the .pdl file
                  todo’s,
                  data structures (e.g. event channel
                  buckets) and algorithms,
                  coding techniques (e.g.
                  container_of)
                  workarounds, etc...
Xenon
high-assurance

                      Guidelines: formatting
Xen




                 all files formatted by a
                 tool
                 public Xenon format is
                 defined as GNU indent
                  indent -kr -nut -i8 -
                  l128 file.c
                 everyone can re-format
                 to their preferred style
                 for local work
Xenon
high-assurance

                 Guidelines: structural limits
Xen




          complexity, modularity,
          and abstraction limits
          examples shown in
          earlier slides
          departures from these
          limits explained in
          the .readme file, i.e. the
          code is more complex,
          less modular on purpose
Xenon
high-assurance

                 Guidelines: logical completeness
Xen




             suppose code has conditions (x < y) and
             (v->task)
             what about (x >= y) and (v->task ==
             NULL)?
             should be dealt with in the code, covered
             by an assertion, or explained in
             the .readme file
Xenon
high-assurance

                 Guidelines: coding practices
Xen




           how to avoid high-risk or low-
           assurance C coding techniques?
           could have used a safe subset of C, e.g.
           MISRA C,
           subsets can be “noisy” and irritating
           instead, adopt 18 high-assurance
           coding rules, mostly from Les Hatton
Xenon
high-assurance

                      More Information
Xen




                 email: john.mcdermott@nrl.navy.mil
                 (Xenon)
                 http://www.grammatech.com
                 (CodeSurfer)
                 Steve McConnel, Code Complete, 2d ed.
                 ISBN 0-7356-1967-0 (PDL)
                 http://www.leshatton.org/
                 ISOC_subset1103.html (Coding
                 Practices)

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XS Boston 2008 Security

  • 1. Xenon Assurance Modifications to Xen Code John McDermott, Naval Research Lab
  • 2. Xenon high-assurance Prologue: Security Xen Strength of mechanism - any conceptual flaws? Assurance - any construction flaws?
  • 3. Xenon high-assurance Prologue: Security Xen Security is always defined with respect to a threat model. A threat model has threat threat actor capability initial access initial knowledge
  • 4. Xenon high-assurance The Xenon Project Xen Project Goals: What happens when you try to develop high assurance open source? Can you build a “separation kernel” that supports unmodified uninterpreted off-the-shelf soft ware, on commodity hardware (e.g. x86_64 with APIC)?
  • 5. Xenon high-assurance Xenon Xen A “separation hyper visor” Not a separation kernel Not a “secure” replacement for Xen A new security-oriented product for specialized use See the Apr. ’07 slides at www.xen.org/xensummit
  • 6. Xenon high-assurance The Xenon Prototype Xen Based on 3.1 Some features removed Only supports x86_64 Refactored code Evidence package
  • 7. Xenon high-assurance Simplicity Xen McCabe cyclomatic complexity Halstead effort (sanity check) Size (sanity check) Xen 3.1 has approx. 3810 C functions Approx. 200 will have to be re- factored x86_emulate.c ?
  • 8. Xenon high-assurance Simplicity: _evtchn_close Xen _evtchn_close - 3 _finish - 5 _chk_state - 3 _state_INTERDOMAIN - 17 _evtchn_close - 34 _state_VIRQ - 3 _state_PIRQ - 2 _get_port - 6 _try_again - 3 _init_state - 1
  • 9. Xenon high-assurance Xen Modularity (cohesion) PageAlloc Xen Xenon PageAlloc Map BootTime RunTime XenHeap DomHeap Scrub Config Trigger
  • 10. Xenon high-assurance Encapsulating Global Data Xen No global data allowed, e.g. v->vcpu_id Information hiding instead, e.g. loose: #define vcpu_id(v) strict: static inline int vcpu_id
  • 11. Xenon Strict encapsulation of vcpu: high-assurance Xen schedule.c get/set_vcpu_id larger but just as fast object size: 158744b vs. 157240b sort test: 0.121s vs. 0.122s search test: 0.836s vs. 0.854s
  • 12. Xenon high-assurance Xenon Construction Guidelines Xen comments PDL files readme files tool-based formatting complexity, modularity, abstraction limits logical completeness coding practices
  • 13. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: Comments Xen minimal don’t comment anything that could be understood in a first reading of the source assume the reader has a modern, program-slicing based source code browser, e.g. CodeSurfer
  • 14. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: PDL Xen each source or header file has a companion Pseudocode Design Language file, e.g. dom_event_channel_c.pdl explains the intent of each line of code does not explain coding, algorithms or data structures see McConnel’s Code Complete, 2nd ed.
  • 15. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: readme file Xen each source, header, and assembler file has a companion “readme” file. everything not covered by the .pdl file todo’s, data structures (e.g. event channel buckets) and algorithms, coding techniques (e.g. container_of) workarounds, etc...
  • 16. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: formatting Xen all files formatted by a tool public Xenon format is defined as GNU indent indent -kr -nut -i8 - l128 file.c everyone can re-format to their preferred style for local work
  • 17. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: structural limits Xen complexity, modularity, and abstraction limits examples shown in earlier slides departures from these limits explained in the .readme file, i.e. the code is more complex, less modular on purpose
  • 18. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: logical completeness Xen suppose code has conditions (x < y) and (v->task) what about (x >= y) and (v->task == NULL)? should be dealt with in the code, covered by an assertion, or explained in the .readme file
  • 19. Xenon high-assurance Guidelines: coding practices Xen how to avoid high-risk or low- assurance C coding techniques? could have used a safe subset of C, e.g. MISRA C, subsets can be “noisy” and irritating instead, adopt 18 high-assurance coding rules, mostly from Les Hatton
  • 20. Xenon high-assurance More Information Xen email: john.mcdermott@nrl.navy.mil (Xenon) http://www.grammatech.com (CodeSurfer) Steve McConnel, Code Complete, 2d ed. ISBN 0-7356-1967-0 (PDL) http://www.leshatton.org/ ISOC_subset1103.html (Coding Practices)