University of Arizona School of Business final report on Cubesats as disruptive technologies.

1. Industry Description and Strategic Recommendations
for CubeSat Market
By
The NewSpace Business Group
Eller College of Management, University of Arizona
Jonathan Card
John Fawkes
Erin Forsyth

2. Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ ii
Table of Figures ................................................................................................................. iii
1 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 1
2 Disruptiveness of CubeSat Market ............................................................................... 2
1.1 Description of Christensen Model ......................................................................... 2
2.1 Overview of Interview Results .............................................................................. 4
2.2 Interpretation of Secondary Research .................................................................... 6
3 Parties Showing Interest ............................................................................................... 8
3.1 Interested Industry Members ................................................................................. 8
3.2 Interested University Members .............................................................................. 8
4 Value Network Overview ............................................................................................. 9
4.1 Description of Value Network Model.................................................................... 9
4.2 Launch Providers ................................................................................................. 10
4.3 Component Vendors ............................................................................................ 13
4.4 CubeSat Communications .................................................................................... 14
Appendices ........................................................................................................................ 16
List of Interested Parties ............................................................................................... 17
List of Launch Providers ............................................................................................... 20
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3. Table of Figures
Figure a. Characteristic profile of disruptive innovation versus the status quo in relation
to the market. Chart generated by authors to demonstrate relationships, not from
particular data.............................................................................................................. 3
Figure b. CubeSat component vendors .......................................................................... 14
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4. 1 Executive Summary
In this paper, the NewSpace Business Group explores the question of whether CubeSats
are positioned to be a disruptive innovation to the traditional satellite market. The specific
innovation under consideration is to approach satellite construction based on:
1. Off-the-shelf-parts and
2. The extensive use of standards to constrain design.
As the study progressed, it became clear that it may have missed the key point, which is
whether the design principles listed above are themselves the disruptive innovation and
whether the traversal up-market of that innovation would consist of those principles being
used in traditional satellite construction, rather than studying whether CubeSats in
particular could be a disruption to the traditional satellite market. There is evidence to
suggest that this is possible; the Iridium satellite constellation used many of these
approaches in the late 1990s. However, that conclusion will have to wait for another
study.
This study concludes that CubeSat technology may on some level be disruptive to
traditional satellites, but there is still a great deal of noise surrounding the emergence of
the new technology. Upon analysis of the technology itself, there is still a dearth of data
points to effectively analyze its emergence. The intent of this study is to outline methods
of further analysis that could be pursued to resolve these questions.
The main concern is still that there are no commercial customers that use CubeSats in a
commercial setting. The market still seems dominated by research organizations. This
could be because there still remain elements of the value chain that do not have candidate
disruptions. The launch provider market has speculated about a number of launch
paradigms, namely Interorbital, Virgin Galactic, and XCOR, but these have not yet begun
in earnest and the existing launch platforms may not be able to serve CubeSats effectively
in their own paradigm. The component vendors are still ambiguous whether they fit a
new value network, and the existing regulatory structure surrounding space
communications poses a difficult hurdle for this new paradigm.
CubeSats could represent a new way of moving forward with spacecraft production It is
interesting, important, and potentially profitable to watch this phenomenon unfold in the
marketplace and we attempt here to outline the important factors to monitor of the next
several years.
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5. 2 Disruptiveness of CubeSat Market
The writers have taken as their belief that the CubeSat market is potentially disruptive not
because the size of the CubeSat is itself important, but that the standardization of parts
and protocols allows for a different paradigm of satellite design. By standardizing on
shape, weight and dimension, the satellite designer is able to make inefficient design
decisions based on decent assumptions and indirect sales channels to suppliers and
complementary services rather than efficient design decisions based on extensive, and
expensive, research and direct sales channels. Our principal interest is in this design
paradigm, but we have adopted the disruptive nature of CubeSats themselves as an easier
proxy for the disruptive nature of the paradigm. In conversations with our sponsor, we are
questioning whether a better comparison would be whether the CubeSat market is
capable of disrupting the traditional approach when applied to other kinds of nanosats.
We cannot yet conclude whether CubeSats are capable of disrupting the satellite market.
In some cases our limited resources prevent us from applying the model to the current
market due to a lack of information. However, one of the key factors in the study is the
complete lack of an identified initial market for CubeSats. The question of disruption of a
given innovation is determined by its capability to transcend from a “toy” technology to
replacing the existing technology paradigm. CubeSats have not demonstrated that they
are even a toy in the commercial market. There are at least two statements that can be
taken as null hypotheses that have not been rejected and it is not clear which should be
taken as the null hypothesis to our problem:
1. CubeSats are not disruptive to the satellite market;
2. The CubeSat paradigm could be disruptive, but the particular standards adopted
are incorrectly specified;
3. The CubeSat paradigm could be disruptive, but less than the entire value network
(discussed below) has yet had the new paradigm applied to it, erecting a barrier to
the development of any CubeSats.
