2. Why Have This Show - I?

3. Why Have This Show - II?
54% of Indian users paid a bribe to at least one of nine selected service
providers in 2010 – TI, 2011
49% Pakistanis, 11% Chinese, 62% Afghans, 4% Brazilians, 27% Russians,
63% Nigerians and 31% Mexicans too paid bribes – TI, 2011
Yet 19% Indonesians, 17% Filipinos, 9% Malays, 4% Canadians, 2%
British and 5% Americans paid bribes – TI, 2011
India scores 3.3, Brazil 3.7, China 3.5, Mexico 3.1 – TI, 2011
Series of megabuck scams in last decade
Very few convictions
Virtually no forfeiture of ill-gotten wealth
International reputation downhill

4. Why Have This Show - III?
An international watchdog study shows India has been drained of
$462 billion between 1948 and 2008 - nearly 40% of India's annual
gross domestic product
India tops the list for black money in the entire world with almost
US$1456 billion in Swiss banks
Indian Swiss bank account assets are worth 13 times the country‘s
national debt
ED probes US$ 24.86 billion transactions - enough to fund national
drinking water project in all 6,00,000) villages in India for the next 10
years
The Economist: A rotten state (11th Mar, 2011)
ARE WE A POOR NATION BECAUSE WE ARE CORRUPT?

5. Why Have This Show - III?

7. What Causes Corruption – The Layman‘s View
Absolute authority vested in political and administrative
bureaucracies
Ineffective/antiquated and overburdened legal system leads to
skewing of power structures
Ineffective anti-corruption mechanisms
Ineffective ombudsmen
Inadequate enforcement of laws and punishment
Government rules and regulations encourage rent-seeking
Privatization , Liberalization and Globalization

8. Defining Corruption - I
Joseph Nye (1996):
―Behavior, which deviates from the formal duties of a public
role because of private-regarding (family, close family, private
clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the
exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. This
includes such behavior as bribery; use of a reward to pervert
the judgment of a person in a position of trust; nepotism
(bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship
rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation
of public resources for private-regarding uses).‖

9. Defining Corruption - II
Mushtaq Khan (1996):
―Behavior that deviates from the formal
rules of private-regarding motives such as
wealth, power, or status‖
Pranab Bardhan (1996):
―The use of public office for private
gains.‖

10. Defining Corruption - III
Oxford Unabridged Dictionary defines
corruption as ―perversion or destruction of
integrity in the discharge of public duties by
bribery or favor.‖
Merriam Webster‘s Collegiate Dictionary
defines it as ―inducement to wrong by improper
or unlawful means (as bribery).‖

11. Defining Corruption - IV
Can occur in either the public or private sector but
typically characterized as the use of public office for
private gain
Economists claim that levels of corruption may
depend on discretionary power, economic rents, and
oversight and weak enforcement institutions
May vary according to the scope of supervision and
the number of hierarchical levels in an organization

12. Typology of Corruption - I
Grand: Senior officials, major decisions or
contracts, and the exchange of large sums of
money, e.g. 2G & CWG
Petty: Low-level officials, the provision of
routine services and goods, and small sums of
money, e.g. licensing & enforcement
Systemic: Permeates an entire government or
ministry, e.g. DDA & MCD
Individual: Isolated and sporadic, e.g. traffic
constable & sanitation inspector

13. Typology of Corruption - II
Syndicated: Elaborate systems devised for receiving and disseminating
bribes, e.g. 2G, Bofors & New Nationalized Bank Branches
Non-syndicated: Individual officials may seek or compete for bribes in
an ad hoc and uncoordinated fashion, e.g. pension sanction & bank
loans
Internal: Interfere with the ability of a government agency to recruit
or manage its staff, make efficient use of its resources, or conduct
impartial in-house investigations, e.g. ED & CBI
External: Efforts to manipulate or extort money from clients or
suppliers, or to benefit from inside information, e.g. CPWD & SEBI
Administrative: Unwarranted interference in market operations, such
as the use of state power to artificially restrict competition and
generate monopoly rents, e.g. PSU IPOs & land sales to private sector

14. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - I
Design or selection of uneconomical projects because
of opportunities for financial kickbacks and political
patronage, e.g. realigning rail track to inflate cost
Procurement fraud, including collusion, overcharging,
or the selection of contractors, suppliers, and
consultants on criteria other than the lowest evaluated
substantially responsive bidder, e.g. cartelization & pre-
qualification of vendors
Illicit payments of "speed money" to government
officials to facilitate the timely delivery of goods and
services to which the public is rightfully entitled, such as
permits and licenses, e.g. transfer of govt. lands

15. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - II
Illicit payments to government officials to facilitate access to
goods, services, and/or information to which the public is not
entitled, or to deny the public access to goods and services to
which it is legally entitled, e.g. fire clearances & change of land
use
Illicit payments to prevent the application of rules and
regulations in a fair and consistent manner, particularly in areas
concerning public safety, law enforcement, or revenue collection,
e.g. hafta & income tax refund advice
Payments to government officials to foster or sustain
monopolistic or oligopolistic access to markets in the absence of
a compelling economic rationale for such restrictions, e.g.
limiting construction of new airports

16. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - III
Misappropriation of confidential information for personal
gain, such as using knowledge about public transportation
routings to invest in real estate that is likely to appreciate, e.g.
extension of DMRC, location of SEZ & national highway
realignment
Deliberate disclosure of false or misleading information on
the financial status of corporations that would prevent
potential investors from accurately valuing their worth, such as
the failure to disclose large contingent liabilities or the
undervaluing of assets in enterprises slated for privatization,
e.g. valuation of assets prior to disinvestment of PSU
shareholding by GOI
Theft or embezzlement of public property and monies, e.g.
Railway property & preferment of duplicate bills

17. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - IV
Sale of official posts, positions, or promotions;
nepotism; or other actions that undermine the creation of
a professional, meritocratic civil service, e.g. State PWD,
Irrigation, NHAI & Central Secretariat
Extortion and the abuse of public office, such as using
the threat of a tax audit or legal sanctions to extract
personal favors, e.g. income tax notice & overstated excise
penalties
Obstruction of justice and interference in the duties of
agencies tasked with detecting, investigating, and
prosecuting illicit behavior, e.g. ED & CBI

18. Illustrations of Corrupt Behavior - IV
•Sale of official posts, positions, or promotions; nepotism;
or other actions that undermine the creation of a
professional, meritocratic civil service, e.g. State PWD,
Irrigation, NHAI & Central Secretariat
•Extortion and the abuse of public office, such as using
the threat of a tax audit or legal sanctions to extract
personal favors, e.g. income tax notice & overstated excise
penalties
•Obstruction of justice and interference in the duties of
agencies tasked with detecting, investigating, and
prosecuting illicit behavior, e.g. ED & CBI

19. Corruption in History - I
―Just as it is impossible not to take the
honey (or the poison) that finds itself at
the tip of the tongue, so it is impossible
for a government servant not to eat up
at least a bit of the King‘s revenue. Just
as fish moving under water cannot
possibly be found out either as drinking
or not drinking water, so government
servants employed in the government
cannot be found out (while) taking
money (for themselves)‖ - Kautilya

20. Corruption in History - II
―This is the ―decree‖ or ―mandate‖ of heaven. If the
emperor or king, having fallen into selfishness and
corruption, fails to see to the welfare of the people,
heaven withdraws its mandate and invests it in
another. The only way to know that the mandate has
passed is the overthrow of the king or emperor; if
usurpation succeeds, then the mandate has passed to
another, but if it fails, then the mandate still resides
with the king‖ - The Chou c.1050-256 BC

21. Corruption in History - III
Machiavelli: Discourses on the need for virtu in
republican government
Rousseau: Government officials, selected by the people
to manage society‘s business, must carry out their duties
in a manner transcending personal interests
Kautilya: Lists ―at least forty ways‖ of embezzling
money from the government in India
Ancient China: Failed extra allowance to government
officials called Yang-lien, meaning ―nourish
incorruptness.‖
Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun: Root of corruption was
―the passion for luxurious living within the ruling group‖

22. Corruption in History - IV
The servants of the nation are
to render their services without
any taking of presents. … To
form your judgment and then
abide by it is no easy task, and
it‘s a man‘s surest course to
give loyal obedience to the law
which commands, ‗Do no
service for a present‘ - Plato

23. Corruption in History - V
―Corruption is worse than
prostitution. The latter
might endanger the morals
of an individual the former
invariably endangers the
morals of the entire
country‖ - Karl Kraus
(1874-1936)

