Engl_дослідження1_10-11-DM_-МЕДІА-СПОЖИВАННЯ-жовтень-2022-2-4.pptx

THE UKRAINIAN AUDIENCE AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE FULL-
SCALE WAR: CHANGES IN MEDIA CONSUMPTION, PERCEPTION OF
THE INFORMATION SPACE, SENSITIVITY TO DISTORTED CONTENT
ANALYTICAL REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF A QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
© DETEKTOR MEDIA CBO
October, 2022

CONTENTS
2
1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
2. GENERAL RESULTS
2.1. General assessment of changes in the Ukrainian information
space after the beginning of the Full-scale War
2.2. The dynamics of media preferences of the audience over
the last year. Popular projects: their advantages and consumption
motives
2.3. Propaganda and distorted content perception in the times
of war
2.4. Changes in self-awareness and values of Ukrainians after
the beginning of russian aggression
3. CONCLUSIONS

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4
The purpose of the study is to analyse the audience's perception of the Ukrainian media space after
the start of the war with the russian federation; changes in media consumption, sensitivity and
attitude to propaganda, as well as possible transformations of the identity and values of Ukrainians.
Methodology: qualitative research; focused group interviews (FGI).
Scope: Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa, Vinnytsia, Lviv.
Sampling scope: 8 FGI; 1 FGI = 8 respondents.
Duration: 1 FGI lasted up to 2.5 hours.
Target audience: women and men, 20-50 years old.
Design
Field stage: 21 August 2022–30 August 2022
№FGI City Sex Age
FGI №1 Kyiv
Male/Female
(50/50)
20–35
FGI №2 Kyiv 20–35
FGI №5 Lviv 36–50
FGI №6 Odesa 20–35
FGI №7 Vinnytsia 36–50
FGI №8 Dnipro 20–35

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5
■ When considering the results of the study, it should be noted that
focus group interviews (FGI) are a specific, qualitative method of
research.
■ The results of such a research are not representative and cannot be
considered as a complete, statistically verified reflection of reality.
■ The aim of qualitative methods is to study the problem from “the
inside" perspective, from the point of view of experts (people who
had specific experience, the research participants) and to gain all
the diversity of possible opinions and tendencies, to study possible
trends in attitudes, evaluations, preferences and motivation.

6
2.1. General assessment of changes in the Ukrainian
information space after the beginning of the Full-Scale War

7
The changes in the Ukrainian media space, which were mentioned most often during the discussions: (1) the transition
to the format of the informational “News United” ("Yedyni Novyny") telethon, (2) a significant increase in Ukrainian-
language content quality - musical, entertaining, informative and educational, (3) a reduction in russian broadcasting
and, consequently, pro-russian narratives in the mass media. The absolute majority of the discussion participants
approve of the latter developments, the evaluations of the telethon though are not that unanimous.
CHANGES IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA SPACE
The general attitude of the audience towards the transition to such a broadcasting format can be generalised
this way: "In the times of war, such a format is a plus. It’s all about information security. In the time of peace - it is
a minus" (Kyiv, seniors).
TELETHON
"News
United"
POSITIVE ASSESSMENTS NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS
■ The marathon is a sign of national unity in the
face of critical threats caused by the russian
invasion. During the discussions, it was noted
that the unification of TV channels belonging
to competing financial and political groups
carried a symbolic and inspiring meaning.
■ "News United" is an important element of
Ukraine's informational stability, counter to
russian propaganda.
● The marathon voices only a single official point of view on
the events, with no alternative opinions. The participants of
the discussions noted that a certain level of censorship
and articulation of propaganda narratives is quite
appropriate during wartime. However, the majority uses
some other sources to get more diverse information: like
Telegram, Viber, YouTube channels.
● "Different TV channels used to provide diverse information,
today - it is all about one point of view. That is, information
is analysed, conveyed, adjusted in a single way... there
are very few different analysts, different opinions... I don't
understand what is true or false" (Vinnytsia, senior).

8
TELETHON
"News
United"
POSITIVE ASSESSMENTS NEGATIVE ASSESSMENTS
■ Only loyal to the authorities media groups are
involved in the telethon. "Such a selective
unification of some TV channels and rejection of
others... may indicate an attack on freedom of
speech" (Kyiv, seniors).
■ Irritation, caused by the involvement of reporters
who used to promote russian propaganda
narratives in the media. "They recruited a bunch
of reporters, who, in my opinion, they should have
gotten rid of a long time ago" (Lviv, seniors).
■ In some cases, the low level of professionalism of
reporters involved in the national marathon was
noted. "I don't know what kind of journalism
courses they graduated, probably three-day
ones... Well, their way of presentation and
knowledge of the language is probably at the
‘Skabeeva level’" (Lviv, seniors).