Belief in hypothesis 2 may be driving the development of the TubeSat standard being
driven by Interorbital Systems and questions whether the new paradigm should be
applied to larger satellites as an extension of the work begun by Iridium in the late 1990s.
Belief in hypothesis 3 is a valid source for further inquiry that could be very rewarding.
1.1 Description of Christensen Model
The fundamental profile of a disruptive innovation, as described by Dr. Christensen of
Harvard University, is when the trajectory of improvement of an inferior, or simplified,
technology that has non-traditional benefits is steeper than the trajectory of increasing
technology requirements by the majority of the consumers of the technology. The
principal characteristics, therefore, of a disruptive innovation are not of the innovation
itself, but of the consumers of the innovation. These characteristics are:
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6. 1. The disruptive innovation is currently perceived as inferior to the traditional
innovation,
2. The disruptive innovation is improving according to the characteristics used to
evaluate the traditional way of doing business faster than the marketplace is
demanding improvement in the traditional way of doing business, and
3. There exists a current market that is underserved or not served by the traditional
technology
This last characteristic is to provide a market for the disruptive technology to sell into
until it disrupts the traditional way of doing business.
The typical representation of a disruptive technology is a graph like in Figure a.
Growth of a Disruptive Technology
Traditional
Innovation
Demand,
Technology capability
Std Dev
High
Demand,
Median
Demand,
Std Dev
Low
Disruptive
Innovation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Year
Figure a. Characteristic profile of disruptive innovation versus the status quo in relation to the
market. Chart generated by authors to demonstrate relationships, not from particular
data.
The market demand is characterized by a distribution because not all customers desire the
same level of technological complexity; currently, they are likely served by buying
technology similar to the state-of-the-art in form and function, but at reduced
functionality. In year 0, this is their only option as the best incarnation of the disruptive
innovation has even less capability than the low-end incarnation of the traditional way of
doing business. However, the rate of improvement of the disruptive innovation’s
capabilities is greater than the increase in the customers’ needs and, in year 2, the best the
disruptive innovation can offer surpasses what the median of the market requires. This
does not constitute a “tipping point” except insofar as there is often a moment when the
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7. larger market becomes aware of the encroachment of the new innovation; the disruptive
technology has been increasing its ability to serve more and more of the market gradually
for the entire period, serving the “long tail” of customers whose needs are far below the
median.
Note: Despite Figure a, we do not assume that the distribution of the
market’s demand for technological complexity is normally distributed. As we
are principally interested in market share and number of sales, the measure
of the center of the distribution that we will be using is the median of the
distribution, not its mean.
Notice that the disruptive innovation does not necessarily disrupt the entire market. It is
not necessary for the innovation to have any particular rate of improvement relative to the
traditional technology, and the traditional technology can be assumed not to increase
faster than there are any customers who desire that level of sophistication. In Figure a, the
rate of improvement of the disruptive technology is equal to the increase in demand for
technological complexity of those customers one standard deviation from the mean.
Neither these customers nor the technology vendors who serve them will be disrupted by
the new technology. For example, while the desktop computer was disruptive to the
majority of the minicomputer and mainframe markets, manufacturers who manufacture
very high-end computers to serve very particular customers continue to exist, such as
Cray. It does not negate the disruptiveness of the desktop to admit that Cray will never go
the way of Digital, because Digital served the median niche and Cray served the
undisrupted high-end niche. By the same token, transistors disrupted vacuum tubes from
the bottom in a similar way, but with a trajectory of improvement that was greater than
the improvement of vacuum tubes; there is no high-end vacuum tube market remaining.
What are not depicted in Figure a, are the factors that create value for those customers
who do not value the typical market measures of value; that is, those customers who
demand technology that performs significantly below the market median.
To establish the disruptiveness of CubeSats, therefore, we will be charting the
technological demand in the major drivers of value in traditional satellites, as measured
by the median capability purchased in a given year, against the increase in capability in
those measures that CubeSats have demonstrated in that year.
