This document provides a lengthy critique of Barack Obama's memoir about his presidency. The reviewer believes Obama lacked strategic vision and resolution, especially regarding the wars in Afghanistan and policies towards Pakistan. They criticize Obama for exaggerating the threat from al-Qaeda and for failing to acknowledge or address Pakistan's support for the Taliban. The reviewer also faults Obama and his advisers like Gates for lacking a clear strategy in Afghanistan and making poor decisions like deploying troops to Helmand province. Overall, the reviewer finds Obama's memoir to be intellectually dishonest and lacking in substantive analysis of his foreign policy decisions.
The CIA in Indonesia and the Secret War in Laos-Book ReviewsAgha A
This document provides a summary of a book review for the book "Feet to the Fire-CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia-1957-58". In 3 sentences:
The book provides great detail on how the CIA covertly intervened in Indonesia's politics in the late 1950s to destabilize the Sukarno regime and support dissident officers, but it lacks strategic analysis of why the intervention ultimately failed. The reviewer argues the book is strong on operational details but weak on analyzing the strategic failures in Washington's assessment. Overall it is an in-depth look at CIA operations in Indonesia but could have provided more critical analysis of why the grand plan failed.
The CIA in Indonesia and the Secret War in LaosAgha A
This document provides a review of two books about covert CIA operations: one on operations in Indonesia in the 1950s, and one on operations against North Vietnam. The reviewer critiques the books for their lack of analysis of strategic failures by US leaders and decision-makers. They argue the books provide great operational details but fail to adequately assess why the larger covert campaigns ultimately failed due to lack of resolve by the US to destroy its adversaries. The reviewer draws parallels to later US failures in Afghanistan, arguing the same lack of strategic resolve and unwillingness to use unrestrained violence against enemies of the state undermined efforts.
ANALYSING WHY THE USA SO CALLED LOST AS PER US GENERAL BOLGER IN AFGHANISTAN ...Agha A
General Bolger's analysis of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is flawed in several key ways:
1) He overrates the role of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, exaggerating their influence over events and claiming implausibly that Bin Laden lured the US back to Afghanistan.
2) Bolger fails to acknowledge critical failures of US political and military strategy, including pursuing wars of choice without clear objectives and failing to coordinate with Pakistan to prevent Taliban escape.
3) His discussions of military campaigns like Operation Anaconda contain exaggerations and ignore facts that undermine his arguments, such as the organized Taliban withdrawal from Afghanistan prior to the US invasion.
4) Bolger demonstrates a repeated
An intellectually honest us military commanderAgha A
The document discusses intellectual honesty and strategic failures in the US military leadership regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It notes that Generals McChrystal and Petraeus did not oppose the 2009-2012 surge in Afghanistan that led to high US casualties with no strategic advantage. A journalist described McChrystal as clueless about why the US was fighting in Helmand but launched an offensive there anyway. While 90% of US casualties were caused by Pakistani proxies, US commanders blamed Al-Qaeda and non-state Taliban groups instead of acknowledging Pakistani involvement. The document argues the surge was a failure with troops distributed without clear objectives. It praises General Dunford for his rare intellectual honesty in acknowledging Assad had strategic advantages in Syria
US drone strikes are being used to manipulate public opinion and fleece US taxpayers rather than strategically target threats. Contractors generate propaganda by posting images of drone strike victims on social media that are then spread by mainstream western outlets. However, many victims like the man in one poster had no role in attacks on US forces and were likely killed just to justify the lucrative drone program. Someday, US taxpayers should audit this dubious program under which drones attack minor targets while the real masterminds operate freely in Pakistan.
This document criticizes Western media and governments for hypocritically portraying Islamist extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda as the primary threats, while ignoring their own role in destabilizing the Middle East through misguided interventions. It argues that the US and UK have a long history of covertly supporting radical Islamist militants when it suits their geopolitical interests, such as against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, resulting in unforeseen blowback. Most terrorist attacks target Muslim countries and communities, while the actual threat posed to Western countries is statistically small.
USAs NONSENSE AND AIMLESS PEACE PLAN IN AFGHANISTANAgha A
FYI – A geo-political analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan/South Asia. He pulls no punches in his opinion.
Similarly in the book I helped major Amin and Colonel Osinski put together it is stated:
…The very idea of USA talking to Taliban is naive...The Taliban do not represent the whole Afghanistan” (Amin, 2009). “The Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population (Figure 1). Even among the Pashtun they command polling support of less than 6%” (McCaffrey, 2009). “If any settlement has to be negotiated with them Afghanistan would have to be divided. What the Taliban signify is not acceptable to at least 50 % of Afghans...Any U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in totality would be a great U.S. strategic failure. Even if the USA withdraws it must retain bases because the Afghans respect B 52 s and fear Allah although I doubt the second assertion somewhat. U.S. or NATO withdrawal would lead to a renewed war between the Northern Alliance supported by Russia, India and Iran and the Good Taliban supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There would be no Taliban occupation of Kabul or Mazar (Figure 9). Although the Taliban may practice their brand of Islam at Kandahar and Ghazni Provinces in Afghanistan (Figure 5), the Afghan war would continue as long as the Indian - Pakistani issue is not decided militarily” (Amin 2009). Therein lays a major problem
US drone strikes are being used to manipulate the public and fleece US taxpayers rather than effectively target threats. Contractors produce propaganda posters of drone strike victims who have no connection to US deaths, which are then spread by media and analysts with ties to contractors. This allows the lucrative drone program to continue targeting unimportant individuals while the real threats operate freely and taxpayers' money is wasted. The drone war has failed to stabilize the region and instead created more chaos and enemies.
The CIA in Indonesia and the Secret War in Laos-Book ReviewsAgha A
This document provides a summary of a book review for the book "Feet to the Fire-CIA Covert Operations in Indonesia-1957-58". In 3 sentences:
The book provides great detail on how the CIA covertly intervened in Indonesia's politics in the late 1950s to destabilize the Sukarno regime and support dissident officers, but it lacks strategic analysis of why the intervention ultimately failed. The reviewer argues the book is strong on operational details but weak on analyzing the strategic failures in Washington's assessment. Overall it is an in-depth look at CIA operations in Indonesia but could have provided more critical analysis of why the grand plan failed.
