This presentation was given to Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen in Copenhagen, Denmark by Dr, Robbin F. Laird on May 22, 2014. The Danish Centre for Military Studies (CMS) was established on 1 April 2010. CMS carries out strategic research and provides research-based public sector services with a focus on topical military and defence and security policy issues and provides an organisational framework for interdisciplinary research cooperation between the University of Copenhagen, other research institutions and other relevant parties. http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/about/

1. This
presenta,on
was
given
to
Centre
for
Military
Studies,
University
of
Copenhagen
in
Copenhagen,
Denmark
by
Dr,
Robbin
F.
Laird
on
May
22,
2014.
The
Danish
Centre
for
Military
Studies
(CMS)
was
established
on
1
April
2010.
CMS
carries
out
strategic
research
and
provides
research-­‐based
public
sector
services
with
a
focus
on
topical
military
and
defence
and
security
policy
issues
and
provides
an
organisaDonal
framework
for
interdisciplinary
research
cooperaDon
between
the
University
of
Copenhagen,
other
research
insDtuDons
and
other
relevant
parDes.
hGp://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/about/
1

2. This
briefing
is
based
on
our
new
book,
Rebuilding
American
Military
Power
in
the
Pacific:
A
21st
Century
Strategy
(Praeger,
2013)
and
reflects
as
well
discussions
held
in
the
Pacific
earlier
this
year.
Some
of
those
discussions
can
be
seen
in
the
Special
Report
on
Australian
Defense
Moderniza,on
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/australian-­‐defense-­‐moderniza,on-­‐shaping-­‐capabili,es-­‐
for-­‐21st-­‐century-­‐opera,ons/
2

3. This
is
a
work
in
progress
and
one
clearly
driven
by
the
evolving
strategic
context,
new
technologies
and
the
forging
of
new
concepts
of
opera,ons.
It
is
also
about
cross-­‐cuVng
moderniza,ons
among
the
US
and
its
allies
in
response
to
North
Korean
and
Chinese
military
developments
as
well,
notably
the
reach
and
range
of
missiles
and
the
“coming”
out
of
the
Chinese
forces
into
the
Pacific
at
greater
range
as
well
3

4. This
slide
highlights
some
of
the
significant
drivers
of
change
in
the
Pacific
which
are
providing
for
pressure
points
on
US
and
allied
strategy
and
capabili,es:
The
impact
of
the
PRC;
The
second
nuclear
age
dynamics
represented
by
North
Korea
whereby
it
is
not
about
conven,onal
to
nuclear
deterrence;
its
is
about
dealing
with
a
small
nuclear
power’s
capability
right
away
if
hos,li,es
seem
imminent;
It
is
about
the
expansion
of
the
“size”
of
the
Pacific
with
the
Arc,c
opening,
a
development
akin
in
some
ways
to
the
opening
of
the
Suez
canal
on
Europe
and
Asia;
And
the
challenge
of
managing
the
sea
and
air
space
associated
with
the
transit
of
goods
and
services
over
a
vast
ocean
area
which,
in
turn,
allows
one
to
provide
for
SLOC
defense.
4

5. The
Russians
will
become
a
mari,me
power
in
a
real
sense
with
the
Arc,c
opening
and
Canada
will
face
the
challenge
of
shaping
an
Arc,c
grid
to
manage
their
security
and
defense
challenges.
A
key
requirement
for
Canada
will
be
to
shape
a
grid
to
cover
the
full
geography,
including
her
ArcDc
interests.
If
one
conceptualizes
that
a
core
challenge
facing
Canadian
sovereignty
is
to
provide
for
security
and
defense
in
the
context
of
the
ArcDc
opening,
then
major
acquisiDons
should
be
made
over
Dme,
and
built
out
to
that
direcDon.
In
effect,
the
grid
covering
from
Northern
Europe
to
the
Northern
Pacific
and
over
the
ArcDc
–
built
with
allied
collaboraDon
–
is
clearly
a
key
challenge
but
also
one
which
could
focus
Canadian
force
development
and
also
defense
and
security
investments.
It
could
also
guide
a
way
to
think
about
public-­‐private
partnerships
in
the
region,
and
tapping
into
the
ongoing
development
of
various
Canadian
civilian
capabiliDes
that
are
relevant
to
the
ArcDc
opening.
hGp://www.frontline-­‐defence.com/index_archives.php?page=2111
5

6. The
usual
Pacific
defense
graphic
shows
the
world
as
seen
from
the
PRC
facing
east
with
Taiwan
and
the
Taiwan
straits
and
then
Korea
and
then
Japan.
But
this
is
not
how
it
looks
from
the
US
standpoint;
the
tyranny
of
distance
is
what
greats
American
naval
and
airpower.
6