9
UKRAINIAN
CONTENT
■ The audience notes a striking increase in Ukrainian-language content in social networks, on various
subjects. The fact is mainly relevant in regards to YouTube, Telegram and Instagram. It is worth
noting that for half of the respondents, coming across an original and interesting product of the
Ukrainian-speaking segment of the Internet was a surprise. "I realised that quality content is made in
Ukraine, no worse than in russia" (Kyiv, young people).
■ First of all, this applies to news channels that provide up-to-date information on social and political
topics. Since the beginning of the war, many Telegram, YouTube channels, and podcasts have
appeared, which inform the audience about the situation at the front in a prompt and professional
manner, with the involvement of experts, photo and video materials from the witnesses.
■ In recent months, participants have discovered some interesting scientific and educational content
in Ukrainian. The participants of the discussions also noted an increase in the number of products
dedicated to the history and culture of Ukraine. "I really like science... I clicked, watched it, it was
relevant to me, and the following video was also interesting and very engaging. Really relevant"
(Kyiv, seniors).
■ The statement also applies to Ukrainian popular music. During the discussions, the respondents
repeatedly admitted that before the war, they had never heard of many original Ukrainian
performers / groups, but now their work is recognized.
“I did not see any difference between Ukrainian and russian content on the Internet, on YouTube.
We are from Odesa, we got used to listening in russian... At some point, I discovered that half of
them were from Ukraine after all. They switched to the Ukrainian language ... in the course of the
last six months. I was pleasantly surprised. It was a discovery for me that we have such a nice, fully
formed Ukrainian-language YouTube ... I began to listen actively” (Odesa, young people).

10
PRO-RUSSIAN
CONTENT
For the majority of the audience, the radical Ukrainisation of the media space is a positive and
long awaited step. It was noted that since the beginning of the russian invasion, the Ukrainian
information space:
■ has almost no russian-language content;
■ thanks to the telethon, openly pro-russian programs on TV stopped broadcasting. In
addition, many experts who contributed to the interests of the enemy (knowingly or
unknowingly) — criticised state institutions, promoted the narratives of russian
propaganda, and caused division in society — have left the air. "... All these shows, like
Savik Schuster's one, all these different platforms were eliminated. A bunch of experts like
Chaplyga, Olena Lukash, Palchevskyi — you don't see them anymore... on the channels.
That is, the market sets the agenda, so they have left this market. That's a plus now"
(Vinnytsia, seniors).
■ young people are less interested in russian pop music, gradually moving towards
Ukrainian music. "I like that there is no more russian pop music, I can see my son, the
young people, gradually moving away from it. Because... through music, they affect the
brains of our young people" (Vinnytsia, seniors).

11
The following changes in the domestic media since the beginning of the war were mentioned by the respondents:
■ Increase in patriotic content, oriented towards developing national identity and unity. “It’s bad that no
attention was paid to this. Only after the war started, they came to this, to the fact that we are Ukraine, we
should have something patriotic, something of our own. Now they are trying to implement it in an abrupt
manner” (Dnipro, young people);
■ Politicisation of the information space. There is almost no entertainment content on television and social
media. Most of the programmes have a socio-political focus. "The entertaining programmes are all about the
war too. "Bayraktar Show" ... there have been much fewer films, TV series" (Kyiv, seniors);
■ Taboo on criticising the authorities actions. It was noted that many issues that exist in society regarding
preparations for war, certain appointments among officials, support of the army, etc., are not discussed in the
media, because "the time is not right". "Socially significant topics are kept silent. Lots of questions. For example,
there were collaborators, people acting in the enemy's interest, I suppose. They don't talk about it. Things that
benefit the government are mentioned, things that don’t - are silenced" (Kyiv, seniors). The general opinion of
the audience is that the government should be criticised even in difficult times of war, but the criticism should
be objective and come from society, not political opponents using dirty technologies;
■ Silencing socially sensitive information. The participants of the discussions noticed that there are certain topics
that have not been covered by any Ukrainian media since the beginning of the war. First of all, the losses
among our soldiers, the material support of the army, the scale of the economic problems that the country is
facing. The attitude towards such censorship differs, but the majority of respondents consider it quite
appropriate. "This is necessary in order not to dissociate society during the war" (Vinnytsia, seniors); "If we cover
this information, the enemy gets this information as well" (Kyiv, seniors).

