SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 40
Baixar para ler offline
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 1
Towards email authentication
TLS
SPF + DKIM + DMARC
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 2
Who adopted it ?
●
Hotmail.com
●
Gmail.com
●
AOL.com
●
Yahoo.com
●
Verizon.com
●
Ebay
●
Paypal
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 3
Tls/SPF/DKIM/DMARC
Receiving
mailer
SPF
validation
DKIM
validation
DMARC
validation
ESMTPS
=
Extended
SMTP
Over
TLS
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 4
TLS(Transport Layer Security)
An encryption layer over TCP that all MTAs
should support and when offered they should
start
(STARTTLS mechanism on the std port 25)
●
Disable SSL1 and SSL2 for security problems
that were discovered , and support only
TLSv1.2
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 5
Mail Transfer Protocols
Protocol Over
tls
Authenticated Authenticated
Over tls
Name
smtp smtps smtpa smtpsa Simple MTP
esmtp esmtps esmtpa esmtpsa Extended SMTP
lmtp lmtps lmtpa lmtpsa Light MTP
RFC3848 July 2004
Shown in “Received: … with ... ” header lines e.g.
Received: from charon-02.sissa.it (charon-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.105])
by smtp.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEAF9D08065
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 6
Check protocol used
in Received: lines
Received: from mail-ob0-f169.google.com (mail-ob0-f169.google.com [209.85.214.169])
by mail.example.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 13F636C003 for <inno@example.org>;
Wed, 11 Mar 2012 11:34:18 +0100 (CET)
Received: from mail.example.org (mail.example.org [10.0.1.2]) by mail2.example.org
with ESMTP id C9HImFdPfk4ogziO for <inno@example.org>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012
11:34:23 +0100 (CET)
Received: from webmail.example.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1])
mail2.example.org (Postfix) with ESMTPA id AD79E54E50 for
<roberto.e.innocente@gmail.com>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 10:48:47 +0100 (CET)
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 7
SPF version 1
Spf = Sender Policy Framework
RFC-4408 April 2006
RFC-2821 layer / protects envelope sender address
The one that appears in the initial smtp exchange
HELO itsme.org
MAIL FROM: <..>
RCPT TO: <..>
DATA
SMTP Envelope
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 8
SMTP protocol – RFC-2821
April 2001
dig mx gmail.com
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;gmail.com. IN MX
;; ANSWER SECTION:
gmail.com. 3599 IN MX 5 gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com.
telnet gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com smtp
220 mx.google.com ESMTP de8si19058389wib.80
EHLO sissa.it
250-mx.google.com at your service, [10.0.1.2]
250-SIZE 35882577
250-8BITMIME
250-STARTTLS
250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES
250-PIPELINING
250-CHUNKING
250 SMTPUTF8
MAIL FROM: <inno@sissa.it>
250 2.1.0 OK jo3si35141161wjc.166 - gsmtp
RCPT TO: <roberto.innocente@gmail.com>
250 2.1.5 OK jo3si35141161wjc.166 - gsmtp
DATA
354 Go ahead jo3si35141161wjc.166 - gsmtp
From: inno@example.org
To: roberto.innocente@gmail.com
Subject: check
Checking address
2 times
.
Envelope Header Body
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 9
Envelope/Header
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 10
Identities in email
Envelope identities :
●
Helo/ehlo identity in envelope
●
Mail from: identity in envelope
●
Rcpt to: identity in envelope
Headers identities :
●
From: identity in header
●
To: identity in header
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 11
Mail RFCs
●
RFC2821 April 2001
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) –
obsoletes RFC821 (Draft std RFC5321)
●
RFC2822 April 2001
Internet Message Format (IMF) –
obsoletes RFC822 (Draft std RFC5322)
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 12
Sender addresses
●
Envelope sender – RFC2821
In HELO and MAIL FROM: smtp lines, usually
stored in Return-Path: header, used to send
back errors, usually not displayed by MUA (mail
user agents)
●
Header sender – RFC2822
In the From: or Sender: mail headers ,
displayed by MUA, usually not cared by MTA
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 13
What does SPF ?
A kind of reverse MX ...
Allows the owner of a domain to specify which mail
servers are allowed to send mail on behalf of the domain.
The domain owner publish a record in DNS specifying
which mail servers are authorized to send mail for his
domain.
When a mail server receives a message claiming to be
from that domain, it looks up the spf record for that domain
and it checks if it came trough one of the allowed mail
servers.
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 14
Proposed SPF for SISSA
sissa.it. 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 redirect=_spf.sissa.it”
_spf.sissa.it. 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 include=_netblock.sissa.it
include=_netblock1.sissa.it”
_netblock.sissa.it. 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 ...
_netblock1.sissa.it 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 ...
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 15
SPF results
●
none = no record published for SPF
●
neutral = sender domain does’nt want to state (?)
●
pass = client is allowed to inject mail for the
domain(+)
●
fail = client is explicitly forbidden to inject mail for
the domain(-)
●
softfail = between pass and fail(~), often the
receiver quarantines
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 16
SPF check headers
Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of inno@sissa.it designates 147.122.1.105 as permitted sender) client-
ip=147.122.1.105;
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of inno@sissa.it designates 147.122.1.105 as permitted
sender) smtp.mail=inno@sissa.it
Received-SPF: pass (domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.214.176 as permitted sender)
Authentication-Results: mta1071.mail.ir2.yahoo.com from=gmail.com; domainkeys=neutral (no sig); from=gmail.com;
dkim=pass (ok)
Received-SPF: none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender hosts) client-
ip=98.138.121.67;
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted
sender hosts) smtp.mail=roberto.innocente@yahoo.it;
Received-SPF: pass (domain of hotmail.com designates 157.55.1.161 as permitted sender)
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 17
SPF algorithm
●
Lookup envelope domain spf record :
●
dig txt sissa.it
– sissa.it TXT “v=spf1 ip4:147.122.1/24 ip6:..... ~mx -all”
●
For each mechanism listed look if it matches:
●
Is the client in ip4:147.122.1/24 ? Then pass (the default
is pass) and exit.
●
Is the client in ip6:..... ? Then pass and exit.
●
Is the client in one mx record ? Then softfail and exit.
●
All is matched by everyhting : reject it and exit.
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 18
