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The OpenSIPS
security audit
how it came about and what’s the plan?
Sandro Gauci,
2021-09-07
Enable Security
Introduction
Why a security audit?
AKA: why take an offensive security approach?
Offensive security = Simulating adversaries/attackers
Only by testing for security aws, can those
bugs be found and therefore addressed
OpenSIPS is de nitely an application that often serves a trusted
security function.
Who am I to talk about this?
Hi! Sandro Gauci here
Original author of SIPVicious OSS - security testing toolset for SIP
In Infosec / Cyber security since > 20 years
Last 13 years doing offensive security and leading Enable Security
We focus on VoIP and WebRTC security i.e.  pentesting, security
audits, developing security tools, consultancy & training
Let me tell you a story
…
It starts on Linkedin
Jan 2021
Proposal
April 2021
Negotiations
April and May
(no pic sorry!)
Signed up!
May 2021
Crowd funding time
June 2021
Funding till July
HOWTO: get a proposal
together
1. De ne the scope - helps limit tests in a huge project such as
OpenSIPS
based on our discussions with Bogdan
de ne the most security sensitive and interesting parts of
OpenSIPS
2. Come up with a test plan for that scope
not exact since creativity is involved and this is not exact
science
gives us an idea of the amount of effort and how much to
charge
3. Compile a proposal which includes Scope of Work, pricing and
schedule
De ning the work and the
price
After much discussion, we ended up with 2 milestones
Made a special price for the OpenSIPS community
First milestone cost 15k EUR - this has been reached
Second milestone cost an additional 5k EUR
First milestone: scope
Scope consists of the following:
OpenSIPS parser
auth module
tm module
dialog module
First milestone: tests
Black box fuzzing
Instrumented fuzzing
Logical tests targeting authentication
Concurrent connection tests ( ooding)
Second milestone: scope
Protocol modules (i.e.  UDP/TCP/TLS/WS)
OpenSIPS management interface
Internal IDs
Topology hiding
Second milestone: tests
TLS related security tests (go beyond basic TLS testing of course)
Black box fuzzing of WebSocket handling
Analysis of TCP/UDP handling
Fuzzing of MI commands
Topology hiding fuzzing and manual tests to nd logic issues
Fuzzing of internal IDs exposed by TM and dialog modules
We need a demo!
What can we show you?
we did not start the work yet on OpenSIPS
show some simple examples to illustrate 2 different approaches
to fuzzing
Black box fuzzing
sngrep is an excellent tool for debugging SIP
also, it had some over ows
found these by coincidence during an event called OpenSIPIt
the issue shown here has been xed late last year
0:00 / 1:00
About black box fuzzing
easy to do in its simplest form
OpenSIPS is mature software (i.e.  we should not nd anything with
this simple approach)
this approach can still be very effective when enhanced with other
techniques
Techniques to enhance
black box fuzzing
compile OpenSIPS with sanitizers
sanitizer coverage reporting
different con gurations to hit the modules that are in scope
fuzz speci c areas e.g.  headers
set speci c trigger points for non-crash or logic bug discovery
Instrumented fuzzing
this approach is different because the target application sort of
fuzzes itself
in memory so, very e cient
ideal for fuzzing functions in isolation (e.g.  for parsers)
can also fuzz entire servers (e.g.  AFLNET) using this technique
we do plan on doing that - it is more advanced
next we have a simple example with libfuzzer
#include "parser/msg_parser.h"
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size)
{
struct sip_msg *msg;
memset(msg, 0, sizeof(struct sip_msg));
parse_msg((char *)data, size, msg);
return 0;
}
How this adds value to
the OpenSIPS project
The problem with
most security testing
they only look the state of the project at some point in time
projects (e.g.  OpenSIPS) are all the time changing, with daily
contributions
how can our work be used in the future?
Contributing to the security
of OpenSIPS - long term
any ndings from our audit may be added as test cases for
regression testing
material so that fuzzing can be integrated as part of its automated
quality assurance processes
especially focus on getting the project integrated within the OSS-
Fuzz ecosystem (e.g.  + )
nginx Apache httpd
Word of caution
our focus is the security audit - this is a positive side-effect output
what we will provide should serve as a great starting point
automated security testing efforts
naturally, future security tests will still be useful
both go hand in hand to make the codebase more robust
So what’s the plan?
Schedule
start mid-September (i.e.  next week)
be done around the end of October 2021
present our reports to the core developers
during the testing, we hope to have communication open with
devs so that any critical xes can be addressed quickly
On fund raising
Current status
rst milestone has been reached already so we can start
if anyone would like to still contribute, you certainly may!
we would love to cover the second milestone as well
This is the end
Thanks!