12
The following changes in the national media since the beginning of the war were mentioned:
■ In the first months of the war, russian liberals who condemned the war, but at the same time articulated the
narratives of the "russkiy mir" were invited to speak. The attitude of the audience towards such interventions is
rather neutral-negative. "A phenomenon, so to say. russians invaded Ukrainian media space'' (Odesa, young
people); "These "nice russians" like Bykov, Nevzorov and the others, still deliver russian propaganda, in more
obscure ways. Thus, they want to stay in their comfortable space, but on the territory of Ukraine" (Vinnytsia,
seniors);
■ Tolerating obscene language. If the audience notices censorship on official channels, the opposite is true in
regards to the social media segment: more expressiveness, openness, less censorship. "... I don't like that there is
so much cursing. It’s just too much. This is the population degrading" (Kyiv, young people); "If it's just a hint,
everyone would understand what was implied, but to say it directly on air, I think it's inappropriate. Things
should be filtered a little" (Vinnytsia, seniors).
During the discussions, there was an opinion that Ukrainian-language media content is beginning to dominate,
successfully replacing russian-language media content. It seems to have come out of the shadows, became visible
to Ukrainians and surprised them with the level of quality. In addition, certain shifts were observed globally.
“Some time ago, when you typed in the name of a programme, you got russian content as a
result. Now, even when it comes to Google, some changes have taken place, and you type in
Ukrainian, so Ukrainian programmes, Ukrainian brands, Ukrainian manufacturers are displayed for
you as a result, and this is very cool” (Kyiv, young people).

13
2.2.The dynamics of media preferences of the audience
over the last year. Popular projects: their advantages and
consumption motives

14
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the russian federation, the nature of media consumption of the majority in
discussions participants has changed significantly. Most often they mentioned: (1) a radical shift towards the direction of
socio-political news; (2) almost complete rejection of entertaining content in the first 3-5 weeks of the war and a slow /
partial return to pre-war practices after a few months; (3) getting rid of russian media products. Different content aspects
are taken into account — from literature, music, films / series to podcasts and vlogs on numerous subjects; (4) interest in
educational projects on the history and culture of Ukraine (mainly among young people).
MEDIA PREFERENCES DYNAMICS
OVER THE LAST YEAR
SOCIO-POLITICAL
CONTENT
■ In the first weeks of the war, all the attention of Ukrainians was focused on the events at the front, the
official announcements from the authorities and the reaction of the international community to the
russian invasion. Among the main sources of such information was the national television marathon
"News United", official Telegram channels, national online publications and channels in social media
(YouTube, Telegram, Twitter, etc.). "I didn't really watch the news before, I didn't have time for it. But
after the 24th, I switched to the news mainly...no time for entertainment now" (Kyiv, young people).
■ When the tension of the first weeks has passed, the intensity of consumption of social and political
news and the number of sources of such content decreased. Still, the majority of the audience,
regardless of age and region of residence, consider the news to be the central element of media
consumption. "At first, I subscribed to many news channels that were related to the war, then I
unsubscribed a couple, now I follow …the most relevant ones, and check them every day" (Dnipro,
young people).

15
OVER THE LAST YEAR
ENTERTAINI
NG
CONTENT
■ Most of the discussions participants noted the decrease in the consumption of entertaining
programmes, and almost everyone experienced certain changes in their preferences.
▪ Humorous and entertaining vlogs, which present current information in a humorous, satirical
form and make fun of russians, the military and political leadership of the russian federation,
kremlin propaganda narratives, etc., have become a popular format. For example, such
projects as "Durnev checks Zombi stories", "Lions on jeeps", "Rahulivna", "Television Toronto",
"Veterans of space forces", "Cool news", "Antizombie", "Newspalm", "What’s wrong?", "Pick(g)s
of the week", "Bayraktar show", etc. The audience of such projects is dominated by young
people. "It's still strange to watch the news only. News with humour is perceived with greater
ease" (Kyiv, seniors); "We have already experienced so much pain and fear, and we are
constantly angry, so now we want some humour" (Odesa, young people).
As the respondents noted, such shows entertain, lift the mood, evoke optimism, inform about the latest
events, and also channel negative emotions towards enemies and relieve stress. "I watch Durnev. It's very
funny. It's very entertaining... people have a negative attitude towards russians, so he...channels this
negativity through a video. People watch, laugh. It was bad for us, then it got bad for the enemy - it’s great.
He makes fun of these stuff" (Kyiv, young people).
SOCIO-
POLITICAL
CONTENT
■ Such russian opposition channels: "Popularnaya politika", "Michael Naky", "Nastoyashchee vremya",
"Dozhd" and others were added to the scope of socio-politically oriented programmes. Such type of
content is of interest to every fourth to fifth discussion participant of the older age group. The
respondents noted that this is the way they try to balance the information from Ukrainian official
sources and evaluate the enemy's attitude towards the events. "I just want to see the reaction from a
different point of view, although it is not russia represented, as they are located abroad... A demo-
version of reactions and assessments from the russian point, so to say" (Kyiv, seniors).