2.1 Overview of Interview Results
We established the following characteristics as integral to determining the sophistication
of a satellite system:
1. The power system,
2. The precision of the attitude control (that is, the ability to reliably focus the
satellite along a particular vector in 3-dimensional space), and
3. The complexity of the propulsion system.
These results were gathered through interviews with high-ranking executives of
companies that manufacture mid-range satellite systems and operate significant satellite
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8. constellations. Given that the manufacturers and the satellite operators were remarkably
similar in their characterization of the important factors in assessing satellite systems, we
decided to move forward with the secondary research.
We did not have the ability to conduct a survey to quantify the extent of industry
agreement that these characteristics were important due to our limited budget and access
to industry members. Therefore, we can only testify to the existence of these
characteristics as a concern; the significance of these characteristics, the relative
importance of these characteristics, and the possible existence of other important
characteristics are left to the reader to establish to their satisfaction
One source of value that was raised by the interview subjects was attitude control. The
degree of reliable accuracy when directing the satellite to a particular orientation, usually
with respect to a point on the surface of the Earth, was a large source of value in a
satellite. This extended to the level of vibrations caused by moving parts, or “jitter”. An
example of a high-value satellite in this respect was commercial remote sensing satellites
like Digital Globe’s satellites. They required a high degree of precision so that they could
generate full coverage of the Earth in as few orbits as possible with a high resolution,
which limited the footprint of the orbit on the surface of the Earth. This combination of
requirements led to the functional requirements that subsequent orbits must have minimal
overlap, leading the orientation precision of the camera to have very tight tolerances, and
the camera must be capturing continuously as the solar panels reorient to track the sun,
leading the bearings and actuators controlling the solar panels to offer sufficiently low
vibrations that they do not blur the photographs taken in high telephoto.
Another source of value that was raised by the interview subjects was propulsion. The
sophistication of the propulsion system grew in a non-linear fashion as the requirements
of the system grew in complexity. That is, it did not grow by a metric such as thrust per
kilogram of satellite mass. Some satellites can be placed in orbit and left alone without
propulsion. Some require the ability to relight, but are not interested in efficiency and
thus can use hypergolic propellants, which do not require an ignition system. Some may
require the ability to change orbits completely on their own and therefore need greater
efficiency; these may upgrade to LOX-hydrocarbon systems that require an ignition
system. Still others may require such high efficiencies that they use cryogenic fuel
systems, which store propellants at near 0 Kelvin and thus have complex cooling
systems.
A third source of value that was raised was power. Some satellites, such as
telecommunication satellites have large power requirements. The data transmission speed
from a telecommunications satellite is governed by the frequency upon which they
transmit, the width of the frequency band, and the strength of the signal on the Earth’s
surface when transmitted down. Improving each of these increases the power needs of the
satellite. As the only source of energy to a satellite in space is solar power, this puts a
heavy burden on the designers to increase solar power efficiency and decrease power
requirements from other systems.
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9. We expected weight to be a significant factor in the design of a satellite. However, the
results were mixed. Those in manufacturing said that weight was usually given to the
manufacturer as a design constraint set by the customer’s budget, which had dictated the
model of launch vehicle to be used. This decision set the maximum weight limit of the
satellite with very low marginal cost for variations in the weight below that maximum.
Therefore, the weight of the satellite was not considered to be a major consideration
within that constraint. The satellite operator, which designed and manufactured a great
deal of their satellites internally, started with industry cost-per-pound estimates for the
various launch vehicles and a rule-of-thumb which said that 50% of the budget of a
satellite is in launch. This in combination with their budget generated the weight target
for each satellite in the constellation, which settled the question of the launch vehicles.
This then drove the maximum weight limit and the other concerns asserted themselves.
These different methods do not necessarily conflict if we assume that the operators
contracting the manufacturing firms had gone through a similar process before
contracting with them.
2.2 Interpretation of Secondary Research
Having identified the factors that establish value in traditional satellites, we can establish
whether CubeSats may be disruptive by analyzing trends in CubeSats’ capabilities in
these areas to see if they overtake the market median.
Power System
Our initial belief that this will be the easiest factor to measure was mistaken. While we
were able to form a survey of traditional satellites launched in the last 10 years, we were
not able to determine the wattage of their power systems.
However, the solar panel industry has experienced radical improvements in recent years
due to government subsidies and growing markets in the third- and second-world
countries. These improvements in the off-the-shelf equipment that CubeSat
manufacturers are likely to purchase in the dominant design pattern gives strong reason to
believe that it is possible. It seems unlikely that, with the exception of telecommunication
satellites and their increasing desire for increased bandwidth, the power needs of
satellites are growing at the same rate that the underlying technology is improving.
