Lets Stop Faffing Around-Risk and UAV Integration
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This presentation was given at the AAUS Conference preceding the Avalon Airshow in Melbourne. It combines work being done as part of the Industry Support to the CASA UAS Standards Subcommittee, in conjunction with a brief intro into elements of the JARUS Working Group 6 Specific Operations Risk Assessment Process
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Lets Stop Faffing Around-Risk and UAV Integration
- 1. CAPTAIN OBVIOUS LETS STOP FAFFING AROUND RISK AND UAV INTEGRATION NOVA SYSTEMS DR TERRY MARTIN
- 2. Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Introduction Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
- 3. Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Introduction Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
- 4. Copyright:Terrence Martin AcceptablySafe is defined by the SafetyTargets- See Argument 1. Argument 4 System transitioned into services in acceptably safe manner Argument 5 System shown to be operated acceptably safely Argument 6 System maintained and sustained acceptably safely Airworthiness High Level Safety Argument Argument 2 System designed to be acceptably safe Personnel are appropriately trained to conduct and verify activities which underpin the safety argument Argument 3 System constructed and implemented completely and correctly Argument 1 System has been specified to acceptably safe. Assumptions stated Applicable for intended Operational Environment Verification of Evidence that SafetyTargets are met, with plans for ongoing monitoring ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE Introduction Airworthiness and the Safety Argument
- 5. Copyright:Terrence Martin Introduction Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
- 6. Copyright:Terrence Martin Introduction Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations
- 7. Copyright:Terrence Martin Introduction Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations
- 8. Copyright:Terrence Martin Introduction Future RPAS Framework Certified Specific Open Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys European Approach Australian Draft Framework Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Low Risk Operations Medium Risk Operations High Risk Operations
- 9. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Introduction Future RPAS Framework
- 10. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Proportionate &SAFE: Operational Restrictions commensurate with technical integrity & operational environment Introduction Future RPAS Framework
- 11. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Enter the US Element Derivative of US sUAS NPRM Introduction Future RPAS Framework
- 12. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulated Specific Open Small RPAS Very small RPAS Element of Initial Airworthiness CPA like Oversight of Integrity. NAA led Industry Appointed Oversight No Integrity Oversight Operational Restrictions Enter the US Element Derivative of US sUAS NPRM Open = Small SegregatedVLOS Container Introduction Future RPAS Framework
- 13. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
- 14. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
- 15. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Airworthiness Expectations based on CPA Regulations e.g.TC/CoA Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
- 16. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
- 17. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific Work to be done • What Equipment • What Restrictions • What Procedures • WhatTraining • How is RISK Assessed?
- 18. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific
- 19. Copyright:Terrence Martin CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited Over population etc Controlled Airspace BVLOS IFR Conditions Above 400 feet AGL Within 3 NM of Aerodrome Introduction Work Outstanding Regulated Specific Operational Flexibility Platform Technical Integrity Equipage Operator Competence
- 20. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap • Specific Category Operations will be based on risk assessment • Category likely to represents biggest demographics for making money Risk Assessment Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
- 21. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap • Specific Category Operations will be based on risk assessment • Category likely to represents biggest demographics for making money • Risk Methodology is critical, yet process still immature • CASA committed to harmonisation large tracts with EASA • JARUS SORA is likely to be adopted by EASA, and hence CASA Risk Assessment Regulated Specific Open Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
- 22. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulation and Risk Captain Obvious: Show me the Money! “I appreciate your well thought out reservations, supported by comprehensive marketing analysis and risk identification, but we have decided to proceed with the project anyway, it just sounds really cool”
- 23. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulation and Risk Captain Obvious: Show me the Money! Microsoft funds AIRMAP for $26 M“I appreciate your well thought out reservations, supported by comprehensive marketing analysis and risk identification, but we have decided to proceed with the project anyway, it just sounds really cool”