24. Bishop Creighton:
―People in authority are not [to] be snubbed or
sneezed at from our pinnacle of conscious rectitude‖
Lord EE Dalberg-Acton, 1887:
―If there is any presumption, it is the
other way against holders of power,
increasing as the power increases. Historic
responsibility has to make up for the want
of legal responsibility. Power tends to
corrupt and absolute power corrupts
absolutely‖

25. Where India Stands: Ends Justify Means
―Great men are almost always bad men,
even when they exercise influence and not
authority: still more when you superadd
the tendency or the certainty of corruption
by authority. There is no worse heresy than
that the office sanctifies the holder of it.
That is the point at which...the end learns
to justify the means‖

26. Frameworks of Research & Practice of Corruption
Two alternative frameworks dominate research and
practice on corruption:
Economic perspective: Focuses limitedly on the roles of
rational self-interest, efficiency pressures, and explicit,
formal regulative structures in explaining and combating
corruption
Organizational behavior: Focuses on the normative and
cognitive aspects of corrupt behavior however, within
organizations and instead of on the wider institutional
orders that also influence the behavior of individuals and
organizations

27. Causes of Corruption - I
Greater efficacy of common law in curbing
corruption than civil law
Democratic and open political systems foster
freedom of association and of the press and
engender public interest groups to expose abuses
Competitors for office have an incentive to
discover and publicize the incumbent‘s misuse
of office whenever an election beckons
– Daniel Triesman (2000)

28. Causes of Corruption - II
Federal structure in which each level has
its own police force can reduce the
vulnerability of any one law enforcement
agency (Rose-Ackerman, 1994)
Relatively balanced power of central and
subnational officials over certain common
pool resources — the tax or ‗bribe‘ base in
a given region — leads to suboptimal over
extraction (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993)

29. Corruption: Driver or Retarder of Growth? - I
YES
Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968): Raises economic growth
rates .―Speed money‖ would speed up procedural delays in
government by encouraging civil servants to work harder for
such ―incentives‖ on a piece rate (Mauro, 1995).
NO
Shleifer and Vishny (1993): Corruption lowers economic
growth
Rose-Ackerman (1978): Difficulty in limiting corruption to
areas where it may be desirable.

30. Corruption: Driver or Retarder of Growth? - II
If Bangladesh were to increase the level of integrity of its
bureaucracy to that of Uruguay, its investment rate would rise
by 5% and yearly GDP growth rate by 0.5%
Bureaucracy efficiency index, 1 being the lowest grade and 10
the highest:
India listed along with Bangladesh in the second lowest
category with a score of 4.5-5.5 with Pakistan in the lowest
category of 1.5-4.5 while Sri Lanka is slotted in the next higher
category of 6.5-7
A one standard deviation improvement in the bureaucracy
efficiency rate was associated with a 4.75% annual rise in GDP
(Mauro, 1995, 696) and a 1.03% rise in GDP per capita
Paulo Mauro, IMF, 1995

31. Corruption: Driver or Retarder of Growth? - III
Mauro, 1998: One standard-deviation improvement in the corruption index leads
education expenditure to rise by over six percentage points of total government
consumption expenditure
Also affects government expenditure on health services
Lambsdorff (1999): If corruption affects the productivity of capital, an adverse
impact on the ratio of investment to GDP will result
Tanzi and Davoodi(1998): Retards growth by increasing public investment while
reducing its productivity
Higher corruption associated with higher total expenditure on wages and salaries
Retards growth by reducing the quality of the existing infrastructure by
increasing the cost of doing business for both government and private sector
leading to lower output and growth
Lowers growth by lowering government revenue needed to finance productive
spending

32. Corruption & Inflation
Al-Marhubi (1999): Faced with rising tax evasion and tax
collection costs in corrupt countries, governments sometimes
have a motive for creating inflation to generate seigniorage
(difference between face value and cost of circulation of a coin;
also referred to as inflation tax in some countries) as a source of
government revenue
Force businesses underground thereby increasing reliance
on the inflation tax
Capital flight, shrinking taxable assets and income of those
most able to meet government revenue requirements
By reducing revenues and increasing public spending, may
also contribute to larger fiscal deficits, with attendant inflation

33. Corruption & Growth of Private Sector
Fisman and Svensson (2007): Found a
negative correlation between the rate of
taxation and bribery and firm growth
Concluded that ―a one-percentage point
increase in the bribery rate was
associated with a reduction in firm
growth of three percentage points, an
effect that was about three times greater
than that of taxation.‖