The CIA in Indonesia and the Secret War in LaosAgha A
This document provides a review of two books about covert CIA operations: one on operations in Indonesia in the 1950s, and one on operations against North Vietnam. The reviewer critiques the books for their lack of analysis of strategic failures by US leaders and decision-makers. They argue the books provide great operational details but fail to adequately assess why the larger covert campaigns ultimately failed due to lack of resolve by the US to destroy its adversaries. The reviewer draws parallels to later US failures in Afghanistan, arguing the same lack of strategic resolve and unwillingness to use unrestrained violence against enemies of the state undermined efforts.
ANALYSING WHY THE USA SO CALLED LOST AS PER US GENERAL BOLGER IN AFGHANISTAN ...Agha A
General Bolger's analysis of the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is flawed in several key ways:
1) He overrates the role of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda, exaggerating their influence over events and claiming implausibly that Bin Laden lured the US back to Afghanistan.
2) Bolger fails to acknowledge critical failures of US political and military strategy, including pursuing wars of choice without clear objectives and failing to coordinate with Pakistan to prevent Taliban escape.
3) His discussions of military campaigns like Operation Anaconda contain exaggerations and ignore facts that undermine his arguments, such as the organized Taliban withdrawal from Afghanistan prior to the US invasion.
4) Bolger demonstrates a repeated
An intellectually honest us military commanderAgha A
The document discusses intellectual honesty and strategic failures in the US military leadership regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It notes that Generals McChrystal and Petraeus did not oppose the 2009-2012 surge in Afghanistan that led to high US casualties with no strategic advantage. A journalist described McChrystal as clueless about why the US was fighting in Helmand but launched an offensive there anyway. While 90% of US casualties were caused by Pakistani proxies, US commanders blamed Al-Qaeda and non-state Taliban groups instead of acknowledging Pakistani involvement. The document argues the surge was a failure with troops distributed without clear objectives. It praises General Dunford for his rare intellectual honesty in acknowledging Assad had strategic advantages in Syria
US drone strikes are being used to manipulate public opinion and fleece US taxpayers rather than strategically target threats. Contractors generate propaganda by posting images of drone strike victims on social media that are then spread by mainstream western outlets. However, many victims like the man in one poster had no role in attacks on US forces and were likely killed just to justify the lucrative drone program. Someday, US taxpayers should audit this dubious program under which drones attack minor targets while the real masterminds operate freely in Pakistan.
This document criticizes Western media and governments for hypocritically portraying Islamist extremist groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda as the primary threats, while ignoring their own role in destabilizing the Middle East through misguided interventions. It argues that the US and UK have a long history of covertly supporting radical Islamist militants when it suits their geopolitical interests, such as against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, resulting in unforeseen blowback. Most terrorist attacks target Muslim countries and communities, while the actual threat posed to Western countries is statistically small.
USAs NONSENSE AND AIMLESS PEACE PLAN IN AFGHANISTANAgha A
FYI – A geo-political analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy in Afghanistan/South Asia. He pulls no punches in his opinion.
Similarly in the book I helped major Amin and Colonel Osinski put together it is stated:
…The very idea of USA talking to Taliban is naive...The Taliban do not represent the whole Afghanistan” (Amin, 2009). “The Taliban are politically rejected by nearly the entire non-Pashtun population (Figure 1). Even among the Pashtun they command polling support of less than 6%” (McCaffrey, 2009). “If any settlement has to be negotiated with them Afghanistan would have to be divided. What the Taliban signify is not acceptable to at least 50 % of Afghans...Any U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in totality would be a great U.S. strategic failure. Even if the USA withdraws it must retain bases because the Afghans respect B 52 s and fear Allah although I doubt the second assertion somewhat. U.S. or NATO withdrawal would lead to a renewed war between the Northern Alliance supported by Russia, India and Iran and the Good Taliban supported by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. There would be no Taliban occupation of Kabul or Mazar (Figure 9). Although the Taliban may practice their brand of Islam at Kandahar and Ghazni Provinces in Afghanistan (Figure 5), the Afghan war would continue as long as the Indian - Pakistani issue is not decided militarily” (Amin 2009). Therein lays a major problem
US drone strikes are being used to manipulate the public and fleece US taxpayers rather than effectively target threats. Contractors produce propaganda posters of drone strike victims who have no connection to US deaths, which are then spread by media and analysts with ties to contractors. This allows the lucrative drone program to continue targeting unimportant individuals while the real threats operate freely and taxpayers' money is wasted. The drone war has failed to stabilize the region and instead created more chaos and enemies.
Fatal Strategic Mistakes of President Bush in 2001 and hopeless performance o...Agha A
There is no good luck or bad luck but consequences
Fatal Strategic Mistakes of President Bush in 2001 and hopeless performance of US drone when called to support operations
Us drone wipes out 36 ak platoon in indus valleyAgha A
1) The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book titled "Intelligence Review-Volume Seven" authored by Agha Humayun Amin before approving and moving forward in the publishing process.
2) It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on formatting, grammar, and design issues in each review.
3) Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. The 70-page book covers topics like the IED war in Pakistan and intelligence games played by actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and PakistanAgha A
The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book. It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time: format, grammar, and design. Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. Specific instructions include checking headers, footers, page numbers, spacing, table of contents, images, and grammar. The document also provides printing recommendations and contact information for the digital proofer.
Why us military system favours sycophancy and apple polishingAgha A
The document discusses a lack of intellectual honesty among US political and military leaders regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It notes that Generals McChrystal and Petraeus did not oppose the 2009-2012 surge in Afghanistan that led to high US casualties with no strategic gains. The document also states that 90% of US casualties in Afghanistan were caused by Pakistani proxies, but US commanders blamed Al Qaeda and Taliban for strategic purposes. It criticizes the surge as distributing troops without clear objectives. The document praises General Joseph Dunford as a rare example of intellectual honesty in the US military system.
