Dr. Pam Zaabel - Secure pork supply: FAD Outbreak Business Continuity
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Secure pork supply: FAD Outbreak Business Continuity - Dr. Pam Zaabel, from the 2012 Allen D. Leman Swine Conference, September 15-18, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. More presentations at http://www.swinecast.com/2012-leman-swine-conference-material
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Dr. Pam Zaabel - Secure pork supply: FAD Outbreak Business Continuity
- 1. Secure Pork Supply Plan September 2012
- 2. North American Animal Agriculture Industry is Unique • The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the U.S. and North American livestock industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of a FAD outbreak • Strategies for the response to, and management of, a FAD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will depend upon the magnitude, location and other characteristics of the outbreak.
- 3. Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Outbreak • Stop movement will quickly lead to overcrowding conditions with serious animal welfare and health issues.
- 4. Phases of FMD Response
- 5. FMD Detection in the United States: Types of an FMD Outbreak Six Types of FMD Outbreaks Type 6: Catastrophic Size of FMD North Outbreak American (in terms of animals, pre mises, and jurisdictions affected) Response Shifts from Emphasis on Stamping-Out to Emphasis on Alternate Strategies (duration of FMD response) 5
- 6. Common Components of Secure Food Supply Business Continuity Plans Secure Egg Supply (HPAI); Secure Turkey Supply (HPAI); Secure Milk Supply (FMD); Secure Pork Supply (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD) – Government, industry, academia partnerships – Voluntary pre-outbreak preparedness components – Biosecurity, surveillance, epidemiology questionnaires, movement permits – Risk assessments (completed and in process) – Plans must be based on current capabilities and will evolve with science and new capabilities – Guidelines only: Final decisions made by responsible officials during outbreak – Outreach and training pre and post outbreak
- 7. Secure Pork Supply Plan (Funded by USDA APHIS VS) • Develop procedures to allow the safe movement of animals with no evidence of infection in a FAD control zone to a pork processing plant or to other sites to Ramirez accommodate different stages of production.
- 8. SPS Partners • SPS Planning Committee – Federal and State officials – Representatives of all phases of the swine industry – NPB, NPPC, AASV – Academia • swine disease experts • swine production experts
- 9. Secure Pork Supply Planning Committee • First meeting October 11-12, 2011 • Working Groups formed: – Biosecurity – Surveillance – Compartmentalization/Monitored Premises – Data Collection, Management, and Sharing – Risk Assessments – Plan for response to an FAD Outbreak Tomorrow – Communications
- 10. FADs included in SPS plan • Foot and mouth disease – Swine, cattle, sheep, goats, deer • Classical swine fever • African swine fever • Swine vesicular disease Foot and Mouth Disease : 7 days post infection PIADC
- 11. Disease Transmission (FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD) • Not zoonotic • Direct contact and oral exposure are the most important routes of infection for swine (Pigs are relatively resistant to airborne infection by all 4 FADs) • Indirect contact (fomites) also can play a lessor role for transmission • Pigs exhale large concentrations of FMDV, cattle are susceptible to aerosolized virus
- 12. Vaccine • FMD and CSF – Vaccine will not be immediately available, or will be in short supply • ASF and SVD – No vaccine Ramirez • May not be a viable option for initial rapid control of these FADs in a large FAD outbreak
- 14. The Charge • Define biosecurity performance standards prior to an outbreak • Participating premises can be rapidly designated as Monitored Premises in the event of an outbreak
- 15. Our Approach • NPB biosecurity and pork producer biosecurity protocols • Combined protocols and revised by Level (Level One and Level Two) • Reviewed and edited by Working Group
- 16. Next Steps • Finish editing the recommendations • Send to Planning Committee for review • Develop illustrations demonstrating the clean/dirty line concept
- 18. The Original Charge: Develop Recommendations for • Comprehensive Integrated Swine Surveillance prior to a FAD outbreak • Surveillance during a FAD outbreak (may depend on phase and type of outbreak) • Surveillance to establish freedom from disease in a premises, production system, region, or the entire US • Surveillance to be eligible for compartmentalization prior to and during an FAD outbreak