Precision of Attitude Control
We have discovered a number of attitude control systems for CubeSats, from hysteresis
rods to magnetorquers. However, we haven’t discovered sources for the degree of
accuracy demonstrated on either the systems on the CubeSats or on traditional satellites;
however this is an area of active development. In the last 5 to 10 years, the number of
CubeSats with attitude control and the increasing sophistication of these systems has been
clearly evident.
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10. Complexity of the Propulsion System
This characteristic was the most difficult to measure accurately. We did not receive
strong guidance on what this means, but we believe that it means the nature of the
propulsion system itself. The difficulty is that there does not seem to be a universally
comparable metric to compare propulsion systems. Different applications of satellites
require different families of propulsion technologies of varying sophistication. For
instance, while some satellites may not require any propulsion or only a single burn to
achieve the desired orbit, others may require low-thrust for “station keeping” activities, in
which case a Hall thruster system may be sufficient. Others still may require the ability to
change orbits completely, so a chemical rocket with relight capability may be necessary.
Still others may require very high efficiency, leading to a choice of cryogenic fuels with
the subsequent need for complex cooling systems. These options all are of increasing
capability, but are difficult to compare properly in the method outlined in the section
describing disruption measurement.
The proper research tool to investigate this would be a conjoint analysis. We wanted to
do an analysis where features such as ion acceleration, relighting a chemical rocket,
cryogenic fuels, and other characteristics of satellite propulsion systems were identified
and then an orthogonal set of sample propulsion systems were presented to each of a set
of experienced satellite product leaders, who would then be asked to sort the systems in
order of increasing complexity or difficulty. The relative loss of rankings associated with
changes in feature sets would provide us with a means of assigning importance to each
feature, which could then be used to score propulsion systems on actual satellite launches
over the past years. Trends in these scores would provide us with the median market
demand for propulsion system complexity.
However, this analysis does not seem necessary, as there are not a significant number of
examples of propulsion technologies in CubeSat systems to compare those trends. We
have found records of one system, the CanX-2 from the University of Toronto, with a
record of a propulsion system but we have not been able to identify whether it was
successful.
We do not believe this indicates that CubeSats are not disruptive. Just as in statistics, the
entire population should be treated as a sample of the complete theoretical population, the
fact that no CubeSat systems have yet to be built with propulsion does not indicate that
no system could possibly be built. It is expected that the un-served and under-served low-
end markets would be the first served by a disruptive technology, and this includes
simple systems that do not require propulsion. While we do not have sufficient data to
identify a trend and make a conclusion whether the increase in CubeSat propulsion
capability is improving faster than the market need for traditional satellite propulsion
systems, we cannot discount it, either.
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11. 3 Parties Showing Interest
The background research into the list of entities provided by the National Reconnaissance
Office did not reveal interesting results. The universities provided were all U.S. schools
and the companies are mostly defense contractors. It seems clear that this list only
includes organizations that have worked with the U.S. government; it does not appear to
be a representative sample of the industry.
Based on a more general survey of the record of actual CubeSat launches, there has been
limited commercial interest except for Aerospace Corporation and Boeing, who launched
demonstration CubeSats in 2007.1 These CubeSats were platforms for demonstrating
components.
3.1 Interested Industry Members
A preponderance of companies manufacture sensors & communications equipment.
Almost entirely military contractors, this list was probably only meant to include
companies that have worked with the NRO. That selection bias may limit the utility of
this data.
3.2 Interested University Members
Out of 50 schools listed, the Academic Ranking of World Universities ranks 17 of them
in the top 100 universities worldwide. Several of the remainder are ranked between 100
and 200, but the exact rank could not be determined. Also, several schools on the list are
excellent but are unranked simply because they are too small or specialized. It should
also be noted that this list only included U.S. universities, although foreign universities
also participate in CubeSat projects.
1
<http://mtech.dk/thomsen/space/cubesat.php> Accessed 04/16/2010. This site is a very
useful survey of CubeSat launches up until mid-2009. It’s author is unknown, but it
includes all CubeSats our research has revealed, and more.
8

12. 4 Value Network Overview
The findings from the analysis of the value chain in the CubeSat market is that there are
companies that might be forming a separate value network from the traditional satellite
market. There are launch providers such as Interorbital, Virgin Galactic, and XCOR that
might be forming launch providers for nanosatellites and CubeSats. However, their
success in competition with the efforts of companies like SpaceX to service nanosatellites
is not yet certain. CubeSats are principally constructed by companies that do not typically
supply parts to space technologies, although the parts are typically used in non-space
technologies. These could also be considered a separate value network from traditional
satellites, though they are not separate value networks from other types of technologies.