- 24. Copyright:Terrence Martin Regulation and Risk • Shortest Distance between 2 points Captain Obvious: Show me the Money RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality
- 25. Copyright: Terrence Martin SAWG Efforts Developing an Australian Roadmap
- 26. System Certification Regulated Specific RiskAssessment Methodology Traffic Density Certification Status Population Comms & Surveillance Coverage CrewTraining Airspace Category Operation Criticality Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Identification of Low Hanging Fruit Improved awareness of what is preventing progress • Technology Shortfalls, • Skills, Knowledge, Capacity • Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population • Platform Integrity Requirements for Operations • Trial Opportunities • Separation Confidence • Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance • Navigation Performance • Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements • Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation
- 27. Copyright:Terrence Martin National Operational Priorities CONOPS Unique Sector Requirements Common Requirements ALL CONOPS Objectives •Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs development) . •Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for review Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR • Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS Roadmap Development CONOPS Development
- 28. Benchmarking (EU, US) Airspace Management Policy Human Factors CNPC Detect & Avoid Risk Management sUAS & Low Level UAVOps Ops near Aerodromes Security EmergingTech Baselining CASA Processes Approval Benchmark Available Manpower Risk Management Knowledge Gaps Safety Obligations Trial Appetite Objectives • Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment and benchmark against key international developments • Benchmark against International Standards Roadmap Development Scoping Terms of Reference Goals Scope Objectives Bounds & Limits Assumption
- 29. Copyright:Terrence Martin Developing the Roadmap 14 Key R&D Activities: • EVLOS/VLOS • 1.RPAS activities awareness for security • 2. Operations in Urban Areas • 3. Human Factors • IFR/VFR • 4. Visual Detectability solutions • 5. DAA • 6. Comms C2 Datalink • 7. Airspace & Airport Access • 8 Contingency • BVLOS • 9. DAA • 10. Comms C2 Datalink • 11 Airspace & Airport Access • 12. Security • 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR • 14 Best Practice Demonstration Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps GAPS LINKED TO ACTION & MILESTONES Operational & Technology gaps: 1. Integration into ATM and Airspace environments 2. Surface operations incl. take-off and landing 3. Operational contingency procedures and systems 4. Data communication links incl. spectrum issues 5. Detect & Avoid systems and operational procedures 6. Security issues 7. Verification and Validation Methods
- 30. Copyright:Terrence Martin Trials Evidence Requirements Skills Trial Sites Teaming Safety Expectations Trial Methodologies Feedback Expectation Developing the Roadmap Site Attributes: • Location, Airspace Class, Surveillance, Population,VHF Coverage, IFR/VFR Routes,Terrain, • Proximity to Critical Infrastructure/CBD/Aerodromes • Politics, funding, investment • Instrumentation? • Feedback of Information/Data to CASA • Call for Input on the Forum. Roadmap Development: Trials • Key Contributors: PatrickWeeden, Lance King,Terry Martin, Kristian Cruickshank
- 31. Copyright: Terrence Martin Specific Operations Risk Assessment
- 32. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAIL V : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAIL VI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Overview
- 33. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA OUTPUT Objectives to be met and the level of robustness SAIL I : 18 (Low) SAIL II : 19 (Low), 6 (Med) SAIL III : 18 (Low), 15 (Med), 6(High) SAIL IV : 3 (Low), 19 (Med), 12 (High) SAIL V : 6 (Med), 28 (High) SAIL VI : 35 (High) Training Barriers Design & Prod Barriers Ops Barriers Maint Barriers JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment SAIL is the level of confidence that a specific operation will stay under control Established SAIL will determine: • Objectives to be complied with, • Description of activities that might support the compliance with those objectives, and • Evidence to indicate the objectives have been satisfied Overview
- 34. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA process makes use of “BowTies” and employs the following key terms: • Threats &Threat Barriers • Harm and Harm Barriers • Hazards and Consequences • Ground Risk • Air Risk • The next few slides provide basic insight into bow tie use within the JARUS SORA framework Overview JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
- 35. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model Bow Ties Initial Event 1 Initial Event 3 Initial Event 2 2. What Safety Event Could Initiate the Hazard? UNDESIRABLE EVENT/TOP EVENT 3. How do we avoid the undesirable Event. How do we control the hazard HAZARD 1. What is the Hazard? 4. What Happens when Hazard Control is lost? Potential Outcome 1 Potential Outcome 2 Potential Outcome 3 Preventative Barriers 6. How can the accident Scenario Develop? What are the potential Outcomes? Mitigation/Recovery Barriers 5. How do we recover if the event occurs? How can the outcome likelihood or consequence severity be reduced?