7. As
things
stand
now,
the
core
for
the
US
effort
from
Hawaii
outward
is
to
enable
a
central
strategic
triangle,
one
that
reaches
from
Hawaii
to
Guam
and
to
Japan.
This
triangle
is
at
the
heart
of
America’s
ability
to
project
power
into
the
Western
Pacific.
With
a
20th
century
approach,
one
which
is
plaXorm-­‐centric
and
rooted
in
step
by
step
augmentaDon
of
force,
each
point
of
the
triangle
needs
to
be
garrisoned
with
significant
numbers
of
plaXorms
which
can
be
pushed
forward.
To
be
clear,
having
capability
in
this
triangle
is
a
key
element
of
what
the
United
States
can
bring
to
the
party
for
Pacific
operaDons,
and
it
remains
fundamental.
But
with
a
new
approach
to
an
aZack
and
defense
enterprise,
one
would
use
this
capability
differently
from
simply
providing
for
push
forward
and
sequenDal
escalaDon
dominance.
Rather
than
focusing
simply
on
the
image
of
projecDng
power
forward,
what
is
crucial
to
an
successful
Pacific
strategy
is
enabling
a
strategic
quadrangle
in
the
Western
Pacific,
anchored
on
Japan,
South
Korea,
Australia,
and
Singapore.
This
will
not
be
simple.
CompeDDon,
even
mutual
suspicion,
among
US
allies
in
the
Western
Pacific
is
historically
deep-­‐rooted;
as
a
former
7th
USAF
commander
underscored,
“history
sDll
maZers
in
impeding
allied
cooperaDon.”
But
in
spite
of
these
challenges
and
impediments,
enabling
the
quadrangle
to
do
a
beZer
job
of
defending
itself
and
shaping
interoperability
across
separate
naDons
has
to
become
a
central
strategic
American
goal.
7

8. 8
Note:
1.
Numbers
include
US
Marines
and
Sailors
aGached
to
Marine
Corps
Opera,onal
units.
Japan
numbers
include
units
that
are
deployed
there
from
East
Coast,
West
Coast
and
Hawaii
as
part
of
the
Unit
Deployment
program.
Those
units’
numbers
have
been
subtracted
from
the
California
and
Hawaii
numbers,
to
avoid
double
coun,ng.
2.
Rotary
Wing
Aircraj
includes
Tiltrotor
(MV-­‐22)

9. 9
Notes:
1.
Numbers
include
US
Marines
and
Sailors
aGached
to
Marine
Corps
Opera,onal
units.
Japan,
Guam
and
Australia
numbers
include
units
that
are
deployed
there
from
East
Coast,
West
Coast
and
Hawaii
Marine
Corps
units
as
part
of
the
Unit
Deployment
program.
Those
units’
numbers
have
been
subtracted
from
the
California
and
Hawaii
numbers,
to
avoid
double
coun,ng.
2.
Rotary
Wing
Aircraj
includes
Tiltrotor
(MV-­‐22)

10. Within
the
distributed
laydown,
the
Marines
must
retain
the
ability
rapidly
to
respond
to
crises
across
the
range
of
demands,
from
Major
Combat
opera,on
in
NE
Asia
to
low-­‐end
Humanitarian
Assistance
and
Disaster
Relief
(HADR)
wherever
it
occurs.
Each
loca,on
for
the
Marines
is
in
transi,on
as
well.
From
Okinawa
and
Iwakuni,
the
Marines
can
locally
train
in
Japan,
Korea
and
the
Philippines,
as
well
as
respond
with
“Fight
Tonight”
capabili,es
if
necessary.
From
Guam,
the
Marines
can
train
locally
in
the
Commonwealth
of
the
Northern
Mariana
Islands
(CNMI)
to
the
north,
the
Federated
States
of
Micronesia
to
the
south,
and
Palau
and
the
Philippines
to
the
west.
Guam
and
CNMI
provide
the
Marines
something
we
do
not
have
anywhere
else
in
the
Pacific:
A
loca,on
on
U.S.
soil
where
they
can
train
unilaterally
or
with
partner
na,ons.
In
broad
terms,
prior
to
the
DL
(ca.
2011),
the
Marines
were
located
in
Japan
(25,000
in
Mainland
Japan
and
Okinawa),
Hawaii
(approximately
6,000)
and
on
the
West
Coast
(approximately
45,000
in
California
and
Arizona).
With
the
DL
(ca.
2025),
there
will
be
a
projected
force
distribu,on
as
follows:
Mainland
Japan
and
Okinawa
(15,000),
Guam
(approximately
4700),
Hawaii
(approximately
8800),
West
Coast
(approximately
43,000)
and
a
rota,onal
force
in
Northwest
Australia
of
10

