(4.17.2017) Powerful or powerless Japan? Investigating the full extent of the world's third-largest power Slides for discussant, Dr. Satoru Nagao. Speaker: Dr. Guibourg Delamotte, Associate Professor of Political science at the French Institute of Oriental Studies (Inalco)’s Japanese studies department Discussant: Dr. Satoru Nagao, Research Fellow at the Institute for Future Engineering, Visiting Research Fellow at the Research Institute for Oriental Cultures at Gakushuin University, Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, and Lecturer at Aoyama-Gakuin and Komazawa universities. ICAS public lecture series videos are posted on Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLAA67B040B82B8AEF

1. Is Japan Truly
a Powerful Country?
Dr. Satoru Nagao

2. Is Japan powerful?
• For at least two reasons, people want to ask this question.
• First, although Japan has a strong economy, Japan has not
shown its presence in the domain of world security.
• Second, Japan has defensive capabilities but no
offensive capabilities.

3. However, whether Japan is powerful
or not is a psychological question.
• When the Obama administration hesitated to attack Syria despite a promise
to attack when Syria used chemical weapons in 2013, it seemed that the US
had retreated from power.
• When Russia succeeded in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria from 2014 to 2016, it
seemed that Putin’s Russia was powerful despite Russia’s far weaker
military than that of the US.
• When the US under President Donald Trump attacked Syria in 2017, it
seemed that the US was powerful.
• A country that can address security needs properly
is regarded as “powerful”.

4. Therefore,
• Three questions must be posed to elicit an answer
as to whether Japan is powerful or powerless.
• What are Japan’s security needs in the Indo-Pacific?
• Does Japan have the will and capability to respond
to its needs?
• Will Japan change to become a truly powerful
country in the near future?

5. 1. What are Japan’s security needs in
the Indo-Pacific?
• Salient features of the recent security situation in the Indo-
Pacific are North Korea’s missile and nuclear development
and China’s maritime assertiveness. Taking China’s
maritime assertiveness as an example can
indicate Japan’s security needs..
Currently, although the Permanent Court
of Arbitration rejected China’s ownership
claim of 90% of the South China Sea in
2016, China is ignoring the verdict and
building three new airports on their
seven artificial islands in the South China
Sea

6. • To identify the security needs, the reason why has China’s
assertiveness intensified so much lately is important. It
seems that the tendency of China’s maritime
expansion has been based on military balance, if
history is any guide. For example, when France withdrew
from Vietnam in the 1950s, China occupied half of the
Paracel Islands. China occupied the other half of the
Paracel Islands in 1974 immediately after the Vietnam War
ended and the US withdrew from the region. After the
Soviet Union withdrew from Vietnam, China attacked
the Spratly Islands controlled by Vietnam in 1988. Along
similar lines, after the US withdrew from the Philippines,
China occupied Mischief Reef, which both the Philippines
and Vietnam claimed

7. 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
USA
China
As background of the current situation, the military balance
between the US and China has also changed after the Cold War.
From 2000 to 2016, China has acquired at least 43 submarines.
During same period, , the US has acquired only 14.
US allies and friendly countries require a new
security framework to adjust to these changing
circumstances.
43
14

8. • For a long time, bilateral alliances led by the US, such as those of Japan–US, US–
Australia, US–Philippines, and US – South Korea have maintained order in the Indo-
Pacific as an “old” security framework resembling a “Hub and
Spoke system.” In the system, a deep defense relation is lacking among the
allies. For example, both Japan and Australia are US allies, but they share no close
security relations. Under this system, US allies and friendly countries are heavily
dependent on US military power. When US influence declines, the
reliability of the entire security framework declines.
• Consequently, a new security framework has emerged.
This framework is a security network of numerous
bilateral, trilateral, quadrilateral, other multilateral
cooperative relationships among US allies and friendly
countries. This cooperation includes not only US-led cooperation such as
Japan–US–Australia, Japan–US–India, and Japan–US–Australia–India, but also
cooperation by Japan–Australia–India and Australia–India–Indonesia, notably
without inclusion of the US

9. “Old Alliance”:
US and its bilateral relations
“New Alliance”：
Network of allies and friendly countries
US
Japan
Australia
US
IndiaJapan
Australia

10. First, because this system is not heavily dependent on US
influence, the adverse impact of declining US influence is expected to be
minimal.
Secondly, because this system includes India and Southeast Asian
countries, which are expected to have rising influence, the security
framework can maintain sufficient power for a long time.
Furthermore, a multilateral system demands that countries adopt a
rule-based approach. For that reason, if China and Russia act
responsibly under an agreed set of rules, they might be allowed to join.
Therefore, the new security framework offers the important possibility
of reducing regional tensions.
This new security framework presents several
strong points of marked benefit.