- 36. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS Holistic Risk Model JARUS SORA : Threats, Hazard and Harm UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on Collision Course Human Error Datalink Deteroration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems THREATS HARM
- 37. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Overview: Barrier Terminology used in SORA Threat 1 Threat 3 Threat 2 UAS Loses Control HAZARD HARM Outcome 1 HARM Outcome 2 HARM Outcome 3 Threat Barriers Harm Barriers Often referred to as preventative barriers Often referred to as mitigation or recovery barriers
- 38. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Threat Barriers UAS out Of Control Technical Issues with UAS Aircraft on Collision Course Human Error Datalink Deterioration Adverse Operating Conditions Deteriorating of External Systems Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to The remote crew is trained to identify critical environmental conditions and to avoid them Environmental conditions for safe operations defined, measurable and adhered to UAS designed and qualified for adverse environmental conditions (e.g. adequate sensors, DO-160 qualification) UAS is designed to automatically manage datalink deterioration situations Datalink performance established and verified (e.g. datalink budget) Procedures and limitations are in- place and adhered to Datalink systems and infrastructure is manufactured to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is designed to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Datalink systems and infrastructure is installed and maintained to adequate standards appropriate to the operation Procs are in place to handle deterioration of external systems supporting RPAS Operations UAS is designed to manage deterioration of externals systems supporting RPAS Operations Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation The UAS is detectable by other airspace users UAS is equipped with functionality to maintain safe separation Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Multi crew coordination Adequate resting times are defined and followed Safe recovery from Human Error A Human Factors evaluation has been performed and the HMI found appropriate for the mission Automatic protection of critical flight functions (e.g. envelope protection) The operator is competent and/or proven UAS manufactured by competent and/or proven entity UAS maintained by competent and/or proven entity UAS developed to authority recognized design standards Inspection of the UAS (product inspection) Operational procedures are defined, validated and adhered to UAS is designed considering system safety and reliability Remote crew trained and current and able to control the abnormal situation Safe recovery from technical issue Threats Overview: Specific Threat Barriers identified for SORA Process
- 39. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Harm Barriers UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground Fatalities to 3rd Parties in the Air Damage to Critical Infrastructure HARM Two Types of Harm Barriers • Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm • Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Crew Training is adequate to cope with Situation Containment in place and effective Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Crew Training is adequate to cope with the situation UAS Design Features mitigate the severity of MAC UAS equipped with capability to Avoid Collision Design features that aid visibility and or detection by other aircraft Crew Training is adequate to cope with the situation Containment in place and effective (tether, geo- fencing, etc.) UAS equipped with obstacle Avoidance capability Effects of Ground Impact Reduced Allowed Operation Profile takes critical infrastructure into consideration Effects of Ground Impact are reduced
- 40. TheSORAProcess
- 41. Copyright:Terrence Martin • Step 0 -Initial Evaluation • Step 1 CONOPS Description • Step 2 • Step 2A: Determine initial UAS Ground Risk Class • Determine initial UAS Air Risk Class • Step 3. • Step 3A- Identify Harm Barriers and GRC • Step 3B- Identify Harm Barrier and ARC • Step 4 – Lethality Determination • Step 5 Specific Assurance and Integrity Levels • Step 6 Ident of RecommendedThreat Barriers • Step 7 Feasibility Check • Step 8-Verification of robustness proposed barriers THE Process Specific Operation Risk Assessment
- 42. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 1: CONOPS Applicant required to collect & provide sufficient technical, operational and human information related to the intended use of the UAS. Information supports risk assessment. Annex C has 2 key sections providing guidance for CONOPS development: • Operationally Relevant Information (Annex C.1) • Technically Relevant Information (Annex C.2)
- 43. Copyright:Terrence Martin Step 1: Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 1: CONOPS Critical Information for Decisions Organisation Operations Training Training Barriers Maintenance Crew Details Safety Normal Ops Strategy Abnormal Ops Accidents & Incidents SOPs Maint of Currency FSTDs Training Program Initial TRG & Quals RPAS RPA Geo Fence Control C2 Link GSE Applicant required to collect & provide sufficient technical, operational and human information related to the intended CONOPS to support risk assessment.