34. Corruption & Growth of Private Sector
Fisman and Svensson (2007): Found a
negative correlation between the rate of
taxation and bribery and firm growth
Concluded that ―a one-percentage point
increase in the bribery rate was
associated with a reduction in firm
growth of three percentage points, an
effect that was about three times greater
than that of taxation.‖

35. Corruption & Creditworthiness
Increases likelihood of arbitrary government actions that reduce
profits and leave firms unable to repay loans
May lower the effectiveness of government services, making it even
more difficult for firms to realize profits (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993).
Reduce legal protection for bondholders as controlling shareholders
may divert resources from the firm to their own private ends.
Higher risk premium when issuing bonds.
An important source of default risk
Surprisingly, corruption does not distinguish between firm spreads
and sovereign spreads to the same degree even though in theory
corruption should matter in very different ways for these two types of
borrowers (Cocchini, et al, 2003)

36. Corruption & Defense Expenditure - I
From 1980-2007, global arms imports have
risen from $40.58 billion to $ 819.04 billion at
1990 constant prices (SIPRI, 2009)
Tanzi (1998) estimated that bribes account for
as much as 15% of the total spending on
weapons acquisition
Therefore based on purchases during 2007
may be as high as approximately $ 125 billion,
i.e. about the GDP of the UAE, New Zealand
and Egypt each in 2007 (World Bank, 2009).

37. Corruption & Defense Expenditure - II
Country TI (CPI) Purchases Country TI (CPI) Purchases
Ranking ($ billion) Ranking ($ billion)
2008 in 2007 2008 in 2007
Greece 57 19.27 China 71 29.02
Mexico 72 1.74 Saudi Arabia 80 18.95
India 85 25.01 Egypt 115 16.60
Vietnam 121 2.00 Pakistan 134 9.57
Yemen 141 1.95 Venezuela 158 2.32
Myanmar 178 2.35

38. Causes of Corruption in Defense Expenditure - I
Gupta, DeMello and Sharan (2001)
Foreign suppliers may bribe officials of countries importing arms
and military equipment facilitated by the tax code of arms-exporting
countries, that allow bribery as a business expense
Payment of bribes to foreign officials typically not considered as a
criminal act in many recipient countries
Since the mid-1980s and the breakup of the former Soviet Union
the defense industry in Russia and the CIS had large idle capacities
and huge fixed sunk costs that prompted arms producers to scout
aggressively for markets abroad
Regulations typically confer power on the officials in charge of
authorizing contracts

39. Causes of Corruption in Defense Expenditure – II
Limited competition among suppliers encourages
rent seeking and provides incentives for officials to
engage in malfeasant behavior
The secrecy surrounding defense outlays gives rise
to corruption. Defense contracts are often excluded
from freedom of information legislation, where
available
Administrative procedures in military spending are
not closely monitored by tax and customs authorities
and standard budget oversight like auditing and
legislative approval

40. Causes of Corruption in Defense Expenditure – III
Stock of defense assets—such as military-controlled
land, hardware, testing grounds, transport vehicles
and facilities such as housing and training centers,
tends to be large and provides further opportunities
for corruption
Size of Global Defense Spending
SIPRI: $1339 billion in 2007—a real-term increase
of 6% over 2006 and 45 per cent since 1998
Corresponds to 2.5 per cent of world gross domestic
product (GDP) and $202 GDP per capita

41. Corruption & Inequity: Water Supply
Falsified meter readings
Distorted site selection of boreholes or abstraction points
Collusion and favouritism in public procurement
Bribes to cover up wastewater and pollution discharge
Kickbacks to accept inflated bills in production
Nepotism in allocation of public offices in water administration
Bribes for diversion of water for irrigation
Bribes for preferential treatment (spread, service level etc)

42. Corruption & Iniquity: Water
Limited Potable Water in Rural Areas
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

43. Corruption & Iniquity: Urban Poor
Burgeoning Slums
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

44. Corruption & Iniquity: Rural Poor
Rural & District Schools
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

45. Corruption & Iniquity: Land Acquisition
Transfer of Agricultural Land to Private Industry
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

46. Corruption & Inequity: Social Security
Social Security for Unorganized Sector
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

47. Corruption & Inequity: Public Works - I
Public-Private Partnership
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