Comments on bill roggios drone strikes nov 2010Agha A
The document discusses criticisms of US drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It questions the reliability of data on drone strikes, whether drones are an effective strategy, and suggests they may be counterproductive by fueling anti-American sentiment. It also criticizes the role of American businesses and their influence on US policy in Afghanistan.
The document summarizes the strategic mistakes made by US leadership during the war in Afghanistan. It argues that the US failed to understand the real nature and location of threats. Specifically:
- The war began with minimal casualties but was not a "grand and glorious operation" as claimed.
- The US wrongly assessed Pakistan's FATA region as the center of terrorism, while the Taliban found safe haven in Pakistan's Balochistan region.
- Thousands of families on all sides suffered due to the war, which the author argues was due to avoidable incompetence by US political and military leaders.
- The US perceptual failure was thinking they faced only non-state actors like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
DAVID CULLICULLEN -OUT OF MOUNTAINS INTO NOWHEREAgha A
1. The book "Out of the Mountains" by David Kilcullen provides an inaccurate and disappointing summary of the US war in Afghanistan.
2. Kilcullen makes numerous factually incorrect claims, such as stating the main Taliban force was in eastern Afghanistan when it was actually based in the southwest. He also fails to analyze important factors like the role of Pakistani support and US drone strikes.
3. The book underestimates the influence of the Pakistani state and overstates Taliban military defeats without explaining the context. It does not provide a clear strategic rationale for the US escalation of the war.
Major A.H. Amin argues that the term "non-state actor" is a myth used to obscure the true sponsors of insurgent and terrorist groups. In reality, almost all major insurgent or terrorist groups that have strategic significance are proxies supported and directed by states. The few minor groups that are truly independent have little strategic or tactical impact. States rely on non-state proxies to wage wars after 1945 in place of direct conventional warfare due to nuclear weapons. However, powerful states like the US will claim attacks are by non-state actors to avoid confronting other nuclear states that sponsor proxies. The term is also misused to obscure the relationship between Pakistan and anti-India militant groups.
This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
General Elwell Otis and the MacArthur family played key roles in the early American colonization and suppression of resistance in the Philippines in the late 19th/early 20th century. As the first American military governor, Otis censored information about the extent of Filipino opposition and conducted a campaign of deception to convince the American public that Filipinos welcomed U.S. rule. The MacArthurs, including General Arthur and General Douglas, took a harsh imperialist approach to subduing Filipino guerrillas and assimilating the population. William Howard Taft also advanced American imperialism through his role developing civil governance and justifying U.S. occupation to present it as a benevolent, altru
German assessment of islam and nonsense theories of pan islamismAgha A
This document contains a long analysis critiquing overly simplistic views of pan-Islamism and arguing that history, ethnicity, and geopolitics are more complex realities that are often ignored. It discusses how certain historical Muslim figures are portrayed differently by different groups and eras. It also notes how religion alone has rarely been the sole basis for statehood, giving examples of how ethnicity and national interests often outweighed religious solidarity between states. The document advocates for a more nuanced understanding of history that considers these various factors rather than only focusing on abstract religious concepts.
This document provides an overview of the book "Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower" by William Blum. It includes an author's foreword discussing how the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US related to actions taken by the US globally. The foreword argues that the attacks were a form of retaliation for decades of US military, economic and political oppression in the Middle East. It also notes that US actions globally have created hatred and potential for terrorism in other regions like Latin America as well. The document then provides a table of contents, outlining 27 chapters that discuss various controversial US foreign policy actions and covert operations that have impacted other nations.
A car bomb exploded near NATO/ISAF headquarters and the US embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan on September 5, 2019. At least 12 people were killed, including a US soldier and a Romanian soldier. Dozens more were injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility. The bombing occurred as US-Taliban peace talks were ongoing to negotiate the withdrawal of US and international troops from Afghanistan.
1) The document discusses President Obama's strategic plans for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which include negotiating with Islamic fundamentalists and withdrawing troops from Iraq over 16 months.
2) Critics argue that negotiating with extremists who conducted 9/11 attacks will not work and that a premature withdrawal could lead to civil war and a power vacuum that destabilizes the region.
3) Supporters of continued military action believe it has helped make progress and prevented further terrorist attacks, and that withdrawing now could negate the efforts and lives lost to date.
1) The document summarizes and comments on an article by Arnaud de Borchgrave arguing that the US should negotiate with the Taliban and withdraw from Afghanistan to avoid a repeat of the Vietnam War outcome.
2) The commenter disagrees with de Borchgrave's analysis, arguing that a full US withdrawal would likely lead to the quick collapse of the Afghan national army and civil war.
3) The commenter also argues that the Taliban only controls part of Afghanistan and a negotiated settlement should not force the surrender of the entire country to the Taliban given the anti-Taliban sentiments of many Afghans.
This document outlines several recent incidents of racial violence and injustice in the US and abroad. It argues that African Americans and people of color have endured too much without response. It calls on citizens to nonviolently take back the government from racist influences, citing their right to revolution. It alleges that the law firm Baker Donelson has undue influence over the government and links to racist groups, and has helped cover up various crimes and issues of racial violence. The document provides a powerpoint presentation on the author's history with Baker Donelson to expose their allegedly criminal practices.
The document discusses the roles of Punjab and Baluch regiments in the 1971 war. It was published on September 2023 with a DOI number and was written by Agha H Amin.
Fatal Strategic Mistakes of President Bush in 2001 and hopeless performance o...Agha A
There is no good luck or bad luck but consequences
Fatal Strategic Mistakes of President Bush in 2001 and hopeless performance of US drone when called to support operations
Us drone wipes out 36 ak platoon in indus valleyAgha A
1) The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book titled "Intelligence Review-Volume Seven" authored by Agha Humayun Amin before approving and moving forward in the publishing process.
2) It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on formatting, grammar, and design issues in each review.
3) Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. The 70-page book covers topics like the IED war in Pakistan and intelligence games played by actors in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
IED,Drones and Suicide Bomber Warfare in Afghanistan and PakistanAgha A
The document provides instructions for reviewing a digital proof of a book. It recommends reviewing the proof three times, focusing on different aspects each time: format, grammar, and design. Once satisfied, the proof can be approved to advance to the next publishing step. Specific instructions include checking headers, footers, page numbers, spacing, table of contents, images, and grammar. The document also provides printing recommendations and contact information for the digital proofer.
Why us military system favours sycophancy and apple polishingAgha A
The document discusses a lack of intellectual honesty among US political and military leaders regarding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It notes that Generals McChrystal and Petraeus did not oppose the 2009-2012 surge in Afghanistan that led to high US casualties with no strategic gains. The document also states that 90% of US casualties in Afghanistan were caused by Pakistani proxies, but US commanders blamed Al Qaeda and Taliban for strategic purposes. It criticizes the surge as distributing troops without clear objectives. The document praises General Joseph Dunford as a rare example of intellectual honesty in the US military system.
Comments on bill roggios drone strikes nov 2010Agha A
The document discusses criticisms of US drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan. It questions the reliability of data on drone strikes, whether drones are an effective strategy, and suggests they may be counterproductive by fueling anti-American sentiment. It also criticizes the role of American businesses and their influence on US policy in Afghanistan.
The document summarizes the strategic mistakes made by US leadership during the war in Afghanistan. It argues that the US failed to understand the real nature and location of threats. Specifically:
- The war began with minimal casualties but was not a "grand and glorious operation" as claimed.
- The US wrongly assessed Pakistan's FATA region as the center of terrorism, while the Taliban found safe haven in Pakistan's Balochistan region.
- Thousands of families on all sides suffered due to the war, which the author argues was due to avoidable incompetence by US political and military leaders.
- The US perceptual failure was thinking they faced only non-state actors like the Taliban and Al-Qaeda
DAVID CULLICULLEN -OUT OF MOUNTAINS INTO NOWHEREAgha A
1. The book "Out of the Mountains" by David Kilcullen provides an inaccurate and disappointing summary of the US war in Afghanistan.
2. Kilcullen makes numerous factually incorrect claims, such as stating the main Taliban force was in eastern Afghanistan when it was actually based in the southwest. He also fails to analyze important factors like the role of Pakistani support and US drone strikes.
3. The book underestimates the influence of the Pakistani state and overstates Taliban military defeats without explaining the context. It does not provide a clear strategic rationale for the US escalation of the war.
Major A.H. Amin argues that the term "non-state actor" is a myth used to obscure the true sponsors of insurgent and terrorist groups. In reality, almost all major insurgent or terrorist groups that have strategic significance are proxies supported and directed by states. The few minor groups that are truly independent have little strategic or tactical impact. States rely on non-state proxies to wage wars after 1945 in place of direct conventional warfare due to nuclear weapons. However, powerful states like the US will claim attacks are by non-state actors to avoid confronting other nuclear states that sponsor proxies. The term is also misused to obscure the relationship between Pakistan and anti-India militant groups.
This document provides a firsthand account of British Army operations in Afghanistan from 2004-2014 as seen by the author, a consultant who worked in Afghanistan during that time. It describes how the British operations lacked clear strategy and purpose, with troops sent into Helmand province in small, vulnerable groups ("penny packets") without sufficient consideration for the local conditions and threat of the Taliban. This approach directly played into the hands of the Taliban and resulted in needless British casualties. Political leaders like Tony Blair sent the troops to Afghanistan without a coherent strategic aim, simply to appease the US, while ignoring local dynamics and making the soldiers targets.
General Elwell Otis and the MacArthur family played key roles in the early American colonization and suppression of resistance in the Philippines in the late 19th/early 20th century. As the first American military governor, Otis censored information about the extent of Filipino opposition and conducted a campaign of deception to convince the American public that Filipinos welcomed U.S. rule. The MacArthurs, including General Arthur and General Douglas, took a harsh imperialist approach to subduing Filipino guerrillas and assimilating the population. William Howard Taft also advanced American imperialism through his role developing civil governance and justifying U.S. occupation to present it as a benevolent, altru
German assessment of islam and nonsense theories of pan islamismAgha A
This document contains a long analysis critiquing overly simplistic views of pan-Islamism and arguing that history, ethnicity, and geopolitics are more complex realities that are often ignored. It discusses how certain historical Muslim figures are portrayed differently by different groups and eras. It also notes how religion alone has rarely been the sole basis for statehood, giving examples of how ethnicity and national interests often outweighed religious solidarity between states. The document advocates for a more nuanced understanding of history that considers these various factors rather than only focusing on abstract religious concepts.
This document provides an overview of the book "Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower" by William Blum. It includes an author's foreword discussing how the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US related to actions taken by the US globally. The foreword argues that the attacks were a form of retaliation for decades of US military, economic and political oppression in the Middle East. It also notes that US actions globally have created hatred and potential for terrorism in other regions like Latin America as well. The document then provides a table of contents, outlining 27 chapters that discuss various controversial US foreign policy actions and covert operations that have impacted other nations.
A car bomb exploded near NATO/ISAF headquarters and the US embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan on September 5, 2019. At least 12 people were killed, including a US soldier and a Romanian soldier. Dozens more were injured. The Taliban claimed responsibility. The bombing occurred as US-Taliban peace talks were ongoing to negotiate the withdrawal of US and international troops from Afghanistan.
1) The document discusses President Obama's strategic plans for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which include negotiating with Islamic fundamentalists and withdrawing troops from Iraq over 16 months.
2) Critics argue that negotiating with extremists who conducted 9/11 attacks will not work and that a premature withdrawal could lead to civil war and a power vacuum that destabilizes the region.
3) Supporters of continued military action believe it has helped make progress and prevented further terrorist attacks, and that withdrawing now could negate the efforts and lives lost to date.
1) The document summarizes and comments on an article by Arnaud de Borchgrave arguing that the US should negotiate with the Taliban and withdraw from Afghanistan to avoid a repeat of the Vietnam War outcome.
