This document analyzes informal institutions and clientelism in Ukraine and their impact on political actors and the state. It aims to reconstruct clientelistic networks under different presidents to explain state capture. Ukraine is considered a limited access order where partial reforms brought rents to elites, trapping the country institutionally. State capture through clientelism led to an unstable yet self-reproducing hybrid regime. The analysis measures state capture over time and models Ukraine's institutional trap.

1. Informal Institutions in Hybrid
Regimes: the Case of Ukraine
Yuriy Matsiyevsky
Fulbright – Kennan Scholar,
March 8, 2012

2. Goals and objectives
• First, to explain the impact of informal institutions
(clientelism and informal deals) on the actors’
behaviour and, second, to account on how
informal institutions interact with formal, and what
keeps the informal institutions intact.
• Objectives:
• to reconstruct the cleintelistic networks under
Kuchma, Yushechenko and Yanukovych and
explain how the state was captured through the
clientelistic networks, why Ukraine has fallen into
an institutional trap, and to measure the stability of
Ukraine’s regime in comparative context.

3. Theoretical foundation
• Literature on hybrid regimes and
clientelism;
• Gerd Mayer’s structural approach to
informal institutions (as based on
‘operational code of political culture’)
• D.North, J. Wallis, B.Weingast’s approach
to limited vs open access orders

4. Methodology and Basic Concept
• Rational choice institutionalism (RCI)
• System network Analysis (SNA)
• Deductive approach – theoretical assumption
precedes empirical test
• Concepts: Hybrid regime (HR) –(competitive
elections with pervasive clientelism)
• Captured state (business have decisive
influence on policy)
• Institutional Trap (ineffective equilibrium that
nobody wants to change )

5. Major thesis
• Ukraine is a basic limited access order
• The state capture began in the second half of
the 90-ies.
• Partial reform brings rents to elites and that is
why they have never been finished
• State capture through clientelism and
informal deals (playing not by the rules, as
was expected, but with the rules) have led to
the institutional trap.
• Ukraine’s regime has remained hybrid
through the entire period of independence

6. Assumptions
• State capture have been initiated from ‘above’
by building clientelistic networks
• clientelism appeared to be more viable than
formal procedures
• Clientelism and informal deals have determined
the path of the regime transformation - the
strategies of elites from cartel pacts at the
beginning of Ukraine’s independence to playing
not by rules, as was expected, but with rules.
• Regime is inherently unstable, but is able to
reproduce itself through the changes within the
dominant coalition

7. Measuring state capture
• Ukraine has the third highest index of state capture (SC)
for 2000, while having the highest index of SC through
parliamentary legislation as well as the highest index of
firms’ influence on the state among 21 transition
countries.
• 6 indices: the sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to
private interests; the sale of Presidential decrees to
private interests; Central Bank mishandling of funds; the
sale of court decision in commercial cases; criminal
cases; illicit contributions paid by private interests to
political parties and election campaigns.
• Indirect indices: corruption perception index (152 out of
183), economic freedom (163 out of 179) paying taxes
index (181 out of 183) all as of 2011-2012
• Since than the share of shadow economy has grown to
50+%,

8. Aspects of state capture
• While in Russia it happened through the
executive, in Ukraine it was through the
Parliament.
• Has taken place between 1998 and 2002
Parliamentary election.
• Decrease of communist’s (from 121 seats
in 1998 to 65 in 2002)and increase of
oligarch’s representations in VR (For
United Ukraine block-175 seats in 2002)
• It is said that in the 6th and 7th Parliament
(2006 and 2007 elections) there are more
than 300 millionaires.

9. Model of Institutional Trap
High uncertainty
Blocked the
Weak institutions Informal Devolution of Institutional
possibility to “play
deals constitutionalism trap
by the rules”
Shifting balance of
resources

10. The traits of the informal pacts
• While good pacts are based upon mutual acceptance of
competition among elites, bad pacts are designed to
avoid elite competition.
• While good pacts provide institutional guarantees for
participants that are enforced by formal institutions, bad
pacts are based upon informal institutional arrangements
or uncertain procedures
• While "good pacts" are public contracts, "bad pacts", even
if they become public, contain significant components of
an informal nature, which rarely become known to the
public. Therefore, these covenants I call informal pacts.
• Finally, while "good pacts" promote the democratic
political culture of elites that can be considered
an added social value, "bad pacts" are reached
exclusively for the survival of political players and bear no
benefit to society.

11. Informal deals under Yushchenko
• Dec.8, 2004 – Political agreement to change
the Constitution, but violating the procedure.
Resulted in unclear division of power, political rivalry
and split within the “Orange team”
• Sep. 22, 2005 – Memorandum of
Understanding.
• Aug. 3, 2006 – Universal of National Unity
• May 7, 2007 – A deal between the Pres.,
Pr.Min., and the Speaker on pre-term elections
• Tymoshenko-Yanukovych deal on new
constitution (2008-2009)

12. Devolution of constitutionalism and its
implications
• The former discussion detailed the
devolution of constitutionalism
• Political expediency subverted procedural
requirements
• High uncertainty, caused by the disrespect
for democratic decision-making
procedures pushed all key players to resolve
conflicts by negotiating informal pacts,
which further intensified uncertainty
and complicated the choice of "playing by
the rules."