SPF (example record)
$ dig txt unipd.it
unipd.it. 259200 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:147.162.10.68
ip4:147.162.10.81 ip4:147.162.10.82 ip4:147.162.10.83 a:mail.unipd.it
?all"
●
Is it ip4:147.162.10.68? pass
●
Is it ip4:147.162.10.81? pass
●
Is it ip4:147.162.10.82 ? Pass
●
Is it ip4:147.162.10.83 ? Pass
●
Is it in address of mail.unipd.it. IN A 147.162.10.68 ? pass
●
Then it is in all : Neutral Terribly wrong !
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 19
SPF versus Sender/ID
●
Sender-ID (RFC-4406) Is Microsoft version
of spf
●
It validates the header sender address
●
Very few use it now
●
Problem is that Microsoft is using now spfv1
syntax and dont want to fix !!
●
And so it violates the spf specification !!!!
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 20
DKIM
●
Domainkeys was first introduced by yahoo
in a private agreement with paypal and
ebay, then since 2007 a draft RFC
●
DKIM took the main concepts from the
yahoo proposal, incorporated some cisco
ideas and appeared as an RFC in the same
year, last version is RFC6376 Sep 2011
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 21
DKIM key rotation
best practice/1
●
It's quite clear why keys should be rotated : to avoid
that they are :
- compromised by cracking them
- stolen
●
DKIM allows a receiver to verify that the signed
parts of a message has not been modified in transit
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 22
DKIM key rotation
best practice/2
●
In 2012 a mathematician published on Wired
that it took him 72 hours and 70 $ of Amazon
WS to crack a 512 bits DKIM key
●
768 bit keys can be cracked by a nation effort
for instance
●
1024 bits is the current recommended length
●
2048 is now considered immune from possible
cracks from today computing environment
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 23
DKIM key rotation
best practice/3
Generate 2 pairs
of DKIM keys
public keys
1 and 2
in DNS
Sign emails
with private key 1
Generate key pair
3
public key 3
in DNS
Sign emails with
private key 2
Generate key pair
n
public key n
in DNS
Sign emails with
private key (n-1)
Start here
After 3 months
3 months later
n=n+1
n=4
Retire
public key (n-3)
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 24
DKIM keys generation
●
It's possible simply to use openssl to generate the keys
●
But opendkim makes it simpler :
$ opendkim-genkey --append-domain --selector=20120316 --domain=sissa.it --bits=1024 --verbose
opendkim-genkey: generating private key
opendkim-genkey: private key written to 20120316.private
opendkim-genkey: extracting public key
opendkim-genkey: DNS TXT record written to 20120316.txt
$ cat 20120316.txt
20120316._domainkey.sissa.it. IN TXT ( "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; "
"p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDHy9jQ+5ZIN0p3KEw9NQ6PQOnMTXLZGQxwtfVWjQlJO/BYjIktlrYx2ZbwnN3kl2Ely
5cPdMWr5mhlM7UwyP74NDHV4DjigE7KIJ0sF2F4rJIMgVPQQu/Vz078zsZFldaci6WgHeByJtdDEM0L7iSeQhGd5hHbmHM5Oyv2YcT9cwIDAQ
AB" ) ; ----- DKIM key 20120316 for sissa.it
$ cat 20120316.private
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIICXQIBAAKBgQDHy9jQ+5ZIN0p3KEw9NQ6PQOnMTXLZGQxwtfVWjQlJO/BYjIkt-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
lrYx2ZbwnN3kl2Ely5cPdMWr5mhlM7UwyP74NDHV4DjigE7KIJ0sF2F4rJIMgVPQ
….
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 25
DKIM testing keys
●
Add public key TXT record to DNS, then
opendkim-testkey -d example.org -s 20121001 -k
2012101.private
Will test that the 2 are a correct pair of keys.
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 26
DKIM configuration
●
Set signature expiration ?
●
Which canonicalization ?
●
relaxed = tolerates minor changes like space
changes and so on
●
simple = strict
●
Select a rendez-vous socket
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 27
DKIM
/etc/opendkim.conf
AlwaysSignHeaders Subject
AutoRestart True
Background True
Canonicalization relaxed/relaxed
Diagnostics Yes
Domain sissa.it
KeyFile /etc/mail/dkim/20130315.pem
InternalHosts /etc/mail/dkim/internal
LogWhy true
Mode sv
Selector 20121001
SignatureAlgorithm rsa-sha1024
Socket I inet:8891@localhost
Syslog Yes
Statistics /var/log/dkim-filter/dkim-statistics
ClockDrift 300
DiagnosticDirectory /var/log/dkim/dkim-diagnostics
DNSTimeout 10
●
This conf is for
signing a single
domain with one key
●
It is supported to sign
multiple domains with
multiple keys
●
Mode sv = signer and
verifier
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 28
DKIM postfix conf
Add to /etc/postfix/main.cf :
# DKIM
milter_default_action = accept
milter_protocol = 2
smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891
non_smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891
If you are using already some milter :
milter_default_action = accept
milter_protocol = 2
smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891,inet:localhost:8893
non_smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891,inet:localhost:8893
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 29
/etc/default/opendkim
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 30
DMARC
●
DMARC =
●
Domain-based
●
Message
●
Authentication,
●
Reporting and
●
Conformance
=Using DNS TXT records
=SPF + DKIM
=Reports are sent back to
sending mailer
First used between paypal and yahoo in pre-standard form in 2007,
From 2009 offered by ISPs, draft in 2012, rfc in beginning 2013
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 31
DMARC
●
Aligned/unaligned mail : DMARC tests
and enforces identifiers alignment
1)Check spf and DKIM
2)DMARC identifiers alignment
3)Acts on unaligned identifiers
Aligned email Unaligned email
Mail
Storage
Internet
Aggregate log
Aggregate reports
Failure reports
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 32
DMARC identifier alignment
One of the 2 authenticated originator(SPF/DKIM) identifiers has to match
the (MUA displayed) header ”From:” domain.
We have 2 kind of alignement : strict(=simple) and relaxed.
Simple means the 2 domains should match exactly (except for spaces).
Relaxed :
- relaxed SPF : the organizational domain of the smtp “MAIL FROM:”
should match the header “From:” organizational domain (see later)
- relaxed DKIM : the organizational domain of the “d=” DKIM domain
should matche the organizational domain of the header “From:”
NB. if the SPF check was not passed the SPF is considered of course
unaligned a priori
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 33
DMARC organizational domain
A domain under which any can subscribe :
1 atom +TLD(top level domain)
E.g. :
news.google.com → google.com
www.amazon.co.uk → amazon.co.uk
www.regione.campania.it → regione.campania.it
It uses http://www.publicsuffix.org for TLDs
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 34
Return-Path: <roberto.e.innocente@gmail.com>
Delivered-To: inno@sissa.it
Received: from charon-02.sissa.it (charon-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.105])
by smtp.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEAF9D08065