- 44. Copyright:Terrence Martin Step 1: Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 1: CONOPS Critical Information for Decisions Organisation Operations Training Training Barriers Maintenance Crew Details Safety Normal Ops Strategy Abnormal Ops Accidents & Incidents SOPs Maint of Currency FSTDs Training Program Initial TRG & Quals RPAS RPA Geo Fence Control C2 Link GSE Applicant required to collect & provide sufficient technical, operational and human information related to the intended CONOPS to support risk assessment. Agriculture: • Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture, • Pest &Weed Detection, Disaster & Emergency Services • SAR (Maritime) • Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings • CBRN • Small Scale Urban SAR • Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM Conservation Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut Logistics • Package Delivery • Long Range Freight Training • BVLOS • VLOS/EVLOS
- 45. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Step # 2 A Air Risk Class Step #2 B JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 2: Intrinsic Ground and Air Risk Determination Step 2 A and B determine INTRINSIC GRC and ARC respectively
- 46. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Step # 2 A Air Risk Class Step #2 B JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 3 : Identify Harm Barriers for GRC and ARC Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores Step #3 A & B Intrinsic GRC Score Intrinsic ARC Score
- 47. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment UAS out Of Control HAZARD Fatalities to 3rd Parties on Ground HARM Two Types of Harm Barriers • Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm • Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm Contingency Procedures are defined, validated & adhered to Crew Training is adequate to cope with Situation Containment in place and effective Effects of Ground Impact are reduced SORA Process: Step 3 A: GRC Harm Barriers • In the overview, we detailed a series of Harm Barriers forGRC, ARC and Infrastructure. • Step 3 A concentrates on the GRC
- 48. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Step # 2 A Air Risk Class Step #2 B JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 3 : Identify Harm Barriers for GRC and ARC Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores Step #3 A & B Intrinsic GRC Score Intrinsic ARC Score Adapted GRC Score Adapted ARC Score
- 49. And Repeat for the Air Risk Class!
- 50. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 4 :Lethality Determination Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores Intrinsic GRC Score Intrinsic ARC Score Adapted GRC Score Adapted ARC Score
- 51. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 4 :Lethality Determination Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores Intrinsic GRC Score Intrinsic ARC Score Adapted GRC Score Adapted ARC Score Lethality Determination Step 4
- 52. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 4: Lethality Determination 1. Lethality needs to be determined for both the Ground and Air Risk: Biggest wins 2. Three lethality Categories: High, Average or Low. 3. GROUND: Size and Energy from GRC calculations: • Impact Consequence • Likely Crash area 4. AIR: 1. In the absence of data to support lethality determination: a HIGH Lethality must be assumed Studies are being conducted and standards being written to evaluate the lethality of UAS. SORA will be updated when this occurs
- 53. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 5 : SAIL Determination Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores Intrinsic GRC Score Intrinsic ARC Score Adapted GRC Score ( 1 to 7) Adapted ARC Score (1 to 7) Lethality Score
- 54. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 5 : SAIL Determination Identify Harm Barriers and Adapt GRC and ARC Scores Intrinsic GRC Score Intrinsic ARC Score Adapted GRC Score ( 1 to 7) Adapted ARC Score (1 to 7) Lethality Score STEP 5: Score SPECIFIC ASSURANCE and INTEGRITY LEVEL
- 55. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 6: SAIL Determination SAIL SCORE STEP 6 : • Lookup Table of Recommended (Required) Threat Barriers given SAIL. • Each requires a level of Robustness • 1 of 4 categories (Optional, Low, Medium and High)
- 56. Copyright:Terrence Martin SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 6: SAIL Determination SAIL SCORE STEP 6 : • Lookup Table of Recommended (Required) Threat Barriers given SAIL. • Each requires a level of Robustness • 1 of 4 categories (Optional, Low, Medium and High)
- 57. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 8: Verification of Robustness and effectiveness of Barriers Robustness designation for each barrier define both the level of integrity required to meet the SAIL and the level of assurance required to demonstrate SAIL objective has been met.Verification required for each threat barrier according to: LOW – Applicant provides self-declaration required level of integrity achieved. MEDIUM • Applicant provides supporting evidence that required level of integrity achieved. • Local authority/qualified entity may request 3rd party validation for some supporting elements. HIGH • 3rd party validation of the achieved integrity is required
- 58. Copyright:Terrence Martin JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 8: Verification of Robustness and effectiveness of Barriers Robustness designation for each barrier define both the level of integrity required to meet the SAIL and the level of assurance required to demonstrate SAIL objective has been met.Verification required for each threat barrier according to: LOW – Applicant provides self-declaration required level of integrity achieved. MEDIUM • Applicant provides supporting evidence that required level of integrity achieved. • Local authority/qualified entity may request 3rd party validation for some supporting elements. HIGH • 3rd party validation of the achieved integrity is required Guidelines for developing and assessing robustness ofThreat and Harm barriers are in Annex A and B respectively BUT Both Annexes are not yet developed!