16
OVER THE LAST YEAR
ENTERTAININ
G CONTENT
▪ Chatroulettes became the part of the content that the audience has been interested in since
the beginning of the war. More than a third of the respondents (young people mostly) noted
that they watch Ukrainian Tiktok and YouTube bloggers who communicate with russians: like
Andriy Luhanskyi, Zalypukha, Sichnya, Volnova, Ochakov TV and others. The main motive for
consuming such content is trying to understand the nature of russian aggression: "What is in
these people’s heads, why do they think like that?... I want to understand why the russian
people are against us... why do they hate us?" (Odesa, young people).
▪ Some types of content, that engaged the interest before, have lost part of its audience. “I used
to watch different entertainment shows: “Master Chef”, “Supermodel”, different things for
women ... Then, I wasn’t interested anymore... Now I think it was dumb” (Odesa, young people).
The same applies for the content of russian production.
REJECTING
EVERYTHING
RUSSIAN
■ Three out of four respondents gave up russian media content on various subjects, mainly
entertainment. Only a few respondents still follow those russian bloggers who publicly condemned the
war (Dud’, Naka, Nevzorov, Varlamov and others).
“I stopped watching all the entertaining content that was produced in russia. Personally, I replaced some of
those programmes with Ukrainian ones. I found equivalents, that’s enough for me. I just think that our views
are sponsoring them, so they are getting paid by YouTube anyways” (Kyiv, young people).
"I stopped watching russian channels. I unfollowed russian bloggers on Instagram. I realised that there is a lot
of russian propaganda actually" (Kyiv, young people).

17
OVER THE LAST YEAR
REJECTING
EVERYTHING
RUSSIAN
HISTORY
AND
CULTURE OF
UKRAINE
■ The full-scale invasion of the russian federation made the national self-awareness relevant to a
significant number of Ukrainians. In addition, the spread of russian propaganda narratives stimulated
the audience's interest in the history of Ukrainian statehood, ethos, and cultural heritage. This was
followed by the growing popularity of content devoted to the history of Ukraine, its traditions, and
culture. One third of the surveyed audience noted that they enjoy watching channels with such
subject focus: "History without Myths", "The wilds", "Damn Rationalist".
“There is a Ukrainian historian - Alferov - he is at the front now. He makes some vlogs at the same time, ... For
example, about the “LPR”. What actually happened there. Why a red and black flag instead of a yellow
and blue. I started watching more historical content. Turns out, in order to know the future, you need to
learn the history” (Dnipro, young people).
■ It is worth noting, the trend applies the audience in all regions, including mostly russian-speaking ones
- the East and the South. “If I come across a channel that is russian or that is associated with russia, I
turn it off immediately. Even when I hear some lyrics about russia in a song, I turn it off ... If the channel
comes with a clearly pro-russian position, then I blacklist it. I watched russian films or series. Now we
have switched to our films” (Dnipro, young people).

18
2.3. Perception of propaganda and distorted content in
the times of war

19
● The conventional understanding of the term "propaganda" among the audience is that it is an informational
influence on certain categories of people with the aim of changing their attitude towards certain persons,
situations, events, etc. "Propaganda is about instilling some single opinion into the masses" (Kyiv, seniors); "It's
anything that involves presenting information in such a way as to lead you to a certain opinion. Thus, propaganda
is everything that makes you do something. This is not just a bare presentation of information" (Kyiv, young people).
● For most participants, propaganda does not carry negative connotations only. It can be useful, convey quite
positive messages. "Propaganda is neither a negative nor a positive phenomenon... Propaganda of a healthy
lifestyle or propaganda against smoking is a usual thing" (Dnipro, young people).
● The respondents note that with the beginning of the russian invasion in February 2022, they began to come across
both Ukrainian and russian propaganda more often. Most believe that propaganda is one of the key elements of
information warfare and is always intensified during armed conflicts. Propaganda in the national media, directed
towards the national consumer, is perceived as a completely justified and necessary means of mobilising and
consolidating society in a period of critical threat. "During the war, propaganda is important, especially for the
defending party" (Dnipro, young people); "State structures, information agencies... they are obliged to do this...
they must lift our spirit" (Kyiv, young people); "Our propaganda is tough. Patriotic only." (Kyiv, seniors).
PERCEPTION OF PROPAGANDA
■ Narratives that are constantly repeated in different messages. Propaganda can be identified when the same
messages in different forms appear over a long period of time. Sometimes this is quite an aggressive
implementation of certain ideas. "When they repeat the same thing again and again. It must be
propaganda then" (Vinnytsia, seniors); "You watch, and realise that you are being pumped with this syringe,
again and again, always the same thing" (Kyiv, seniors).
HOW UKRAINIANS DETECT PROPAGANDA?