11. The
last
slide
and
this
one
focus
on
the
Pacific
exercises
of
the
Marines,
the
USN
and
the
USAF
in
working
with
allies.
These
exercises
are
a
crucial
,ssue
through
which
combat
innova,on
is
being
shaped
among
the
allies
and
the
US
in
forging
a
21st
century
approach
to
Pacific
defense.
11

12. A
key
element
of
the
reshaping
of
the
PACAF
approach
to
air
dominance
is
making
progress
on
integrated
air
and
missile
defense.
The
Army’s
ADA
systems
are
a
key
part
of
the
air
dominance
re-­‐set.
12

13. 13

14. 14

15. 15

16. 16

17. hGp://www.frontline-­‐defence.com/index_archives.php?page=2164
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/australian-­‐defense-­‐moderniza,on-­‐shaping-­‐capabili,es-­‐
for-­‐21st-­‐century-­‐opera,ons/
17

18. Two
key
Aussie
air
assets
as
part
of
its
moderniza,on
strategy
are
seen
here:
the
KC-­‐30A
air
tanker
and
the
Wedgetail
air
baGle
management
system.
The
photos
were
taken
on
visits
to
the
bases
of
the
respec,ve
squadrons
in
Australia
in
March
2014.
18

19. Japanese
defense
policy
is
in
evolu,on.
It
started
with
a
very
narrow
self-­‐defense
concept
which
focused
on
the
homeland
narrowly
understood.
But
as
the
US
role
in
the
region
changed
over
the
past
twenty
years
and
threats
in
the
neighborhood
expanded
such
a
policy
made
liGle
strategic
sense.
The
focus
is
now
on
“dynamic
defense”
which
is
shaping
air
and
mari,me
capabili,es
to
defend
Japan
more
broadly
and
to
over
,me
work
with
the
US
and
allies
to
be
able
to
protect
Japanese
interests
running
North-­‐South.
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐re-­‐set-­‐of-­‐pacific-­‐defense-­‐australia-­‐and-­‐japan-­‐weigh-­‐in/
19

20. It
is
not
really
about
a
Pivot
to
the
Pacific.
It
is
about
the
PRC,
North
Korea
and
the
allies
reshaping
the
strategic
environment.
The
ques,on
then
becomes
how
can
the
US
reshape
its
capabili,es
and
strategies
to
be
relevant.
20

21. The
size
of
the
Pacific
poses
its
own
challenges.
Shaping
scalable
and
modular
forces
among
the
US
and
the
allies
is
crucial
to
operate
at
distance
and
to
shape
targeted
forces
to
deal
with
local
crises.
Also
the
constant
challenge
of
dealing
with
humanitarian
and
disaster
relief
challenges
in
the
region
taxes
US
and
allied
forces.
There
is
a
frequent
demand
to
come
to
mutual
support
and
aid
as
well
as
to
encompass
a
much
wider
range
of
partners
in
the
region.
All
of
these
dynamics
require
not
simply
the
existence
and
development
of
forces
in
the
abstract.
It
requires
regular
training
among
the
allies
and
with
the
United
States.
As
a
result,
the
exercise
regimes
are
a
crucial
lifeblood
for
forging
real
capabili7es
and
effec7ve
and
innova7ve
approaches
to
move
forward.
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/allied-­‐pacific-­‐exercises-­‐and-­‐training-­‐shaping-­‐a-­‐deterrence-­‐
in-­‐depth-­‐strategy/
21

22. The
rebuilding
of
American
military
power
will
be
reshaped
by
a
number
of
new
technologies
as
well
as
approaches.
The
challenge
will
be
to
be
innova,ve
enough
to
move
ahead
in
a
fiscally
constrained
environment
and
in
the
heavy
presence
of
legacy
thinking.
22

23. This
graphic
shows
the
impact
of
,ltorator
technology
coupled
with
the
KC-­‐130Js
in
reshaping
a
core
capability
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐sp-­‐magp-­‐cr-­‐training-­‐for-­‐scalability/
hGp://sldinfo.com/flipbooks/SPMAGTF/Special%20Purpose%20MAGTF%20Crisis
%20Response/
hGp://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?
op,on=com_content&view=ar,cle&id=33573:the-­‐sp-­‐magp-­‐cr-­‐training-­‐for-­‐
scalability&ca,d=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113
23

24. hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐pacaf-­‐commander-­‐and-­‐reworking-­‐pacific-­‐defense-­‐the-­‐
aor-­‐will-­‐become-­‐a-­‐caoc/
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐chief-­‐of-­‐staff-­‐of-­‐the-­‐australian-­‐air-­‐force-­‐on-­‐the-­‐future-­‐
of-­‐air-­‐power-­‐the-­‐impact-­‐of-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35-­‐on-­‐the-­‐raaf/
hGp://thediplomat.com/2013/04/game-­‐changer-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35-­‐and-­‐the-­‐pacific/
24

25. t
is
clear
that
the
F-­‐35
global
enterprise
is
a
unique
enabler
of
the
en7re
re-­‐set
of
US
and
allied
airpower.
Yet
this
crucial
and
even
central
reality
is
hardly
recognized
in
the
mounds
or
should
one
say
piles
of
commentary
on
the
F-­‐35
program.
And
indeed,
notably
in
tes,mony
of
defense
officials
in
front
of
Congress,
is
the
absence
of
emphasis
upon
how
central
the
allies
are
to
the
program,
or
that
the
F-­‐35
has
recently
become
the
plane
of
choice
for
all
of
the
core
Pacific
allies.
Allies
are
not
simply
“partners”
in
the
program
they
are
the
enablers
of
21st
century
air
combat
development
and
approaches.
Allies
are
not
simply
“following”
the
US
lead;
they
are
innova,ng
on
their
own
and
will
infuse
the
F-­‐35
global
enterprise
with
the
spirit
of
innova,on
and
inven,on,
not
mortgaged
by
the
“sequestra,on”
somnolent
evident
in
Washington.
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐f-­‐35-­‐global-­‐enterprise-­‐viewed-­‐from-­‐down-­‐under/
25

26. hGp://www.sldinfo.com/a-­‐21st-­‐century-­‐approach-­‐to-­‐airpower-­‐the-­‐italian-­‐air-­‐force-­‐
and-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35/
The
first
issue
is
the
ques,on
of
why
the
Italian
Air
Force
was
mixing
its
fleet
between
As
and
Bs.
“We
studied
the
issue
carefully
and
for
the
kind
of
missions
we
face
we
needed
the
flexibility
which
the
B
can
add
to
the
fleet.
We
need
to
go
to
the
mission
not
the
airfield.
We
will
operate
in
many
areas
where
there
are
only
short
runways;
the
B
allows
us
to
operate
in
those
condi,ons.
We
can
mix
the
fleet
and
operate
at
sea
on
land,
on
our
own
ships
or
own
others.
It
is
the
kind
of
flexibility,
which
we
see
as
crucial
to
a
21st
century
seVng.
I
will
give
you
an
example
of
what
we
don’t
want.
We
planned
to
operate
with
the
USMC
in
Afghanistan.
But
we
were
three
months
later
in
the
deployment
than
we
intended
because
our
Tornados
could
not
operate
in
the
same
condi,ons
as
the
USMC.
We
had
to
take
three
months
to
build
out
the
air
base
from
which
we
would
operate
with
them.
Time
is
crucial
to
many
of
the
missions
in
which
we
will
be
engaged.
The
Bs
give
me
a
26

27. hGp://www.sldinfo.com/special-­‐report-­‐on-­‐italy-­‐and-­‐the-­‐f-­‐35/
It
is
also
difficult
to
argue
with
the
proposi,on
that
the
Mediterranean
and
the
Middle
East
will
not
be
a
busy
opera,onal
area
for
NATO
and
allied
forces.
The
F-­‐35
fleet
that
rolls
out
from
a
diversity
of
users
will
need
the
kind
of
opera,onal
and
maintenance
support
which
can
be
provided
at
Cameri.
The
Italians
have
built
major
warehouse
facili,es
to
hold
parts
for
the
F-­‐35
as
well
as
maintenance
bay
accommoda,ons
secured
to
collateral
SECRET,
and,
with
the
IT
system
which
can
manage
the
parts
which
are
stamped
with
common
parts
iden,fiers,
it
will
be
straighporward
to
manage
the
inventory
coming
in
and
out
of
these
warehouses
to
support
an
allied
fleet.
A
way
to
look
at
this
would
be
the
shape
a
graphic
as
follows
with
Cameri
as
the
hub
to
support
the
Western
and
Eastern
Mediterranean
and
the
en,re
sweep
of
allied
F-­‐35
fleet
opera,ons.
This
could
include
the
USAF,
the
USN,
the
USMC,
the
Italian
forces,
the
Bri,sh
forces,
the
Norwegian
forces,
etc.
The
Italians
have
understood
the
F-­‐35
fleet
concept
and
have
laid
down
an
infrastructure
to
support
it
AT
THE
SAME
TIME
as
they
built
their
FACO
and
wing
27