This ambiguity gives a suggestion that CubeSats may be emerging with this characteristic
of an innovation that could disrupt traditional satellites.
4.1 Description of Value Network Model
Dr. Christensen describes a phenomenon in the value chains of disruptive innovations
that he calls a “value network”.2 The phenomenon suggests that the general model of the
value chain in a disruptive innovation is identical to that of the traditional way of doing
business, but that it will consist of different firms from those which supply the traditional
way of doing business.
For example, the desktop computer was disruptive to the market supplied by
minicomputers. Both desktop computers and minicomputers had hard disk drives, but the
minicomputers contained 8” drives and desktop systems had 5¼” drives. Ultimately, the
5¼” drive systems were disruptive to the 8” drive market. The same held true for other
components of the computer system markets. The same forces that kept out the vendors
of traditional ways of doing business from adopting the disruptive innovation, such as the
unknown market size and initially low sales estimates, prevent the component vendors
from investing in the necessary capital to supply the disruptive technology. Therefore,
new firms that can thrive on low absolute numbers of sales can supply the disruptive
technology.
It is not clear whether all components must come from separate vendors for an innovation
to be considered disruptive. If separate value networks arise, that seems to be compelling
evidence. However, it is not clear that some components that are commercially available
for other industries cannot be used in the disruptive technology. Good examples of this
are not forthcoming.
2
Christensen, Clayton M. Innovator’s Dilemma. New York: Collins Business Essentials,
1997. p. 36.
9

13. Below, we explore the value chain of the CubeSat market to determine whether there is
evident of a separation of the value networks supplying CubeSats and traditional
satellites.
4.2 Launch Providers
Currently, the same companies that launch traditional satellites launch CubeSats with one
notable exception. Due to their small size, CubeSats typically share launch vehicles with
larger satellites. It is generally impossible to fill an entire launch vehicle with CubeSats,
though this could change if CubeSats become more common in the future. CubeSat
launch providers include government agencies, government-owned corporations, and
private corporations, both old and new.
Overview of Launch Providers
Government launch providers so far include NASA and the ESA, and in the future are
likely to include the Chinese space agency. NASA is restricted from undercutting the
American private sector by offsetting the cost of competing with the private sector with
taxpayer monies3 and this is expected to prevent it from being a major competitor in the
CubeSat launch industry if and when commercial launch options become widely
available. The Russian Federal Space Agency is also unlikely to compete heavily and
directly in the CubeSat launch industry, as this would bring it into competition with ISC
Kosmotras, of which it owns half.
ISC Kosmotras is the primary government-owned corporation in the CubeSat launch
market. It is a joint venture between the Russian, Ukrainian and Kazakh governments. It
launches primarily out of the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, but also out of a new
base in Russia, Dombarovsky, just north of the Kazakh border. It has launched several
vehicles carrying CubeSats from this site. In 2006 it suffered a launch failure that
destroyed 14 CubeSats,4 potentially damaging its reputation, but that has not stopped it
from receiving more business. ISC Kosmotras uses rockets converted from
decommissioned Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, or ICBMs, allowing it to
reduce costs when compared to purpose-built rockets. It has roughly 150 ICBMs in stock
that are projected to be useful until 2020. After this, however, it will need to find a new
type of rocket to use, and may lose the cost advantage of using converted ICBMs.
There are several private corporations offering CubeSat launch services, and more are
likely to enter the market in the near future. Space Exploration Technologies Corporation
3
Reference to this regulation is made here
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/1985/03/Government-Obstacles-to-the-
Commercial-Use-of-Space> by The Heritage Foundation, but we have still be unable
4
Clark, Stephen. Russian rocket fails: 18 satellites destroyed.
<http://mtech.dk/thomsen/space/cubesat.php#3> Accessed 04/25/2010.
10

14. (SpaceX) has attempted CubeSat launches in the past several years.5 A string of early
failures damaged its reputation, but in 2008 it conducted the first successful launch of a
privately funded, privately developed orbital launch vehicle. It has only made one other
launch since then, but has several on the way. If the next few launches are also
successful, SpaceX will likely become a leading competitor in the CubeSat launching
market.