2) The commenter disagrees with de Borchgrave's analysis, arguing that a full US withdrawal would likely lead to the quick collapse of the Afghan national army and civil war.
3) The commenter also argues that the Taliban only controls part of Afghanistan and a negotiated settlement should not force the surrender of the entire country to the Taliban given the anti-Taliban sentiments of many Afghans.
This document outlines several recent incidents of racial violence and injustice in the US and abroad. It argues that African Americans and people of color have endured too much without response. It calls on citizens to nonviolently take back the government from racist influences, citing their right to revolution. It alleges that the law firm Baker Donelson has undue influence over the government and links to racist groups, and has helped cover up various crimes and issues of racial violence. The document provides a powerpoint presentation on the author's history with Baker Donelson to expose their allegedly criminal practices.
The document discusses the roles of Punjab and Baluch regiments in the 1971 war. It was published on September 2023 with a DOI number and was written by Agha H Amin.
Major Agha H. Amin was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in 1983. He served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions over his military career. In his civilian career, he performed projects in infrastructure and transmission lines in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan. He has authored over 120 books and journals on military topics. The document goes on to describe a battle of Pandu fought by the 4/10 Baluch battalion against India in the 1947-48 Kashmir war, and criticizes the omission of accurate accounts of the battle from official Pakistani military histories.
Battles of Najafgarh , Gangiri and Delhi RidgeAgha A
- The 6th Dragoon Guards regiment arrived in Bengal, India from England in November 1856 and was stationed in Meerut at the time of the 1857 rebellion.
- During the rebellion, the regiment saw action at Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, Delhi, and helped destroy a rebel battery at Eidgah with no reported casualties.
- It lost a few men at the battles of Ghaziabad, Badli Ki Serai, and in minor actions in July 1857 but overall emerged from the rebellion relatively lightly compared to other British units.
- However, the limited historical sources available in Pakistan make it difficult for researchers there to find all details on the regiment's role and casualties during
The battalion was part of an infantry brigade deployed at Sulaimanke Headworks during the 1965 war with India. It saw little serious action as it primarily engaged Indian border police posts that were no match for regular Pakistani army battalions. The battalion suffered only 3 fatal casualties for the entire war, showing it faced little militarily credible opposition. While the battalion performed well, it must be remembered that it faced inferior Indian border police rather than other army units.
This document summarizes the performance of the 9 Punjab battalion during the 1965 war with India. The battalion was part of the 12th Division of the Pakistan Army and was tasked with capturing the town of Chhamb. Despite having significant superiority in tanks and artillery, the 12th Division failed to cross the Tawi River on the first day. The 9th Punjab battalion suffered 15 killed and 31 wounded but managed to form a bridgehead across the Tawi. After the war, the battalion was praised for its performance and received several awards, though its strategic impact was limited due to the overall failure of Operation Grand Slam.
The battalion was deployed as a guard battalion but parts saw action in 1965 war including C Company commanded by Major Anis. C Company withdrew from its position exposing the rear of 16 Punjab to Indian attack, effectively sealing 16 Punjab's fate. C Company's withdrawal doomed 16 Punjab and was described as cowardly and the cause of 16 Punjab's debacle. While most of 8 Punjab saw no action, C Company under Major Anis performed poorly and was to blame for 16 Punjab's defeat.
1) The battalion was deployed as part of 11 Division along the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor according to maps.
2) The battalion faced a brigade-level attack from the Indian army using three infantry battalions and a tank squadron.
3) A captain from the Pakistani artillery played a crucial role by engaging the attacking forces with 60 medium shells, repulsing the Indian attack.
The battalion was deployed in September 1965 as part of Operation Grand Slam, relieving the 13th Punjab battalion near Dalpat-Chak Kirpal. According to Brigadier Rizvi, the battalion attacked towards Fatwal along with 13 Lancers, advancing up to 6 miles near Kasur and suffering 9 killed and 21 wounded. However, records list the battalion as losing either 9, 11, or 10 killed. The battalion had little impact as it joined the war late when the focus had shifted, and did not receive any awards despite actions in the Rann of Kutch prior to the war.
NORTH LINCOLNSHIRE REGIMENT OF FOOT IN 1857-59 BATTLESAgha A
This document provides biographical and career details of Major Agha.H.Amin, who was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983. It discusses his education, various military and civilian positions held over his career, publications authored, and contact information. The document also briefly describes a study aid about British infantry battalions that participated in the battles of 1857-59 in India, including their roles, operations, casualties, and contributions to the outcome of the war.
The 2nd Battalion of the Punjab Regiment fought in the 1965 war against India. While it received several gallantry awards, the document argues that its role was exaggerated and it did not actually face most of the major Indian attacks. Only one company saw direct fighting on the first day, and it dispersed against heavy odds. The battalion was deployed away from the main sites of battle and did not face significant enemy forces apart from this initial engagement. Its impact on the decisive Battle of Chawinda was marginal.
This document provides information about Major Agha.H.Amin, including his military and civilian career experiences. It notes that he was commissioned in the old PAVO Cavalry in March 1983, attended Saint Marys Academy Lalazar and Forman Christian College Lahore, and served in various command, staff, research, logistics and instructional positions in the military. It also lists some of his civilian career projects and publications. The document provides his contact email addresses.
1ST BATTALION WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT IN 1857-59 BATTLES.pdfAgha A
- 1st Battalion HM 8th Foot was stationed in India when the 1857 rebellion broke out. It was involved in securing areas around Delhi.
- At the siege of Delhi in September 1857, it suffered 46 of its total 57 fatal casualties and played a marginal role in the assault.
- Overall it saw minor action in other battles, with limited casualties. The majority of its casualties occurred at the decisive battle of Delhi.