20
Manipulation. The main tool of propaganda are various manipulative techniques. These might include:
● (1) event coverage from a single, beneficial point of view;
● (2) the assessments carry a clear polarisation of good / bad, beautiful / ugly, and other value dichotomies. "War is
always black and white. If you are looking for different shades during the war, you start to doubt things" (Dnipro,
young people);
● (3) silencing the information contradicting the messages that must be conveyed to the audience. The
respondents understand that the Ukrainian mass media do not cover certain sensitive topics related to the
situation at the front, the losses on our side. Four out of five consider such a way of coverage absolutely justified.
"... There is a lack of accurate information on our losses... the current situation is portrayed to be better than it
actually is. I believe that Ukraine has no right to tell such a truth, say that things are bad and everything is not that
shiny. Because it is very demoralising, and causes the loss of courage" (Kyiv, senior);
○ “For example, the fact that Ukrainians do not flee, do not surrender. It can’t be that way, no matter how
good we are, there are still some people who give up or go to the other side. Propaganda hides this fact,
and exaggerates the contrary” (Dnipro, young people);
○ “The true state of the economy is not mentioned. Some negative moments are not getting covered. We
are always doing well. All is well at the front. Everything is fine with the president, everything is fine
everywhere. No matter the war” (Kyiv, seniors);
● (4) hyperbolising things. “It could be anything, it could be an exaggeration of the truth. Truth and lies go hand in
hand" (Kyiv, young people); "Exaggerated fact, the same as with Chornobayivka. Everyone liked that —
Chornobayivka 12.0, Chornobayivka 13.0. It really happened, but the scale of it was exaggerated" (Dnipro, young
people).
○ According to the respondents, disinformation can also be used, but it is neither the main nor a necessary
part of propaganda.
HOW UKRAINIANS DETECT PROPAGANDA?

21
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF PROPAGANDA? MAIN NARRATIVES OF UKRAINIAN PROPAGANDA
■ According to the respondents, the main goal of Ukrainian propaganda is to unite the nation against the aggressor,
encourage confidence in the upcoming victory, and alleviate stress from the terrible experiences of war. "... to lift the
spirit, soothe the pain" (Kyiv, young people).
■ The following propaganda narratives were most often encountered by the respondents:
"Ukraine wins, no matter what";
"Ukrainians are more united than ever and can’t be broken";
"The Armed Forces are extremely effective", "Trust the Armed Forces";
"russia is in the state of crisis, on the verge of collapse";
"The russian army is demoralised, poorly equipped."
■ The absolute majority of those interviewed believe that the government implements a correct and effective
communication strategy to support the stability among people during a difficult challenge. "To be honest, such
propaganda protects our country. There are people who stayed, we are here, we didn't escape" (Kyiv, seniors).
■ Only in some cases was it noted that some narratives should be excluded or softened. For example, the dehumanisation
of the enemy, the cultivation of hatred towards russians, and the seek for revenge. Such things eliminate the moral
superiority of Ukrainians over russians. "It is better not to talk about the murder of russians that much. It's very appealing.
On the one hand, it seems right, but on the other hand, if you look at the military personnel, most of them try not to be
blinded by hatred, as they are true professionals" (Kyiv, young people).

22
■ Almost every group discussion mentioned Oleksiy Arestovych's speeches in the first weeks of the war.
Although now his optimistic forecasts are perceived rather ironically, for many his interviews were almost
the only factor of emotional stability. "Arestovych was a tool of soothing Ukrainian propaganda. If he
hadn't helped to go through the first 2-3 weeks, people would have been more tense, would have been
more likely to panic. The fewer of them would stay in Ukraine or in Kyiv" (Kyiv, young people);
“I used to watch Arestovych every day actually ... Like he was there, to ease my pain, to satisfy the
need to be told that everything was fine. Now I don't have these needs anymore, so I don’t watch him”
(Dnipro, young people).
■ Some other original and interesting projects of the Ukrainian media with a propaganda orientation were
also mentioned:
Chatroulette "Their main goal is to show people that we are different from russia indeed... And we don't
need them at all... This is relevant... And entertaining at the same time" (Kyiv, young people);
The project called "Durnev checks stories";
Sternenko channel. "He has a clear and consistent attitude" (Lviv, seniors).
THE MOST SUCCESSFUL PROPAGANDA PRODUCTS

23
UKRAINIAN VS. RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA
■ During the discussions, the audience was asked to compare Ukrainian and russian propaganda in the times of
war. According to the respondents, the main differences are as follows:
UKRAINIAN PROPAGANDA RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA
1. Propaganda has significantly increased since the
beginning of the war, but alternative opinions can still be
found in the media. In the country, despite martial law, the
freedom of speech is preserved.
2. More humane by nature, appeals to sympathy and
emotions. "Ukrainian propaganda... it is rather more vital...
with all the tears and its soul" (Lviv, seniors).
3. Manipulative, but doesn’t use fakes and lies too often.
“We are not filming staged videos, thank God” (Odesa,
young people); “... We do not blame anyone out of the
blue and do not spread fakes” (Kyiv, seniors).
4. Much smaller budget and experience compared to
soviet-russian propagandists. "Still growing. Not fully
developed" (Kyiv, seniors).
5. Cultivates patriotism for the sake of defending.
1. Almost omnipresent, obsessive, aggressive
"Zombifying, degrading" (Kyiv, seniors).
2. Absolutely cynical, violent, justifying the genocide of
Ukrainians. “russian propaganda is generally directed
against Ukrainians and is very aggressive. Almost to the
extent of genocide, nuclear weapons use. We don't talk
about destroying russia. We talk more properly, softer”
(Kyiv, seniors).
3. Lies are a key element. "Propaganda should dress up
things a bit, but not just lie" (Dnipro, young people).
4. A huge budget and a vast experience of affecting
public consciousness.
5. Cultivates patriotism for the sake of destroying another
nation.