Orbital Sciences Corporation is another private corporation that is just now entering the
CubeSat launch market. Like ISC Kosmotras, it uses converted (American) ICBMs as
launch vehicles. OSC has been operating launch vehicles for close to 20 years. It is not
focused on the micro-satellite market, but also launches large satellites as well producing
anti-ballistic missiles. Its Minotaur IV launch system is scheduled to make a CubeSat
launch in May 2010, but OSC has also launched CubeSats as far back as 2006 on older
rockets.6
Interorbital Systems is a relatively new company, founded in the U.S. in 1996, which is
developing a small rocket for launching small satellite payloads, as well as a series of
larger rockets that can be used for human spaceflight or cargo. It is developing a new
method of launching rockets at sea, which has the potential advantages of lower
regulatory hurdles, greater safety, flexibility of launch site, and added launch velocity due
to launching from directly on the equator. Interorbital Systems is also notable for
vertically integrating into the nanosatellite market; it has recently offered the TubeSat
satellite bus for sale at a price of $8000. The TubeSat is not a CubeSat, but is slightly
smaller and tube-shaped, and close enough in size that it would largely serve the same
customers as CubeSats.
ISIS is another company that deserves mention as a launch broker, rather than a launch
provider. ISIS is primarily a maker of small satellite (sub)systems, but also offers to act
as a launch broker for its customers, taking on the task of finding a launch provider, a
launch time, and negotiating a launch contract, which it bundles into a service package
with the components it produces for its customers.
Virgin Galactic has expressed interest in augmenting their tourism business model with a
business focused on launching small satellites, which would include CubeSats.7 This
5
Chin, Alexander, Roland Coelho, Lori Brooks, Ryan Nugent, Dr. Jorgi Puig-Suari.
Standardization Promotes Flexibility: A Review of CubeSats’ Success.
<http://www.responsivespace.com/Papers/RS6/SESSIONS/SESSION%20IV/4006_CHI
N/4006P.pdf> Accessed 04/25/2010.
6
Michael’s List of CubeSat Satellite Missions.
<http://mtech.dk/thomsen/space/cubesat.php#Solo2> Accessed 04/25/2010
7
David, Leonard, Virgin Galactic Deal Targets Small satellit Launches, Space.com
<http://www.space.com/news/090728-virgin-galactic-satellite-launch.html> Accessed
04/19/2010.
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15. pursuit is said to be a significant part of their recent equity sale to an Abu Dhabi
company. If this venture is successful, it might represent the start of a new, parallel value
network. There has also been mention at ISDC 2009 that XCOR is interested in pursuing
this market with the Lynx craft, but that vehicle is also not flight-ready and little has been
said in detail.
Cost of a CubeSat Launch
The commercial price of CubeSat launches has ranged from $40,000 to $2 million in the
past. However, these are market prices; the actual launch cost is lower, possibly much
lower. Because CubeSats usually piggyback on the launches of other, larger satellites,
they can often take up space and weight that would otherwise be filled only with ballast,
allowing for a low marginal cost. According to one estimate by a professional cost
accountant, the marginal cost of launching a CubeSat could be as low as $1,000.8 As
more companies enter the launch market, competition is likely to drive launch prices
closer to actual costs, possibly even commoditizing orbital launches.
As the author of this article points out, this low marginal cost estimate is based on the
assumption that CubeSats piggyback onto other launches that would take place with or
without them. This $1,000 figure may be inapplicable for rockets carrying many
CubeSats, as the launch cost of the CubeSat at that point may no longer be considered
marginal. However, even if a rocket were to carry only CubeSats, the launch cost per
satellite could potentially be lower than the $40,000 minimum previously charged by
commercial providers. SpaceX, one of the few companies to publish its pricing,
advertises the launch cost of the Falcon1e rocket as $9.1 million. With a payload of
1,010 kg to low-earth orbit, the Falcon1 could potentially carry as many as 1,010
CubeSats. This equates to a theoretical minimum launch cost of $9,010 per CubeSat,
assuming the rocket could be fitted out with the maximum possible payload.
Conclusions on Disruptiveness
Because CubeSats can, and do, piggyback onto the launches of larger satellites, they have
so far been launched by pre-existing launch providers on the same rockets that are used
by other satellites. Therefore, CubeSat technology has not yet proven disruptive to launch
providers. It may show the characteristics of a disruptive technology in the future,
however. Smaller satellites create the potential for smaller launch vehicles. Because
rockets must carry the weight of their own fuel, launch costs tend to increase
exponentially with payload weight. This means that lighter payloads could achieve lower
launch costs. CubeSats, and small satellites in general, create the possibility for a new
generation of smaller launch vehicles that could offer greater launch flexibility and lower
launch costs. At least one company (Interorbital Systems) is working on such a launch
8
The full article may be seen at http://www.satmagazine.com/cgi-
bin/display_article.cgi?number=602922274
12

16. vehicle. If these new, smaller rockets do indeed offer lower launch costs and greater
flexibility, CubeSats will likely prove to be a disruptive technology to launch providers.