for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET)
Received: from hermes-02.sissa.it (hermes-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.102])
by charon-02.sissa.it with ESMTP id C9HImFdPfk4ogziO for <inno@sissa.it>;
Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET)
Received: from mail-ob0-f169.google.com (mail-ob0-f169.google.com
[209.85.214.169])
by hermes-02.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F3F636C003
for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:18 +0100 (CET)
Received: by obcva8 with SMTP id va8so7836910obc.8
for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT)
DMARC strict alignement
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=gmail.com; s=20120113;
h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type;
bh=1HsA0bCF354+0pj/N8P9EvjDk+8XAXJZBZOa7CLpBZc=;
b=feCQAtWRiaarWlH3KAUivMzje4bRw2RUOuuxaWXO8wj+wEC7nGkanNNq9XaeYxgMvM
3BpuPh8jYO/pS2AIqkIKtNjgV2DhQ6ku8hwp56GYajs4O8twyLgKNwnu1BydHGYjL3zx
EvMYbhZvTItSqndCEt9gFGO2V7vdsQK/7sEVIaTc+cytQCfhUbNQ2U9iuVO5iDHYpBLF
/EqMwfV1ECV0Jh/JdBhB0ZFZAL2q5ObxNiFLQOM47yVsQzIE5lyShDDMlgULsiv86UR5
uOZx6ZZ68iwQttYMoY85w2LwQImuRXiuV6daKaR7XQ110bCNCmHI1Al4OooCrVxUbz9i
6Lyg==
MIME-Version: 1.0DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=gmail.com; s=20120113;
h=mim
Received: by 10.202.226.136 with HTTP; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:17 +0100
Message-ID: <CAPhLB8ZUFcYRshzme4T55Km8cQ3O36m8FxDYK7xKyOXEw3ZfUw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: check tls
From: Roberto Innocente <roberto.e.innocente@gmail.com>
To: inno@sissa.it
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2e558341654051100cf4a
SPF alignment : (=strict)
mail from: domain gmail.com with from: domain gmail.com
DKIM alignment : (=strict)
DKIM d= domain gmail.com with from: domain gmail.com
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 35
Return-Path: <roberto.e.innocente@bounce.gmail.com>
Delivered-To: inno@sissa.it
Received: from charon-02.sissa.it (charon-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.105])
by smtp.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEAF9D08065
for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET)
Received: from hermes-02.sissa.it (hermes-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.102])
by charon-02.sissa.it with ESMTP id C9HImFdPfk4ogziO for <inno@sissa.it>;
Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET)
Received: from mail-ob0-f169.google.com (mail-ob0-f169.google.com
[209.85.214.169])
by hermes-02.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F3F636C003
for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:18 +0100 (CET)
Received: by obcva8 with SMTP id va8so7836910obc.8
for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT)
DMARC relaxed alignement
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=bounce.gmail.com; s=20120113;
h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type;
bh=1HsA0bCF354+0pj/N8P9EvjDk+8XAXJZBZOa7CLpBZc=;
b=feCQAtWRiaarWlH3KAUivMzje4bRw2RUOuuxaWXO8wj+wEC7nGkanNNq9XaeYxgMvM
3BpuPh8jYO/pS2AIqkIKtNjgV2DhQ6ku8hwp56GYajs4O8twyLgKNwnu1BydHGYjL3zx
EvMYbhZvTItSqndCEt9gFGO2V7vdsQK/7sEVIaTc+cytQCfhUbNQ2U9iuVO5iDHYpBLF
/EqMwfV1ECV0Jh/JdBhB0ZFZAL2q5ObxNiFLQOM47yVsQzIE5lyShDDMlgULsiv86UR5
uOZx6ZZ68iwQttYMoY85w2LwQImuRXiuV6daKaR7XQ110bCNCmHI1Al4OooCrVxUbz9i
6Lyg==
MIME-Version: 1.0DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed;
d=gmail.com; s=20120113;
h=mim
Received: by 10.202.226.136 with HTTP; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT)
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:17 +0100
Message-ID:
<CAPhLB8ZUFcYRshzme4T55Km8cQ3O36m8FxDYK7xKyOXEw3ZfUw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: check tls
From: Roberto Innocente <roberto.e.innocente@back.gmail.com>
To: inno@sissa.it
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2e558341654051100cf4aSPF alignment : (=relaxed)
mail from: organizational domain gmail.com with from: organizational domain
gmail.com
DKIM alignment : (=relaxed)
DKIM d= organizational domain gmail.com with from: organizational domain gmail.com
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 36
DMARC policies
●
Reject (not delivered at all) : p=reject
●
Quarantine (msg not deliverd to inbox) : p=quarantine
●
None (msg disposition is unchanged) : p=none
Percentage of mails not passing dmarc validation that
are let to fall on more permissive policy is specified by :
p=reject ; pct=40; 60% of the emails not passing
dmarc are just
quarantined and not rejected
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 37
DMARC attr/val pairs
attribute description use
v= version v=DMARC1
p= policy p=none,p=quarantine,p=reject
adkim= alignment mode for DKIM adkim=s,adkim=r
aspf=
alignment mode for SPF
aspf=s,aspf=r
rua= Report aggregates rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it
ruf= Report failures ruf=mailto:dmarc-fail@sissa.it
sp= Policies for subdomains
rf= Reporting format
pct= Percentage of msgs subject to
policy
pct=100,pct=10
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 38
DMARC reports
●
There are two kinds :
●
Aggregate reports (usually transmitted daily by
correspondent mailers)
– rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@sissa.it
●
Failure reports transmitted for each failed message
validation
– ruf:mailto:dmarc-ruf@sissa.it
●
ruf can create a lot of traffic and should be enabled only
after having studied the aggregate reports and the
causes of failures
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 39
DMARC first record and on
First toe in water :
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it
v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=10;
rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it;ruf=mailto:dmarc-fail@sissa.it;
v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100;
rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it;ruf=mailto:dmarcfail@sissa.it;
2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 40
DMARC results
Received-SPF: none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender
hosts) client-ip=98.138.121.67;
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com;
spf=none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender hosts)
smtp.mail=roberto.innocente@yahoo.it;
dkim=pass header.i=@yahoo.it;
dmarc=pass (p=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=yahoo.it
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.it; s=s2048; t=1426751596;
bh=HWE0CuHc4MJcLSExRAPaY+xm5EglHD1ogTn8WNJKfQs=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:In-Reply-
To:References:Subject:From:Subject;
b=blILetG7T71DYiqE8LQQJqAG1+CyaDwki5XQrKcZHvVjUPrnq22R3fwbnlSWVwwMbBIOMUYJTmGOl
5yOktsdh3VbE+U1WwG6Rlt1I2vUlPRDrNcHQx/siJL7M0jY299WG2BSDUj+S7B2yJL9spkI+VDMZyKeM
QeChhDlKbH5xtYOweBrzsu3t54HcfYvDWR/mhPLmZdBpYLItdazgq6ynW6S+Ik+a49MJU5wiGfI6J68haF
oh4MsERWmJIPn0D6Fv4s5/1MMgUFdwHRf2HoK29tLZl+9pe/N2NhmwQjIY6j8jFvWiNEvfXcy9P9G+n/F
ej3rOQJ06taBJA6oovTPIg==

