2. Market Share and Market Power
Market share is not the
same as market power!
First-Mover Advantages for Apple?
3. Market Shares in Retail Banking
Personal current accounts 2010 market share (%)
Lloyds TSB / Halifax Bank of Scotland 30
Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS) 16
HSBC (including First Direct) 14
Barclays 13
Santander (Abbey, Alliance & Leicester) 12
Nationwide Building Society 7
Co-operative Bank 3
National Australia (Clydesdale & Yorkshire Bank) 2
Source: Office of Fair Trading
5 Firm Concentration Ratio here is?
4. Market Shares in Retail Banking
Personal current accounts 2010 market share (%)
Lloyds TSB / Halifax Bank of Scotland 30
Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS) 16
HSBC (including First Direct) 14
Barclays 13
Santander (Abbey, Alliance & Leicester) 12
Nationwide Building Society 7
Co-operative Bank 3
National Australia (Clydesdale & Yorkshire Bank) 2
Source: Office of Fair Trading
5 Firm Concentration Ratio here is? 85%
5. The Reality of Market Power
Pricing
Power
Entry
Barriers
Buying
Power
Supply
Chain
Control
Economies
of Scale
Influence
over
regulators
6. Industry Leadership Benchmark Businesses
Profits to re-invest Habitual consumption
Market power is
often self-reinforcing
7. Industry Leadership Benchmark Businesses
Profits to re-invest Habitual consumption
Market power is
often self-reinforcing
Innovative businesses
can disrupt dominance
9. Main types of economic efficiency
Allocative Productive Dynamic
Where price = MC
Producing at the lowest
point of the
average cost curve
Changes in the
choices available in a
market over time
11. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Allocative Efficiency – Competition / Pure Monopoly
Perfectly Competitive Market
S1
D1
P1
P2
Entry of
new firms
drives
price
lower
MC
S2
AC
12. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Allocative Efficiency – Competition / Pure Monopoly
Perfectly Competitive Market
S1
D1
P1
P2
Entry of
new firms
drives
price
lower
MC
P1 P1
AC
Q1
S2
13. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Allocative Efficiency – Competition / Pure Monopoly
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Perfectly Competitive Market Pure Monopoly Market
S1
D1
P1
P2
Entry of
new firms
drives
price
lower
AC
MC
AC
MC
Monopoly
demand
(AR)MR
P1 P1
Q1 Q2
P2
S2
14. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Allocative Efficiency – Competition / Pure Monopoly
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Perfectly Competitive Market Pure Monopoly Market
S1
D1
P1
P2
Entry of
new firms
drives
price
lower
AC
MC
AC
MC
Monopoly
demand
(AR)MR
P1 P1
Q1 Q2
P2
C2
P12
S2
15. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Allocative Efficiency – Competition / Pure Monopoly
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Perfectly Competitive Market Pure Monopoly Market
S1
D1
P1
P2
Entry of
new firms
drives
price
lower
AC
MC
AC
MC
Monopoly
demand
(AR)MR
P1 P1
Q1 Q2
P2
C2
Monopoly Profit
P>MC
Loss of allocative
efficiency
S2
Monopoly pricing can lead
to deadweight loss of
consumer welfare
17. Aims of Price Discrimination
Extra Revenue Higher Profit Improved Cash Flow
Use Up Spare
Capacity
18.
19.
20. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Price Discrimination in Action: Segmenting the Market
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Market A Market B
AR
MR
MR
AR
LRAC = LRMCLRAC = LRMC
21. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Price Discrimination in Action: Segmenting the Market
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Market A Market B
AR
MR
MR
AR
LRAC = LRMC
P1
Q1
LRAC = LRMC
22. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Price Discrimination in Action: Segmenting the Market
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Market A Market B
AR
MR
MR
AR
LRAC = LRMC
P1
Q1
LRAC = LRMC
Supernormal
profit
23. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Price Discrimination in Action: Segmenting the Market
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Market A Market B
AR
MR
MR
AR
LRAC = LRMC
P1
Q1
LRAC = LRMC
Supernormal
profit
Q2
Supernormal
profit
P2
P13
24. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Price Discrimination in Action: Segmenting the Market
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Market A Market B
AR
MR
MR
AR
LRAC = LRMC
P1
Q1
LRAC = LRMC
Supernormal
profit
Q2
Supernormal
profit
P2
P3
P3 prices this
group out of
the market
P3
25. Evaluation Question
Evaluate the view that
a strategy of price
discrimination by a
producer always works
more in the interests
of producers rather
than consumers and
society as a whole
26. Pricing in interests of producers
Exploitation of the consumer – the
majority still pay > marginal cost
Extraction of consumer surplus turned
into higher producer surplus / profit
Possible use as a limit pricing tactic /
and a barrier to entry
Reinforces the monopoly power /
dominance of existing firms
27. Pricing in interests of producers
Exploitation of the consumer – the
majority still pay > marginal cost
Extraction of consumer surplus turned
into higher producer surplus / profit
Possible use as a limit pricing tactic /
and a barrier to entry
Reinforces the monopoly power /
dominance of existing firms
28. Pricing in interests of producers
Exploitation of the consumer – the
majority still pay > marginal cost
Extraction of consumer surplus turned
into higher producer surplus / profit
Possible use as a limit pricing tactic /
and a barrier to entry
Reinforces the monopoly power /
dominance of existing firms
29. Pricing in interests of producers
Exploitation of the consumer – the
majority still pay > marginal cost
Extraction of consumer surplus turned
into higher producer surplus / profit
Possible use as a limit pricing tactic /
and a barrier to entry
Reinforces the monopoly power /
dominance of existing firms
30. Evaluation: Counter-arguments
Potential for cross subsidy of
activities that bring social benefits
Making better use of spare capacity
Bringing some new consumers into
market – otherwise excluded by price
Use of monopoly profit for research –
this is a stimulus to innovation
31. Evaluation: Counter-arguments
Potential for cross subsidy of
activities that bring social benefits
Making better use of spare capacity
Bringing some new consumers into
market – otherwise excluded by price
Use of monopoly profit for research –
this is a stimulus to innovation
32. Evaluation: Counter-arguments
Potential for cross subsidy of
activities that bring social benefits
Making better use of spare capacity
Bringing some new consumers into
market – otherwise excluded by price
Use of monopoly profit for research –
this is a stimulus to innovation
33. Evaluation: Counter-arguments
Potential for cross subsidy of
activities that bring social benefits
Making better use of spare capacity
Bringing some new consumers into
market – otherwise excluded by price
Use of monopoly profit for research –
this is a stimulus to innovation
35. Falling prices for smartphones
According to one forecast,
the global smartphone
market will grow 34 per
cent over the next twelve
months with sales of 285m
units in 2013 but average
selling prices of
smartphones will fall 9 per
cent to $273.
36. Smartphone Market Share (2012)
Smartphone
Market Share (% of
Global Sales, Q3
2012)
Samsung 22%
Nokia 19%
Apple 5%
RIM
(Blackberry) 2%
HTC 4%
37. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Smartphones – A Decreasing Cost Industry?
Internal Economies of Scale
and the Price of Smartphones
AC1
AC2
MC1
MC2
AR
MR
Profit maximising price when costs
are high is P1 and Q1
P1
Q1
38. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Smartphones – A Decreasing Cost Industry?
Internal Economies of Scale
and the Price of Smartphones
AC1
AC2
MC1
MC2
AR
MR
Profit maximising price when costs
are high is P1 and Q1
When economies of scale are
achieved, the profit-maximising
price falls to P2 and output
expands to Q2
P1
Q1
P2
Q2
39. Cost & Price
Output (Q)
Smartphones – A Decreasing Cost Industry?
Internal Economies of Scale
and the Price of Smartphones
AC1
AC2
MC1
MC2
AR
MR
Profit maximising price when costs
are high is P1 and Q1
When economies of scale are
achieved, the profit-maximising
price falls to P2 and output
expands to Q2
Economies of scale mean lower
prices for consumers
And higher profits for
manufacturers of smartphones!
P1
Q1
P2
Q2
C2
Supernormal
profit!
40. Smartphones – A Decreasing Cost Industry?
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
External Economies of Scale in
Smartphone industry
LRAC1
External economies of scale (EEoS)
When the long-term expansion of
an industry leads to the
development of ancillary services
which benefit suppliers in the
industry
41. Smartphones – A Decreasing Cost Industry?
Cost & Price
Output (Q)
External Economies of Scale in
Smartphone industry
LRAC1
External economies of scale (EEoS)
When the long-term expansion of
an industry leads to the
development of ancillary services
which benefit suppliers in the
industry
• Industry expertise / skilled
labour
• Relocation of key supply
businesses
• Investment in infrastructure
• Links with universities and
other research businesses
LRAC1 with external
economies of scale
42. What factors other than
cost might help to explain
why average selling prices
of smartphones are
expected to fall by nearly
10 per cent in 2013?
Intense competition Emerging Markets
Substitute Devices Satisficing Behaviour
Pricing behaviour often reflects the different
strategic objectives of businesses
43. Get help from fellow
students, teachers and
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@tutor2u_econ