4.3 Component Vendors
Component vendors, just like the components themselves, come in all shapes and sizes.
Figure b outlines some key component vendors.
After viewing the component vendors we see that many of these companies did not start
to sell components for CubeSats, they started by making components for larger satellites.
In some cases, CubeSat builders found what these companies offered and realized that
their products could be used to further the industry. Companies that already make
components for different uses may be making production runs for the other industries
they sell to, which may reduce the costs for the CubeSat industry. However, many of
these companies are small and it may be more reliable to procure components from a
company who has a larger parent company, such as Spectrolab, which is owned by
Boeing. With a more prominent parent in the picture, the scale and quality of the
purchased product may increase. Overall, if potential CubeSat builders do not find
companies who are already making components for other markets, they may have to go
to companies that have the ability to do special orders, and in the case of a job shop
environment, prices are always higher.
13

17. Company name Website Products Notes
Pumpkin has one of
the most
http://www.cubesat comprehensive
Cubesat outer structure.
Pumpkin kit.com/ websites combining
Build it yourself kits.
and organizing
masses of
information.
Design and production
of high performance
http://www.clyde- Clyde Space has the
power subsystems,
Clyde Space space.com/ first online Cubesat
lithium polymer
store.
batteries and high
efficiency solar panels.
Offers low-cost, high-
efficiency solar cells in
http://www.spectro
Spectrolab a unique form factor. A Boeing Company
lab.com/
offers the IGPS-1
Micro GPS receiver for
SpaceLink Co http://www.spaceli small satellites in LEO Most of the website
Ltd. nk.biz/ orbits is in Japanese
Figure b. CubeSat component vendors9
4.4 CubeSat Communications
There are many things involved in CubeSat Communications. The communication needs
to be able to uplink, and downlink from the CubeSat and the operators need to make sure
the frequencies used for the CubeSat communications comply with federal regulations.
Overall, communications seems to be one of the many difficulties that must be overcome
9
more component vendors can be found at http://www.cubesatkit.com/content/links.html
14

18. in order to succeed in the CubeSat development industry. After researching the various
CubeSat vendors, a communications vendor did not seem to be present. Our team
decided to contact Pumpkin, the top provider of other CubeSat components to see what
they use for communications. Pumpkin referred us to California Polytechnic State
University, the leading university researching CubeSats. Didier Jourdain at California
Polytechnic State University, when asked about hardware for radios said, “Icom and
Yaesu seem to be the most popular companies for radios.” As far as communications,
Brian Castello at California Polytechnic State University, stated “Well we use Amateur
radio frequencies to talk to our satellites. However, that is generally reserved for
Universities and non-profits. Government organizations such as NASA will generally use
other non-Amateur bands in the Radio Frequency Spectrum. We use frequencies around
437 MHz but again there are lots of options.” Mr. Castello was correct in that there are
many frequency bands to broadcast on, however, the company operating the CubeSat
would have to ensure that frequency was available for use with the FCC.
The current regulatory environment for satellites is for each operator to individually
communicate with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a frequency band
in a particular orbit. The FCC sponsors that application to the United Nation’s
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which grants final approval contingent
on the operator demonstrating use of the frequency band by broadcasting on that
frequency from that orbit.
15

19. Appendices
16

20. List of Interested Parties
Universities
Auburn University- not in top 100
University of Alabama- Not in top 100
Tuskegee University- Not in top 100
Arizona State University- 94
University of Arizona- 77
Boston University- 74
Cal Poly State University- Not in top 100 (but ranked very high in other rankings)
San Jose State University- Not in top 100
Stanford University- 2
University of California, Irvine- 46
University of California, Santa Barbara- 35
University of Chicago- 9
University of Colorado- 34
Florida Institute of Technology- Not in top 100
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University- Not in top 100
University of Hawaii- Not in top 100
University of Illinois- 25
Purdue University- 65
Taylor University- Not in top 100
SUNY Genesco- Not in top 100
Iowa State University- Not in top 100
University of Central Florida- Not in top 100
University of Florida- 58
University of Southern California- 46
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School- Not in top 100
University of Kansas- Not in top 100
University of Louisiana- Not in top 100
U.S. Naval Academy- Not in top 100
Dartmouth College- Not in top 100 (Somewhere in the low 100’s)
Michigan Technological University- Not in top 100
Washington University- St. Louis- 29
Montana State University- Not in top 100
Cornell University- 12
Polytechnic University NYC- Not in top 100
North Carolina State University- Not in top 100 (Was 99 in 2003)
University of North Dakota- Not in top 100
University of Oklahoma- Not in top 100
University of Texas at Austin- 38
Texas Christian University- Not in top 100
Texas A&M- 88
Utah State University- Not in top 100
George Mason University- Not in top 100
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21. University of Washington- 16
George Washington University- Not in top 100
Morehead State University- Not in top 100
University of Alaska, Fairbanks- Not in top 100
University of Kentucky- Not in top 100
University of New Mexico- Not in top 100
Santa Clara University- Not in top 100
University of Arkansas- Not in top 100
Industry Participants
The Aerospace Corporation- Technical and advisory services to space programs since
1960.
