Collective MemoryNature of Collective MemoryMemory is
Lecture notes week_3
1. February 5 & 7|
Explaining Cooperation and Conflict
Theoretical Foundations
Major theoretical paradigms
From premises to theory
Major theories relevant to
U.S. foreign policy
Rationalist explanations for war
Security dilemma and
offense-defense theory
Alliances and polarity
Societal-level theories
Theories of decision-making
2. Othe
Realism Liberalism Constructivism
r
Core concepts & cooperation, interdep ideals, ideology, lang
power, conflict
beliefs endence uage
Key actors / states, institutions,
states states, IGOs, NGOs
organizations IGOs
military power, int’l institutions & law,
Main tools ideas, values
diplomacy commerce
Reality largely objective largely objective largely subjective
Bargaining
zero-sum non-zero-sum non-zero-sum
context
International largely anarchic, anarchic insofar as
anarchic
system growing order assumed to be
Main cause of state pursuit of self- lack of processes to assumptions of
conflict interest regulate competition conflict and hostility
Main approach to interdependence, communication and
balance of power
peace cooperation, int’l law cooperation
shape ideas + norms
Policy cooperate for mutual
pursue self-interest to promote desired
prescriptions interests
outcome
transnational networks,
Explanatory state aggression, globalization,
cultural conflict,
power weakness of institutions democracy-promotion
terrorism
3. Realist theories Theories of rivalry and territory Decision-making theories
• Spiral Models • International Rivalries (Diehl/Goertz; • Individual Level
• Offensive /Defensive Realism Thompson/Rasler/Colaresi) • Popular Beliefs and Images
• Offensive/Defensive Balance • Territory and War • Images of the Enemy
• Balance of Power Theories • “Steps to War” Model (Vasquez) • Misperception and War
• Threat perception and strategic failure
• Balancing vs. Bandwagoning • Learning and War
• Soft Balancing Society-level theories
• Risk theory –
• Regional balancing • Democratic Peace Theories • Prospect theory
• Game-Theoretic Models of BoP • Quantitative Empirical Studies • Poliheuristic Theory (Mintz)
• Theories of polarity & capability • Informational Model (Schultz) • Crisis Decision-making theories
distribution • Theories of Regime Type • Psychoanalytic Approaches
• Alliances and War • Dictatorial Peace? • Organizational Level
• Lateral Pressure Theory (Choucri & • Domestic institutions & political • Bureaucratic Politics / Organizational
North) survival Processes
• Theories of Hegemony / • Diversionary War • Military Doctrine and Innovation
Hegemonic theories • Democracy and war outcome • Civil-Military Relations
• Militarism & strategic culture
• Power Transition Theory • Democratization & regime change
(Organski/Kugler) • Small Group Level
• Social Identity Theory • Arms races and war
• Hegemonic Transition Theory
(Gilpin) • Richardson model
Economic Theories • Theories of crisis-escalation
• Shifting Power and Preventive War
• Long Cycle Theory (Thompson, et al) • Gen. Marxist-Leninist Theories • Entrapment models
• interdependence and trade • Audience costs and domestic politics
• Loss of control and inadvertent war
Institutionalist Theories • Globalization & militarized conflict
• Institutions and Peace • Militarization & commercial rivalry Other / General
• Theories of Collective Security & • Coalitional politics models • Theories of civil war and “new wars”
Security Regimes • Ethno-nationalism and War
• Regional Security Systems Ideational and Cultural Theories • Intervention in Civil Wars
• Ideological sources of conflict and • Termination and Settlement of Civil Wars
Rational Choice Theories cooperation • Alternative theories of causation
• Prisoners' Dilemma Models • Ideas and norms (Schroeder) • Strategic theories
• Cultural differences and war • Nuclear weapons and conflict
• Single-Play and Iterated Games • War duration and termination
• “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington)
• Bargaining Model of War • Consequences of war: Winners &
• Strategic Culture
• Expected-Utility Models losers, economic costs, diffusion of war
• Attitudinal theories
• Commitment Strategies • New Conceptions of Security
• Religion and War Environmental Scarcity & Conflict
• Selectorate theory (Bueno de •
Mesquita, et al. )
• Feminist theories of peace and war • Demography, Security, &Conflict
• Refugees and Conflict
4. From premises to theory:
Realist framework
Anarchic system
State as primary unit /“unitary rational actors”
Interest defined as power
Problems
Concern for relative gains
Collective action problems
5. From premises to theory:
Realist framework
Anarchic system
State as primary unit /“unitary rational actors”
Decisions based on rational, strategic analysis
Cost/benefit analysis, preference-maximizing
Policy driven by national interest
Interest defined as power
Is war ever RATIONAL?