24
FAKES AND MEANS OF DETECTING
INACCURATE CONTENT
The main insights during the discussion of this block of questions can be generalised as following:
The main source of fake news is:
● 1) reporters/ bloggers, who like to “hype” on sensitive topics and don’t manage to verify information in time. “They
are trying to present it faster, and then it turns out to be inaccurate. Due to the fact that the channels compete
with each other, whoever publishes the news first, is better. ‘My brother said, someone’s son said, somebody told
me ... someone is serving in this very battalion’ - such information spreads to the public. Through Viber, in Telegram
channels, on Facebook” (Dnipro, young people). It was noted that the most active disinformation was spreading
at the beginning of the war, when the media was actually feeding on people's fears and state of being lost.
“Right at the beginning of the war it could be seen everywhere. A throw-in info, so to say. How Kyiv would be
bombed, carpet bombing. Poland could be bombed. ..They could drop a nuclear bomb, that's it. People were
escalating things "(Kyiv, young people)
● 2) Intended or unintended spread of russian propaganda narratives the enemy was trying to fill the Ukrainian
information space with. Such content is usually spread with a systematic work of PSYOP specialists that involve an
army of bots. "russia throws in the information, spends a huge amount of money, uses a lot of people, resources"
(Kyiv, seniors). However, in a significant number of cases, disinformation is spread by Ukrainians with good
intentions. ".. it happens so that in social networks even the patriotic Ukrainians themselves accidentally pick up
these fakes and start spreading them" (Kyiv, seniors)
Opinions of the audience on whether the number of fakes in the Ukrainian media space has increased since the beginning
of the war were divided. Half believe that there is no more unreliable information left, others, on the contrary, believe that
the number of fakes has increased significantly. However, all discussion participants have come across distorted content
and are convinced to be able to identify it in most of the cases.

25
INACCURATE CONTENT
▪ Most of the unreliable information can be found in Telegram and Viber channels. In official sources it
happens less.
▪ Typical subjects of fakes observed by the respondents are(1) seemingly inevitable tragic events (nuclear
attack, use of chemical/biological weapons by the enemy, etc.), (2) stories about betrayal of national
interests by the government, the Armed Forces, the Security Service of Ukraine, etc., (3) "POV" stories about
hostile residents of the western regions and annoying immigrants from the East. The audience clearly defines
the purpose of such narratives, which is intimidation, panic spread, causing distrust in the authorities,
dividing Ukrainians and setting Western Ukraine against russian-speaking refugees from the East. "My
godmother told me that they came to Lviv, got drunk, cursed all the time, and demanded something in
russian. People I know actually spread these things! I visit this woman's account, search with Google
pictures, and see that she lives in Moldova and is actually a part of... she has some kind of russian-Moldovan
friendship community in the background of her photo" (Kyiv, seniors).
HOW INACCURATE CONTENT IS DETECTED
■ On the basis of 8 focused group discussions, it is difficult to say whether the sensitivity of Ukrainians to distorted
content increased during the war times or not. Still, it is certainly possible to note an increasing sensitivity to
enemy propaganda.
“I followed various russian media. Not many, 2-3 publics in general, but I followed them as a source of information,
quite reliable one. Now… the same sources also seem to be not that biassed, but it is interesting to note that while
the whole world is saying one thing, and the russian foreign ministry is saying another, they would choose the russian
foreign ministry statements” (Odesa, young people).

26
INACCURATE CONTENT
■ At almost every discussion, it was noted that Ukrainian information resistance specialists debunk russian fakes
at once and this information is quite successfully promoted by the Ukrainian media. "Our people have already
learned to find, tell and convey it to the public very fast" (Kyiv, seniors); "People are able to filter the
information, they have become more proficient. There is a channel on Viber ... "Resisting disinformation"...
where it is demonstrated whether something is actually disinformation or fake" (Odesa, young people).
■ The following main practices of verifying information were mentioned:
1. Searching for information on some event in other sources, incl. official ones. “I’m tracking the same
information across multiple news channels. Then compare and analyse it. The information that match is most
likely to be true” (Kyiv, young people);
2. Referring to the original source of the message. "... You can find direct links to the news. In magazines, for
example, you turn on Google Translate - they tell one thing, but in the translation version it is completely
different. Such magazines, as Bild and others" (Lviv, seniors);
3. Checking photos through applications, including Google. "The picture often raises doubts. Then you see that it
is either photoshopped, or is information from 15 years ago, or even did not happen in this country.
Sometimes even Ukrainians, patriots with good intentions, spread those things" (Vinnytsia, seniors);
4. Looking for interviews / comments by experts on taken issues, or reporters whose opinions are trusted. "Yuriy
Butusov or Mykhailo Tkach - they value their reputation very much. They wouldn’t spread it. As for me, the
golden standards of journalism such as Western journalism are represented in Ukraine by these very people.
Yanina Sokolova, as well. To spread fakes is considered to be shameful" (Kyiv, seniors);
5. Discussing the event with people they consider competent.