11. What needs does Japan have under the
new security framework?
• First, Japan should bear a greater burden of defending
itself.
• Second, it is important for Japan to enhance security
cooperation with other US allies and friendly countries.
Ex: Australia, India, UK and France
• A third important role for Japan is building the capacity of
Southeast Asian defense forces.

12. 2. Does Japan have the will and
capability to respond to its needs?
• Japan has already realized the importance of the three matters
above.
• Japan’s new “Marine” type amphibious force to defend and take back islands is
good example.
• The National Security Strategy of Japan published in 2013 has described the
importance of security cooperation with Australia, India, and Southeast Asian
countries.
• EX:
• Japan and Australia signed a new Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement
• Japan has cooperated with India by concluding defense information sharing
agreements
• Japan also leased TC-90 training planes to the Philippines.
• Patrol vessels to Philippines and Vietnam Japan will export used P-3C patrol planes
to Vietnam and Sri Lanka ……..etc

13. Nevertheless, it is also true that Japan’s cooperation
has not included offensive capabilities.
• For example, in the case of artificial islands in the South China Sea,
China cannot use airfields on these artificial islands safely if coastal
countries have missiles with which to attack.
• For that reason, Vietnam has started to deploy precision-guided
rocket launchers. Vietnam also imports Club S submarine launched
surface attack cruise missiles from Russia. Furthermore, they are
planning to import Bramos cruise missiles developed as a joint
venture of Russia and India.

14. • It is not easy to imagine that Japan will support
Vietnamese offensive capabilities as Russia and
India appear to be doing
• Does Japan have powerful influence in such a
case?
• Viewed from this perspective, Japan’s influence
can be powerful only when other countries
provide capabilities Japan cannot provide.

15. 3. Will Japan change to become a truly
powerful country in the near future?
• Although Japan’s influence is limited, it is also true
that Japan is changing.
• EX: Japan planned to export submarines to Australia.
• Japan has started air-to-air missile joint development
projects with the UK
• To defend against missile attack from North Korea, Japan is
planning to hold limited offensive capability to destroy
missile bases.
• However, one problem remains.

16. Will the US allow Japan to transform itself?
• For a long time, the US did not wish Japan to possess
offensive capabilities. For example, when Japan requested
the export of F-22 stealth fighter jets in 2007, the US
refused the request. Possessing the F-22 would signal that
Japan can bomb missile sites in North Korea
independently.
• And for Japan, relations with the US are the
priority. Japan and the US have created trustworthy
relations through close diplomatic coordination during
more than 65 years. Furthermore, the US is the only
foreign country to have occupied Japan during its 2000
year history. Japan will not possess offensive capabilities if
the US will not allow it.

17. However, signs have pointed to
changes in US policy.
• In the past, the US has restrained not only Japan but
also other US allies such as Taiwan, South Korea, and the
Philippines from developing offensive capabilities.
• But, under a rising North Korean threat, the US has
already allowed South Korea to develop cruise
missiles with an 800-km range. They succeeded in
the first test on April 2017. This fact has indicated
that the US will allow Japan to possess similar
missiles in the near future.

18. 4. Conclusion: Is Japan powerful?
• Is Japan powerful? Under current circumstances, Japan has
strived to enhance its own defense capabilities to ease
dependence on the US. Japan has been increasing its
influence by responding to their needs.
• However, to show its powerful influence using arms exports,
Japan requires collaboration with other countries that can
provide offensive capabilities that Japan cannot provide.
• In addition, to possess offensive capabilities, Japan must seek
permission from the US.
• These facts indicate that Japan itself does not seek to become
an independently powerful country with offensive
capabilities.
• Japan will be a powerful country only when the US, its
allies, and countries friendly to the US including Australia,
India, and Southeast Asian countries strongly demand that
Japan become a powerful country.

19. Thank you very much
Power~!?
Power~!Power~!
Power~!
Power~!? Power~? Power~!?