QuakeFinder, LLC- Developing an earthquake forecasting system.
Tethers Unlimited- Developing space tether technology.
Globaltec- Chinese company selling electronics components, modules & software.
Global Imaging Systems- Sells and services automated office equipment, electronic
presentation systems, document imaging management systems, and network integration
and management services.
Kentucky Science and Technology Corporation- NPO to advance science & innovation in
Kentucky
Boeing- Major Aircraft Manufacturer
Pumpkin- Makes cubesats
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab- University physics lab, largely doing defense work
AeroAstro- Designs & builds small satellites and satellite subsystems
Aerojet- Makes propulsion systems for missiles & spacecraft
Astronautical Development- Creates radio & interface hardware for small spacecraft
Azure Summit Technology- Communications software & hardware
BAE Systems- High-tech military equipment integrator
Booz Allen Hamilton- Tech & Strategy Consulting
Bridger Photonics- Makes lasers & sensors
Brimrose Tech Corporation- High-resolution radar equipment
Busek Co. Inc.- Spacecraft propulsion systems
Cal Poly Corporation- NPO, support services to Cal Poly San Louis Obispo
CU Aerospace- Lasers, space propulsion, space software, materials
Design_net engineering- Avionics and instrumentation
Digital Fusion Solutions- IT & Strategy consulting to government clients
Innovative Technology Systems- IT services for military & intelligence customers
Interorbital Systems- Space tourism, microsatellite launch, planned lunar rover
Design & Development Engineering Services Corp- Satellite subsystem design & testing
Planning Systems Incorporated- Network-centric systems for military & space use
ITT corporation- Defense products and pumps/fluid control systems
NASA/JPL-Ames- U.S. government space research lab
KOR Electronics- Military sensor/communications simulation & testing equipment
L-3 Communications- Military sensor, communications & propulsion systems
Linquest- Network-centric military satellite communications
18

22. Los Alamos National Laboratory- Research in energy, nuclear physics, medicine &
computing
Michigan Aerospace Corp- Sensor, computer & mechanical systems for space & marine
use
Microcosm, Inc.- Software & hardware copy protection and usage control
Microsat Systems- Microsatellites & satellite subsystems
Nanohmics- Engineering and development assistance (Very poorly explained)
Naval Research Laboratory- Develops all kinds of equipment for the U.S. Navy and
Marine Corps
Northrop Grumman- Military Aircraft & Electronic Systems
Qinetiq North America- Software, security equipment, product testing
Rincon Research Corp- Radar, digital signal processing
Science Applications International Corp- Integrator of high-tech equipment, largely
government work (lack of detail)
Space Dynamics Laboratory- Develops sensor & communications technology for space
use. An NPO run by Utah State University.
SRI International- R&D in a very diverse group of fields
Texas Engineering Experiment Station- Partnership of multiple Texas-based
organizations, both for-profit and non-profit. Engineering in homeland security, power
systems, computer systems & medical care.
Charles Stark Draper Lab- Sesnors, controls & robotics systems for military, space &
civil use.
Foster-Miller Inc.- Robotics, sensor systems, materials sciences
Miltec Corp- There are 2 or 3 Miltecs, and I’m not sure which one it is.
Malin Space Science Systems- Instruments for use on robotic spacecraft.
Vulcan Wireless- Sensors, communications & systems engineering
Optimal Synthesis- PC software & consulting services. Not much info.
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23. List of Launch Providers
National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) ....www.nasa.gov
European Space Agency (ESA) .................................www.esa.int
ISC Kosmotras ...........................................................http://www.kosmotras.ru/
Orbital Sciences Corporation .....................................http://www.orbital.com/
SpaceX .......................................................................www.spacex.com
Interorbital Systems (planned future provider) ..........http://www.interorbital.com/
China National Space Administration (not a current launch provider, but a probable
future provider)
....................................................................................http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/cin
dex.html
ISIS (launch broker, not a launch provider)...............http://www.isispace.nl/
20