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

An Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation Requirements
An Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation RequirementsAn Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation Requirements
An Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation RequirementsGabriella Davis
 
Network security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthNetwork security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthDilum Bandara
 
Troopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can You
Troopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can YouTroopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can You
Troopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can YouDouglas Bienstock
 
Cyber Security Best Practices
Cyber Security Best PracticesCyber Security Best Practices
Cyber Security Best PracticesEvolve IP
 
HTTP - The Other Face Of Domino
HTTP - The Other Face Of DominoHTTP - The Other Face Of Domino
HTTP - The Other Face Of DominoGabriella Davis
 
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016Matthew Dunwoody
 
Email Security and Awareness
Email Security and AwarenessEmail Security and Awareness
Email Security and AwarenessSanjiv Arora
 
Domain name server
Domain name serverDomain name server
Domain name serverMobile88
 
HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)
HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)
HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)Marco Balduzzi
 
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...DirkjanMollema
 
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemFantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemRoss Wolf
 
Red + Blue, How Purple Are You
Red + Blue, How Purple Are YouRed + Blue, How Purple Are You
Red + Blue, How Purple Are YouJared Atkinson
 
Important tips on Router and SMTP mail routing
Important tips on Router and SMTP mail routingImportant tips on Router and SMTP mail routing
Important tips on Router and SMTP mail routingjayeshpar2006
 

Mais procurados (20)

How email works
How email worksHow email works
How email works
 
An Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation Requirements
An Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation RequirementsAn Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation Requirements
An Introduction To The DMARC SMTP Validation Requirements
 
Network security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthNetwork security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in Depth
 
Troopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can You
Troopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can YouTroopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can You
Troopers 19 - I am AD FS and So Can You
 
Cyber Security Best Practices
Cyber Security Best PracticesCyber Security Best Practices
Cyber Security Best Practices
 
HTTP - The Other Face Of Domino
HTTP - The Other Face Of DominoHTTP - The Other Face Of Domino
HTTP - The Other Face Of Domino
 
Email Spoofing.pptx
Email Spoofing.pptxEmail Spoofing.pptx
Email Spoofing.pptx
 
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
No Easy Breach DerbyCon 2016
 
Email Security and Awareness
Email Security and AwarenessEmail Security and Awareness
Email Security and Awareness
 
Domain name server
Domain name serverDomain name server
Domain name server
 
Understanding NMAP
Understanding NMAPUnderstanding NMAP
Understanding NMAP
 
HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)
HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)
HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications (Black Hat EU 2011)
 
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
I'm in your cloud... reading everyone's email. Hacking Azure AD via Active Di...
 
Security Awareness Training by Fortinet
Security Awareness Training by FortinetSecurity Awareness Training by Fortinet
Security Awareness Training by Fortinet
 
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find ThemFantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
Fantastic Red Team Attacks and How to Find Them
 
Red + Blue, How Purple Are You
Red + Blue, How Purple Are YouRed + Blue, How Purple Are You
Red + Blue, How Purple Are You
 
Email Analysis
Email AnalysisEmail Analysis
Email Analysis
 
Network Access Control (NAC)
Network Access Control (NAC)Network Access Control (NAC)
Network Access Control (NAC)
 
Important tips on Router and SMTP mail routing
Important tips on Router and SMTP mail routingImportant tips on Router and SMTP mail routing
Important tips on Router and SMTP mail routing
 
E mail flow
E mail flowE mail flow
E mail flow
 

Semelhante a TLS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, authenticated email

Bewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-Server
Bewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-ServerBewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-Server
Bewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-Serverpanagenda
 
Short Introduction to IPv6
Short Introduction to IPv6Short Introduction to IPv6
Short Introduction to IPv6Martin Schütte
 
The not so simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018
The not so  simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018The not so  simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018
The not so simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018Jos Elstgeest
 
2.5.1.2 packet tracer configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...
2.5.1.2 packet tracer   configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...2.5.1.2 packet tracer   configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...
2.5.1.2 packet tracer configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...Salem Trabelsi
 
SIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolbox
SIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolboxSIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolbox
SIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolboxstefansayer
 
Layer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacks
Layer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacksLayer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacks
Layer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacksfangjiafu
 
DIY eMail@Home
DIY eMail@HomeDIY eMail@Home
DIY eMail@Homejvehent
 
In Plain Sight: The Perfect Exfiltration
In Plain Sight: The Perfect ExfiltrationIn Plain Sight: The Perfect Exfiltration
In Plain Sight: The Perfect ExfiltrationItzik Kotler
 
TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"
TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"
TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"Kunio Miyamoto, Ph.D.
 
Kamaelia Grey
Kamaelia GreyKamaelia Grey
Kamaelia Greykamaelian
 
us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...
us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...
us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...sonjeku1
 
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...CODE BLUE
 
Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...
Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...
Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...RootedCON
 
Student packet tracer manual v1.1
Student packet tracer manual v1.1Student packet tracer manual v1.1
Student packet tracer manual v1.1milkux
 
Ssh config note
Ssh config noteSsh config note
Ssh config noteR.k. Thapa
 
Design of a campus network
Design of a campus networkDesign of a campus network
Design of a campus networkAalap Tripathy
 

Semelhante a TLS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, authenticated email (20)

Bewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-Server
Bewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-ServerBewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-Server
Bewährte Praktiken für HCL Notes/Domino-Sicherheit. Teil 2: Der Domino-Server
 
Short Introduction to IPv6
Short Introduction to IPv6Short Introduction to IPv6
Short Introduction to IPv6
 
Setting ubuntu server sebagai pc router
Setting ubuntu server sebagai pc routerSetting ubuntu server sebagai pc router
Setting ubuntu server sebagai pc router
 
The not so simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018
The not so  simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018The not so  simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018
The not so simple mail transport protocol @dpcon 2018
 
2.5.1.2 packet tracer configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...
2.5.1.2 packet tracer   configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...2.5.1.2 packet tracer   configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...
2.5.1.2 packet tracer configure cisco routers for syslog, ntp, and ssh oper...
 
SIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolbox
SIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolboxSIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolbox
SIP Express Media Server SBC application as powerful SBC and SIP toolbox
 
Layer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacks
Layer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacksLayer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacks
Layer one 2011-gh0stwood-d-dos-attacks
 
DIY eMail@Home
DIY eMail@HomeDIY eMail@Home
DIY eMail@Home
 
In Plain Sight: The Perfect Exfiltration
In Plain Sight: The Perfect ExfiltrationIn Plain Sight: The Perfect Exfiltration
In Plain Sight: The Perfect Exfiltration
 
TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"
TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"
TBD - To Block Connection from Suspicious IP addresses by using "DICE"
 
Kamaelia Grey
Kamaelia GreyKamaelia Grey
Kamaelia Grey
 
us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...
us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...
us-17-Tsai-A-New-Era-Of-SSRF-Exploiting-URL-Parser-In-Trending-Programming-La...
 
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...
A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages! ...
 
Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...
Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...
Monica Salas & Raul Siles - Hype Potter and the Chamber of DNSSECrets [rooted...
 