Northumberland Fusiliers in 1857-59 Battles.pdfAgha A
The 1st Battalion of the 5th Regiment of Foot (Northumberland Fusiliers) was stationed in Mauritius when it was called to reinforce British forces in India during the 1857 uprising. The battalion arrived in Calcutta in July and August 1857. It participated in key battles including relieving Arrah where it suffered two casualties, the first relief of Lucknow where it suffered heavy losses and helped ensure the relief's success, the defense of the Lucknow garrison, and operations through 1858. The battalion performed outstandingly and suffered high casualties of 62 men, including five officers killed in action, primarily during the relief of Lucknow. Its role was pivotal in some of the major battles, but relatively minor in others
43 BALUCH IN 1971 AND INDIAN OFFICER WHO SAW THEMAgha A
1) The document analyzes the performance of the 43rd Baluch battalion in the 1971 war, which suffered heavy casualties after being poorly employed by incompetent commanders in the 88th Brigade.
2) When the 5th East Bengal battalion defected to the Indian side, the 43rd Baluch battalion was brought in to replace it, even though they were inexperienced and unprepared for the situation.
3) In an attack by Indian forces guided by defectors, the 43rd Baluch battalion suffered the highest fatalities of any battalion on the western front due to being put into a vulnerable position by the failed leadership of the 88th Brigade commander and 10th Division commander.
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry Agha A
Battle of Gangiri-Heavy Price paid by HM 6 Dragoon Guards for Gallantry https://www.academia.edu/52632772/Battle_of_Gangiri_Heavy_Price_paid_by_HM_6_Dragoon_Guards_for_Gallantry via @academia
4th Punjab Infantry now 9 FF Pakistan Army and 42 Highlanders led the Final ...Agha A
The 4th Punjab Infantry battalion arrived in Calcutta in November 1857, meaning it missed the decisive battles of the war, including the siege of Delhi and the relief and evacuation of Lucknow. The battalion's participation in the battle of Cawnpore was minimal and it suffered no casualties. The battalion played a significant role in the final assault on Lucknow in March 1858, leading the assault on Martiniere with the 4th Punjab Infantry while the 42nd Highlanders and 90th Foot attacked frontally. The British enjoyed overwhelming artillery superiority, evidenced by the 42nd Highlanders suffering only 10 fatal casualties over 10 days of operations culminating in the final capture of Lucknow.
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING...Agha A
WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OR INDIAN ARMY CAN NEVER PRODUCE A MUSTAFA KAMAL- SOMETHING SERIOUSLY WRONG IN THE GENES
April 2020
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20723.27689
Project: MILITARY HISTORY
Agha H Amin
The Building Blocks of QuestDB, a Time Series Databasejavier ramirez
Talk Delivered at Valencia Codes Meetup 2024-06.
Traditionally, databases have treated timestamps just as another data type. However, when performing real-time analytics, timestamps should be first class citizens and we need rich time semantics to get the most out of our data. We also need to deal with ever growing datasets while keeping performant, which is as fun as it sounds.
It is no wonder time-series databases are now more popular than ever before. Join me in this session to learn about the internal architecture and building blocks of QuestDB, an open source time-series database designed for speed. We will also review a history of some of the changes we have gone over the past two years to deal with late and unordered data, non-blocking writes, read-replicas, or faster batch ingestion.
Beyond the Basics of A/B Tests: Highly Innovative Experimentation Tactics You...Aggregage
This webinar will explore cutting-edge, less familiar but powerful experimentation methodologies which address well-known limitations of standard A/B Testing. Designed for data and product leaders, this session aims to inspire the embrace of innovative approaches and provide insights into the frontiers of experimentation!
State of Artificial intelligence Report 2023kuntobimo2016
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a multidisciplinary field of science and engineering whose goal is to create intelligent machines.
We believe that AI will be a force multiplier on technological progress in our increasingly digital, data-driven world. This is because everything around us today, ranging from culture to consumer products, is a product of intelligence.
The State of AI Report is now in its sixth year. Consider this report as a compilation of the most interesting things we’ve seen with a goal of triggering an informed conversation about the state of AI and its implication for the future.
We consider the following key dimensions in our report:
Research: Technology breakthroughs and their capabilities.
Industry: Areas of commercial application for AI and its business impact.
Politics: Regulation of AI, its economic implications and the evolving geopolitics of AI.
Safety: Identifying and mitigating catastrophic risks that highly-capable future AI systems could pose to us.
Predictions: What we believe will happen in the next 12 months and a 2022 performance review to keep us honest.
4th Modern Marketing Reckoner by MMA Global India & Group M: 60+ experts on W...Social Samosa
The Modern Marketing Reckoner (MMR) is a comprehensive resource packed with POVs from 60+ industry leaders on how AI is transforming the 4 key pillars of marketing – product, place, price and promotions.
06-04-2024 - NYC Tech Week - Discussion on Vector Databases, Unstructured Data and AI
Discussion on Vector Databases, Unstructured Data and AI
https://www.meetup.com/unstructured-data-meetup-new-york/
This meetup is for people working in unstructured data. Speakers will come present about related topics such as vector databases, LLMs, and managing data at scale. The intended audience of this group includes roles like machine learning engineers, data scientists, data engineers, software engineers, and PMs.This meetup was formerly Milvus Meetup, and is sponsored by Zilliz maintainers of Milvus.
ViewShift: Hassle-free Dynamic Policy Enforcement for Every Data LakeWalaa Eldin Moustafa
Dynamic policy enforcement is becoming an increasingly important topic in today’s world where data privacy and compliance is a top priority for companies, individuals, and regulators alike. In these slides, we discuss how LinkedIn implements a powerful dynamic policy enforcement engine, called ViewShift, and integrates it within its data lake. We show the query engine architecture and how catalog implementations can automatically route table resolutions to compliance-enforcing SQL views. Such views have a set of very interesting properties: (1) They are auto-generated from declarative data annotations. (2) They respect user-level consent and preferences (3) They are context-aware, encoding a different set of transformations for different use cases (4) They are portable; while the SQL logic is only implemented in one SQL dialect, it is accessible in all engines.
#SQL #Views #Privacy #Compliance #DataLake
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ISBN: 9798573820804
Obama's Strategic Naiveté
Reading Obamas Memoirs Volume 1
Reading Obamas memoirs reinforced my belief that the man is
mediocre par excellence.