- 59. Copyright:Terrence Martin STEP 6 : • Identify Recommended Threat Barriers • Established Integrity Levels • Assign Robustness for each Threat Barrier SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 7: Feasibility Check SAIL SCORE
- 60. Copyright:Terrence Martin STEP 6 : • Identify Recommended Threat Barriers • Established Integrity Levels • Assign Robustness for each Threat Barrier SORA INPUT Concept of Ops Information on: • Operator • Intended Ops • UAS Description • Remote Crew SAIL Evaluation Ground Risk Class Air Risk Class Lethality SAIL Verdict JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment Step 7: Feasibility Check SAIL SCORE STEP 7 : Feasibility • Is it feasible to put all the barriers in place to enact the original CONOPS • Can Additional Harm Barriers be implemented to lower the SAIL • Can CONOPS be revised to lower the SAIL s that less onerous barriers can be used
- 61. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Expanded Operations can’t proceed until Risk Process developed • CouldWait for Europe or Could Use their principles and progress our own SORA and Australia
- 62. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead Risk Model draws on principles from QUT Practically expanded for ADF use by Nova SORA and Australia Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor • Employs BowTie XP • Comprehensive breakdown of areas identified in JARUS model • Can be used to enhance model significantly for Australian RPAS community benefit
- 63. Copyright:Terrence Martin Common Applicant CONOPS Information on: • Operator • IntendedOps • UAS Description • Remote Crew Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State CASA Assessor Templates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Submission Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model Rare or Unseen CONOPS Reviewed by a Specialist Assessment Result Assessment Result CASA HAZLOG
- 64. Copyright:Terrence Martin Common Applicant CONOPS Information on: • Operator • IntendedOps • UAS Description • Remote Crew Updated SORA Blackbox Hazard Central Event BarrierThreat Barrier Effectiveness Rating Barrier Category Consequence Barrier Degradation (or Escalation) Factor Background Models & Process to be Updated by Risk Specialists Joe Public ApplicationTemplates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Moving Ahead End State CASA Assessor Templates Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. Hello WorldI am paddingfor this document.I hope nobody can read this during the presentation.That would embarrassme.Cananyone out there read me.Smile wryly if you can, but please don’t embarrassme. SAIL I SAILVSAIL IV SAILIIISAIL I SAILV Submission Priority Templates for National Priority CONOPSSuite of Indigenous CONOPS Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. Hello WorldI am padding for this document.I hope nobody can read this duringthepresentation. That would embarrassme. Cananyone out there read me.Smile wrylyif you can, but pleasedon’t embarrass me. SORA Framework NOVA Model Rare or Unseen CONOPS Reviewed by a Specialist • Safe & Commensurate with Risk • Repeatable • Transparent • Harmonised Internationally yet Ahead of the Game Assessment Result Assessment Result CASA HAZLOG
- 65. Copyright:Terrence Martin Moving Ahead • Allows us to assess the risk for Australian Priority CONOPS • Supports Downstream Development of templates (Internal & External) • Identify Australian Gaps to cross reference against International Gaps • Transparent process that pinpoints which barriers are contributing to risk for ANY Particular operation • Some Operations may not need robust barriers- Low Hanging Fruit • Some Operations we will be uncertain about the effectiveness of barriersTrials • More Resolution about which barriers Allows us to pinpoint shortfalls in regulatory process or in missing technical enablers communicate to Industry What does it give Us?
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