28. The
size
of
the
Pacific
poses
its
own
challenges.
Shaping
scalable
and
modular
forces
among
the
US
and
the
allies
is
crucial
to
operate
at
distance
and
to
shape
targeted
forces
to
deal
with
local
crises.
Also
the
constant
challenge
of
dealing
with
humanitarian
and
disaster
relief
challenges
in
the
region
taxes
US
and
allied
forces.
There
is
a
frequent
demand
to
come
to
mutual
support
and
aid
as
well
as
to
encompass
a
much
wider
range
of
partners
in
the
region.
28

29. An
emergent
force
is
the
enhanced
role
of
connec7vity
among
joint
and
coali7on
plaQorms
and
systems.
It
is
no
longer
simply
seVng
a
goal
for
greater
interoperability;
it
is
building
in
to
the
Pacific
defense
effort
greater
capability
for
divergent
plaporms
and
systems
to
be
connected
in
a
dynamic
defense
and
deterrent
force.
One
way
to
express
this
dynamic
is
the
coming
of
the
aerospace
combat
cloud
and
the
ability
to
engage
in
collabora,ve
opera,ons
much
more
effec,vely
and
fundamentally.
The
cloud
concept
has
been
highlighted
by
Lt.
General
(re,red)
Deptula,
the
Dean
of
the
Mitchell
Ins,tute
for
Aerospace
Studies
of
the
Air
Force
Associa,on,
as
a
key
focal
point
in
shaping
the
way
ahead
in
integrated
combat
power.
29

30. Rather
than
“integra,ng”
separate
plaporms
and
separate
services
and
domains,
a
joint
and
coali,on
force
is
emerging
which
can
distribute
through
a
baGlespace
and
operate
by
cross
connec,ng
and
shaping
an
offensive
defensive
enterprise.
Shaping
a
force
that
is
cloud-­‐ready
is
a
key
to
the
effort
and
acquisi,on
of
new
plaporms
in
the
future
needs
to
proceed
from
an
understanding
that
they
need
to
connect
to
the
cloud
and
operate
flexibly
in
providing
either
offensive
or
defensive
capabili,es
dependent
on
the
mission
and
the
priori,es
shaped
by
the
decision-­‐
making
process.
And
that
process
itself
is
undergoing
major
changes
as
distributed
capabili,es
populate
the
cloud
and
allow
the
force
to
operate
in
real
,me.
The
combat
cloud
provides
situa,onal
dynamic
decisions
to
be
made
by
war
fighters
at
all
levels
to
get
deep
inside
the
adversary’s
decision
cycle
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐next-­‐phase-­‐of-­‐air-­‐power-­‐crajing-­‐and-­‐enabling-­‐the-­‐
aerospace-­‐combat-­‐cloud/
hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-­‐gce-­‐drives-­‐usmc-­‐avia,on-­‐innova,on-­‐major-­‐cuomo-­‐of-­‐
the-­‐infantry-­‐officer-­‐course-­‐discusses-­‐the-­‐iocs-­‐team-­‐perspec,ve/
30

31. 31
While
joint
opera,ons
designed
to
integrate
the
effects
of
separate
plaporms
by
separate
service
components
in
their
respec,ve
domains
has
evolved
to
a
degree,
a
joint
and
coali,on
concept
of
opera,ons
is
emerging
that
can
achieve
even
greater
synergy.
That
greater
synergy
will
be
made
possible
through
cross-­‐domain
opera,ons
by
plaporms
distributed
throughout
the
baGlespace.
Those
cross-­‐domain
synergies
can
be
achieved
only
with
an
architecture
enabled
by
robust,
reliable,
and
secure
connec,vity
allowing
for
the
universal
sharing
of
informa,on
to
achieve
the
desired
effects
of
the
objec,ves
of
the
opera,on.
This
is
the
goal
of
what
is
being
no,onally
described
as
a
“Combat
Cloud.”
Shaping
a
force
that
can
share
informa,on
among
a
dispirit
collec,on
of
systems
resident
in
a
cloud-­‐like
architecture
will
be
key
to
the
concept.
Acquisi,on
of
new
plaporms
in
the
future
can
be
op,mized
by
an
understanding
that
they
need
to
connect
in
the
cloud
and
operate
flexibly
in
order
to
provide
either
offensive
or
defensive
capabili,es
dependent
on
the
mission
and
their
priori,es
as
shaped
by
the
decision-­‐making
process.

32. 32