27
INACCURATE CONTENT
■ However, the number of materials that consumers actually verify remains insignificant. Usually, this is
really important, exciting content, which makes up no more than 5% of all statements that a person
receives. "I'm saying things how they are, you just trust the message. If you like it, then everything is
okay" (Kyiv, young people).
■ Therefore, it is possible to gain reliable information about the dynamics of sensitivity of Ukrainians to
disinformation only with help of a quantitative study, which involves a standard instrument and a
significantly larger number of respondents.

28
2.4. Changes in self-awareness and values of Ukrainians
after the beginning of russian aggression

29
CHANGES IN SELF-AWARENESS AND
VALUES OF UKRAINIANS
During the discussions, participants were asked to share their impressions of how the war affected Ukrainians, their
practices, identity, and values. The following changes were noted:
IN THE SYSTEM OF VALUES
■ People have learned to live day by day, with almost no plans for the future. “The main thing is that everyone
rushed to do some projects: “Come on, let's go.” People used to postpone. Whether it is getting a pet dog or
going to the sea” (Kyiv, young people); “The war evokes that ‘life cannot be postponed’ syndrome ” (Lviv,
seniors); “You begin to appreciate every day more, you didn’t realise such things, but now you understand that
you need to appreciate it and enjoy every minute” (Dnipro, young people).
■ There was a certain shift from material to existential values. Many Ukrainians have realised that their own life
and the lives of their loved ones are the most important, have processed the importance of simple human
communication and mutual support. "Since the beginning of the war, I have started to text "Good morning" to
all my relatives every morning, or they text me. That's how I keep in touch... You don't worry so much anymore"
(Vinnytsia, seniors); "In communication, you start to appreciate your relatives more, to communicate more and
support each other" (Dnipro, young people).
■ Understanding the importance of unity and mutual help for the sake of victory. The same applies not to
interpersonal contacts only, but also to the interaction of society and the authorities, cooperation between
institutions. "You don't need to go somewhere, argue with someone, or prove something. People who migrated
from Donetsk understand that it is necessary to somehow unite as well" (Kyiv, young people); "If we want to win,
consolidation must be complete, as it happened in Israel. The war goes on, you see" (Kyiv, seniors).

30
IN THE SYSTEM OF VALUES
■ Increase in trust and respect for the military. “I started to appreciate the military more. The
Armed Forces became my heroes. Ordinary soldiers… they are true patriots and defend their
land” (Odesa, young people).
■ For the first time, pride for the country and fellow citizens seems to appear. "Somehow, I would
like to channel the thought that Ukraine is a strong, powerful state. There is pride, and I want
to demonstrate my belonging" (Kyiv, seniors); "People started to respect themselves as
Ukrainians" (Vinnytsia, seniors).

31
CHANGES IN SELF-AWARENESS
■ The participants of the discussions note a striking increase in patriotic sentiments. After the shock of the first weeks
of the war, came the realisation of what we might lose if Ukraine surrenders. "I started to love Ukraine, and I admit
that I didn't notice, didn't respect our country so much before... and now it’s quite the opposite..." (Dnipro, young
people). In addition, the violence demonstrated by occupants provoked a natural rejection of everything russian:
language, culture, production, including media.
▪ The majority of citizens finally understood that russia is the enemy of Ukrainian statehood, and the goal of
the invasion is the genocide of Ukrainians. "There is no doubt left on who our neighbours really are" (Kyiv,
young people); "The first week, when they started bombing Kharkiv,... I experienced a total shift, I
understood that they really wanted to wipe these cities off the earth, and I had such an epiphany... They
are barbarians" (Vinnytsia, seniors).
▪ Mass switching to Ukrainian among russian speakers. "I used to communicate in russian more, but now I'm
fundamentally changing this and correcting myself... When I hear only Ukrainian in the content I consume,
that's a good thing, it means my environment has changed" (Vinnytsia, seniors).
▪ The urge to better understand the history of the country, ethnic groups, especially those periods, that were
distorted in coverage by soviet, and now russian, propaganda. “I knew that the war was going on in the
East, but I never really thought about it. At the beginning of the war, I began to understand what was
happening there. I read both their news and our news, compared, and started to talk to people. I am still
very ashamed, you absolutely need to watch the news, you need to look further than just your own
surroundings”(Odesa, young people).
▪ Transition to consumption of Ukrainian-language media content (partial or full).
▪ Active involvement in volunteer activities, financial assistance to the army, victims of the occupation, etc.