Bogdan-Andrei Iancu & the OpenSIPS people for this opportunity
The sponsors for raising the funds to support our work
My colleague Alfred for his work and demos
Get in touch & References
Email:
Website:
The OpenSIPS security audit page:
Communication Breakdown blog @ rtcsec.com
sandro@enablesecurity.com
https://www.enablesecurity.com
https://www.opensips.org/Community/Security-Audit

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The OpenSIPS security audit - OpenSIPS Summit - Sandro Gauci

  • 1. The OpenSIPS security audit how it came about and what’s the plan? Sandro Gauci, 2021-09-07 Enable Security
  • 3. Why a security audit? AKA: why take an offensive security approach? Offensive security = Simulating adversaries/attackers
  • 4. Only by testing for security aws, can those bugs be found and therefore addressed
  • 5. OpenSIPS is de nitely an application that often serves a trusted security function.
  • 6. Who am I to talk about this? Hi! Sandro Gauci here Original author of SIPVicious OSS - security testing toolset for SIP In Infosec / Cyber security since > 20 years Last 13 years doing offensive security and leading Enable Security We focus on VoIP and WebRTC security i.e.  pentesting, security audits, developing security tools, consultancy & training
  • 7. Let me tell you a story …
  • 8. It starts on Linkedin Jan 2021
  • 14. HOWTO: get a proposal together
  • 15. 1. De ne the scope - helps limit tests in a huge project such as OpenSIPS based on our discussions with Bogdan de ne the most security sensitive and interesting parts of OpenSIPS 2. Come up with a test plan for that scope not exact since creativity is involved and this is not exact science gives us an idea of the amount of effort and how much to charge 3. Compile a proposal which includes Scope of Work, pricing and schedule
  • 16. De ning the work and the price After much discussion, we ended up with 2 milestones Made a special price for the OpenSIPS community First milestone cost 15k EUR - this has been reached Second milestone cost an additional 5k EUR
  • 17. First milestone: scope Scope consists of the following: OpenSIPS parser auth module tm module dialog module
  • 18. First milestone: tests Black box fuzzing Instrumented fuzzing Logical tests targeting authentication Concurrent connection tests ( ooding)
  • 19. Second milestone: scope Protocol modules (i.e.  UDP/TCP/TLS/WS) OpenSIPS management interface Internal IDs Topology hiding
  • 20. Second milestone: tests TLS related security tests (go beyond basic TLS testing of course) Black box fuzzing of WebSocket handling Analysis of TCP/UDP handling Fuzzing of MI commands Topology hiding fuzzing and manual tests to nd logic issues Fuzzing of internal IDs exposed by TM and dialog modules
  • 21. We need a demo!
  • 22. What can we show you? we did not start the work yet on OpenSIPS show some simple examples to illustrate 2 different approaches to fuzzing
  • 23. Black box fuzzing sngrep is an excellent tool for debugging SIP also, it had some over ows found these by coincidence during an event called OpenSIPIt the issue shown here has been xed late last year
  • 25. About black box fuzzing easy to do in its simplest form OpenSIPS is mature software (i.e.  we should not nd anything with this simple approach) this approach can still be very effective when enhanced with other techniques
  • 26. Techniques to enhance black box fuzzing compile OpenSIPS with sanitizers sanitizer coverage reporting different con gurations to hit the modules that are in scope fuzz speci c areas e.g.  headers set speci c trigger points for non-crash or logic bug discovery
  • 27. Instrumented fuzzing this approach is different because the target application sort of fuzzes itself in memory so, very e cient ideal for fuzzing functions in isolation (e.g.  for parsers) can also fuzz entire servers (e.g.  AFLNET) using this technique we do plan on doing that - it is more advanced next we have a simple example with libfuzzer
  • 28. #include "parser/msg_parser.h" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) { struct sip_msg *msg; memset(msg, 0, sizeof(struct sip_msg)); parse_msg((char *)data, size, msg); return 0; }
  • 29. How this adds value to the OpenSIPS project
  • 30. The problem with most security testing they only look the state of the project at some point in time projects (e.g.  OpenSIPS) are all the time changing, with daily contributions how can our work be used in the future?
  • 31. Contributing to the security of OpenSIPS - long term any ndings from our audit may be added as test cases for regression testing material so that fuzzing can be integrated as part of its automated quality assurance processes especially focus on getting the project integrated within the OSS- Fuzz ecosystem (e.g.  + ) nginx Apache httpd
  • 32. Word of caution our focus is the security audit - this is a positive side-effect output what we will provide should serve as a great starting point automated security testing efforts naturally, future security tests will still be useful both go hand in hand to make the codebase more robust
  • 34. Schedule start mid-September (i.e.  next week) be done around the end of October 2021 present our reports to the core developers during the testing, we hope to have communication open with devs so that any critical xes can be addressed quickly
  • 36. Current status rst milestone has been reached already so we can start if anyone would like to still contribute, you certainly may! we would love to cover the second milestone as well
  • 37. This is the end
  • 38. Thanks! Bogdan-Andrei Iancu & the OpenSIPS people for this opportunity The sponsors for raising the funds to support our work My colleague Alfred for his work and demos
  • 39. Get in touch & References Email: Website: The OpenSIPS security audit page: Communication Breakdown blog @ rtcsec.com sandro@enablesecurity.com https://www.enablesecurity.com https://www.opensips.org/Community/Security-Audit