ION Santiago - DNSSEC and DANE Based Security for TLS
ION Santiago - DNSSEC and DANE Based Security for TLSION Santiago - DNSSEC and DANE Based Security for TLS
ION Santiago - DNSSEC and DANE Based Security for TLS
 
Student packet tracer manual v1.1
Student packet tracer manual v1.1Student packet tracer manual v1.1
Student packet tracer manual v1.1
 
From logs to metrics
From logs to metricsFrom logs to metrics
From logs to metrics
 
FreeBSD and Hardening Web Server
FreeBSD and Hardening Web ServerFreeBSD and Hardening Web Server
FreeBSD and Hardening Web Server
 
Ssh config note
Ssh config noteSsh config note
Ssh config note
 
Design of a campus network
Design of a campus networkDesign of a campus network
Design of a campus network
 

Mais de rinnocente

Random Number Generators 2018
Random Number Generators 2018Random Number Generators 2018
Random Number Generators 2018rinnocente
 
Docker containers : introduction
Docker containers : introductionDocker containers : introduction
Docker containers : introductionrinnocente
 
An FPGA for high end Open Networking
An FPGA for high end Open NetworkingAn FPGA for high end Open Networking
An FPGA for high end Open Networkingrinnocente
 
WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?
WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?
WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?rinnocente
 
Fpga computing
Fpga computingFpga computing
Fpga computingrinnocente
 
Refreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernels
Refreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernelsRefreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernels
Refreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernelsrinnocente
 
Nodes and Networks for HPC computing
Nodes and Networks for HPC computingNodes and Networks for HPC computing
Nodes and Networks for HPC computingrinnocente
 
features of tcp important for the web
features of tcp  important for the webfeatures of tcp  important for the web
features of tcp important for the webrinnocente
 
Public key cryptography
Public key cryptography Public key cryptography
Public key cryptography rinnocente
 
End nodes in the Multigigabit era
End nodes in the Multigigabit eraEnd nodes in the Multigigabit era
End nodes in the Multigigabit erarinnocente
 
Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration
Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration
Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration rinnocente
 
Comp architecture : branch prediction
Comp architecture : branch predictionComp architecture : branch prediction
Comp architecture : branch predictionrinnocente
 
Data mining : rule mining algorithms
Data mining : rule mining algorithmsData mining : rule mining algorithms
Data mining : rule mining algorithmsrinnocente
 
FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)
FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)
FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)rinnocente
 
radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)
radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)
radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)rinnocente
 

Mais de rinnocente (16)

Random Number Generators 2018
Random Number Generators 2018Random Number Generators 2018
Random Number Generators 2018
 
Docker containers : introduction
Docker containers : introductionDocker containers : introduction
Docker containers : introduction
 
An FPGA for high end Open Networking
An FPGA for high end Open NetworkingAn FPGA for high end Open Networking
An FPGA for high end Open Networking
 
WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?
WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?
WiFi placement, can we use Maxwell ?
 
Fpga computing
Fpga computingFpga computing
Fpga computing
 
Refreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernels
Refreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernelsRefreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernels
Refreshing computer-skills: markdown, mathjax, jupyter, docker, microkernels
 
Nodes and Networks for HPC computing
Nodes and Networks for HPC computingNodes and Networks for HPC computing
Nodes and Networks for HPC computing
 
features of tcp important for the web
features of tcp  important for the webfeatures of tcp  important for the web
features of tcp important for the web
 
Public key cryptography
Public key cryptography Public key cryptography
Public key cryptography
 
End nodes in the Multigigabit era
End nodes in the Multigigabit eraEnd nodes in the Multigigabit era
End nodes in the Multigigabit era
 
Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration
Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration
Mosix : automatic load balancing and migration
 
Comp architecture : branch prediction
Comp architecture : branch predictionComp architecture : branch prediction
Comp architecture : branch prediction
 
Data mining : rule mining algorithms
Data mining : rule mining algorithmsData mining : rule mining algorithms
Data mining : rule mining algorithms
 
Ipv6 course
Ipv6  courseIpv6  course
Ipv6 course
 
FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)
FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)
FPGA/Reconfigurable computing (HPRC)
 
radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)
radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)
radius dhcp dot1.x (802.1x)
 

Último

DNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about usDNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about usDynamic Netsoft
 
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdfActive Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdfCionsystems
 
Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...
Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...
Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...OnePlan Solutions
 
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdfLearn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdfkalichargn70th171
 
Right Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial GoalsRight Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial GoalsJhone kinadey
 
Unlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language Models
Unlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language ModelsUnlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language Models
Unlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language Modelsaagamshah0812
 
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online  ☂️CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online  ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️anilsa9823
 
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptxHand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptxbodapatigopi8531
 
Test Automation Strategy for Frontend and Backend
Test Automation Strategy for Frontend and BackendTest Automation Strategy for Frontend and Backend
Test Automation Strategy for Frontend and BackendArshad QA
 
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...OnePlan Solutions
 
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop SlideBuilding Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop SlideChristina Lin
 
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantSalesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantAxelRicardoTrocheRiq
 
5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf
5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf
5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdfWave PLM
 
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfwhy an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfjoe51371421
 
HR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.com
HR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.comHR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.com
HR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.comFatema Valibhai
 
Cloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStack
Cloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStackCloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStack
Cloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStackVICTOR MAESTRE RAMIREZ
 
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...MyIntelliSource, Inc.
 
How To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.js
How To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.jsHow To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.js
How To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.jsAndolasoft Inc
 

Último (20)

DNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about usDNT_Corporate presentation know about us
DNT_Corporate presentation know about us
 
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdfActive Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
Active Directory Penetration Testing, cionsystems.com.pdf
 
Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...
Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...
Tech Tuesday-Harness the Power of Effective Resource Planning with OnePlan’s ...
 
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdfLearn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
Learn the Fundamentals of XCUITest Framework_ A Beginner's Guide.pdf
 
Right Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial GoalsRight Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
Right Money Management App For Your Financial Goals
 
Unlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language Models
Unlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language ModelsUnlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language Models
Unlocking the Future of AI Agents with Large Language Models
 
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online  ☂️CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online  ☂️
CALL ON ➥8923113531 🔝Call Girls Kakori Lucknow best sexual service Online ☂️
 
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptxHand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
Hand gesture recognition PROJECT PPT.pptx
 
Test Automation Strategy for Frontend and Backend
Test Automation Strategy for Frontend and BackendTest Automation Strategy for Frontend and Backend
Test Automation Strategy for Frontend and Backend
 
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
Advancing Engineering with AI through the Next Generation of Strategic Projec...
 
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop SlideBuilding Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
Building Real-Time Data Pipelines: Stream & Batch Processing workshop Slide
 
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service ConsultantSalesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
Salesforce Certified Field Service Consultant
 
5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf
5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf
5 Signs You Need a Fashion PLM Software.pdf
 
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdfwhy an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
why an Opensea Clone Script might be your perfect match.pdf
 
HR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.com
HR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.comHR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.com
HR Software Buyers Guide in 2024 - HRSoftware.com
 
Cloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStack
Cloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStackCloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStack
Cloud Management Software Platforms: OpenStack
 
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
Steps To Getting Up And Running Quickly With MyTimeClock Employee Scheduling ...
 