6. Rationalist explanations (Fearon)
Is it ever rational to go to war?
Observations
states often have incentives to compete.
certain modes of competition (e.g., war) are more costly
than other methods (negotiation, bargaining).
Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would
avoid the costs and risks of fighting?
“war is costly and risky, so rational states should have
incentives to locate negotiated settlements that all
would prefer to the gamble of war.”
7. Rationalist explanations (Fearon)
Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would
avoid the costs and risks of fighting?
Possible explanations
Anarchy (“there’s nothing to stop it”)
expected benefits exceed expected costs
rational preventive war
miscalculation due to lack of information
miscalculation or disagreement about relative power
8. Rationalist explanations (Fearon)
Why don’t states reach prewar bargains that would
avoid the costs and risks of fighting?
Plausible explanations
miscalculation due to lack of information
miscalculation or disagreement about relative power
Key factors
Bluffing and information asymmetries
Commitment problems
Issue indivisibility
9. Security Dilemma and
Offense-Defense Theory (Robert Jervis)
“Security dilemma”: An increase in one state’s security results
in relative decrease in security of others
Offense-defense theory (two variants)
Threat variant: the greater security threat states face, the
more aggressive they become.
"States seek security, and clash because their efforts to secure
themselves threaten others' security."
States fear conquest and violence against their citizens and will
aggress to avert them.
Opportunity variant: The more easily states can conquer, the
more aggressive they become.
Capacity and imperial cycles
10. Theories of Alliances:
Alliance
In/formal arrangement for cooperation between 2+ states
Mutual commitment and exchange of benefits
Costs for defection / failing to honor agreement
Questions
When and why do alliances form?
How do leaders choose among potential states or threats
when seeking external support?
How do great powers choose which states to protect?
How do weak powers decide whose protection to accept?
11. Theories of Alliances:
Balance of Power (Waltz; Walt)
Description of existing power distribution
Conscious policy to achieve BoP and stability
States will balance threat, rather than power
Distance, interdependence and ideology are important
Balancing: External (alliances); internal (increase capacity)
System characteristics determine behavior
System is anarchic, self-help
States = unitary actors that seek@ minimum, self-
preservation; @ maximum: world domination
Seek goals through balancing (internal + external)
12. Theories of Alliances:
Balance of Power (Waltz; Walt)
Description of existing power distribution
Conscious policy to achieve BoP and stability
System characteristics determine behavior
System is anarchic, self-help
States seek goals through balancing (internal + external)
Balance of Threat
States will balance threat, rather than power
Threat as a function of
Aggregate power or strength
Geographic proximity
Offensive capability
Aggressive intentions
13. Theories of Alliances:
Ideological Alliances
Birds of a feather . . .
Fly together: common ideology → alliance
Fly apart: common ideology → conflict
14. Theories of Alliances:
Ideological Alliances
Birds of a feather . . .
Fly together: common ideology → alliance
Ideological solidarity:
States lacking domestic legitimacy likely to seek ideological alliances
to increase internal and external support.
More pronounced between superpowers and regional allies
More common in bipolar system
Greater impact of ideology when defensive advantage is clear
Fly apart: common ideology → conflict
Ideological division:
Modest association, but it’s exaggerated as general pattern
Less powerful motive than threat balancing
Certain ideologies can be more source for division than unity
15. Theories of Alliances:
Ideological Alliances
Birds of a feather . . .