Much of the first half of the book lacks substance and even
style.
This review will only address Obamas foreign policy perceptions
and descriptions.
The below few lines about wars on page-319 really shook my
belief in this character who served as US president for two
terms !
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To call Afghanistan a war would be a rather ludicrous statement
keeping in view the odds involved .
Obamas description of so called war against al Qaeda was also
highly exaggerated as well as inflated !
After all where can anyone quantify and state , how many
casualties the al Qaeda inflicted on the US military ?
As one who is based in Afghanistan and one who has seen US
Afghan war closely , I can state with confidence that so called al
Qaeda cannot be held responsible for even 0.001 % of US
military deaths !
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As we saw closely , some 99 % of US military casualties were
inflicted by Pakistani state supported Taliban proxies in the US
Afghan war.
And here I read about how a man sadly president of USA for 8
years is writing such pure and unadulterated nonsense?
But this was only the beginning of reading utter nonsense as
readers of this review will see in the subsequent pages.
On page 323 Obama introduces a character who was to prove a
fatal disaster to USAs Afghan war:--
How on earth was a pedantic CIA bureaucrat shape USA’s
Afghan strategy ? These statements well illustrate extreme
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naievette of this Chicago lawyer who was to play havoc with US
Army in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2012 !
Obama starts make absolute nonsense statements on page-
325:--
This scribe was based in Afghanistan in 2006 and the country
was not at all sliding into a sink hole as Mr Obama fallaciously
and misleading proclaims !
Contrary to Obamas false claims the US military was pursuing a
careful military strategy in Afghanistan designed to expose
minimum US soldiers to risk and all through President Bush’s
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eight years tenure the US military had suffered less than 400
fatal casualties due to actual fighting in Afghanistan.
In Obamas disastrous (for US Army) tenure, US military was to
suffer over 1400 fatal battle casualties and nothing worthwhile
or substantial was achieved.
US fatal military casualties in actual fighting in 2007 were 83
while as we will see Obamas badly planned and “direction less”
so called surged doubled and trebled these fatal casualties.
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As far as I clearly recollect , there was no operational or
strategic crisis in Afghanistan in 2008 early on the eve of
Obama presidency.
On page-326 our naive lawyer from Chicago comes up with an
absolute nonsense apology of strategy as below: --
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As far as this scribe saw there was no Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
Or Pakistan !
USA captured Afghanistan in 2001 with zero military casualties
in actual fighting ! So much for Obamas nonsense assertions
regarding Al Qaeda !
As far as this scribe closely saw while serving as a contractor in
Helmand and Kunduz 99.99 % of fatal casualties on US troops in
Afghanistan were inflicted by so called Afghan Taliban who
were clearly Pakistani state proxies.
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Obamas analysis are a sorry proof of his intellectual bankruptcy
and lack of strategic resolution in analyzing facts forthrightly
and bluntly.
Instead all we find in this apology of a book by a former US
president are dumb twists, petty hair splitting and supremely
non committal statements like as below:--
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Sadly I expected serious and substantial analysis from a former
US president but Obamas shallow analysis was deeply
disappointing.
Like all throughout this book Obama analyses no solid
mechanism instituted by the USA to monitor Pakistan’s actions
against hostile infiltration in Afghanistan?
In a consultancy assignment in 2012-14 this scribe was shocked
to learn that the US state department, Pentagon, CIA and DIA
were so badly led and ham handedly run that no such
mechanism was instituted by the USA at all?
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This was the position all along in both Bush and Obama era , so
Obamas claims about all he did to regulate Pakistan are nothing
else but white lies !
Obama states that Riedel report stated that unless Pakistan
stopped sheltering Taliban, US efforts in Afghanistan would not
succeed.
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However all along this lengthy book , much of it a sheer waste
of stationery, Obama makes no serious efforts to tell the
reader, what efforts his administration made and more
seriously how miserably he failed !
Every page of this book was a recurring and painful
disappointment!
Like Obama has nothing to state about how clueless and
confused Gates was about the conduct of Afghan war?
Like Gates treatment about why US lives were wasted in
barren wastes like Helmand’s are evasive and ambiguous
and an insult to the memory of 800 or so US lives
pointlessly lost in Helmand. On page 340 Gates offers a
lame duck excuse that Marines were sent to be
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sacrificed for no strategic purpose in Helmand as Marine
general Conway wanted them deployed as a
marine only show!
Helmand as I worked there on USAID projects in 2004-5
contained nothing strategic except sand and drugs and
morphia paste labs and there was nothing strategic in
Helmand. Why Gates allowed US lives to be sacrificed for no
strategic purpose will always remain an inexcusable blot on
Gates shoulders as well as Mc Chrystal and Bruce Reidels
shoulders .
Obama praises Gates all along but fails to see any of Gates
major strategic sins !
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Like Gates totally missed the fact that the real insurgents’
bases and havens in Pakistan were never attacked as the
USA as a state did not possess the strategic resolution to
attack .
Obama is intellectual dishonest while discussing sacking of
General Mc Kiernan and totally hoodwinks and hides the
fact that the real reason for removal of Mc Kiernan
Saw the real issue as destroying insurgent safe havens in
Pakistan.
Obama, Riedel and Gates, all three lacked the guts to deal
with this central issue and Mc Kiernan guts were too much
for them to handle!
Michael Hastings also singled out Mc Kiernan’s inability to
suck as his major disqualification!
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Gates was no clueless that he actually confessed in his
memoirs that he had no idea why the US Army launched its
major operations in Helmand ?
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Obama praises Mc Chrystals strategy and conduct of
operations in Afghanistan but what we saw with our own
eyes was distribution of US soldiers in penny packets and
presenting them on a platter for the Taliban to ambush at
will and whim !
Excerpts from this scribes book “Presented on a platter”
illustrate specific US Army strategic and operational failures,
specifically in Obama presidency :--
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Obama fails to justify his Libyan faux pas and every word and
line regarding the Libyan affair was a shocking proof of how US
leadership had qualitatively deteriorated.