- 19. Approach Considerations • Utilize testing approaches the industry is using, but also test these samples for FADs – Producers are more likely to collect and submit samples. – Not a financial burden for producers to collect samples. – What would the incentive be for producers? • Provide samples to diagnostic labs so can conduct testing pre-outbreak
- 20. Next Steps • Draft a straw man protocol to be reviewed by the Surveillance Working Group
- 22. The Charge Develop criteria – To receive and maintain monitored premises status during an FAD outbreak – For swine production systems to be eligible for compartmentalization according to OIE guidelines
- 23. Our Approach: Monitored Premises • Biosecurity and Surveillance are very important to achieve Monitored Premises status • Wait for Biosecurity and Surveillance working groups to make recommendations for becoming a Monitored Premises
- 24. Our Approach: Compartmentalization • Discussed how to approach compartmentalization • Start with swine specific disease such as CSF • Ask two production companies/ systems to start the process of working toward compartmentalization • Identify road blocks during process
- 25. Progress Update • One production company is willing to work through the application process to apply to become a compartment
- 27. The Charge • To enable optimal management of data during an FAD outbreak, recommend – data to be collected prior to and in the event of an outbreak – responsibilities for data entry and management – priorities and mechanisms for data sharing prior to and during an outbreak • Address issues related to data confidentiality and access
- 28. Our Approach • Reviewed and discussed approaches of other Secure Food Supply plans • Discussed what types of gaps may exist in data collection and storage of information • Administer questionnaires to help identify gaps
- 29. Next Steps • Analyze survey responses. – NAHLN Laboratories – State Veterinarians • Discuss possible approaches on how to address gaps in the data collection and storage process • Evaluate available data sharing mechanisms and best practices • Produce report for committee with findings on data availability, gaps and sharing
- 32. The Charge Recommend and prioritize risk assessments necessary to provide additional scientific basis for the Secure Pork Supply plan
- 33. Risk Assessment Priorities • Risk Assessments will be Disease and commodity (movement) specific • Disease Priority – FMD, CSF, ASF, SVD • Type of Movement Priority Such as Wean to Finish /Nursery to Finish Genetic replacements in to breeding farm Cull pigs (different types) Finishing to harvest
- 34. Next Steps • Working group calls as needed • Assure alignment with other SPS working groups • UMN finalizing funding and priorities of RA funding with USDA for the next year • More detailed discussions when have Analyst assigned and begin RA
- 36. The Charge • Recommend policies and procedures for maximizing a secure pork supply while minimizing FAD spread if an outbreak occurred tomorrow with currently available resources • The plans should vary with the phase and type of outbreak
- 37. Our Approach • Updating NPB’s Highly Contagious Foreign Animal Diseases of Swine Strategy Document – provides a basic overview of response activities that would occur if an FAD is suspected and/or confirmed in swine by animal health officials – includes industry goals in support of the FAD response and actions necessary to meet industry-defined goals
- 38. Our Approach • Develop a controlled stop movement document – Factors to Consider in a Stop Movement Order for Swine in the U.S. due to a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak
- 39. Next Steps • Complete revisions of NPB’s Highly Contagious Foreign Animal Disease of Swine Strategy document • Complete the Controlled Stop Movement Document • Send both documents to working group for review
- 41. CROSS-SPECIES FMD COMMUNICATIONS TEAM Goals – Protect animal health & minimize disease spread – Ensure consumer confidence in meat & milk safety – Prevent supply disruption to customers
- 42. Cross-Species FMD Team Desired Outcomes • Serve as the umbrella for all outreach • Speak with one voice • Do not duplicate efforts/work smart • Eliminate consumer confusion • Do not duplicate efforts/work smart
- 44. Next Steps Develop messaging for – CSF – ASF – SVD
- 45. Summary • Reviewed the goals, charge and approach of the SPS and the seven Working Groups • Discussed the progress and next steps of the Working Groups
Notas do Editor
- Jim Roth at CFSPH developed a document outlining the phases and types of a FMD outbreak. This document could be applied to all affected species during a FMD response.