Fly together: common ideology → alliance
Fly apart: common ideology → conflict
General patterns
Ideologically-driven alliances most common when
states are fairly secure
the ideology does not require sovereignty be sacrificed
a rival movement creates a powerful threat to legitimacy
impact of ideology on choice of partners will be exaggerated
leaders will overestimate degree of ideological agreement
among both allies and adversaries
16. Theories of Alliances:
Balancing & Bandwagoning (Waltz; Walt)
Definitions
Balancing: states align against prevailing power/threat
Bandwagoning: states align with stronger powers /threats
Patterns
Balancing far more common
More common: in peacetime; during early stages of war; among
stronger states
Bandwagoning more common when:
Weak state can’t secure protection through balancing
State cannot find others to ally with
Join apparent winner to avoid being on losing side
17. Polarity
Number of poles
Unipolar
Bipolar
Multipolar
Degree of polarization
Tightness / density
Discreteness / degree of interaction
Level of animosity
Relationship to war
Unipolar: major war less frequent
War likely during transitions in balance
18. Polarity and Balancing
Bipolar v. multipolar balancing
Bipolar balancing occurs internally
Multipolar balancing tends to occur externally
19. Polarity and Balancing
Multipolar systems Bipolar systems
characterized by complexity, Internal balancing is easier
uncertainty and more precise
Making & maintaining Unequal burden-sharing
alliances requires expert between partners
strategy, cooperation major constraints arise from
States seek alliance partners main adversary, not partners
by adapting to them Major powers don’t need to
Weaker partner determines make themselves attractive
policy in moment of crisis to alliance partners
Flexibility in alliances leads to Rigidity of bipolar alliances
rigidity in strategy allows more flexible strategy
Miscalculation is the greatest Overreaction is the greatest
danger. danger
20. Economic theories
Marxist & dependency theories
Primacy of economics – shaping politics + society
Clash of private interests & economic classes
Structure as by-product of imperialism
Capitalist states build empires to secure markets for
excess production (Luxemburg)
Capitalist states intervene abroad to protect economic
interests, corporations (Magdoff)
Dependency / dependencia theory
MNCs & banks exercise control over developing countries
21. Economic theories
Economic interdependence (variants)
Liberals: interdependence lowers likelihood of war
by increasing value of trading over aggression
“better to trade than invade”
Realists: interdependence increases probability of
war by increasing mutual dependence &
vulnerability
Incentives to initiate war, if only for continued access to
necessary materials and goods
22. Societal-level theories
Diversionary war
To secure support, leaders make bellicose promises,
take dangerous FP positions, or seek “rally” effects
that are difficult to abandon later (Beschloss)
Democratic Peace
Democracies seldom fight each other
consolidated democracies have never fought one another
Explanations
prudent diplomacy, similar social structures, regional
attributes, historical alliances.
democratic self-interest
23. Societal-level theories:
Democratic Peace (Kant, Doyle)
Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?
Doyle: four basic institutions / constitutional features
citizens are all equal and enjoy equal rights
representative government
private property rights
economics governed by supply and demand.
Kant: three key factors
states must be republics
states will gradually establish a “pacific union”
all states must respect "cosmopolitan law“
24. Democratic peace (Doyle, Kant)
Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?
Combining Doyle & Kant
Constitutional law & democratic self interest
Democratic-republican structures reinforce caution about
high costs of war
International law – and mutual respect – for other states
Complements constitutional guarantee of caution, helps
engender future cooperation
States respect “cosmopolitan law” & “spirit of commerce”
Adds material incentives to moral commitments
Together, these conditions create foundation for the
establishment and expansion of a “pacific union”
25. Democratic peace (Doyle, Kant)
Why don’t liberal-democracies fight one another?
“pacific union” formed by
Constitutional law & democratic self interest
International law – and mutual respect – for other states
States respect “cosmopolitan law” & “spirit of commerce”
Why do they fight other states?
Why not push for world-wide democratization?
26. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)
Institution
“general pattern or categorization of activity” – or –
“particular human-constructed arrangement”
“involve persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity,
and shape expectations”
How/why do institutions form?
27. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)
Puzzle of formation
rational choice predicts cooperation & institutions
prisoner's dilemma not applicable: iterated and multi-
issue PD encourages cooperation
collective action problems less severe when relatively
small number of parties
selective incentives
“rational anticipation” and functionalism
Actors form institutions based on functions they expect
the institution to serve
Property rights & legal liability
Reducing transaction costs
Reducing uncertainty & providing information
Adverse selection effects
28. Neoliberal Institutionalism (Keohane)
Puzzle of compliance
Why comply if regimes can't enforce their rules?
Continuity and formation costs
States value institution enough to cooperate even when
they prefer not to (in a single instance) in order to maintain
the institution.
"Networks of issues and regimes"
states know that failure to comply may result in tit-for-tat
retaliation.
states involved in iterated interactions worry about
reputation and affects on future cooperation.
29. Other major theories
Nationalism (Hayes, Snyder)
Nationalism complicates imperial rule & support
Collective action (Hardin, Olson)
"tragedy of the commons“ & "free rider" problems
Collective goods are under-provided; collective costs are
over-provided.
Gender theories
Foreign policy & state behavior reflects male attributes
found in leaders
Domino theory
Conquest of a given state will ease subsequent conquest of
nearby states
30. Theories of decision-making:
Cognitive theories (Jervis)
Attribution theory: states attribute own behavior to
circumstances; attribute others' behavior to character
Behavioral corollary: states tend to ascribe others' good
behavior to their own efforts; blame others' bad conduct on
the other's innate character.
Belief perseverance: states are slow to absorb new facts
and realities that clash with existing beliefs
Common misperceptions:
States will exaggerate shared character of information, often
unaware when others‘ perceptions diverge from their own
States tend to exaggerate the centralized, disciplined, and
coordinated character of others' behavior.