13. Institutional Trap in Ukraine’s politics
• Devolution of constitutionalism brought
Ukrainian elites to an "institutional trap" –
they realized the malignancy of informal
agreements but continued to use them in the
hope of winning over the opponents.
• Trying to beat one another in a game of
two against one prevented the elites from
initiating structural reforms in Ukraine
and removed it further from democratic
standards of policy making.

14. Sustaining the equilibrium:
Patronal networks in Ukraine
• Networks demonstrate how the state was
controlled under different presidents;
• How the regime was able to reproduce itself
even after the people in power have changed.
• The regime’s transformations went through
several stages:
• From semi-authoritarian regime under
Kuchma to ‘defective democracy’ under
Yushchenko to quasi-authoritarianism under
Yanukovych.

15. P.Lazarenko’s government (1996-1997)

16. V.Pustovoytenko’s government (1997-1999)

17. V.Yanukovych’s government (2002-2005)

18. Yu.Tymoshenko’s first government 2005

19. Yu.Tymoshenko’s second government 2007-2010

20. M.Azarov’s government (2010- present)

21. Network Centralization Index
L.Kuchma V.Yushchenko V.Yanukovyh
Government
P. Lazarenko V.Pustovoytenko V.Yanukovych Yu.Tymoshenko Yu.Tymoshenko
М.Azarov
(1996 - 1997) (1997 - 1999) (2002 - 2004) (2005) (2007-2010)
Centralization 38,28 44,97 22,38 68,31 58,83 76,47
Index
Index shows the extent to which the network could be controlled from one center. The value of the index lies
in the interval form 0 to 100. If it goes beyond the 50, it means that network is highly centralized.

22. Is the regime stable?
Will Yanukovych survive the next electoral cycle?
• According to H.Linz, stability is a sum of
legitimacy, efficacy, and effectiveness
• Measuring stability:
• Legitimacy is a public support
• Efficacy reflects the public attitudes towards the
current situation in the country
• Effectiveness reflects the attitudes towards the
policies being implemented
• Vertical threats (effective opposition capable to
mobilize public support)
• Horizontal threats (disloyal allies)

23. Measuring the regime’s stability
Indicators of stability in % for Value of RSI
February 2010 December 2011 02/2010 12/2011
Legitimacy - 59,5 35,2
Efficacy - 28,1 11,7
Effectiveness - 45,4 30,8 0,72 0,70
Vertical threats – the readiness
to participate in protests) -
26,2 52
Horizontal threats – loyalty of the 0,78 0,76
milieu - 50 %

24. Stability of hybrid regimes
Regime stability index for Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Georgia (2000-2011)
0,81
0,8
0,79
0,78 RSI for Ukraine with
0,77 Horisontal threats
0,76
RSI for Russia with
0,75
0,74 Horisontal threats
0,73 RSI for Belarus with
0,72 Horisontal threats
0,71
0,7 RSI for Georgia with
Horisontal threats
02
03
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06
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Se 011
20
20
20
20
20
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De 11
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25. RCI and WGI correlations
Years Ukraine Russia Belarus Georgia
RSI WGI WGI r, RSI WGI WGI r, RSI WGI WGI r, RSI WGI WGI r,
Estimate (0-1) R^2 Estimate (0-1) R^2 Estimate (0-1) R^2 Estimate (0-1) R^2
2002 0,479 0,76 -0,37 0,57 0,879 -0,24 0,27
2004 0,77 -0,65 0,63 0,23 0,77 -0,56 0,61 0,77 0,059 0,79 -0,146 0,53 0,073
2005 0,78 -0,23 0,54 0,76 -0,7 0,64 0,796 -0,13 0,525
2006 0,77 0,02 0,499 0,77 -1,77 0,85 0,795 -0,13 0,525
2007 0,77 0,01 0,498 0,795 -0,32 0,56
2008 0,76 0,04 0,5 0,78 -0,9 0,68 0,78 -1,6 0,82 0,797 -0,34 0,565
2009 0,76 -0,01 0,501 0,78 -0,97 0,7 0,79 -0,20 0,54
2010 0,78 -0,15 0,58 0,78 -0,94 0,69 0,77 -1,55 0,8 0,797 -0,17 0,537

26. Prospects for the future
• Between 2012 and 2015 a dominant coalition will
face a growing pressure both from within and outside
the Ukraine.
• It is then the low rates of legitimacy, effectiveness
and efficacy may be intensified by the vertical and/
or horizontal threats, what, theoretically, should lead
to power change, but not the fact that to the change
of regime
• Regime is not a people, but institutions. The change
of people does not constitute the change of regime.

27. Conclusions
• In the captured state a regime could be more or
less authoritarian. In Ukraine it remained hybrid,
though proportions between autocratic and
democratic elements have changed over time.
• Informal pacts have become an integral part of
the "operational code"of political culture of the
Ukrainian elites
• Devolution of constitutionalism brought
Ukrainian elites to "institutional trap" – they
realised malignancy of informal agreements
but continued to use them in the hope of
winning over the opponents.
• While Russia and Belarus have been caught
into authoritarian trap, Ukraine has been in
hybrid trap