- The SPS Planning Committee determined that the SPS would include these four diseases.
- Members of the Planning Committee wanted these disease transmission factors to be taken into consideration when developing the plan.
- It was also emphasized that FMD and CSF vaccine may be in short supply or not immediately available. No vaccine is currently available to prevent ASF and SVD infection. Therefore, while vaccine may be a tool to be used during an outbreak, we must not rely on them and instead develop alternate response strategies.
- This is the original charge made by the SPS Planning Committee during their face-to-face meeting last fall. The Planning Committee determined that this working group should define biosecurity performance standards prior to an outbreak, so that participating premises can be rapidly designated as Monitored Premises in the event of an outbreak. The objective would be to have production sites audited prior to an outbreak so the designation of being a Monitored Premises may occur quickly after the outbreak is determined so that the pigs may continue to be moved from the premises (provided ,of course, that other criteria are met such as the animals appear to be free of disease and meet the surveillance criteria).
- The working group used the NPB biosecurity recommendations and existing pork producer /production biosecurity protocols as a starting point to define required biosecurity steps for the compartment and for Monitored Premises. Multiple protocols have been reviewed and edited. Currently the group is working on defining how the clean/dirty line concept can be applied to different production layouts. Sections edited includeLoad-outs, Visitors, Transportation, Employees, Production sites
- So, in review, the Biosecurity Working Group will finish editing the biosecurity recommendations, the sections will be combined and the entire document sent to the SPS Planning Committee for review and comments. Illustrations will continue to be developed which help demonstrate how the clean/dirty line concept can be applied to different production systems/layouts.
- This is the original charge made by the SPS Planning Committee during their face-to-face meeting last fall. The Planning Committee determined that this working group should develop recommendations for these four areas. The key is that recommendations should involve comprehensive and integrated surveillance prior to an outbreak and that surveillance recommendations need to be made for surveillance activities during an outbreak, to establish freedom from disease and the surveillance which should take place in a compartment.
- The benefits of this approach includes the utilization of testing approaches which the swine industry is already using. These sample submitted for domestic disease testing could also be tested for FADs. Producers are more likely to collect and submit these samples to labs to test for domestic diseases of concern; therefore, the goal is to make is so the collection of these samples would not be a financial burden to producers. By providing samples to the labs pre-outbreak, the labs are able to make sure they have the reagents, and make this testing more routine so that when the outbreak occurs, they are ready to ramp up the testing.
- Once the straw man has been developed, it will be distributed to the Surveillance working group for review and editing.
- This is the original charge made by the SPS Planning Committee during their face-to-face meeting last fall. The Planning Committee determined that this working group should develop criteria to receive and maintain monitored premises status during an FAD outbreak and develop criteria for swine production systems to be eligible for compartmentalization according to OIE guidelines.
- This working group address criteria for both Monitored Premises and Compartmentalization. The approach for developing criteria for Monitored Premises will be to wait for the recommendations from the Biosecurity and Surveillance Working Groups. These two components are extremely important in outlining what it takes to become a Monitored Premises. This working group will then provide feedback of those recommendations.
- During conference calls, the members discussed how to approach compartmentalization according to the OIE standards. The group decided to start with a swine specific disease first, so CSF will be the first disease attempted. Two production companies were asked to start the process of working toward compartmentalization with the help of CFSPH. The thought was that it may take working through the process to be able to see what the road blocks are to the process to see how those road blocks can be addressed.
- One production company agreed to allow us to work with them through the application process to apply to become a compartment. We are starting to gather the information needed . We will then take this information to the CVO John Clifford or the individual he assigns to work with us. The process will be a back and forth between our group and the USDA to determine the amount of information needed that we need to provide for them to become a compartment as described in the OIE code.