32
THINGS THAT IMPRESSED THE MOST AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
■ In some cases, it was noted that the final formation of the Ukrainian political nation is still in the process. "Society
is going through a huge trauma. However, this is precisely the process of nation forming - at such cost, with huge
sacrifices. Now we have a chance to finish what had to be finished 100 years ago" (Vinnytsia, seniors).
We asked respondents what impressed them the most after the start of the war, which was completely
unexpected. The following was mentioned most often:
▪ The majority of respondents did not expect an attack from the russian federation and believed that it was
impossible until the very last moment of the invasion start. "I never thought that in the 21st century such a
war was even possible" (Kyiv, seniors);
▪ The unjustified violence from the russian military towards Ukrainian civilians, the extent of pillage;
▪ Recognizing that russians and Ukrainians are different in their culture, mentality, and values. “I was
surprised that my relatives, living in russia, did not text a single word to me, did not find out how things
were going. We were told, they say, that things in Irpin, Bucha did not happen at all. I say: “How? If you
took your parents out of there beforehand” (Kyiv, seniors); “I knew they had some issues, but I didn’t
actually realise how many. They told their soldiers... to rape the women. What kind of world do we live in?
It must be some other galaxy, to understand them means to go crazy” (Vinnytsya, seniors);
▪ How weak the russian army turned out to be, despite the powerful arsenal of weapons and the number of
troops;

33
THINGS THAT IMPRESSED THE MOST AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR
▪ The ability of Ukrainians to mobilise fast for the sake of saving the country. The number of
volunteers who joined the ranks of the Armed Forces immediately after the beginning of the
invasion, as well civilians involved in volunteer and charity movements, was mentioned. "I was
surprised that so much was done to protect the country. A lot of men. So many volunteers... Their
heroism. People delivered food. People tried to help their neighbours, carried stuff to the
basements" (Kyiv, seniors);
▪ The patriotism and fearlessness of the residents of the southern regions, Kherson in particular, that
were still protesting, even after being occupied. "A young boy with a Ukrainian flag jumped at
the APC. So courageous" (Kyiv, seniors);
▪ How useless global international institutions were (UN, Red Cross, Amnesty International should
have prevented aggression and engage in peace-restoring processes more actively). "Frankly, I
was surprised that the UN exists on paper only. Same goes for the Red Cross. Total degradation"
(Kyiv, seniors);
▪ Unexpected, sincere support from Poland.

35
CONCLUSIONS
GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF CHANGES IN THE UKRAINIAN INFORMATION SPACE AFTER THE BEGINNING OF THE
FULL-SCALE WAR
DYNAMICS OF AUDIENCE MEDIA PREFERENCES OVER THE LAST YEAR. POPULAR PROJECTS: THEIR PROS AND MOTIVES
FOR CONSUMPTION
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the russian federation, the nature of media
consumption by the majority of participants in the discussions has changed significantly. They mostly mentioned:
(1) a radical shift towards socio-political news; (2) almost total rejection of entertaining content in the first 3-5
weeks of the war and a slow / partial return to pre-war practices after a few months; (3) rejection of russian
media products. Different types of content are taken into account — from literature, music, films / series to
podcasts and vlogs of a diverse subject matter; (4) interest in educational projects on the history and culture of
Ukraine (mainly among young people).
The changes in the Ukrainian media space, which were mentioned during the discussions most often: (1) the
transition to the format of the informational telethon "News United", (2) a significant increase in high-quality
Ukrainian-language content - musical, entertaining, informative and educational, (3) a reduction in russian
broadcasting, and, consequently, pro-russian narratives in the mass media. If the latter was approved by a majority
of the discussion participants, the evaluations of the telethon are not so unanimous.
During the discussions, people voiced the opinion that Ukrainian-language media content is starting to dominate,
successfully replacing russian-language media content. It seems to have come out of the shadows, became visible
to Ukrainians and surprised them with its quality level. In addition, certain shifts are also taking place globally.

36
CONCLUSIONS
PERCEPTION OF PROPAGANDA AND DISTORTED CONTENT IN THE TIMES OF WAR
The conventional understanding of the term "propaganda" among the audience is that it is an informational
influence on certain categories of people with the aim of changing their attitude towards certain persons,
situations, events, etc.
For most participants, propaganda does not carry negative connotations only. It can be useful, convey quite
positive messages.
The respondents note that with the beginning of the russian invasion in February 2022, they began to come
across both Ukrainian and russian propaganda more often. Most believe that propaganda is one of the key
elements of information warfare and is always intensified during armed conflicts. Propaganda in the national
media, directed towards the national consumer, is perceived as a completely justified and necessary means of
mobilising and consolidating society in a period of critical threat.
CHANGES IN SELF-AWARENESS AND VALUES OF UKRAINIANS AFTER THE BEGINNING OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION
The participants note a striking increase in patriotic sentiments. After the shock of the first weeks of the
war, came the realisation of what can be lost if Ukraine surrenders. In addition, the violence
demonstrated by occupants provoked a natural rejection of everything russian: language, culture,
production, including media.

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