1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict. 2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit. 3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
March 14, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic
interests amid the escalating civil war.
2. The Saudi-led coalition and the internationally recognized Hadi government in
Yemen will not agree to ceasefire terms while current frontlines hold.
3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that
threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the new federal administration.
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1
3

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda in Syria began a new phase of military operations against the Syrian regime. The
Tahrir al Sham Assembly, a rebel coalition that includes al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fatah al
Sham, attacked Shia pilgrims in Damascus and Assad regime forces in southern Dera’a city.
Outlook: Al Qaeda in Syria will conduct spectacular attacks to set conditions for future
offensive operations.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
Pakistan seeks to preserve its strong relationship with Saudi Arabia while balancing internal
tensions. Pakistan pledged $1 million USD in aid to the Saudi-backed Yemeni government.
Pakistan may also deploy a brigade to help Saudi Arabia secure its southern border,
according to an unconfirmed report. Pakistani involvement in a Sunni coalition raises the risk
of backlash from Pakistan’s Shia population.
Outlook: Pakistan will maintain low-level involvement in the Saudi-led coalition but will avoid
significant public support.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
President Hadi refused to meet with the UN Special Envoy to Yemen to discuss a ceasefire.
The Saudi-led coalition and Hadi government intend to seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports before
beginning negotiations. Pakistan pledged $1 million USD in aid to the Hadi government.
Outlook: The Hadi government will not accept a ceasefire without further military success.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition announced that it will base in Mokha city, Taiz governorate, to
support Operation Golden Spear, which aims to control Yemen’s western coastal ports.
Outlook:The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will counter Saudi-led coalition armor in al Hudaydah
governorate, where the Hadi government lacks support. Operation Golden Spear will stall.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS Wilayat al Bayda may temporarily fill a security vacuum in central Yemen. Wilayat al
Bayda increased attacks after AQAP likely withdrew from the al Bayda frontline following five
days of U.S. airstrikes. Wilayat al Bayda likely consists of former AQAP members.
Outlook: AQAP will resume operations on the al Bayda frontline.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 09 MAR: A reported
U.S. airstrike
targeted AQAP in
Mayfaa district.
2) 10 MAR: A Saudi-
led coalition airstrike
killed 22 civilians in a
qat market in
Khawkah city.
3) 10 MAR: AQAP fired
Grad rockets at
Emirati-backed
Hadhrami Elite
Forces in al Ghabar.
4) 11 MAR: ISIS
Wilayat al Bayda
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces in
Amar, al Sawmah
district.
5) 14 MAR: AQAP
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces in
A’arfaf area, al
Dhaleh governorate.
5
4
3
2
1

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
New Somali President Farmajo risks losing popular support if he cannot deliver on campaign
promises. Somali soldiers protested unpaid salaries. Famine is spreading in Somalia.
Outlook: The federal government’s limited reach will hamper aid distribution.
Security
The U.S. may increase its supporting role in ongoing operations against al Shabaab. U.S.
AFRICOM also seeks to extend AMISOM’s withdrawal schedule until 2019.
Outlook: Increased military pressure on al Shabaab will limit the group’s attack capabilities
but will not degrade its popular support base.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) in
Mogadishu on the same day, signaling an uptick in the group’s campaign to degrade security
in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab is also seizing population centers and disrupting AMISOM
logistics lines in regions surrounding Mogadishu.
Outlook: Al Shabaab’s campaign will degrade support for the government in Mogadishu.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
2
3
1
1) 07-09 MAR: Al
Shabaab gunmen
assassinated
several clan leaders
in southern
Mogadishu.
2) 09 MAR: Ethiopian
AMISOM forces
repelled an al
Shabaab attack in
Bardhere, Gedo
region.
3) 10 MAR: The UAE
finalized plans to
build a base in
Boosaaso, Puntland.
4) 13 MAR: Al
Shabaab detonated
two SVBIEDs
targeting a hotel and
a military base in
central Mogadishu.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed peace process is deteriorating as conflict over oil escalates in Libya. The
House of Representatives (HoR) withdrew its support for the agreement that established the
Government of National Accord (GNA). Anti-GNA sentiment is increasing in eastern Libya.
Outlook: Lack of HoR participation will derail UN and regional peace efforts.
Security
The Libyan National Army (LNA) recaptured two oil ports seized by the al Qaeda-linked
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB) on March 3. Clashes are ongoing in central Libya. Egypt
and possibly Russia may have supported the LNA counterattack.
Outlook: Clashes over oil sites may grow into broader civil conflict in central Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
The al Qaeda network supports BDB elements and may have helped coordinate the oil port
attacks. Al Qaeda associates in Benghazi and Derna increased operations to fix LNA forces.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will exploit the increasingly polarized civil war to expand its support base.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 03 MAR: The
MSCD increased
operations in
Derna.
2) 07 MAR: The LNA
massed 5,000
troops in Brega for
a counterattack
against the BDB.
3) 07-12 MAR: The
LNA air force
conducted airstrikes
against BDB
positions in al Sidra,
Ras Lanuf, al
Uqaylah and Ben
Jawad.
4) 13 MAR: The LNA
clashed with the
BRSC in the 12
Buildings complex
of Qanfouda
district, Benghazi.
2
3
1
4

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
AQIM- and ISIS-affiliated militants may cooperate against security forces in western Tunisia.
Pro-ISIS media allegedly reported that AQIM and ISIS militants cooperated to thwart an
ambush by the Tunisian army in Kasserine governorate, western Tunisia.
Outlook: AQIM and ISIS militants will not compete in shared safe havens.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
Al Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is engaged in a campaign
to build operational capabilities. Suspected JNIM militants seized vehicles from the Malian
Army in Fafa, eastern Mali. JNIM fired indiscriminately at civilians as well as soldiers.
Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari’s deteriorating health risks throwing Nigeria into
chaos. Buhari’s deputy, a southern Christian, enacted pro-southern economic policies which
will incite sectarian unrest. Buhari’s return to Nigeria will not mitigate questions about his
health, and the Nigerian executive will remain weak through the 2019 elections.
Outlook: JNIM will exploit weak points in security forces in order to seize weapons. Boko
Haram will exploit sectarian tensions in order to expand in Nigeria.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 09 MAR: Moroccan
police arrested two
ISIS militants that
planned attacks in
the country and
procured material to
make IEDs.
2) 10 MAR: The
Algerian Army
destroyed three
militant bunkers
between Bouira and
Bordj Bou Arreridj
provinces in
northern Algeria.
3) 13 MAR: Salafi-
jihadi militants killed
a policeman in an
attack on a police
station in Janoura,
Kabili Governorate,
Tunisia.
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31

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA
SAHEL
2
3
1
1) 07 MAR: Sudanese
rebel fighters
captured three Boko
Haram fighters
alongside Sudanese
soldiers in South
Kordofan, Sudan.
2) 09 MAR: The
Nigerian Army
raided a hotel in
Gombe State,
Nigeria in response
to a bomb threat.
3) 13 MAR: Suspected
JNIM militants
attacked the Malian
Army in a market in
Fafa, Gao Region,
killing two soldiers
and four civilians.
SAHEL

13. 13
ACRONYMS
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3
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Group for the Aid of Islam and the Muslims (JNIM)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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