Xen Memory Management

Vancouver, February 2009

Memory management in (x86) Xen

Tim Deegan

Xen’s memory services
• Memory management
• Allocating memory to guests, scrubbing free memory
• Tracking memory usage with reference counts and types
 Heap allocators and the frametable.
• Virtual memory
• Protecting guests from each other
• Enforcing typing rules, e.g. read-only areas
• Providing translation services between address spaces
 MMU hypercalls, shadow pagetables, hardware-assisted paging

© 2008 Citrix Systems, Inc. — All rights reserved 2

Terminology
• Virtual address/Physical address/Machine address
• Frame vs. Page
• PFN: physical frame number
• Guest’s abstraction for tracking/allocating RAM
• Usually fairly contiguous
• GFN: guest frame number
• Guest’s idea of what hardware addresses are
• Used in guest pagetables
• MFN: machine frame number
• Actual hardware addresses

Basic memory management
• Buddy allocator hands out frames
• Each guest has a max number of frames
• Frame-table records for each frame:
• Owner, if any
• Linked list of other frames owned by this guest
• Reference count (must be zero to free the frame)
• Type, and a refcount for the type (must be zero to change type)
• TLB-flush-avoidance timestamp


PV pagetables, a.k.a. direct paging
• PFN  MFN table managed by the guest
• Shared MFN  PFN table provided by Xen
• GFN == MFN, so pagetables can be used directly
by the hardware
• Xen checks the contents of the guest pagetables
before allowing the hardware to see them.


Enforcing isolation
• Guest pagetables must have a pagetable type
• Xen checks that page contents obey the typing
rules before allowing them to take on PT type
• Typing rules:
• No mapping other guests’ frames
• No read-write mappings of frames with PT type
• Modifying an already-typed PT needs a call to Xen
to check the modification obeys the rules.
(Or trap-and-emulate assistance from Xen.)


Grant Tables
• Guest-supplied ACLs allowing other guests to map
their frames
• Mapper makes a hypercall with a domid, an
opaque index, and the address of a PTE
• Xen checks that entry in the mappee’s grant table
and if it’s OK, modifies the PTE
• Needs explicit unmap hypercall when finished
• Also available: grant-copy, where Xen memcpy()s
from/to a granted frame instead of mapping it.


HVM pagetables
• PFN  MFN table managed by Xen
• GFN == PFN so need another layer of translation
• Guest won’t cooperate in enforcing access control
• Two options:
• Xen builds shadow copies of guest pagetables
with the extra translations and controls added; or
• Hardware support for using a second set of
pagetables containing extra translations and
controls

Shadow pagetables
• Keep Xen-maintained copies of guest frames that
we think are being used as pagetables
• Guest never sees the shadows so we can add any
translations and restrictions we like
• 13 different kinds of shadows depending on what
kind of pagetable we think it is: a single frame can
have up to 10 shadows at once
• Also have three kinds of shadows for faking out
superpages (2MB of contiguous PFNs does not
mean 2MB of contiguous MFNs)

Shadow pagetables: building
• Start with an empty top-level shadow of the PFN in
CR3
• On pagefault, shadow the entries in the PT walk,
making new shadows at each level if necessary.
• Each shadow entry is the guest entry with the GFN
replaces by an MFN (of the next-level shadow or of
guest memory) and extra access restrictions:
• Pages that have shadows are mapped read-only.
• Extra restrictions can be specified in the PFN  MFN table.
• We can restrict write access to guest’s frames for tracking page-
dirtying during live migration.


Shadow pagetables: maintenance
• Shadowed pages are always kept read-only.
• When the guest writes to a shadowed frame, Xen’s
pagefault handler must:
• Emulate the current instruction to figure out what’s being written;
• Write the new value into the guest pagetable; and
• Update the equivalent parts of all shadows of the frame.


Shadow pagetables: tearing back down
• Shadowing a frame is expensive
• Thousands of cycles for trap and emulation of every write.
• Easy to tell when a page becomes a PT; harder to
tell when it stops:
• Reference count based on higher-level shadows and CR3 contents,
but hard to know when a PFN’s been used in CR3 for the last time
• Guess based on odd-looking page contents
• Guess based on memory access patterns
• Get PV drivers to give us hints
• Recycle under memory pressure by approximating LRU


Optimizations
• Tagged TLBs (AMD’s ASID; Intel’s VPID) allow us
to avoid a TLB flush on every VMEXIT/VMENTER
• In theory can do even better now that Win2k8 supports context
switching without TLB flushing.

• Shadowing not-present entries with invalid entries
lets us fast-track “real” pagefaults back to the guest
• Out-of-sync shadows: let the guest write directly to
the lowest level of pagetables and sync up the
shadows whenever a hardware TLB would re-read
(TLB flush, page faults, higher-level writes)


Hardware-assisted paging
• Xen supplies a second set of pagetables describing
the PFN  MFN translation and extra restrictions
• CPU takes a pointer to this as well as a (PFN-
space) CR3 value from the guest
• MMU hardware applies the composition of the two
translations and the intersection of the access
rights


Hardware-assisted paging: performance
Avoid expensive trap + emulate on writes to PTs,
and extra logic on pagefault path
TLB fill can now take 20 memory accesses!
CPU’s TLB is much smaller than the set of
shadows we can maintain
• AMD’s RVI gives +10% performance over shadows
on some workloads, -10% on others; Intel’s EPT
seems more consistently better than shadowing
• Performance depends heavily on using superpage
mappings in the second pagetable

Fin


Xen Memory Management

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