48. Corruption & Inequity: Public Works - II
Government Executed
Corruption = Monopoly + Discretion – Accountability

49. National Integrity System – Institutional Layout
Non-government Government
Political Parties Legislature Public Procurement
International Central Information Local & Regional
Institutions Commission Governments
Media Central Election Judiciary
Commission
Civil Society CAG Police &
prosecutors
Private Sector Public Sector Ombudsman
Executive

50. National Integrity System – Institutional Layout
Pillar Core Rules/Practices
Executive Conflict of interest; administrative law; judicial
review of official decisions
Legislature Fair and transparent elections
Legislative Committees Power to question senior officials
Auditor General Public Reporting
Public Service Public service ethics; monitoring assets and integrity
testing; conflict of interest, nepotism and cronyism
Judiciary
Media Access to information
Civil Society Freedom of speech; the right to information and
giving citizens a voice
Anti-corruption/watchdog Enforceable and enforced laws
agencies
Private Sector Competition policy; public procurement; good
financial management
International Effective mutual legal/judicial assistance

51. National Integrity System
Objectives
Combating corruption as part of the larger struggle
against misconduct and misappropriation
Creating an efficient and effective government
working in the public interest. In fine, the ultimate
goal of the NIS is promoting good governance,
“. . . the aim is not complete rectitude or a one-time cure
or remedy, but an increase in the honesty or integrity of
government as a whole . . . (Pope, 1997)

52. National Integrity System – Oversight Layout
CAG
CBI CVC
_______ Parliament
_______ Courts

53. National Integrity System – Legal Environment
CAGA
SPEA PCA
CVCA
_______ Parliament
_______ Courts

54. National Integrity System – Vigilance Layout
DCVO
CVO
ACVO
CVC
JS (Vig)
Dir/DS
VC MoPT
VC

55. National Integrity System – The Linkages
Parliament
CAG‘s (DPC) PAC
CVC Act SPE Act
Act COPU
Constitutional Statutory Constitutional
Enforceable
Advisory Advisory Advisory

56. National Integrity System – Some Pitfalls: I
Line budget and accounting system are non-transparent, often arbitrary
Key government data not available online to public
Key public services not brought online including at the rural level
Enforcement agencies must conform to civil service regulations – cannot
hire specialists at market rates – budget dependent on uncertain government
grants
Conveyor belt recruitment by UPSC based merely on a third division BA
minima
Ministries and Depts. expanded from 18 in 1947 to over 150 now –
decentralization may breed more corruption as number of employees in the
approvals chain increases manifold
Non-standard contract specifications for identical stores, buildings, etc .
Internal audit, statutory audit and accounts face charges of corruption

57. National Integrity System – Some Pitfalls: II
Constitutional authority of Parliamentary Oversight Committees and CAG
eroded by their advisory powers
Statutory authority of CVC eroded by advisory powers – also plagued by
charges of corruption
CBI needs prior approval of cadre controller to investigate cases against
officers of Jt. Secretary and above – also charged with internal corruption
Inadequate CBI courts
Multiple layers of appeal – delays of several decades
No higher courts for PCA cases – delays of several decades
Non-transparent appointment of senior civil servants of Jt. Secretary and
above rank
Senior civil service not trained to deal with demands of an opening economy

58. National Integrity System – Some Pitfalls: III
Discretion in senior management in post-liberalization era, e.g. omission of
transfer clause in BOT PPP projects or CWG‘s OC
Failure of public grievance redressing systems in Ministries/Depts
Lack of transparency in government decisions – very little data and
justification available in public domain
No exemplary punitive action for dismissing employees caught red-handed
taking a bribe or unable to explain disproportionate wealth within a stipulated
time frame;
Corruption associated with outsourcing
Delays in audit and submission of accounts
Denial of documents to audit and investigative agencies by Ministries/Depts
Ministers‘ powers to appoint senior civil servants without recording reasons

59. Jan Lokpal Bill: The Magic Potion?
An intelligentsia-fuelled expression of mass
discontent
Lokpal: Too much on one table?
Violates separation of powers in Constitution
Merges executive and judicial authority
Investigation + policy evaluation
Omnibus Public Ombudsman
Seeks to override existing National Integrity
institutions instead of strengthening them

60. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - I?
Pass Public Audit Bill of CAG
Vest control of CBI in PMO?
Statutory and binding status of CVC and
Parliamentary Oversight Committees
Create a parallel legal framework to try PCA
cases headed by the Lok Pal
All CBI courts to report to Lok Pal as
benches
HR and financial autonomy for CBI, CAG &
CVC

61. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - II?
Like CVC, CAG too should be multi-member
Mandatory professional and educational
qualifications to be prescribed for CAsG, CICs,
CVC & VCs + all posts at the rank of Jt.
Secretary and above in Central Secretariat
Extend mandate of High Powered Committee
for CVC to include CAG and all Secretaries to
GOI
Induct non-police specialists to man and head
CBI and other investigative agencies
All public projects costing over Rs. 1000 crore
be preceded by public consultation

62. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - III?
Switchover to accrual accounting and
performance budgeting – both in public
domain
Reduce Ministries and Depts by two-thirds
and classify them in five standalone groups, viz.
infrastructure & environment, social services,
security & foreign affairs, economic services
and miscellaneous
Foreclose all public projects that have not
reached even 50% completion after five years
Social Audit of government spending by
expert citizen groups

63. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - IV?
Prohibit re-employment of judges after
retirement
Prohibit appointment of retired civil servants
to constitutional posts
Re-look civil services recruitment system and
introduce professional requirements for
selection
Shorten recruitment time for civil servants to
not more than three months to attract the best
Invite outstanding people from the private
sector to head Ministries/public projects

64. Jan Lokpal Bill: Is it Enough - V?
Pre-audit scrutiny of estimates for all public
projects and schemes of layout of Rs. 1000 crore and
above by CAG
Earmark 20% of all GOI expenditure for
oversight, vigilance and Lok Pal
Earmark 5% of GOI expenditure for training
Repeal all obsolete Acts and Rules that induce
corruption within three months
Evaluation of officers of Jt. Secretary and above
to GOI at 20, 25 and 30 years of service by multi-
member committees vested with statutory binding
powers

65. What is Enough - I?
The day a corrupt officer is jailed and his ill-gotten property
forfeited within a month of his being caught – shift the onus of
disproving guilt on the employee
Competent officers and outsiders drafted in to government by a
transparent process to provide governance – mandatory professional
qualification for each senior manager
5,00,000 redundant govt. posts at a conservative median cost of Rs.
25 lakh per annum each abolished to save the nation Rs. 1,00,000
crore per annum and provide employment for 365 days with Rs.
200/day as minimum wage would employ 1.40 crore people with an
annual wage of Rs. 0.73 lakh per head
Assuming 3 adults/family, annual income would be Rs. 2.19 lakh per
annum, several times over our present average national income for
over 45 lakh families

66. What is Enough - II?
Strengthen vigilance and punishments for State civil servants too
Remove prior sanction of Ministry for prosecuting officers of Jt.
Secretary to GOI and above
Grant powers of a criminal court to the CVC, CAG & Ombudsmen
At least 75% of public services made online even in rural areas
Promote use of plastic cards for all payments
Ban cash payment of government receipts/revenues
Promote expert Citizens‘ Councils to mandatorily evaluate
government programs/schemes
Replace obsolete Acts with contemporary ones

67. What is Enough - III?
List all government contracts online with linkage of benefits to
each Parliamentary constituency
Abolish all subsidies and introduce single-point subsidy of 50% on
POL
Privatize government railways, hospitals, airports, public
transportation, non-NH highways on Build-Own-Operate Basis, etc.
Rationalize personal and corporate tax structure by removing all
exemptions and substituting with lump sum deductions for personal
taxes and turnover percentage on corporate taxes
Mandatory possession of PAN cards by all members of a family,
akin to Social Security No. in the USA
Divest Ministers of their power to select bureaucrats

68. What is Enough - IV?
Remove staff car concept in government – each car costs approx. Rs.
One lakh per month (with driver) – 50000 cars removed and
substituted with hired cars @ Rs. 40,000/month saves government Rs.
300 crore per annum from wastage, misuse and corruption
Introduce annual quantitative work contracts between Minister and
Secretary to reduce Ministerial discretion
Abolish Ministers‘ discretion to locate public projects in their
constituencies and reallocate budgetary provisions
Abolish Ministers‘ powers to change end use of government land
Government departments not to procure land for private projects
Introduce licensing system for the real estate sector
Release surplus government land to bring down real estate prices

69. Our Nation has suffered enough!
Corruption has:

70. Views expressed in this
presentation are personal