That such highly mediocre characters like Obama could rise to
the office of US president was simply stranger than fiction!
And the total intellectual dishonesty of the Nobel prize
organization in awarding Nobel prize to a monster who
destroyed Syria and Libya and launched the highest number of
drone strikes who had little to do with 99 % US deaths in
Afghanistan?
Reading Chapter 27 of this book convinced me that Obama
deserves a Nobel Prize for “SUPREME INTELLECTUAL
DISHONESTY AND MASTERLY LIES” !
His whole narrative about OBL can be termed as sheer lies !
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Two of Pakistan’s ISI chiefs publicly stated that Pakistani state
knew about OBL location all along but Obama weaved masterly
lies in this narrative.
As we saw it in Pakistan OBL was presented to Obama by the
Pakistani state as an election gift to win 2012 elections and the
whole affair was staged by state actors, both USA and Pakistan.
Quoted by Jeff Stein in Newsweek –OBL Abbottabad Raid -2011
Agha A
THE PAKISTANI STATE WILL CHECK NATIONAL ID DOCUMENTS OF ALL
PAKISTANI CITIZENS ON HILARIOUS PRETEXT THAT MULLA MANSUR WAS
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ISSUED PAKISTANI NATIONAL ID BY CORRUPT PAKISTANI OFFICIALS
WITHOUT KNOW LEDGE OF PAKISTAN STATE !
In SIM card verification 10 to 20 Rs per card were charged and huge bucks made
for sweet _____ all , in NIC verification again citizens will be harassed and money
charged while as per reliable multiple sources MULLA AKHTAR Mansur was a
PAKISTANI intel asset and his NIC and passport were issued with PAKISTANI
state agreement and precise knowledge
In OBL raid a Pakistan Army infantry battalion was brought to surround OBL
residence so that US raiding force securely raids the compound and a Pakistan
Army liaison officer accompanied raiding US force
http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/29/hersh-furor-pakistan-perfidy-332674.html
The details of Bin Laden’s whereabouts over the following decade have remained
buried. He is thought to have spent the first five years in a cave in Pakistan’s tribal
area, hidden away in a virtual witness protection program. Hersh was hardly the
first to charge that the Pakistanis eventually squirreled away Bin Laden in
Abbottabad, home to the nation’s West Point and many of its top military and
intelligence officials. Or that, confronted with the Americans’ discovery of him
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there (thanks to a Pakistani turncoat), the Pakistanis facilitated the May 2011
SEAL raid. Indeed, former Pakistani and American intelligence officials were
saying as much within hours of the operation.
On May 7, 2011, a well connected former Pakistani tank officer, Agha H. Amin,
noted that no local security forces showed up during the entire 40 minutes that the
SEALs were mucking around in Bin Laden’s prominent compound, which began
with a very loud helicopter crash and ended with a very noisy exit.
“How do you rationalise the fact that two Pakistani battalions had cordoned [off]
the areas 15 minutes before the raid and when the raid started Pakistani troops
warned the area’s residents to switch off their lights!” Amin wrote in the Lahore
edition of The Nation. “When I said it on 7 May 2011 it was a conspiracy theory,”
Amin wrote on his Linkedin page this week. “But when Hersh stated it [in] May
2015 it’s investigative journalism.”
Now, Pakistani journalism is a cesspool of rumors and conspiracy theories.
But The New York Times’s veteran foreign correspondent in the region, Carlotta
Gall, also reminded us this week that Hersh “is following up on a story that many
of us assembled parts of” years ago. In 2013, she said, “I learned from a high-
level member of the Pakistani intelligence service that the ISI had been hiding Bin
Laden and ran a desk specifically to handle him as an intelligence asset. After
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[my] book came out, I learned more: that it was indeed a Pakistani Army
brigadier—all the senior officers of the ISI are in the military—who told the CIA
where Bin Laden was hiding, and that Bin Laden was living there with the
knowledge and protection of the ISI.”
Reading Obamas memoirs convinced this reviewer that western
leaderships quality had sunk to the lowest level and Obama was
one clear proof of this sad fact !
Since Obama is a highly intellectually dishonest person he
totally white washes USAs Syrian failure ! One of the greatest
strategic failures of USA where USA despite doling 2 to 5 billion
USD per year to Syrian insurgents for some 6 years failed to
dislodge the Syrian Assad regime.
Why the USA was trying to remove the most secular and anti
Islamic extremist regime in the world remains a supreme
mystery.
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Obama also totally hoodwinks USAs massive drone strikes in
two small districts in Pakistan which had absolutely nothing to
do with US Afghan war ?
Map below from this scribes book analyzing US drone strikes
illustrates Obamas totally ill conceived drone strikes , much
trumpeted and falsely proclaimed as USAs great strategic
success:--
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All along Obama showed a remarkbale strategic irresolution on
confronting the Pakistani state .Just like his predecessor Bush
regime.
All along US had no strategy in Afghanistan but was only fooling
its own public with political gimmicks and meaningless jargon.
Obamas surge had no strategic design and Bruce Riedel was last
person to be asked to frame a military strategy about which he
knew less than a philosophically frigid and barren spinster.
Lastly the chart below illustrates Obamas strategic barrenness:-
-
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By Major Agha H Amin (Retired)
AUTHOR HISTORY OF PAKISTAN ARMY FROM 1757 TILL 1971,PAKISTAN ARMY TILL 1965 ,PAKISTAN
ARMY SEEN THROUGH EYES OF PAKISTANI GENERALS, SEPOY REBELLION OF 1857-59
REINTERPRETED,DEVELOPMENT OF TALIBAN FACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN-A
GEOGRAPHICAL ACCOUNT (ALONG WITH OSINSKI AND DEGEORGES)
EX EDITOR MONTHLY BLOBE KARACHI,EX ASSISTANT EDITOR MONTHLY DEFENCE JOURNAL
KARACHI,EX EDITOR JOURNAL OF AFGHANISTAN STUDIES KABUL.