Call Girls In Mukherjee Nagar 📱 9999965857 🤩 Delhi 🫦 HOT AND SEXY VVIP 🍎 SE...
Call Girls In Mukherjee Nagar 📱  9999965857  🤩 Delhi 🫦 HOT AND SEXY VVIP 🍎 SE...Call Girls In Mukherjee Nagar 📱  9999965857  🤩 Delhi 🫦 HOT AND SEXY VVIP 🍎 SE...
Call Girls In Mukherjee Nagar 📱 9999965857 🤩 Delhi 🫦 HOT AND SEXY VVIP 🍎 SE...
 
Vip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS Live
Vip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS LiveVip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS Live
Vip Call Girls Noida ➡️ Delhi ➡️ 9999965857 No Advance 24HRS Live
 
How To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.js
How To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.jsHow To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.js
How To Use Server-Side Rendering with Nuxt.js
 

TLS, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, authenticated email

  • 1. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 1 Towards email authentication TLS SPF + DKIM + DMARC
  • 2. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 2 Who adopted it ? ● Hotmail.com ● Gmail.com ● AOL.com ● Yahoo.com ● Verizon.com ● Ebay ● Paypal
  • 3. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 3 Tls/SPF/DKIM/DMARC Receiving mailer SPF validation DKIM validation DMARC validation ESMTPS = Extended SMTP Over TLS
  • 4. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 4 TLS(Transport Layer Security) An encryption layer over TCP that all MTAs should support and when offered they should start (STARTTLS mechanism on the std port 25) ● Disable SSL1 and SSL2 for security problems that were discovered , and support only TLSv1.2
  • 5. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 5 Mail Transfer Protocols Protocol Over tls Authenticated Authenticated Over tls Name smtp smtps smtpa smtpsa Simple MTP esmtp esmtps esmtpa esmtpsa Extended SMTP lmtp lmtps lmtpa lmtpsa Light MTP RFC3848 July 2004 Shown in “Received: … with ... ” header lines e.g. Received: from charon-02.sissa.it (charon-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.105]) by smtp.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEAF9D08065
  • 6. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 6 Check protocol used in Received: lines Received: from mail-ob0-f169.google.com (mail-ob0-f169.google.com [209.85.214.169]) by mail.example.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 13F636C003 for <inno@example.org>; Wed, 11 Mar 2012 11:34:18 +0100 (CET) Received: from mail.example.org (mail.example.org [10.0.1.2]) by mail2.example.org with ESMTP id C9HImFdPfk4ogziO for <inno@example.org>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from webmail.example.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) mail2.example.org (Postfix) with ESMTPA id AD79E54E50 for <roberto.e.innocente@gmail.com>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 10:48:47 +0100 (CET)
  • 7. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 7 SPF version 1 Spf = Sender Policy Framework RFC-4408 April 2006 RFC-2821 layer / protects envelope sender address The one that appears in the initial smtp exchange HELO itsme.org MAIL FROM: <..> RCPT TO: <..> DATA SMTP Envelope
  • 8. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 8 SMTP protocol – RFC-2821 April 2001 dig mx gmail.com ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;gmail.com. IN MX ;; ANSWER SECTION: gmail.com. 3599 IN MX 5 gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com. telnet gmail-smtp-in.l.google.com smtp 220 mx.google.com ESMTP de8si19058389wib.80 EHLO sissa.it 250-mx.google.com at your service, [10.0.1.2] 250-SIZE 35882577 250-8BITMIME 250-STARTTLS 250-ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES 250-PIPELINING 250-CHUNKING 250 SMTPUTF8 MAIL FROM: <inno@sissa.it> 250 2.1.0 OK jo3si35141161wjc.166 - gsmtp RCPT TO: <roberto.innocente@gmail.com> 250 2.1.5 OK jo3si35141161wjc.166 - gsmtp DATA 354 Go ahead jo3si35141161wjc.166 - gsmtp From: inno@example.org To: roberto.innocente@gmail.com Subject: check Checking address 2 times . Envelope Header Body
  • 9. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 9 Envelope/Header
  • 10. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 10 Identities in email Envelope identities : ● Helo/ehlo identity in envelope ● Mail from: identity in envelope ● Rcpt to: identity in envelope Headers identities : ● From: identity in header ● To: identity in header
  • 11. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 11 Mail RFCs ● RFC2821 April 2001 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) – obsoletes RFC821 (Draft std RFC5321) ● RFC2822 April 2001 Internet Message Format (IMF) – obsoletes RFC822 (Draft std RFC5322)
  • 12. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 12 Sender addresses ● Envelope sender – RFC2821 In HELO and MAIL FROM: smtp lines, usually stored in Return-Path: header, used to send back errors, usually not displayed by MUA (mail user agents) ● Header sender – RFC2822 In the From: or Sender: mail headers , displayed by MUA, usually not cared by MTA
  • 13. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 13 What does SPF ? A kind of reverse MX ... Allows the owner of a domain to specify which mail servers are allowed to send mail on behalf of the domain. The domain owner publish a record in DNS specifying which mail servers are authorized to send mail for his domain. When a mail server receives a message claiming to be from that domain, it looks up the spf record for that domain and it checks if it came trough one of the allowed mail servers.
  • 14. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 14 Proposed SPF for SISSA sissa.it. 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 redirect=_spf.sissa.it” _spf.sissa.it. 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 include=_netblock.sissa.it include=_netblock1.sissa.it” _netblock.sissa.it. 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 ... _netblock1.sissa.it 300 IN TXT “v=spf1 ...
  • 15. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 15 SPF results ● none = no record published for SPF ● neutral = sender domain does’nt want to state (?) ● pass = client is allowed to inject mail for the domain(+) ● fail = client is explicitly forbidden to inject mail for the domain(-) ● softfail = between pass and fail(~), often the receiver quarantines
  • 16. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 16 SPF check headers Received-SPF: pass (google.com: domain of inno@sissa.it designates 147.122.1.105 as permitted sender) client- ip=147.122.1.105; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=pass (google.com: domain of inno@sissa.it designates 147.122.1.105 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=inno@sissa.it Received-SPF: pass (domain of gmail.com designates 209.85.214.176 as permitted sender) Authentication-Results: mta1071.mail.ir2.yahoo.com from=gmail.com; domainkeys=neutral (no sig); from=gmail.com; dkim=pass (ok) Received-SPF: none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender hosts) client- ip=98.138.121.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender hosts) smtp.mail=roberto.innocente@yahoo.it; Received-SPF: pass (domain of hotmail.com designates 157.55.1.161 as permitted sender)