- This is the original charge made by the SPS Planning Committee during their face-to-face meeting last fall. The Planning Committee determined that this working group should recommend data to be collected prior to and in the event of an outbreak to enable optimal management of an FAD outbreak, recommend responsibilities for data entry and management, recommend priorities and mechanisms for data sharing prior to and during an outbreak, and address issues related to data confidentiality and access.
- During conference calls, working group members reviewed and discussed approaches of other Secure Food Supply plans and discussed what types of gaps may exist in data collection and storage of information. During the discussions, the members determined that they had ideas on what the gaps may be but would need more concrete information to confirm what those gaps truly are. To do so, they would administer questionnaires to help identify those gaps.
- A survey was sent to 13 state veterinarians and the working group is following up with those who didn’t respond. The NAHLN laboratories survey will be sent to labs this month. The producer survey was tested with many producers and a page summary on what data producers need to collect and record is being edited. Survey responses will be used to discuss how gaps can be addressed in the data collection and storage process. The working group also plans to evaluate data sharing mechanisms and finally produce a report summarizing these activities.
- Patrick Webb wrote a document and received input from NPB’s Swine Health Committee and the health committee with NPPC. It includes three components- valid pre-harvest traceability, standardized biosecurity and comprehensive and integrated disease surveillance.
- This is the original charge made by the SPS Planning Committee during their face-to-face meeting last fall. The Planning Committee determined that this working group should recommend and prioritize risk assessments necessary to provide additional scientific basis for the Secure Pork Supply plan.
- During conference calls, the working group determined that Risk Assessments will be disease and commodity or movement specific. It was determined that FMD would be the highest priority for risk assessments followed by CSF, ASF, and SVD.
- Here are the plans or next steps of this working group: Working group calls as needed, assure alignment with other SPS working groups, UMN finalizing funding and priorities of RA funding with USDA for the next year, and more detailed discussions when have Analyst assigned and begin RA.
- This is the original charge made by the SPS Planning Committee during their face-to-face meeting last fall. The Planning Committee determined that this working group should recommend policies and procedures for maximizing a secure pork supply while minimizing FAD spread if an outbreak occurred tomorrow with currently available resources. These plans should vary with the phase and type of outbreak.
- Those documents the working group will be reviewing include changes made to NPB’s Highly Contagious FAD document. This document currently being updated by CFSPH provides a basic overview of response activities that would occur if an FAD is suspected and/or confirmed in swine by animal health officials and includes industry goals in support of the FAD response and actions necessary to meet industry-defined goals.
- Jim Roth is currently writing a document addressing how a controlled stop movement could occur during a FMD outbreak. The approach to, and need for, stop movement will depend on the phase and type of FMD outbreak. The document includes both an approach to initial controlled stop movement as well as an approach to restarting swine movement and processing. The approach to restarting swine movement will include both restarting processing of market hogs and sows for slaughter as well as restarting movement of swine between production stages. As with the previous document, this document will be presented to the working group for edits and comments.
- Once the revisions to NPB’s Highly Contagious FAD document are complete and the Controlled Stop Movement document has been written, both documents will be sent to the working group for review.
- Currently, the National Pork Board is part of a Cross-Species FMD Communications Team. The goals set forth by this team include to protect animal health & minimize disease spread, ensure consumer confidence in meat & milk safety, and prevent supply disruption to customers. The pork, beef, and dairy industries are represented on this cross-species team with the sheep industry showing interest.
- This team has four desired outcomes. Two of the desired outcomes are included on this slide. While they focus on serving as the umbrella for all outreach to coordinate the livestock/food industry, each species has their individual species-specific plan and messaging they will drive through their channels. They will also speak with one voice in an attempt to maintain consumer confidence. They include not duplicating efforts and work smart and eliminate consumer confusion. FMD is not a food safety issue.
- A FMD disease messaging website has been created and contains communication messaging.
- While extensive messaging has been developed for FMD, messaging still needs to be developed for the additional swine specific diseases of CSF, ASF and SVD. The communications team at the National Pork Board will be working with additional members of the SPS Communications Working Group to develop these messages for both producers and consumers.