2. Main Themes
• Most Use of Force is Reactionary
• Default Defensive Response
• Situations That Enable Offensive Response
• Realities of Threat Engagement
• Examples
• Catastrophic Entry
• What a good CQB system should provide
3. Reactionary Use of Force
• Most police use of force is reactionary in nature
even if it is officer initiated.
• This especially applies to deadly force incidents due
to the rarity of the event in similar situations-
traffic stops, SWAT warrant service, hold up alarms,
etc…
• Police officers, and more recently most soldiers,
are conditioned through repetition and expectation
not to be ready to shoot. It is the nature of their
work and a requirement of their good natured
personalities.
4. Default to Defensive Actions First
Despite their training, when dealing with close range, sudden,
immediate threats, almost all operators at any level will…
• Flinch before doing anything else if they are shot at or even just
have a gun suddenly pointed at them
• First take measures to immediately survive before taking measures
to engage the threat
– This is most often moving backward away from the threat
– Moving quickly and completely behind cover
– Moving sideways or dodging in place
– At the very least, Stopping forward movement to avoid getting closer
– At closer range the defensive action will include reaching up to swat
away the gun or simply putting the hands up between the operator
and gun
5. Self-Preservation is Rational
• Rational people will move into a threat with no other obvious
choice, such as when caught at close range, due to physical
momentum, or when they have a tactical advantage and the threat
is surprised or not directly oriented on them.
• The only people who move directly into the face of an immediate
threat are the desperate, suicidal, psychotic, or those overly
conditioned to ignore their own safety. This most often leads to
unacceptable often catastrophic results.
• Closing on an oriented, ready threat will most often get an operator
working within restricted rules of engagement and expectations of
social behavior towards populations, wounded or killed, unless
there is an overwhelming advantage in capability of at least 3 to 1.
6. Offensive Response
True Deliberate Offensive Initiated Deadly Force is Rare. At least some of these
elements must be present.
Anticipation/Deliberation
The suspect has already displayed an immediate deadly force threat (most often
shooting or attempting to shoot first) and the suspect has already been identified or
isolated. A gunfight is the only obvious course of action. Other means are not viable.
Duress
The operator is not under the duress of immediately trying to survive from a
disadvantaged situation. (time, position, cover, distance, orientation, etc)
Decision
The operator has made the deliberate decision to kill and is fully ready to engage.
A deliberate rational decision can be made more quickly through awareness,
experience, training, and conditioning
A non-deliberate decision may be made through rage, inappropriate conditioning, or
confusion
Exceptional deliberate clarity may occur due to lack of fear of death and other complex
mechanisms
7. Offensive Response
Examples:
• The threat is shooting at someone else
• Rounds are thrown wild, are expected, and from a distance
• Threat is running or driving away
• Suspect surprised and operator has a significant advantage in
initiative and readiness
• Threat fully identified but distracted and oriented on
someone else
These situations are rare in the first few moments of fights, even
including police CQB operations involving warrant service,
unknown active shooters, or response to typical crime, or
standard military cordon and search or raid operations in
precision environments
8. Realities of Threat Engagement
Basic Premise
• Deadly force incidents, even during pro-active operations, are mostly reactive in
nature
• Action beats reaction and causes high levels of duress
• High levels of duress often cause a primary defensive response
• Offensive operations require a 3 to 1 advantage in force at a minimum for
expected positive outcomes
Problems with traditional CQB
• Requires entering and closing with a threat as the primary response
• Does not allow a 3 to 1 advantage against equally armed threats until multiple
operators are in the room
• Advancing on threat takes other operators out of the fight making it a 1 on 1
gunfight
• Requires surprise or non-resistance to be successful and requires operators to use
tactics that are against human nature and offer little to no defensive or offensive
tactical advantage
9. Realities of Threat Engagement
Despite training, almost all operators at any level will…
• Stop and engage threats from the area of the breach point if they have any
choice
• Avoid moving closer to an active danger in anything more than a cautious
shuffle, unless the threat has temporarily or most likely stopped
• Move away or evasively to avoid being shot when under duress
• The most important part of a gun fight is not hitting the threat with the
first accurate shot, it is avoiding the first shots of the threat. Immediate
survival is how the subconscious body is wired
• Even well-trained, equipped, and ready operators will not move forward
into a threat
Ask yourself, does your CQB method hold up when there is an actual threat,
or is it only good against non-resisters, people totally caught by surprise, and
paper targets? Does it require operators to move forward into a threat as a
default?