  • 17. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 17 SPF algorithm ● Lookup envelope domain spf record : ● dig txt sissa.it – sissa.it TXT “v=spf1 ip4:147.122.1/24 ip6:..... ~mx -all” ● For each mechanism listed look if it matches: ● Is the client in ip4:147.122.1/24 ? Then pass (the default is pass) and exit. ● Is the client in ip6:..... ? Then pass and exit. ● Is the client in one mx record ? Then softfail and exit. ● All is matched by everyhting : reject it and exit.
  • 18. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 18 SPF (example record) $ dig txt unipd.it unipd.it. 259200 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:147.162.10.68 ip4:147.162.10.81 ip4:147.162.10.82 ip4:147.162.10.83 a:mail.unipd.it ?all" ● Is it ip4:147.162.10.68? pass ● Is it ip4:147.162.10.81? pass ● Is it ip4:147.162.10.82 ? Pass ● Is it ip4:147.162.10.83 ? Pass ● Is it in address of mail.unipd.it. IN A 147.162.10.68 ? pass ● Then it is in all : Neutral Terribly wrong !
  • 19. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 19 SPF versus Sender/ID ● Sender-ID (RFC-4406) Is Microsoft version of spf ● It validates the header sender address ● Very few use it now ● Problem is that Microsoft is using now spfv1 syntax and dont want to fix !! ● And so it violates the spf specification !!!!
  • 20. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 20 DKIM ● Domainkeys was first introduced by yahoo in a private agreement with paypal and ebay, then since 2007 a draft RFC ● DKIM took the main concepts from the yahoo proposal, incorporated some cisco ideas and appeared as an RFC in the same year, last version is RFC6376 Sep 2011
  • 21. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 21 DKIM key rotation best practice/1 ● It's quite clear why keys should be rotated : to avoid that they are : - compromised by cracking them - stolen ● DKIM allows a receiver to verify that the signed parts of a message has not been modified in transit
  • 22. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 22 DKIM key rotation best practice/2 ● In 2012 a mathematician published on Wired that it took him 72 hours and 70 $ of Amazon WS to crack a 512 bits DKIM key ● 768 bit keys can be cracked by a nation effort for instance ● 1024 bits is the current recommended length ● 2048 is now considered immune from possible cracks from today computing environment
  • 23. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 23 DKIM key rotation best practice/3 Generate 2 pairs of DKIM keys public keys 1 and 2 in DNS Sign emails with private key 1 Generate key pair 3 public key 3 in DNS Sign emails with private key 2 Generate key pair n public key n in DNS Sign emails with private key (n-1) Start here After 3 months 3 months later n=n+1 n=4 Retire public key (n-3)
  • 24. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 24 DKIM keys generation ● It's possible simply to use openssl to generate the keys ● But opendkim makes it simpler : $ opendkim-genkey --append-domain --selector=20120316 --domain=sissa.it --bits=1024 --verbose opendkim-genkey: generating private key opendkim-genkey: private key written to 20120316.private opendkim-genkey: extracting public key opendkim-genkey: DNS TXT record written to 20120316.txt $ cat 20120316.txt 20120316._domainkey.sissa.it. IN TXT ( "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; " "p=MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDHy9jQ+5ZIN0p3KEw9NQ6PQOnMTXLZGQxwtfVWjQlJO/BYjIktlrYx2ZbwnN3kl2Ely 5cPdMWr5mhlM7UwyP74NDHV4DjigE7KIJ0sF2F4rJIMgVPQQu/Vz078zsZFldaci6WgHeByJtdDEM0L7iSeQhGd5hHbmHM5Oyv2YcT9cwIDAQ AB" ) ; ----- DKIM key 20120316 for sissa.it $ cat 20120316.private -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIICXQIBAAKBgQDHy9jQ+5ZIN0p3KEw9NQ6PQOnMTXLZGQxwtfVWjQlJO/BYjIkt-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- lrYx2ZbwnN3kl2Ely5cPdMWr5mhlM7UwyP74NDHV4DjigE7KIJ0sF2F4rJIMgVPQ ….
  • 25. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 25 DKIM testing keys ● Add public key TXT record to DNS, then opendkim-testkey -d example.org -s 20121001 -k 2012101.private Will test that the 2 are a correct pair of keys.
  • 26. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 26 DKIM configuration ● Set signature expiration ? ● Which canonicalization ? ● relaxed = tolerates minor changes like space changes and so on ● simple = strict ● Select a rendez-vous socket
  • 27. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 27 DKIM /etc/opendkim.conf AlwaysSignHeaders Subject AutoRestart True Background True Canonicalization relaxed/relaxed Diagnostics Yes Domain sissa.it KeyFile /etc/mail/dkim/20130315.pem InternalHosts /etc/mail/dkim/internal LogWhy true Mode sv Selector 20121001 SignatureAlgorithm rsa-sha1024 Socket I inet:8891@localhost Syslog Yes Statistics /var/log/dkim-filter/dkim-statistics ClockDrift 300 DiagnosticDirectory /var/log/dkim/dkim-diagnostics DNSTimeout 10 ● This conf is for signing a single domain with one key ● It is supported to sign multiple domains with multiple keys ● Mode sv = signer and verifier
  • 28. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 28 DKIM postfix conf Add to /etc/postfix/main.cf : # DKIM milter_default_action = accept milter_protocol = 2 smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891 non_smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891 If you are using already some milter : milter_default_action = accept milter_protocol = 2 smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891,inet:localhost:8893 non_smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891,inet:localhost:8893
  • 29. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 29 /etc/default/opendkim
  • 30. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 30 DMARC ● DMARC = ● Domain-based ● Message ● Authentication, ● Reporting and ● Conformance =Using DNS TXT records =SPF + DKIM =Reports are sent back to sending mailer First used between paypal and yahoo in pre-standard form in 2007, From 2009 offered by ISPs, draft in 2012, rfc in beginning 2013
  • 31. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 31 DMARC ● Aligned/unaligned mail : DMARC tests and enforces identifiers alignment 1)Check spf and DKIM 2)DMARC identifiers alignment 3)Acts on unaligned identifiers Aligned email Unaligned email Mail Storage Internet Aggregate log Aggregate reports Failure reports
  • 32. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 32 DMARC identifier alignment One of the 2 authenticated originator(SPF/DKIM) identifiers has to match the (MUA displayed) header ”From:” domain. We have 2 kind of alignement : strict(=simple) and relaxed. Simple means the 2 domains should match exactly (except for spaces). Relaxed : - relaxed SPF : the organizational domain of the smtp “MAIL FROM:” should match the header “From:” organizational domain (see later) - relaxed DKIM : the organizational domain of the “d=” DKIM domain should matche the organizational domain of the header “From:” NB. if the SPF check was not passed the SPF is considered of course unaligned a priori
  • 33. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 33 DMARC organizational domain A domain under which any can subscribe : 1 atom +TLD(top level domain) E.g. : news.google.com → google.com www.amazon.co.uk → amazon.co.uk www.regione.campania.it → regione.campania.it It uses http://www.publicsuffix.org for TLDs
  • 34. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 34 Return-Path: <roberto.e.innocente@gmail.com> Delivered-To: inno@sissa.it Received: from charon-02.sissa.it (charon-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.105]) by smtp.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEAF9D08065 for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from hermes-02.sissa.it (hermes-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.102]) by charon-02.sissa.it with ESMTP id C9HImFdPfk4ogziO for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from mail-ob0-f169.google.com (mail-ob0-f169.google.com [209.85.214.169]) by hermes-02.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F3F636C003 for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:18 +0100 (CET) Received: by obcva8 with SMTP id va8so7836910obc.8 for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT) DMARC strict alignement DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=1HsA0bCF354+0pj/N8P9EvjDk+8XAXJZBZOa7CLpBZc=; b=feCQAtWRiaarWlH3KAUivMzje4bRw2RUOuuxaWXO8wj+wEC7nGkanNNq9XaeYxgMvM 3BpuPh8jYO/pS2AIqkIKtNjgV2DhQ6ku8hwp56GYajs4O8twyLgKNwnu1BydHGYjL3zx EvMYbhZvTItSqndCEt9gFGO2V7vdsQK/7sEVIaTc+cytQCfhUbNQ2U9iuVO5iDHYpBLF /EqMwfV1ECV0Jh/JdBhB0ZFZAL2q5ObxNiFLQOM47yVsQzIE5lyShDDMlgULsiv86UR5 uOZx6ZZ68iwQttYMoY85w2LwQImuRXiuV6daKaR7XQ110bCNCmHI1Al4OooCrVxUbz9i 6Lyg== MIME-Version: 1.0DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mim Received: by 10.202.226.136 with HTTP; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:17 +0100 Message-ID: <CAPhLB8ZUFcYRshzme4T55Km8cQ3O36m8FxDYK7xKyOXEw3ZfUw@mail.gmail.com> Subject: check tls From: Roberto Innocente <roberto.e.innocente@gmail.com> To: inno@sissa.it Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2e558341654051100cf4a SPF alignment : (=strict) mail from: domain gmail.com with from: domain gmail.com DKIM alignment : (=strict) DKIM d= domain gmail.com with from: domain gmail.com
  • 35. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 35 Return-Path: <roberto.e.innocente@bounce.gmail.com> Delivered-To: inno@sissa.it Received: from charon-02.sissa.it (charon-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.105]) by smtp.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTP id BEAF9D08065 for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from hermes-02.sissa.it (hermes-02.sissa.it [147.122.1.102]) by charon-02.sissa.it with ESMTP id C9HImFdPfk4ogziO for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:23 +0100 (CET) Received: from mail-ob0-f169.google.com (mail-ob0-f169.google.com [209.85.214.169]) by hermes-02.sissa.it (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F3F636C003 for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:18 +0100 (CET) Received: by obcva8 with SMTP id va8so7836910obc.8 for <inno@sissa.it>; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT) DMARC relaxed alignement DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=bounce.gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:date:message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; bh=1HsA0bCF354+0pj/N8P9EvjDk+8XAXJZBZOa7CLpBZc=; b=feCQAtWRiaarWlH3KAUivMzje4bRw2RUOuuxaWXO8wj+wEC7nGkanNNq9XaeYxgMvM 3BpuPh8jYO/pS2AIqkIKtNjgV2DhQ6ku8hwp56GYajs4O8twyLgKNwnu1BydHGYjL3zx EvMYbhZvTItSqndCEt9gFGO2V7vdsQK/7sEVIaTc+cytQCfhUbNQ2U9iuVO5iDHYpBLF /EqMwfV1ECV0Jh/JdBhB0ZFZAL2q5ObxNiFLQOM47yVsQzIE5lyShDDMlgULsiv86UR5 uOZx6ZZ68iwQttYMoY85w2LwQImuRXiuV6daKaR7XQ110bCNCmHI1Al4OooCrVxUbz9i 6Lyg== MIME-Version: 1.0DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mim Received: by 10.202.226.136 with HTTP; Mon, 12 Mar 2012 03:34:17 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2012 11:34:17 +0100 Message-ID: <CAPhLB8ZUFcYRshzme4T55Km8cQ3O36m8FxDYK7xKyOXEw3ZfUw@mail.gmail.com> Subject: check tls From: Roberto Innocente <roberto.e.innocente@back.gmail.com> To: inno@sissa.it Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=001a11c2e558341654051100cf4aSPF alignment : (=relaxed) mail from: organizational domain gmail.com with from: organizational domain gmail.com DKIM alignment : (=relaxed) DKIM d= organizational domain gmail.com with from: organizational domain gmail.com
  • 36. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 36 DMARC policies ● Reject (not delivered at all) : p=reject ● Quarantine (msg not deliverd to inbox) : p=quarantine ● None (msg disposition is unchanged) : p=none Percentage of mails not passing dmarc validation that are let to fall on more permissive policy is specified by : p=reject ; pct=40; 60% of the emails not passing dmarc are just quarantined and not rejected
  • 37. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 37 DMARC attr/val pairs attribute description use v= version v=DMARC1 p= policy p=none,p=quarantine,p=reject adkim= alignment mode for DKIM adkim=s,adkim=r aspf= alignment mode for SPF aspf=s,aspf=r rua= Report aggregates rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it ruf= Report failures ruf=mailto:dmarc-fail@sissa.it sp= Policies for subdomains rf= Reporting format pct= Percentage of msgs subject to policy pct=100,pct=10
  • 38. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 38 DMARC reports ● There are two kinds : ● Aggregate reports (usually transmitted daily by correspondent mailers) – rua=mailto:dmarc-rua@sissa.it ● Failure reports transmitted for each failed message validation – ruf:mailto:dmarc-ruf@sissa.it ● ruf can create a lot of traffic and should be enabled only after having studied the aggregate reports and the causes of failures
  • 39. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 39 DMARC first record and on First toe in water : v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=10; rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it;ruf=mailto:dmarc-fail@sissa.it; v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@sissa.it;ruf=mailto:dmarcfail@sissa.it;
  • 40. 2012/10/03 Roberto Innocente 40 DMARC results Received-SPF: none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender hosts) client-ip=98.138.121.67; Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; spf=none (google.com: roberto.innocente@yahoo.it does not designate permitted sender hosts) smtp.mail=roberto.innocente@yahoo.it; dkim=pass header.i=@yahoo.it; dmarc=pass (p=NONE dis=NONE) header.from=yahoo.it DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=yahoo.it; s=s2048; t=1426751596; bh=HWE0CuHc4MJcLSExRAPaY+xm5EglHD1ogTn8WNJKfQs=; h=Date:From:Reply-To:To:In-Reply- To:References:Subject:From:Subject; b=blILetG7T71DYiqE8LQQJqAG1+CyaDwki5XQrKcZHvVjUPrnq22R3fwbnlSWVwwMbBIOMUYJTmGOl 5yOktsdh3VbE+U1WwG6Rlt1I2vUlPRDrNcHQx/siJL7M0jY299WG2BSDUj+S7B2yJL9spkI+VDMZyKeM QeChhDlKbH5xtYOweBrzsu3t54HcfYvDWR/mhPLmZdBpYLItdazgq6ynW6S+Ik+a49MJU5wiGfI6J68haF oh4MsERWmJIPn0D6Fv4s5/1MMgUFdwHRf2HoK29tLZl+9pe/N2NhmwQjIY6j8jFvWiNEvfXcy9P9G+n/F ej3rOQJ06taBJA6oovTPIg==